Class And Party In American Politics

Jeff Stonecash, Jeffrey Stonecash

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367315054
• eBook ISBN: 9780429981197
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This single volume work examines whether class political divisions have increased or decreased over time in America. Most studies have concluded that class differences have declined, and that Democrats have alienated their electoral base--the working class. However, counter to these scholarly and pundit mainstream, in Class and Party in American Politics Jeffrey M. Stonecash shows that the less affluent now give higher levels of support to the Democrats (and lower levels to the Republicans) than in the 1950s and 1960s.Class and Party in American Politics is clear, concise, and firmly grounded on electoral and voter survey data from 1952 to 1996. This text will be profoundly useful for Campaign 2000 courses, among others as well, and it most likely will not become dated in the future. It was named a Choice Outstanding Academic Book of 2001.

1
Inequality and Political Debate: The Failed Role of Democrats

We live in a capitalistic society. The private market, with minimal constraints, determines the distribution of wealth in society. That process, plus the inheritance of opportunities and wealth from prior generations, invariably creates inequalities in the distribution of income, wealth, and opportunities in society. Many people see the inequalities as natural, unremarkable, even beneficial, rewards for achievements and penalties for not achieving. Further, it is widely argued that inequalities can be overcome through individual effort and that government programs are unnecessary.

Others regard the inequalities of American society as the product of family wealth and background, as fundamentally unfair, and perhaps even illegitimate in a society that professes to believe in equality of opportunity. These critics argue that one's background shapes opportunities and subsequent life chances and that society should adopt policies to increase equality of opportunity.

We also live in a political democracy. The political process is the mechanism for members of society to register their reactions to inequalities. It is through this process that ideas filter about what constitutes fairness and justice. It is also through this process that we debate what actions, if any, should be taken to try to respond to the inequalities that emerge from the private market.

Political debates about whether and how society should respond are crucial in a democracy. They are the means by which groups can argue about the legitimacy of the social order and make their case for whether change is needed. Less-affluent people and their sympathizers use the political process to make their case about the need for policies to create more equality of opportunity for the less-affluent population. Opponents to redistribution use the process to protect their interests. They argue for the importance of incentives and rewards to achievers and the dangers caused by interference in the outcomes of private markets. The debate is crucial. It is the means to decide whether actual conditions have become too divergent from ideals about opportunity and whether society should respond (Hochschild 1995: 15-38).

This debate is more important for the less affluent. Although affluent people need to make their case for the merits of differential rewards, they already possess income and opportunities. Their goal is not redistribution and they do not need to bring about change. If there is to be a challenge to the legitimacy of inequality, the argument for policies to respond must come from the less affluent. The mechanism to carry that debate on a mass scale is a political party. A party acts as a collection of individuals with some rough commonality of interests. That commonality may be tenuous and it may be a struggle to maintain unity, but the party serves to bring together like-minded individuals. Only a party can both carry sustained debate about the broad issue of equality of opportunity and create the unity to enact specific policies to respond to constituents' concerns (Key 1949: 307-312). Academics, think tanks, and government studies may provide the grist for such debates, but only party candidates can command the attention of large numbers of individuals and organize them into a coalition. This sense of commonality and willingness to identify with each other then creates the potential to enact changes to serve the interests of those identifying with the party.

The role of raising the issue of inequality has fallen to the Democratic Party since at least the Great Depression. That does not make Democrats more moral than Republicans, as some might suggest. Rather, Democrats have a constituency that makes them more concerned about such issues, so they are more inclined to carry the argument for policies to increase equality of opportunity.

