Couple Stories

Application of Psychoanalytic Ideas in Thinking about Couple Interaction

Aleksandra Novakovic, Marguerite Reid, Aleksandra Novakovic, Marguerite Reid

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781782206088
• eBook ISBN: 9780429882180
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Mental Health in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This book presents the application of key psychoanalytic concepts in thinking about the dynamics in the couple relationship. The contributions to the first part, mainly theory, discuss how different psychoanalytic ideas can be used in conceptualizing the nature of couple interaction. In the second part, on clinical practice, four couples tell their stories during their clinical sessions.

Couple Stories conveys a lively experience of the couple's relationships as these occur in the consulting room and there are several commentaries for each 'couple story'. Commentaries explore the concepts described in the earlier part of the book, as well as clinical themes that couples bring to their sessions and the difficulties that they have encountered in the course of their relationship. Commentaries also provide an insight into how psychoanalytic couple therapists think about the clinical material, what they might select as a focus, and how they may go about developing a hypothesis about the nature of the relationship between the partners.

PART I

MAINLY THEORY

CHAPTER ONE

“As my shrivelled heart expanded”: the dynamics of love, hate, and generosity in the couple

Aleksandra Novakovic

In this chapter, I present the object relations theory of the paranoid–schizoid and depressive positions and discuss the couple interactions within these two positions. I summarise Klein’s (1975c,f,g[1940, 1946, 1957]) and some post-Kleinian ideas¹ about the two basic positions, or states of mind—the paranoid–schizoid and depressive positions—and present concepts that are, in my view, most relevant to the topic of this chapter. The paranoid–schizoid and depressive positions are characterised by different anxieties and defences that most, and perhaps all, individuals and couples alike, experience to some extent and at some points in their lives. I found that Proust’s (2002[1919]) metaphors imaginatively capture and bring to life, so to speak, the fantastical aspects and complexity of emotional life described by Klein, and resonate with the dynamics in these two positions, and I discuss a few segments from In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower (In Search of Lost Time, Volume 2). Finally, I consider the fused, warring, differentiated, benign, creative, and generous couple relations within these different positions.

Paranoid–schizoid and depressive positions

In her work with small children, Klein developed the play technique. She found that children’s unconscious phantasies,² that is, their wishes, anxieties, and feelings about the relationship between the parents, and feelings about parents, siblings, and family, were represented in children’s play. Klein observed in children’s play a split between how the parents are unconsciously represented, and that the “parental imagos are separately endowed … with wholly good and benign qualities and intentions, or else with wholly bad ones” (Hinshelwood, 1989, pp. 417–418). Klein used the term “splitting” to describe this process of separating the “good” from the “bad” and the splitting into “only good” and “only bad” figures.

By using mental mechanisms of splitting, projection, and introjection, children, and individuals in all stages of life, project good and bad parts of themselves, that is, their phantasies, into the world and they also take in—introject—aspects of external reality. Segal (1988a) points out the difference between the processes of projection and introjection, and the unconscious mental representation in phantasy:

For instance, it is possible to say that an individual at a given moment is using the processes of projection and introjection as mechanisms of defence. But the processes themselves will be experienced by him in terms of phantasies which express what he feels himself to be taking in or putting out, the way in which he does this and the results which he feels these actions to have. (Segal, 1988a, p. 16)

The child’s experiences stem from the continuous interaction between the child’s internal world and the environment, and it is on the basis of these interactions that the child’s complex internal world develops. Klein emphasised that from the beginning of life love and hate coexist. It is of crucial significance in early development, and also in later life, how feelings of love and hate are experienced or denied, introjected or projected, integrated or split.

Klein discovered that there were two kinds of anxieties that children expressed in their play, the paranoid–schizoid anxiety, which is about the survival of the self, and the depressive anxiety, which is about the survival of the other. Although, the paranoid–schizoid position is established first, and the depressive position subsequently, Spillius (2007a) points out that Klein refers to “positions” and not to “phases”, since “throughout childhood and indeed also in later life there can be fluctuation between the two positions” (p. 35).

