to most Scotsmen this Treaty of Union is still the central pivot in the history of their country; to most Englishmen it is perhaps merely a formal episode in the transformation of their northern neighbours from barbarism to citizenship. To the economic historian it is both a case-study in interregional relations between a large and wealthy political unit and a small relatively poor one, and also a major event in the long-drawn-out but enormously fruitful phenomenon of the economic integration of this island.
An important postscript today would have to include the Brexit debate and push for contemporary Scottish independence centred around political-economic relations with the European Union.
The Acts of Union fulfilled many political-economic interests, not least of which was, from the Scottish commercial perspective, access to English colonial holdings and an enlarged domestic free trade zone or home market for aspiring and increasingly affluent Scottish merchants. Throughout the 1600s, English tariffs and other forms of trade protection limited or prohibited Scotland’s access to English overseas markets in the West Indies and American colonies and made close ties with the English home market difficult, if only because cloth and other industries duplicated English production. Prior to 1707,
The rivalry of kings involved the two nations in savage, if periodic, warfare, with the imprisonment of merchants, the looting of towns and the confiscation of ships: it also involved Scotland in a series of continental alliances of which those with France in particular gave the Scots extraordinary commercial privileges and encouragement to look beyond Britain for their cultural and economic ties.
(Smout 1964, 456)
Through the Union, Scotland would gain privileged access to English trade routes in luxuries (wine, silk, spices, and dyes), along with items of agricultural and proto-industrial significance (linen, wool, coal, salt, fish, and hides).
Union with England also brought fiscal relief. Not only were the late 1600s a time of starvation for many in the Highlands who were suffering through several years of famine from bad harvests, but the Parliament was debt burdened by a failed attempt to set up a colony in Panama through the Company of Scotland (granted a royal charter in 1695) as an attempt to monopolize trade with India, America, and Africa. The colony of New Caledonia on the Isthmus of Darien followed in the tradition of mixed success as witnessed by England’s Virginia Company (which in 1607 attempted to establish the Jamestown Colony in present-day Virginia but soon foundered) and Plymouth Company (which achieved much success with its 1620 Plymouth Colony and the Mayflower pilgrims of American fame). Further north, the Hudson’s Bay Company was granted a monopoly over the English fur trade through a royal charter in 1670 and a build-up of trading posts across present-day Canada. Without exaggeration, the Company of Scotland was a dismal failure. Upon landing in Darien, the colonists were besieged by the Spanish and most would soon die of hunger and disease, the few survivors heading home in 1700. Formed as a joint-stock public-private partnership, its failure implicated not only the capital of wealthy Scottish merchants and landlords, and the liquidity of the recently created Bank of Scotland, but also the savings of those of more humble means. Through the Acts of Union in 1707, England agreed to pay the costs of the defunct Company of Scotland.
Improvements in transportation routes linking Britain were slow to follow. Smith famously rode from Scotland to Oxford in 1740 on horseback and would not return to visit for six years once graduated from Oxford, despite a life-long devotion to his mother back home in Kirkcaldy, because this journey was a “serious and expensive undertaking” with a return trip likely to cost over half of his annual Snell exhibition stipend (Rae 1895, 63). Urbanization in Glasgow began in Smith’s lifetime but it, along with the development of heavy industry like chemicals, mining, and smelting, and associated capital and physical infrastructure like canals and large-scale banking, would become significant only after his death. Thus during Smith’s lifetime, industry was small-scale. Aside from agriculture, textile production (linen in particular) was the main Scottish industry (Berry 2013, 7).
In the international realm, the eighteenth century begins with Britain as a rich, but by no means singularly dominant, economy in Europe with ‘productive if unscientific agriculture, busy if unmechanised industry, and vigorous if narrow commerce’ (Crafts 1981, 1). As Thomas and McCloskey summarize,
Britain experienced a commercial revolution before an industrial revolution. The inconsiderable little island of the sixteenth century, a mere dwarf beside the Spanish and Portuguese giants, had become by the last third of the eighteenth century the most powerful empire in the world.