Conventional Wisdom

Even as inequality has increased over the last three decades, a conventional wisdom has developed that Democrats have stumbled in their ability to address equality of opportunity issues. This analysis challenges that wisdom, but it is important to explain the various strands of research that have come together to form this conclusion. By many accounts, during the 1970s the Democratic Party lost its focus on economic issues. It betrayed the principles that had kept it in power for so long and alienated much of the New Deal coalition. It became too liberal and too identified with a host of cultural issues—civil rights, civil liberties, feminism, abortion, and gay rights (Machines 1996; Edsall and Edsall 1991b: 137-214)— and drove southerners away (Black and Black 1987: 232-256). "Like a hapless victim run over by a truck" (Bonafede 1981: 317), the party floundered, burdened with a liberal image on cultural issues. Democratic elites worried more about people who had failed—welfare recipients and criminals from disadvantaged backgrounds—than those who worked hard and "played by the rules" (Greenberg 1996: 36-44). To critics, party elites worried more about the rights of gays and mothers on welfare with illegitimate children than about workers losing jobs (Miller et al. 1988: 15). These preoccupations catered to the civil liberties concerns of affluent white liberals and drove away the party's core constituency—working-class whites—who felt neglected by out-of-touch leaders who didn't care about their values and problems.

The push for the Democratic Party to focus on civil liberties and civil rights issues originated among affluent, well-educated whites beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Ladd and Hadley 1975: 181-221) and continuing into the 1980s (Pierce and Hagstrom 1980; Sundquist 1985: 11-13) and the 1990s. These elites are more supportive of egalitarian cultural tolerance than the middle to lower socioeconomic cohorts. Their support for civil rights, free speech, and gay rights presumably alienated working-class whites and drove them away from the Democratic Party. The result was division among working-class blacks and whites about what role government should play in shaping opportunities.

The moderately egalitarian New Deal liberalism that produced majorities from the start of the Great Depression through the election of Lyndon Johnson has been undermined by the competition between constituencies and interests that now differ sharply about the meaning of equality. (Edsall 1992: 7)

The result has been alienation of the white working class and the decline of New Deal class political divisions. In this view, affluent whites vote more Democratic than less-affluent whites. That conclusion has become widely stated by academics, who concluded that the adoption of these positions cost the party its most crucial electoral base.

There has been an inversion of the old New Deal relationship of social class to the vote. In wide sectors of public policy, groups of high socioeconomic status are now more supportive of equalitarian (liberal) change than are the middle to lower socioeconomic cohorts (within white America); and as a result liberal (often, although not always, Democratic) candidates are finding higher measures of electoral sustenance at the top of the socioeconomic ladder than among the middle and lower rungs. (Ladd and Hadley 1975: 27)

Contrary to Key's scenario [of change in the South], however, the Democratic party also became less popular among white working-class southerners. The party's identification with civil rights in particular and social change in general provoked enormous irritation. . . . Although the region's white workers did not ordinarily convert to Republicanism, they certainly became less Democratic between 1952 and 1984. (Black and Black 1987: 246)

As the Democratic party mobilizes black voters, the party becomes more dependent upon black support, causing many whites to leave the party. When whites defect, the Democratic coalition becomes still more dependent upon black votes, resulting in more white defections, and so it goes (79). Quite simply, the Democratic party was not big enough to accommodate both blacks and whites. Racial hostility, particularly on the part of lower-status whites, meant that race served to splinter the Democratic coalition. (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989: 84)

. . . the Democratic nominating process often produced candidates who were seen as too liberal by much of the general electorate . .. . the association of the national Democratic Party with civil rights and the aspirations of blacks had the effect of alienating millions of white Democrats, including southerners and blue-collar northerners, who felt that black gains came at their expense. (Ginsberg 1996: 9)

Consultants and political commentators have concurred with how the Democratic Party's image evolved.

Whom did the party represent? With whom did it identify itself? There was a widespread sentiment, expressed consistently in the [focus] groups that the Democratic party supported giveaway programs—that is programs aimed primarily at minorities. This was no longer a party of great relevance to the lives of middle-class Americans. (Greenberg 1996: 44)

. . . after 1968, the Democrats stood in the public's eye for a new kind of liberalism, one that spelled permissiveness and moral nihilism, and that ignored and ridiculed the conservative desires of white ethnic working-class Americans who once voted for the Democrats as a matter of ritual. Once the Democrats were seen as supportive of both exotic lifestyles and revolutionary rhetoric, it was only a matter of time before working class Democrats would be driven straight into the waiting arms of conservative Republicans. (Radosh 1996: xi)

Finally, journalists, drawing on existing research and providing their own interpretations, have come to treat the conclusions as accepted wisdom.

