Proofs of God in Early Modern Europe

An Anthology

Lloyd Strickland

• Publisher: Baylor University Press
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781481309318
• eBook ISBN: 9781481309325
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Modern Philosophy

Proofs of God in Early Modern Europe offers a fascinating window into early modern efforts to prove God's existence. Assembled here are twenty-two key texts, many translated into English for the first time, which illustrate the variety of arguments that philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries offered for God. These selections feature traditional proofs—such as various ontological, cosmological, and design arguments—but also introduce more exotic proofs, such as the argument from eternal truths, the argument from universal aseity, and the argument ex consensu gentium. Drawn from the work of eighteen philosophers, this book includes both canonical figures (such as Descartes, Spinoza, Newton, Leibniz, Locke, and Berkeley) and noncanonical thinkers (such as Norris, Fontenelle, Voltaire, Wolff, Du Châtelet, and Maupertuis) and noncanonical thinkers (such as Norris, Fontenelle, Voltaire, Wolff, Du Châtelet, and Maupertuis).

Lloyd Strickland provides fresh translations of all selections not originally written in English and updates the spelling and grammar of those that were. Each selection is prefaced by a lengthy headnote, giving a biographical account of its author, an analysis of the main argument(s), and important details about the historical context. Strickland's introductory essay provides further context, focusing on the various reasons that led so many thinkers of early modernity to develop proofs of God's existence.

Proofs of God is perfect for both students and scholars of early modern philosophy and philosophy of religion.

Part I

Classic Presentations of the Traditional Physical and Metaphysical Proofs

A

Metaphysical Proofs

1

Four Proofs of God’s Existence (1644)

René Descartes

René Descartes (1596–1650) is often referred to as the “father of modern philosophy” on account of his attempt to develop a new philosophy that broke with the dominant Scholastic philosophy of his day. He was educated at the Jesuit college at La Fleche, and after a short time as a volunteer in the Dutch army, he devoted himself to the study of science and subsequently to its metaphysical underpinnings. Descartes was to become one of the most influential thinkers of his age, even though his work was kept off of the curriculum of most universities for some decades after his death, in part because of the threat it was thought to pose to the established Scholastic philosophy. Descartes’ chief philosophical works were Discours de la Methode (Discourse on method, 1637),1 Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (Meditations on first philosophy, 1641),2 and Principia Philosophiae (Principles of philosophy, 1644).3

The following piece consists of §§13–23 of the first part of Principia Philosophiae,4 in which Descartes offers no fewer than four distinct proofs of God’s existence: first an ontological argument (§14) followed by three cosmological arguments (§§18, 20, and 21). Although the former was often perceived as a revival or restatement of the ontological argument first developed by St. Anselm (1033–1109),5 Descartes’ version is different, trading on his notion of a “clear and distinct idea,” that is, an idea or notion that represents all the qualities contained within a thing without adding any other qualities that are not essential to it. Hence, according to Descartes, a clear and distinct idea of God will contain those qualities or attributes that really pertain to the essence of God, such as being omnipotent, omniscient, and eternal, whereas an obscure or confused idea of God will include other, nonessential qualities, such as corporeality.6 Building on this, Descartes’ ontological argument holds that if we inspect the clear and distinct idea of God, we shall perceive that necessary and eternal existence is contained therein, from which we can infer that God exists. As for Descartes’ cosmological arguments, the first one—subsequently dubbed the “trademark argument” by commentators—is wholly unique to him. The argument begins with Descartes’ recognition that he has in his mind an idea (in the sense of a concept or notion) of God, the Supreme Being, and from that he seeks to show that the only way the idea could have gotten there is if God himself put it there, as a kind of stamp or trademark. The argument rests on two key planks. One is a Scholastic principle that holds that what is more perfect cannot be produced by what is less perfect, which Descartes takes to be self-evident, or known by the “natural light” of reason. Underpinning this principle is a model of causation based on the transfer of properties or perfections, such that the cause-effect relationship is based on a transfer of something (such as motion or perfection) from the cause to the effect. In this model, the cause can transfer only as much of a property or perfection as it has itself, hence Descartes’ assertion that the more perfect cannot be produced by the less perfect. The second plank of Descartes’ argument is a distinction between objective perfection, that is, the perfection of the object that is represented by an idea, and formal perfection, that is, the perfection a thing actually has in itself by virtue of being what it is. With regard to our idea of God, Descartes supposes that while the idea itself has no more formal perfection than any other idea, its objective perfection far exceeds that of any other idea because it represents God, the Supreme Being. This means that Descartes, as a limited and imperfect human being, possesses an idea whose objective perfection far exceeds Descartes’ own degree of formal perfection. This indicates that the idea is not one he could have made up by himself, since the cause of an idea must possess as much formal perfection as the idea has objective perfection, and Descartes has only a limited amount of formal perfection to transfer when concocting his ideas. Accordingly, he concludes that the only plausible source of his idea of God is God himself, who alone has the supreme degree of formal perfection required to produce an idea with the supreme degree of objective perfection.