(1981, 102)
Domestic statistics on the 1700s are sketchy at best but indicate a population of roughly 7 million (1 million in Scotland, 6 million in England and Wales), with population growth accelerating in the latter portion of the century (Lee and Schofield 1981, 17). Real output grew slowly with a notable ‘take-off’ of particular industries like cotton and iron, and industrialization in general, by 1780; agriculture saw its proportional share of the total national product fall from 45 percent in 1700 to 33 percent in 1800 (Crafts 1981, 3). Changes in the composition of capital stock also reflect this trend, with 22 percent devoted to industry and commerce in 1800, compared with only 12 percent in 1760 (Crafts 1981, 4).
Pre-industrial late seventeenth-century England and Wales had a relatively even distribution of income amongst the factors of production identified later by Smith, with approximately one-third going equally to employment, rents, and profits. By 1801, ‘best guess estimates’ have employment and profits at around 40 percent each, with rent having fallen to 20 percent (Crafts 1981, 7–8). An island that began the 1700s as predominantly agricultural thus entered the 1800s as proto-industrial. As go empirics, so goes theory. The Physiocrats’ focus on land as the source of economic value would soon seem antiquated, anticipating Smith’s labour theory of value in a commercial, though non-industrial, era: ‘In 1780 the factory system was still in embryo, the improved steam engine scarcely diffused at all, iron output in absolute terms not much above 1720, and cotton still a small activity relative to the economy as a whole’ (Crafts 1981, 5). Smith’s England was certainly not yet the ‘workshop of the world’ that it soon would become. Describing the period just after Smith’s death, Crafts (1981, 3) writes that
by the end of the eighteenth century industrial employment was much more a full time occupation than the supplementary activity for rural workers it had often been in earlier times. The economy was adopting a factory system of enterprise and the old rural by-employments in cottage industry were declining in relative importance as specialisation gathered pace.
The Industrial Revolution thus cannot be found in Smith’s writing because, subject to some minor historical quibbles, Smith’s The Wealth of Nations is about commercial society, not industrial society. This point is key to understanding why Smith is both a founding father of capitalist political economy and also at odds with the discipline of economics that would crystallize in the late nineteenth century. We will explore the Industrial Revolution, along with changes in capitalism and economic theory, in subsequent chapters of this book. For now, suffice it to say that economic historians have long debated: was it home demand or overseas demand that underpinned this revolution? Hobsbawm’s Industry and Empire, for example, asks the beguiling, if unresolvable, question:
How did entrepreneurs come to see before them, not the modest if solid expansion of demand which could be filled in the traditional manner, or by a little extension and improvement of the old ways, but the rapid and limitless expansion which required revolution?
(1968, 6)
The drive toward capitalist industrialism, was, as Hobsbawm says, ‘a leap into the dark’ (1968, 7). But unlike the technological innovations that underpin it, capitalism was equally telegraphed through centuries of change at home and abroad. Foreign trade grew faster than the economy as a whole in the eighteenth century; however, domestic demand grew faster than foreign demand during the period of rapid commercial expansion (Cole 1981, 38, 44). Trade in woollen cloth was the key English export since the late Middle Ages, and this continued to be most important at the beginning of Smith’s life in the 1700s, constituting 70 percent of total English exports (Cole 1981, 39). Cole (1981, 45) concludes that ‘in the long run both home and overseas demand were essential to the growth process.’ This growth process would upend a thousand-year-old social order by the 1800s with the Industrial Revolution and onset of early modern capitalism. England in the eighteenth century no longer had its peasantry, though Scotland did, as did most of Europe. The 1700s were thus coloured by various tensions and struggles over the shift from feudalism (with its monarchy and mercantilism) to commercial society (ruled by Parliament and liberalism) and its proto-capitalist requirements. Prosperity for Scotland would follow from the Union, impressing the benefits of politically enabled commercial society and trade.