The overlapping issues of race and taxes have permitted the Republican party to adapt the principles of conservatism to break the underlying class basis of the Roosevelt coalition . . . (3) . . . race has become a powerful wedge, breaking up what had been the majoritarian economic interests of the poor, working and lower-middle classes in the traditional liberal coalition (4). Working-class whites and corporate CEOs, once adversaries at the bargaining table, found common ideological ground in their shared hostility to expanding government intervention. (Edsall and Edsall 1991b: 154)

. . . one of the defining traits of American politics over the [last] 25 years has been the defection of working-class, white voters, especially men, from the Democratic Party. (Kohlbert and Clymer 1996: A-23)

The scrambling—in bad years, the reversal—of Lubell's calculus [that Democrats do better among the lower class] is by now a given in American politics: there is no longer a Democratic tilt within the white working class (79). The growing Democratic estrangement from the white working class has been a staple of political analysis and commentary at least as far back as 1970. (Meyerson 1996b)

Many people see the Democrats' situation as part of a broader transformation in the substantive focus of American political debates and in the electorate and the political process. To some, greater general affluence since World War II has reduced the significance of material conflicts (Inglehart 1971; Ladd and Hadley 1975:195-200). Instead of issues of class and opportunity creating political divisions, new issues are dominating American politics, dividing the electorate along different lines. Some scholars think race has become the great "transforming issue" in American politics (Carmines and Stimson 1989: 14). Many whites have negative attitudes toward blacks and they see welfare and redistribution programs as largely benefiting undeserving blacks (Gilens 1995: 601; Gilens 1996: 1010). The new electoral cleavages in American politics revolve around racial issues (New York Times 1988: A-25; Oreskes 1988: 1; McWilliams 1989: 199; Goldfeld 1997). Others see clashes over cultural issues as dominating political conflicts (Edsall and Edsall 1991b; Rae 1992). The new lines of division are between those who differ about affirmative action, abortion, gay rights, school prayer, and family values. As Ben Wattenberg (1995:13, 75-96) argues, "values matter most." Others stress the role of religious divisions (Petrocik 1998; Layman 1999).

These new issues have displaced the economic issues that were the basis of the New Deal coalition. Class political divisions have steadily declined (Abramson 1974:102-105; Ladd and Hadley 1975: 73 and 233-239; Ladd 1978a: 98; Ladd 1991: 31-33; Keefe 1994: 214; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1995:146 and 152-153), and the inescapable conclusion is that the Democratic coalition is coming apart (Schneider 1984: 2131; Rae 1992: 629). The "New Deal coalition has crumbled" (Stanley and Niemi 1995: 237). The question is no longer if or how change occurred, but what the Democrats might do to recover (Bonafede 1983; Shafer 1985; Radosh 1996; Teixeira 1996: 67-69). The focus of debate becomes how much the party must move to the middle and how much the liberal elements of the party must be stifled to reposition the party in the middle (Penn 1998).

These changes have also affected the electorate and the political process. With economic issues fading in relevance, and without the clarity of political division and debate provided by those issues, the electorate's engagement with parties has declined. Successive generations of voters have become less attached to parties (Abramson 1976), independents have increased (Flanigan and Zingale 1998: 62-64), campaigns are seen as more candidate centered (Salmore and Salmore 1989; Aldrich and Niemi 1996), and the connection of parties to clear sets of constituents has declined (Ladd 1997; Shea 1999).

The arguments that Democrats have alienated the working class and that class divisions have declined have profoundly shaped the American democratic debate. It has become" ... the new orthodoxy . . . haunting liberal intellectual life, an orthodoxy that waxes nostaligic about the New Deal to blame black political demands for the rightward turn in American politics...." (Reed 1991: 336). The presumption is that it is not possible for a party to address issues of equality of opportunity, or, at least, equality of opportunity with reference to blacks, without losing its core white working-class electoral base.

