Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbour

Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936-1941

Antony Best

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136156533
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Recent controversies about Pearl Harbour have highlighted the need for a new assessment of British policy towards Japan during the period leading up to the Pacific War. Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbour provides a thorough and authoritative account of British efforts to avert conflict with Japan, and makes use of the most recently released material from British archives, including information from intelligence sources.
This is the most comprehensive study so far of British policy towards East Asia in this period. It illustrates the extent of British weakness in the region and the degree to which the constant need to appease American opinion hamstrung Britain's ability to achieve an understanding with Japan.

1  Introduction

On 8 December 1941 the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires in London, Kamimura Shinichi, was called to the Foreign Office to be presented with a British declaration of war on his country. This document stated, in the lofty tones of diplomatic language

On the evening of December 7th His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom learnt that Japanese forces, without previous warning either in the form of a declaration of war or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war, had attempted a landing on the coast of Malaya and bombed Singapore and Hong Kong. In view of these wanton acts of unprovoked aggression committed in flagrant violation of international law and particularly of Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention, relative to the opening of hostilities, to which both Japan and the United Kingdom are parties, I have the honour to inform the Imperial Japanese Government in the name of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom that a state of war exists between the two countries.¹

Later that day in Washington an outraged and embittered United States Congress met and decided in the light of the previous day’s attack without warning on the naval base of Pearl Harbor to pass their own official declaration of war against Japan.

The war in the Pacific thus began with both Britain and the United States perceiving themselves as responding to completely unjustified and unprovoked aggression; the Japanese, the Asian allies of Nazi Germany, had not even had the decency to declare war before the first bombs dropped. This conviction that Japan’s acts were unwarranted and a violation of international codes of practice has cast a long shadow over the historiography of the origins of the Pacific War. The controversial nature of the opening shots of the conflict has necessarily meant that the study of this period of history has concentrated to a large degree on the question of blame, and the assumption has all too easily been made that because Japan was guilty of delivering the first blows it must be held solely responsible for the outbreak of war. However, to come to any true understanding of the events of 7–8 December 1941 it is important to clear the mind of any preconceived notions of responsibility, with all the moral connotations that word implies. History is fundamentally a process of understanding; it should not be an excuse to indulge in finger-pointing.

The idea of blame is dangerous because it encourages the historian to take short cuts. The desire to attribute blame exaggerates the natural and almost inescapable tendency to study historical events through the prism of hindsight. It is also a process all too easily influenced by the tendency of the victors of wars to describe the origins of the conflict in a manner favourable to themselves. If one is beguiled into such an approach there is the danger that one will be led into manipulating events to fit a pattern, to search for convenient continuities, to discount initiatives that fall outside the expected, and to end up with a very deterministic interpretation of the period. The result can be a history that concentrates far too heavily on the short term and when it does deal with the long term trades in generalizations rather than seeing the rich complexity of the events that led to conflict.

To be more specific, the problem in relation to our understanding of the Pacific War is that the enormity of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor has done the historian a disservice because it demands explanation and virtually forces one to draw up a narrative in which Pearl Harbor is the only possible destination of events. In particular, it requires us to focus on the major crises of the period to the detriment of any attempt to study the efforts made for reconciliation in a bid to avoid war. In addition, Pearl Harbor is a problem because the very scale of the Japanese attack, and the fact that it took place not on a colony but on a territory of the United States, pushes the historian towards a concentration on Japanese–American antagonism as the key to understanding the origins of the Pacific War to the exclusion of other factors, thus leading to a rather narrow perspective.