The paranoid–schizoid position refers to a particular state of mind, when the individual perceives himself or herself, as well as people with whom he or she has a close relationship, as either completely good or wholly bad. In this split universe, the relationship with a “good” person is experienced as good, loving, or valuable, while with a “bad” person, it is akin to being at war, hateful, or just devoid of any meaning or goodness. It is not only that the subject or external figure³ is felt to be all “good” or all “bad”, but the whole world and life itself can be perceived in this idealised or devaluing tone, without many nuances in between.

The main anxieties in this position are persecutory or paranoid.⁴ Persecutory anxieties concerning the survival of the self are, essentially, a fear of being destroyed, annihilated, or fragmented, and, similarly, there might be related anxieties of being attacked, controlled, hurt, tormented, etc. In order to cope with, or rather survive, these anxiety situations, the subject uses defences, usually referred to as paranoid or primitive defences: projective identification, idealisation, omnipotence, and splitting.

Klein describes a process she terms projective identification that involves splitting and projection (in phantasy) of parts of the self, or internal figures, into the other person, who might then identify with these projections. Projective identification is based on the schizoid mechanism of splitting “good” from “bad” parts of the self. The subject can project and get rid of a “bad” part of the self, or project a “good” part of the self into the external figure. Conversely, by introjection, “good” and “bad” external figures are taken in.

Projective identification as a defence mechanism can be employed for attacking a “bad” figure, or for atoning feelings of envy by attacking and spoiling the goodness of a “good” figure. Projective identification is also used for evasion of a frightening or painful experience of separation. Thus, by projecting a part of the self into the other, the other can be omnipotently possessed and controlled in phantasy. In reality, these processes are much more interdependent and fluid.

Grotstein (2009) describes Klein’s view of projective identification as a defensive mechanism that is basically an unconscious, omnipotent, and intrapsychic phantasy. He emphasises the significance of Bion’s finding that projective identification could also be a “communicative phenomenon in which the unconscious of the subject actually influences the unconscious of the object” (p. 301). The concept of projective identification is discussed by Morgan in Chapter Three, while the communicative aspects of projective identification and containment are discussed by Hewison in Chapter Four.

Segal (1988b) highlights the significance of the paranoid–schizoid position, not only in child development, but also the important protective function some defences provide, in a modified form, for adults:

With splitting are connected persecutory anxiety and idealisation. Of course both, if retained in their original form in adulthood, distort judgment, but some elements of persecutory anxiety and idealisation are always present and play a rôle in adult emotions. Some degree of persecutory anxiety is a precondition for being able to recognise, appreciate and react to actual situations of danger in external conditions. Idealisation is the basis of the belief in goodness of objects and of oneself, and is a precursor of the good object–relationships. (Segal, 1988b, p. 36)

When an individual is in the paranoid–schizoid position, the picture of oneself and the other is clear-cut, or, rather, it is black or white, but, on an unconscious level, the subject can experience different internal figures, or parts of the self, in various relationships or in conflict with each other. For example, in a couple relationship, both he and she are convinced that they “know” what is going on. The situation is clear—the other is “doing” something “wrong” or “bad”. They both “know” that they are “right” in feeling that they have to protect themselves or retaliate for the undeserved, unprovoked, and hurtful act or sentiment that the other makes them suffer.

On an unconscious level, both he and she project their own feelings into their partner, for instance, a fear of abandonment, and then provoke and attack in the other this disavowed part of themselves. She feels he makes her suffer, because she cannot rely on him and trust him to want to commit to the relationship. She then retreats in silence and withdraws emotionally. Faced with her retreat, he sees her as deliberately withholding, and this makes him angry. While she ignores him, he feels unwanted, hurt, and enraged, because he cannot “get through” to her. He becomes insulting, shouts, and threatens to leave. His rage, hurtful comments, and threat to leave convince her, yet again, that she is “right” in not trusting him. The hurtful, enraging, or frightening experience of abandonment is enacted in the couple relationship, since they both feel rejected. Yet, in their different ways, they both also “force”, or induce, the other by projective identification to experience their own fear of being abandoned. In this instance, both partners share this anxiety. Perhaps the hope in coming together was that the other would “give” them that “belief” that they were “wanted”. However, by projecting their anxieties and making the other identify with feeling “unwanted”, they recreate the hurtful experience in the other. While both feel rejected, they each also become a rejecting and abandoning figure for the other. Both feel hurt and on another, less conscious level, perhaps avenged for being “rejected”.

