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NEITHER BRUTES NOR ANGELS
The brain is one and three
Humans are entirely particular beings. As seems obvious to any un-biased observer (as long as they belong to the mammalian species) humans demonstrate certain aspects that closely relate us to many other animals. Anyone who has a cat or a dog in their home is forced to recognize that we share with these creatures not only the same basic physiological functions ā from breathing to eating food ā but also, although perhaps in a different form, some emotional states: anger, fear, happiness, and even pleasure in being caressed and the desire for physical contact. Alternately, it is equally obvious that the human being has particularly unique characteristics, setting us apart from all other animals, even from those closest to us, like primates. These similarities and differences may be understood only if they are contextualized in the long and marvelous adventure of life and its development on earth: a journey that originated billions of years ago and the memory of which is ingrained in our genetic patrimony.
It has been calculated, in this context, that we share a considerable amount of our genetic patrimony, in varying amounts according to the species, with other living things, including plants. These shared percentages remind us of lifeās unity and our bonds to all beings with which we cohabitate on this blue planet, our shared home, in delicate equilibrium and which today are being put to the test. The percentage of shared genetic patrimony with primates, the mammals closest to us, is incredibly high; specifically, with chimpanzees, the estimate is 98%. This amount is impressive and needs to be emphasized in order to remind us of our communal belonging to the same evolutionary thread on the phylogenetic rope. Whether we like it or not, we share the same ancestors. What is even more impressive, however, are the differences we human beings present with regards to these close relatives of ours: although the percentage of human specificity on the biological plane is minuscule, it has become enormous in terms of cognitive, emotional and social potential. Human beings present completely particular capacities that are not found in other animal species; these particular capacities make us cultural animals, capable of thinking, reasoning, transmission of learning, and even altruism and cooperation.
Our similarity with other living things, and our extraordinary specificity at the same time, are things that we can all recognize in our daily lives: men and women mix profound reflections with irrational behaviors, technological inventions with emotional impulsivity, altruism and cooperation with aggression and oppression. To understand the complexity of the human being and our behaviors, with all our richness and all our (at times) disconcerting contradictions, we must begin with an analysis of the human brainās characteristics. Although this organ remains among the most unknown in our bodies, thanks to the use of new technologies our knowledge of it has become more precise and consolidated within recent decades. Let us begin, therefore, with an analysis of the characteristics of the human brain and how they developed during the course of phylogenetic evolution ā that long evolutionary walk of animal life that brought about the human species. Readers, do not be fearful, and resist the temptation to skip ahead, or worse, abandon the book entirely: we wonāt dwell on anatomical analyses or neurophysiological details, but rather we will describe only the essential aspects, useful for understanding both its general psychological functions as well as the specific themes that are the focus of this book.
Since the 1970s Paul D. MacLean has described the human brain has having three levels, corresponding to three planes of phylogenetic evolution. It is for this reason we speak of the triune brain, or, better still, the brain as simultaneously one and tripartite (for the globality of its function). Jaak Panksepp, a psychobiologist who has made enormous contributions in the last decades to the study of the motivational systems and emotional circuitry of the brain, emphasizes that the description of the three levels is in many respects a non-exhaustive didactic simplification that should not be taken literally, especially in regards to the diverse anatomical structures of which it is made up. Do not therefore imagine the human brain neatly divided into three parts, each with specific tasks: such a representation fails to represent both the anatomical and functional articulation of the brain. Still, the description of the three levels remains useful, as it successfully illustrates the complexity of the human brain and its phylogenetic evolution. In fact, the three levels reflect the progression of cerebral development in vertebrates and mammals, where long phases of stability are followed by rapid expansion. This evolution does not concern the structure and function of single neurons that do not have special properties in human beings, but rather the enormous difference in the number of neurons (estimated at around 90 billion) and above all the amplitude and complexity of the synaptic connections between them (astronomically estimated at 1013 and 1015) and the various parts of the human brain. Let us take, therefore, a deeper look at the three brains that coexist in our nervous system and their principal functions.