The intention of this book is to challenge some of the myths that have grown up about this period and to contribute to our understanding of the origins of the Pacific War by focusing on the evolution of the various strands, both negative and positive, of British policy towards Japan and East Asia from January 1936 to the outbreak of war in December 1941. This is, of course, only one element in the complex mosaic of East Asian history in this period, but the study of British policy is worthwhile because Britain was, at least until 1940, the major extra-Asian player in the region. Indeed, it is possible, as two leading historians of the period, Ian Nish and Hosoya Chihiro, have pointed out, to make a case that the confrontation in 1941 was to a degree an Anglo-Japanese conflict, because Japan’s main ambition was to seize control over the mineral-rich territories of South-East Asia and it was Britain which posed the most direct obstacle to this aim, and that the United States became involved because it had tied its own security to that of Britain.² The emphasis on Anglo-Japanese competition need not be limited simply to the events of 1941; it can be taken further to demonstrate that throughout the period from 1933 this phenomenon was a major destabilizing element in East Asia. This does not refer just to rivalry over markets in China, or even to strategic concerns, although it is interesting to note that as early as 1933 Japan had clearly replaced the Soviet Union as the chief target of British intelligence-gathering in East Asia; it also points to wider economic factors.³ In particular, it is important to see how the restrictive trading practices which the British Empire introduced to buttress British industries during the Depression, such as imperial preference and quotas on Japanese exports, pushed Japan towards the desire for autarky and the establishment of a yen bloc, and thus expansionism in East Asia. In addition, a study of British policy is important because it reveals that events in East Asia must be seen as part of the broad struggle in this period between revisionist and status quo powers and thus as part of a global conflict. This point is an exceptionally important one, and a difficult one to approach due to the unpleasantness of the revisionist regimes involved, but it is essential to investigate the legitimacy of Japan’s cries of discrimination and to see how one leading status quo power responded to such claims.

In approaching this subject it would be a mistake to assume that it is merely the sorry story of a slow, inexorable slide towards war. Instead, the period in question represents a series of troughs and peaks as the course of Anglo-Japanese relations shifted one way and then another under the influence of the hectic pace and magnitude of the events that shook the international system during these years. In relating this tale it is necessary to see the relationship between Britain and Japan against the background of a region in turmoil; one cannot hope to comprehend events without studying how Britain viewed the nationalist aspirations of Kuomintang (KMT) China, or how it perceived the machinations of the Soviet Union in East Asia. In addition, it is vital to see the influence of the confrontation in Europe between the Axis and the Anglo-French blocs, and how this shaped Britain’s fears for its security and emboldened Japan into action. Last, and perhaps in the long term most importantly, it is essential to understand the attitude and role of the United States. One must not imagine that American isolationism meant that Washington could be ignored; Britain could never forget that its success in any future war in East Asia or in Europe rested on Roosevelt’s benevolent support. In this period American silence spoke as much as its actions.

As well as the external influences on British attitudes towards Japan, policy was also the result of a complex debate between the various government departments in Whitehall about how best to uphold Britain’s interests in East Asia and elsewhere. The one constant in this tangle was that the Foreign Office was responsible for the everyday handling of relations, but dissatisfaction with its conduct of policy all too often led to challenges to its authority from the Treasury, the service ministries and, in the wartime period, the Ministry of Economic Warfare; this meant that the formulation of policy was often an acrimonious process. It is also important to realize that there were pressure groups working in this field which at various points and particularly before September 1939 could exert influence on sympathetic government ministries. The China Association, representing the interests of British companies in China, was one such lobby, and there was a more nebulous body of Japanophiles made up of businessmen, journalists, politicians and servicemen seeking to influence policy.

As one of the main themes of this study is to look at what attempts were made to avoid war during the period, the role of those sympathetic to an understanding with Japan is of some concern. It is important to understand that, just as there were those in Britain and Japan, both in and outside government circles, who consistently believed that the depth and range of the clash of interests made conflict inevitable, there was also a competing group who worked for the goal of improving mutual ties. To this latter group the mutual antagonism between Britain and Japan, the erstwhile allies, was not a cause for fatalism; there was a belief that although the problems that had arisen were serious they were not insoluble, and that in the long term the interests of the two empires were not incompatible. To the believers in a rapprochement it seemed expedient for Britain and Japan to sit down and negotiate in a spirit of compromise and determination to overcome the obstacle of mutual misunderstanding. There was, however, a division within these ranks. On one side there were those who were at heart sentimentalists and yearned to return to the Elysian days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, while on the other was a group who, for reasons of Realpolitik, saw a closer relationship as a vital necessity in the harsh international climate of the 1930s. This difference in motivation was important, for while the sentimentalists in both countries could agree in a rather naive way, the practitioners of Realpolitik in Britain and Japan saw reconciliation only in terms of their own countries’ self-interest, and were therefore frequently pursuing different and at times directly contradictory ends – this was a significant disadvantage as the members of this group tended to wield the greater influence in their respective countries.