This would be a more ordinary occurrence of a heated and possibly repetitive couple conflict, while in psychosis, when the subject regresses or predominantly functions on a pathological paranoid–schizoid level, the boundaries between the subject and the external reality can become extremely blurred. In very disturbed states of mind, due to the relentless and massive employment of projective identification, the subject can be delusional and experience a profound confusion between self and other. It is also relevant to note, however, that when children, and individuals in general, feel disturbed in their internal or external reality by an event that provokes fear about their safety or survival, they can regress to a more infantile paranoid–schizoid level, although, subsequently, they regain a more balanced outlook.

Envy and jealousy are significant in early development, as in life in general, and can have a profound impact on the capacity to love, work, and relate with others, depending on how these feelings are experienced, worked through, or defended against. Likierman (2015) summarises the distinction between the two:

Klein suggested that jealousy is experienced in relation to a twosome or a couple, and triggered by possessive desires for a loved object when it is out of reach and seen to belong to another … Unlike jealousy, which focuses on the rivalry for a good object, envy does not place value on the object at all. On the contrary, it focuses direct aggression not on rivals for the object, but on the object itself, and represents a malign resentment of its goodness. (Likierman, 2015, p. 175)

The envied figure is attacked, and its good qualities can be diminished and spoiled in different ways. Spillius (2007b) adds a dimension in considering the dynamic interaction between two people, the giver and receiver, in stirring up or containing the experience of envy. She finds that factors that can mitigate or exacerbate the envy depend on how the person who gives is perceived by the person who receives, and how, in turn, the giver perceives the receiver.

In the depressive position, the subject is able to bring together different and diverging feelings about the other person, to experience the otherness of the other, and to feel that he or she is separate from the other person and different. Therefore, the subject can experience the other in a more realistic way. Instead of an either black or white picture of the other, of the world, and, indeed, of oneself, which is a characteristic experience in the paranoid–schizoid position, the other is perceived as having both helpful, caring, loving attributes, as well as, a number of weaknesses. When the subject is in a depressive position state of mind, he or she is aware that the other can, at times, be inconsiderate, withholding, envious, or hostile, but, on the whole, the subject is able to maintain an awareness of both good and bad aspects of the other person, and contain different ambivalent feelings about people and life in general.

For instance, in a couple relationship, one partner becomes angry with the other, and, in the grip of a disturbing emotional experience, feels hurt or resentful. In the heat of the moment, he or she sees, or, rather, feels, only the “badness” of the other. This “badness” could be anything that gave rise to the annoyance or upset with the partner. However, there is a capacity to eventually move out of the paranoid–schizoid state and regain the experience of the other as a “whole” person, as both “good” and “bad”. This ability to recapture the “whole” person, despite still feeling some declining reverberations of hurt or anger evoked when the other was experienced only as “bad”, is enabled by recapturing the “whole” person within oneself, both the “good” and the “bad” parts of the self. Hence, one is no longer in the grip of a paranoid–schizoid state type of illusion of being completely “right”, solely “good” or morally justified.

The paranoid–schizoid and depressive positions are never fixed. The shifts between these two positions can reflect and can also be reflected in the different oedipal phantasies pertaining to these two different positions. Hinshelwood (1994) points out that Klein modified Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex in emphasising the importance of the early stages of development, and that, in her theory of the early Oedipus complex, she shifts the focus from the idea of actual parents to the phantasy world of the child.