The reptilian brain is the most ancient, and presides over the regulation of our vegetative functions (such as respiration and temperature) and our more primitive actions linked to individual survival and reproduction of the species (the trunk of the encephalon and the hypothalamus are part of its anatomy). Beginning with perception of external environments, the reptilian brain regulates activities concerning the preservation of self and species (such as feeding, wake-sleep cycles, exploration, attack, escape and sexual excitement, in relation to the different reproductive functions of males and females) and implements innate plans of action.
The second brain belongs to primitive mammals, most commonly denominated as the emotive or limbic brain (its structures include the amygdala, the hippocampus, and the thalamus). In addition to modulating the reptilian brainās action plans, the limbic brain presides over fundamental emotions (such as fear, anger, joy, and sadness) that reference specific and subjective lived experiences and impulses in reaction to the external world, on the basis of somatic and visceral responses. The limbic brain is also involved in emotions belonging to more evolved and complex social relations, such as maternal care, sexuality, individualized relationships, gregariousness, and play.
The third brain is the neocortex, or the brain of neo-mammals, and it presides over learning and action control ā modulating emotions and adaptive responses with more flexibility in relation to external events. Some parts of the neocortex, defined as paralimbic due to their close relationship with the limbic structures, govern complex emotions (such as shame, guilt and pride) tied to social life, which is particularly rich and evolved in humans. In humans the neocortex reaches its maximum development and enormously increases connectivity by building a complex web of informational exchange between various cortical areas. Because of this, specific, and superior, cognitive functions become possible: thought, language, narration, values, planning and pursuit of complex goals, self-consciousness, self-determination. The neocortex is the brain that enabled the human species to have culture, education, art, myth, religion and science. In humans this brain is fundamentally immature at birth, when it is both limited in size and complexity of function, and develops gradually until adolescence. This is the solution that nature found when confronted with the impossibility of giving birth to a newborn with an enormous brain from a being that walks erect on two legs and consequently has a relatively small pelvis: to give birth to a very immature pup with a long period of development after birth in a sort of external incubation. Consequently, a human offspring, for a longer time than the other primates, must depend on its parents for many years before reaching sexual maturity and the ability to reproduce, as well as developing the ability to reason as an adult and provide autonomously for itself. As we will see, the existence of this long period of immaturity and dependence has important consequences for the themes we are considering. Humansā prolonged infancy ā the longest in the animal kingdom ā is explained therefore by the necessity of bringing the neocortex to maturation. At the same time, it is also a period of maximum neuroplasticity, during which experience, learning, and education leave a decisive mark on the brain and in the mind. The time period spanning infancy to early youth is the most ductile and sensitive to external influences, but human beings remain plastic and in many ways also infantile even as adults, evidenced by their curiosity, playfulness, and the continual capacity for learning.
The three levels of phylogenetic evolution, often more simply referred to as the āthree brainsā, cohabitate in our central nervous system and are tightly linked and communicative with each other: it is for this reason that the brain has been defined as both one and triune. The three brains communicate with each other both ātop-downā and ābottom-upā as well as internally and horizontally. This results in a continuous interaction of reciprocal influence, where the most archaic levels influence the more phylogenetically recent levels and vice versa. For example, in sexual behavior both the ancient reptilian brain (as in the production of hormones) and the limbic brain (as in the emotional circuits of pleasure) are involved, as well as the neocortex (as in subjective preferences), all with reciprocal interactions.
This results in the brain as a whole being an extremely interconnected hierarchic system with superior and inferior functions, that can operate both synergistically and autonomously: the three evolutionary levels of the brain are not separate entities, although in some ways they can function independently. While the more ancient structures are closed, rigid, stereotyped, and respond to external stimuli with automatic and prescribed reactions, the superior ones of the neocortex are more open and flexible, and are no longer restricted to schematized and predetermined reflexes at the phylogenetic level. The neocortex thus introduces greater freedom. This freedom is not infinite, however, both because the more ancient phylogenetic structures continue to exercise their influence, and because new cultural and experience-based learning leaves a biological trace in a brain that has specific limits and precise functional modalities. Consequently, human action on physical and social environments, as well as upon itself, presents ample room for exploration but is not, however, omnipotent, as it remains strongly limited by intrinsic constraints of the species. Practically, this means that the capacities produced by the neocortex ā particularly thought, reasoning, and self-reflection ā enable every human to exercise more flexibility in their own behavior, extracting themselves from the biological automations deriving from the reptilian and emotional brain.