13. The sense in which knowledge of remaining things depends upon the knowledge of God.

When the mind, which knows itself, is still in doubt about all other things, it looks around in every direction in order to extend its knowledge further: in the first place, it finds in itself ideas of many things, and it cannot be mistaken as long as it just contemplates these ideas and neither affirms nor denies that there is anything resembling them outside itself. It also finds certain common notions, and from these it constructs various demonstrations; as long as it attends to them, it is entirely convinced these demonstrations are true. Thus, for example, it has in itself ideas of numbers and shapes, and also has among the common notions “that if you add equal quantities to equal quantities, what will result from that will be equal,” and the like. From these it is easy to demonstrate that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles etc., and hence the mind is convinced that this and other such conclusions are true as long as it attends to the premises from which it has deduced them. But it cannot attend to them all the time, and afterwards, when it remembers that it does not yet know whether it was perhaps created with such a nature that is mistaken even about those things which seem most evident, it sees that it may rightly doubt such conclusions and cannot have any certain knowledge until it should know the author of its being.7

14. That from the fact that necessary existence is contained in our concept of God, it is rightly concluded that God exists.

When considering the various ideas it has in itself, the mind finds there is one of a supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and supremely perfect being,8 which is by far the most distinguished of all, and it recognizes in this idea not merely a possible and contingent existence, as is found in the ideas of all the other things it distinctly perceives, but an absolutely necessary and eternal existence. And just as it is completely convinced that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles because it perceives that having three angles equal to two right angles is necessarily contained in the idea of a triangle, so it must clearly conclude that the supremely perfect being exists just from the fact it perceives that necessary and eternal existence is contained in the idea of a supremely perfect being.

15. That necessary existence is not likewise contained in the concepts of other things, but only contingent existence.

The mind will believe this even more if it considers that it does not find in itself an idea of any other thing wherein it observes necessary existence is likewise contained. From this it understands that this idea of a supremely perfect being is not invented by the mind and represents not some chimera but a true and immutable nature which cannot not exist, since necessary existence is contained therein.

16. Preconceived opinions prevent God’s necessity of existence from being clearly recognized by everyone.

Our mind, I say, will easily admit this, if it has completely freed itself from preconceived opinions first. But because we are accustomed to distinguish essence from existence in all other things, and to arbitrarily make up various ideas of things which do not exist anywhere and never have, it easily happens that when we are not completely fixed on the contemplation of the supremely perfect being, we doubt whether the idea of God is one of those we have arbitrarily made up, or at least one of those in which existence does not pertain to its essence.

17. The greater the objective perfection in any of our ideas, the greater its cause must be.

Now when we further consider the ideas we have in us, we see that, insofar as they are certain modes of thinking, they do not differ very much from each other, but insofar as one represents one thing and another represents another, they are very different, and the more objective perfection they contain in themselves, the more perfect their cause must be. For instance, if someone has in himself the idea of some highly technical machine, it can reasonably be asked what caused him to have it: Did he somewhere see such a machine made by another? Did he acquire meticulous knowledge of mechanics? Or is his strength of genius so great that, despite never having seen such a machine anywhere, he could think it up by himself? For all the artifice contained in that idea merely objectively, as in an image, must be contained in its cause—at least in its first and principal cause, whatever that may ultimately be—not merely objectively or representatively, but in reality, formally or eminently.

18. That from this source it is again concluded that God exists.

So, because we have in us the idea of God, or a Supreme Being, we may rightly consider the cause of our having it. And we find so much immensity in the idea that we are entirely certain it could have been imparted to us only by something in which there really is the complete range of all perfections, that is, by a God who really exists. For it is very well known by the natural light not only that nothing comes from nothing and that what is more perfect cannot be produced by (or have as its efficient and total cause) what is less perfect, but also that there cannot be in us the idea or image of anything unless there exists somewhere, either in us or outside us, an original which contains in reality all of its perfections. And because we do not in any way find in ourselves those supreme perfections of which we have an idea,9 we rightly conclude therefrom that they exist in something different from us, namely, in God, or at any rate that they once did so, from which it most evidently follows that they still do.

19. That although we do not grasp the nature of God, his perfections are nevertheless known to us more clearly than any other thing.