The infant’s increasing capacity to come to terms with the oedipal situation is linked with the establishment of the depressive position. Britton (1989) made a significant contribution in conceptualising the link between the depressive position, mental development, and the oedipal situation. He found that the development is enhanced when the child is able to envisage a benign parental intercourse from a different position, in a space outside the self. It is this awareness of the space outside the self, that furthers the development of the child’s capacity to observe and think, the capacity to be a witness, and not a participant in, the parental relationship, and, in turn, to work through the oedipal situation. The theories about the Oedipus complex are discussed by Nyberg in Chapter Two.

A capacity to experience guilt in the depressive position and concern about the effects of one’s actions on another person is a fundamentally different experience from the persecutory guilt in the paranoid–schizoid position. The latter is marked by the subject feeling threatened and having a nagging feeling of being “bad” for having done something “wrong”. Persecutory guilt is a disturbing experience, and, essentially, it is a fear of punishment and retribution for one’s misdeeds. In psychotic depression, the subject might feel he or she is utterly despicable, doomed to be hated, or unworthy for having caused some unforgivable and irremediable damage. In a very disturbed state of mind, the subject can feel compelled to atone and expiate the persecuting guilt by some violent self-destructive act, or, if the phantasies about being persecuted for the irremediable damage are projected on the other, then by attacking this “other”.

In the depressive position, the subject’s guilt is felt as sorrow, pain, and sadness about the injustice, harm, or injury they believe that they inflicted on the other, either in their thought or deed. Since the main anxiety in this position is not about a threat or damage to oneself, but about the damage one has caused in phantasy or reality to the other, the person feels concern for the other, a need to repair, to put right the harm that one feels one has caused. There is a capacity for gratitude and appreciation of the other, and also for generosity manifest in the ability to forgive the other and oneself. Klein emphasises the importance of mourning in the depressive position, and Steiner (1992) points to the intensely conflicting experiences of mourning when the subject has a realisation of the hurt and harm inflicted on the internal or external figure, and feels that his or her love was not sufficient to protect and prevent the damage that was done.

Jaques (1988[1965]) links the depressive position with a capacity, in mid life (and in later life), to experience and re-experience the feelings of loss and grief, and “to love and mourn what has been lost and what is past, rather than to hate and feel persecuted by it” (p. 245). If the subject can mourn the losses and past grievances, he can then begin to mourn his own eventual death, while his capacity for creativity “takes on new depths and shades of feeling”.

If, in the depressive position, the recognition of dependence and need for the other person provokes too much anxiety or envy, or if the pain about the perceived damage in phantasy is too great, the subject can resort to manic defences. By employing these defences, one avoids awareness of these disturbing feelings: the guilt is evaded by denying the damage that the subject feels he has caused, and by denying the goodness and importance of the other person, the need for the other is evaded and denied. The other person is then perceived as having nothing good, desirable, or valuable, and, in this act of disparaging the other, the subject feels triumphant and superior.

The focus of this chapter is on the paranoid–schizoid and depressive positions and how the different states of mind within these positions manifest in couple interaction; however, there are innumerable and myriad possible experiences within each of these two positions. Steiner (1988) reminds us that: “The distinction between the two positions has an impressive quality but does sometimes makes us forget that, within the positions, mental states with very different qualities exist. (p. 325)

The two positions fluctuate, and the shifts between the positions can be regressive or developmental. Britton (1988a) develops further Bion’s idea of the alternating movements between the two positions, and distinguishes a regression to the pathological paranoid–schizoid position from the movement to a non-pathological, or normal, paranoid–schizoid position. He points out the developmental aspects of shifts between reintegration in the depressive position and a disintegration in the non-pathological paranoid–schizoid position that occur in the encounter with a “new” idea that shatters the stability of “knowing”.

The fears and grievances, as well as the capacity to mourn, love, and bear the turmoil of “new” ideas, are reworked over and over again in phantasy and reality, with past and present figures, in repetitive or in new ways:

Although love-relationships in adult life are founded upon early emotional situations in connection with parents, brothers and sisters, the new re...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS
• SERIES EDITOR’S FOREWORD
• INTRODUCTION
• PART I MAINLY THEORY
• PART II COUPLE STORIES AND CLINICAL COMMENTARIES
• EPILOGUE
• REFERENCES
• INDEX