The human brain presents some morphological and functional differences between males and females, although on a much smaller scale compared to other mammals. The male brain is on average more voluminous ā even when taking body size into account ā and this led the academics of the nineteenth century to mistakenly believe that men were more intelligent. Today we believe that the differences concern certain brain structures, as spatial orientation is more developed in males. The most obvious difference pertains to the greater interconnection between the left and right sides of the female brain, which results in better coordination. Furthermore, the two hemispheres present fewer asymmetries in women: the areas devoted to language, in particular, are not confined to the left brain, as we see in males, but are also majorly present in the right side. Research has shown, in general, that the verbal dimension prevails in women even in front of sexual and emotional stimuli. Equally, their cognitive style of decision-making is primarily based on linguistic abilities, while an evaluation based on analog capacities prevails in men. Regarding sexuality, the production of sexual hormones differs with regards to the reproductive roles, with a cyclical monthly mechanism in females, and a continuous one in males. These two modalities are controlled by the pituitary gland, which is in turn controlled by the hypothalamus, which stimulates the gonads to produce female hormones (estrogen and progesterone) or male hormones (testosterone). The hypothalamus also controls the major secretion of arginine-vasopressin in males, and oxytocin in females (see chapter 2); furthermore, some areas of the hypothalamus linked to sexual behaviors are larger in males. Whether this organizational difference, which occurs in utero under the effect of maternal hormones, provides the foundation for sexual orientation and differences in roles is subject to discussion.
Human beings between biology and culture
Letās look closer now at the specific human cognitive capabilities being made possible by the development of the neocortex in our species. We will use as our basis Jean Piagetās description, who delineated with exemplary clarity and precision the emergence of intelligence and of thought in children: a development that anyone who has anything to do with small children may personally observe, if they watch carefully. To summarize, that which sets us human beings apart is the capacity to build a mental image of our external reality even when it doesnāt fall directly within our senses (sight, hearing, etc.) and to mentally work on it. The human brain goes well beyond simply mirroring the perceived external reality; however complex, this mental activity always requires the presence of an object from our external world that is perceived by our senses. Our mind has the ability to exceed the immediate perception of external objects, to mentally mirror and imagine realities that were perceived but are no longer present, or even nonexistent or abstract realities that will never visibly fall under our senses. This capacity for mental representation, as Piaget defined it, is not present in infants, but becomes evident in human babies, and only in human babies, provided they present normal neurophysiological and relational development, around two years of age. In short, around age two thought appears, as it hasnāt before, when the intelligence of the little one is constricted to the perception and manipulation of reality (sensori-motor intelligence). Concretely, the capacity for mental representation manifests itself with specific behaviors, easily observable in children around 18ā24 months: deferred imitation (for example, imitating the meowing of a cat seen the day before), symbolic play (running after a ball pretending to be a cat), and language (using the conventional sign in the mother tongue indicating cat). This will be followed by the ability to leave a graphic sign onto which meaning is attributed (for example, a scribble is identified with a cat) and fantastic invention (imagining oneself as a cat with boots).
Mental representation allows for the use of symbols to indicate a certain reality, and because of this our species has been defined as a āsymbolic oneā. These symbols may be personal, as seen in childrenās pretend play, where a box may be used as if it were a house, and immediately after a car, without the child losing awareness of its concrete reality. Symbols may also be conventional and specific to a certain culture. They can, in other words, have a shared significance, as occurs in language, within which a certain phonetic sign ā and then a graphic one ā indicates a determined reality in a certain language (for example, the word āhomeā means both the physical house, and the lived experiences that pertain to it). With these symbols human beings become capable of developing concepts (for example, the idea of home) and thereafter, starting primarily from age six, to fulfill more and more complex mental operations while still being constricted to concrete reality. Afterwards they become capable of more abstract reasoning, thanks to the development of formal or hypothetical-deductive thought, as utilized by science. In normal neurophysiological development the ability for abstract and deductive reasoning becomes possible in adolescence, but its full expression depends strongly on the use of a written language and schooling. Consequently, this type of thought cannot be fully mastered by those who did not go through the academic system, and even more so by those belonging to a culture that has not developed a written language.