And this is sufficiently certain and obvious to those who are accustomed to contemplating the idea of God and to giving attention to his supreme perfections. For although we do not grasp his perfections, since evidently it is of the nature of the infinite not to be grasped by we who are finite, nevertheless we are able to understand them more clearly and more distinctly than any corporeal things, because they fill our thought to a greater extent, and are simpler and not obscured by any limitations.10

20. That we were not made by ourselves, but by God, and hence he exists.

Now not everyone heeds this, and also, when people have an idea of some technical machine they usually know where they got it from, but we do not in the same way remember the idea of God reaching us from God at any time, as we have always had it: for these reasons, it must now be asked, by means of what do we exist, we who have in us the idea of the supreme perfections of God? Now certainly it is very well known by the natural light that a thing which knows of something more perfect than itself does not exist from itself, for in that case it would have given itself all the perfections of which it has in itself the idea. And hence, its existence cannot come from any being which does not have all those perfections in itself, that is, which is not God.

21. That our enduring existence is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of God.

And nothing can obscure the perspicuity of this demonstration if we give our attention to the nature of time or the duration of things, which is such that its parts are not mutually dependent, and never exist simultaneously. Therefore, from the fact that we now exist, it does not follow that we are going to exist in the very next moment that follows, unless some cause—namely, the same one that produced us in the first place—continually reproduces us, as it were, that is, conserves us. For we easily understand that there is no power in us through which we may conserve ourselves, and that the one in whom there is so much power that he can conserve we who are different from him is all the more able to conserve himself, or rather, he requires no other being for his conservation, and in short is God.

22. That from our method of recognizing the existence of God we simultaneously recognize all of his attributes that are discernible by the natural power of our abilities.

There is a great advantage to proving God’s existence in this way, namely, by means of the idea of him, because we simultaneously discern what exactly he is, insofar as the weakness of our nature permits. That is, when reflecting on the idea of him we were born with, we see that he is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, the source of all goodness and truth, the creator of all things, and finally, that he has in himself all things in which we can clearly perceive some infinite perfection, or perfection not restricted by any imperfection.

23. That God is not corporeal, and does not perceive as we do, nor does he will the wickedness of sin.

For there are, of course, many things in which, although we discern some perfection, we also find some imperfection or limitation, and hence they cannot belong to God. Thus in the case of corporeal nature, because it includes divisibility together with extension in space, and it is an imperfection to be divisible, it is certain that God is not a body. And although it may be a sort of perfection in us that we sense, nevertheless, because every act of sensing involves being acted upon, and to be acted upon is to depend upon something else, it must in no way be thought that God senses, but only that he understands and wills. Nor should we think that these happen as they do in us, through operations that are in some way distinct, but such that through a single act, always the same and utterly simple, he simultaneously understands, wills, and does everything. Everything, I say, that is, all things, for he does not will the wickedness of sin, because it is not a thing.

2

Concerning God (1677)

Baruch Spinoza

While still a teenager, Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) left his education at the Talmud Torah school in his birthplace of Amsterdam to work in his father’s import business, which he later ran together with his half brother, Gabriel. In 1656 he was excommunicated from his synagogue for supposedly teaching heresies and committing monstrous deeds,1 though we have no specific information about what these were, only that Spinoza’s efforts to defend himself against the charges proved unsuccessful. Thereafter, he became a private scholar while supporting himself grinding lenses for telescopes and microscopes. His death at the age of forty-four was probably hastened by years of inhaling the dust from the glass he ground. Spinoza’s chief works were Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I, & II, More Geometrico Demonstratae (The principles of René Descartes’ philosophy, demonstrated in the geometrical manner, 1663),2 the only book published under his own name in his lifetime;3 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (A theologico-political treatise, 1670),4 and Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata (Ethics demonstrated in geometrical order, 1677),5 published posthumously.

The following selection is taken from Spinoza’s Ethica,6 a work written in the style often favored by geometers, starting with definitions and axioms from which are then deduced various conclusions, or propositions. In proposition 7, Spinoza argues (based on previous findings and definitions) that existence pertains to the essence of a substance; given that he later goes on to identify God as the only substance (in proposition 14),7 this can be seen as a form of ontological argument. Near the end of the selection, in proposition 11, Spinoza offers another proof, this time based on the principle of sufficient reason, which in his formulation holds that if a thing exists, there must be a cause or reason why it does, and if a thing does not exist, there must be a cause or reason why it does not. In either case, he claims, this cause or reason is either to be found in the thing’s own nature or in something outside it. Applying this to the question of God’s existence, Spinoza argues that if God does not exist, there must be a cause o...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction: Proving God in Early Modern Europe
• A Note on the Texts in This Volume
• Part I. Classic Presentations of the Traditional Physical and Metaphysical Proofs
• Part II. Alternative Presentations of the Traditional Physical and Metaphysical Proofs
• Part III. Other Metaphysical and Moral Proofs
• Further Reading
• Index
• Notes