The dilemma the Democratic party faces is how to renew its appeal to the country's white middle-class majority—particularly the males—without abandoning its minorities, and therewith its principles. The polarization of the electorate in 1984 raised disturbing questions. Are the divisions in society so deep that a party can no longer champion the rights of blacks without losing whites? Of women without losing men? (Sundquist 1985: 15)

Democrats' inability to effectively raise questions about inequality is important for the party, but also for society in general. Lacking a party to mobilize, organize, and serve as an advocate for the less affluent results in the growth of inequalities, with no inclination to address them. This lack of a sustained debate over the inequality of opportunity for the less affluent has two consequences. First, without a party to serve as an advocate of their concerns, there are fewer policy benefits. As V. O. Key put it years ago, "Politics generally comes down, over the long run, to a conflict between those who have and those who have less. Over the long run, the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics" (Key 1949: 307). Second, there are also dangers for society. A society that experiences increasing inequality, with no means for the electoral expression of grievances about declining equality of opportunity, risks growing and frustrated polarization over the virtues and legitimacy of the system.

The role of the Democrats is essential to call attention to the ideals of equality of opportunity that are central to American society, and to contrast these ideals with the differential rewards that result from capitalism. Republicans, of course, have an equally important role to make an argument about the limits of and disincentives created by redistribution, but the crucial role in a world of extensive inequalities is that Democrats raise these issues. Critics within the Democratic Party base criticisms of their party on that expectation. William Galston has argued:

American liberalism has always preached equality of opportunity.

For two generations, starting with FDR, the Democratic party presided over the heroic age of American liberalism. Its vision was defined by the twin imperatives of general welfare and equal opportunity. Its historic mission was to mitigate the excesses of raw capitalism and to give excluded groups access to the mainstream of American life.

... the decline of the Democratic party is a matter of national concern, because it has the unique capacity to challenge us to diminish the gap between our practices and our principles ... (Galston 1985: 19-24)

Edsall and Edsall reiterated the argument with a broader focus:

The fracturing of the Democratic coalition has permitted the moral, social, and economic ascendance of the affluent in a nation with a strong egalitarian tradition, and has also permitted a diminution of economic reward and of social regard for those who simply work for a living, black and white. Democratic liberalism—the political ideology that helped to produce a strong labor movement, that extended basic rights to all citizens, and that has nurtured free political and artistic expression—has lost the capacity to represent effectively the allied interests of a biracial, cross-class coalition. Liberalism, discredited among key segments of the electorate, is no longer a powerful agent of constructive change.

As liberalism fails to provide effective challenge, the country will lack the dynamism that only a sustained and vibrant insurgency of those on the lower rungs can provide. Such an insurgency, legitimately claiming for its supporters an equal opportunity to participate and to compete and to gain a measure of justice, is critical, not only to the politics and the economics of the nation, but also to the vitality of the broader culture and to democracy itself. (Edsall and Edsall 1991a: 86)

For whatever reasons, the conclusion is that it is politically risky to raise issues of equality of opportunity, even at a time when inequality is increasing. The democratic debate must be constrained to cultural issues and middle-income issues. Making an argument for the positive role government can play is politically counterproductive. Class and redistributive issues are dangerous.

Not everyone, of course, has accepted these conclusions. Some argue that the case for the lower class must be made, and that the case must be made within the Democratic Party or advocates for the less affluent must leave the party (Kopkind and Cockburn 1984; Piven and Cloward 1997). Others argue that the evidence about the problems of the Democratic Party in maintaining support has simply been misread. To these critics the problem is that the party has muddled into the middle and has not give...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Preface
• 1 Inequality and Political Debate: The Failed Role of Democrats
• 2 The Puzzling Survival of Democrats
• 3 Social Change and Anticipating Party Fortunes
• 4 Evolving Party Constituencies and Concerns
• 5 Electoral Response and Realignment
• 6 Reconsidering Party and Issues in American Politics
• Appendix: The Analysis of Class Divisions in American Politics
• References
• Index