Current academics maintain that the appearance of these peculiar cognitive abilities in the course of human evolutionary development is a result of needing to adapt not to a physical environment, but to a social life. A social life that proved to be particularly rich for a being that had conquered erect stature and had liberated the hands, and was always more involved in articulated exchange with family and groups, which were indispensable for survival. It was to resolve the adaptive tasks posited by the complexities of social life that human beings developed a particular intelligence, no longer limited by the perception of reality and its direct manipulation. Social life imposed both the need to cooperate and to defend oneself from the manipulation of others, the need to convince as well as dissemble, to help others and to find peaceful and long-lasting resolutions to conflicts. While primate intelligence was enough to confront and overcome adaptive problems resulting from the physical environment (for example, the search for food), it was too limited for relational living. It was in fact indispensable for a good social life for humans to be able to mentally visualize what went on in the minds of their peers, which was not always deductible from their expressivity. It was, in summary, absolutely necessary to be able to imagine that which could not be seen because it was in someone elseās mind: more practically, to be able to think about what others think about and experience. This ability served different purposes: to better trick or convince others, but also to effectively provide help and cooperate on a communal objective, useful for the family and the group, upon which individual survival depended. The human mind emerged therefore in biological evolution in relation to the complexities of social life and for this reason it is so closely bound to language. This means that at the base of our cognitive development, and of our unique mental abilities, is our innate sociality. This is the primary characteristic of the human species: a profound sociality that is evident not only in our ability to establish from birth deep relationships of attachment and affection, but also in our ability to establish a rich array of positive social behaviors with our peers, like empathy, aid, and cooperation. According to many anthropologists, it is this rich sociality, and not only the greater cognitive capacities in themselves, that has enabled humans to expand all over the Earth.
The conquering of thought and language, combined with the enormous plasticity of the human brain, provided the specific foundation for the development of consciousness, which allows for the self-regulation of our relationship with our environment, thanks to the mental integration of a large quantity of information. In terms of primary consciousness, this reflexive property is partially shared with other mammals. From it, always around two years of age, a higher level consciousness is developed which is specific to humans. It presents unique characteristics, such as awareness not only of oneās own body, but also of oneās own mental activity (both emotive and cognitive), of oneās own unity and identity, up to self-consciousness. Only humans are conscious of being conscious and can reflect on this consciousness. Consciousness cannot be located in any specific part of the neocortex but it is the result of complex activity in the brain, activating and connecting vast cerebral areas. It is limited and subject to constrictions, something we are well aware of from our daily experience of losing consciousness while sleeping, and which is also demonstrated by psychoactive substances ā including common alcohol ā which can heavily alter it. Conscious and unconscious processes coexist and are in continuous dynamic interaction within cerebral functions in two ways: some conscious behaviors can become unconscious (as we see in learned behaviors that become automatic, such as learning to drive a car), while others that are unconscious can become conscious (as can occur in cases of an automatic aggressive emotional reaction). Self-consciousness and self-reflection enable us to consider our lived experiences and our own actions, to evaluate them as well as anticipate them, to plan for and pursue complex goals, and to self-determine our own behavior. Even if consciousness has its fundamental origin in the physical emotive experience, language, both in shared and internal form, is a decisive instrument in the construction of self-consciousness. It in fact permits for a devolved representation of our self, as if we were looking upon ourselves from the outside: because of this it is defined as the āmicrocosm of consciousnessā.
The development of self-consciousness had decisive consequences including the possibility to operate intentionally, to make voluntary decisions, to modify behaviors and strategies, to plan actions, and to control and regulate emotions. Consciousness, therefore, isnāt just the simple reflection of reality, but is in itself a source of reality; consequently, self-consciousness means not only reflection upon and better knowledge of oneās self, but al...