A figure who can be seen as working in the latter manner was Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador to Japan from September 1937 to December 1941, and he plays an important role in this study. An analysis of his attitudes and influence is essential because he was deeply disturbed by the steady deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations, and sought to alleviate the growing tensions by espousing an alternative to the negative policy pursued by the British government, thus hoping to establish the grounds for a new understanding. The fact that Craigie felt that war could and should be averted and that his opinions on this matter were rejected is an important comment on the origins of the Pacific War. It raises a number of questions, such as why the views of someone so close to the heartbeat of Anglo-Japanese relations were ignored, and whether the alternative path Craigie postulated could have averted war.⁴ In addition, it is necessary to study in some detail the proposals put forward in London by the two diplomats who held the post of Japanese Ambassador to the United Kingdom during this period, Yoshida Shigeru and Shigemitsu Mamoru, and to assess the practicability of their efforts to ease tensions.

The fact that programmes for an improvement of relations were ignored also raises the issue of how perceptions of Japan within Whitehall were formulated and what information was fed into this process. In this context it is important to look at the quality and breadth of British intelligence sources in East Asia. This is a difficult area to study, as the government still has strict controls over what records are released into the public domain and therefore the material on this field is far from complete, but it is possible, while acknowledging the crucial gaps in our understanding, to construct an image of what the Foreign Office and the service ministries ought to have known at any one time, and then to point out or postulate how that information influenced policy. This is, of course, an area of some controversy among historians, particularly in relation to foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and an attempt will be made to demonstrate what can reasonably be surmised from the latest records released by the government about Britain’s reading of events in late 1941.⁵

The period covered by this survey relates to the years 1936 to 1941. The choice of the former as a starting date was deliberate and reflects a belief that, while the start of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937 was clearly a vitally important event for Anglo-Japanese relations, to study the development of policy from 1936 leads to a broader and less regionally specific analysis. It allows for a discussion of the tensions that existed between Britain and Japan even before the Lukouchiao incident had taken place, and reveals that in the summer of 1937 a serious attempt was made within Whitehall to construct a new policy towards East Asia.

2 Halting a policy of drift

January 1936 to July 1937

On 17 January 1936 the Secretary of State for War, Alfred Duff Cooper, circulated to his Cabinet colleagues a memorandum entitled ‘The Importance of Anglo-Japanese Friendship’.¹ This paper, which reflected the growing concern in the War Office about Britain’s position in East Asia, observed that the current state of Anglo-Japanese relations was unsatisfactory and that an amelioration of tensions could only be achieved if the British government displayed a more friendly attitude towards Japan. It warned that this was particularly important in the light of the current state of Europe, where Britain was not only threatened by a resurgent Germany but was also faced with the possibility of conflict with Italy over Abyssinia, and recommended in sombre tones that

so long as affairs in Europe remain unsettled, our interests in the Far East, at any rate north of Singapore, are at the mercy of the Japanese. It would seem a reasonable precaution, therefore, to try, by every means and even at some cost, to safeguard by amicable agreement with Japan, interests which we are unable to protect by military means.²

It also noted that the situation was not entirely black as Japan had recently made a number of overtures to Britain, and that it would be logical considering the strategic position to take advantage of these. This was a powerful argument but in the winter of 1936, while it was relatively easy to suggest that relations should be improved, it was more difficult to see how this could be achieved in practice. This was in part because of the great complexity of events in East Asia but it was also due to grave differences of view in Whitehall about how Britain should treat Japan and maintain, or even expand, its stake in China.

In 1936 British interests in China were fairly substantial. Approximately 6 per cent of Britain’s overseas investments were located in China; it was an important market for imperial exports, and a number of powerful commercial enterprises such as the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Butterfield Swire, British-American Tobacco and Jardine, Matheson & Co. relied on China for the majority of their business.³ China was not, however, a stable trading partner for, although the period of warlord domination had ended in 1928 with the establishment of the KMT government at Nanking led by Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese unity was under threat from outside and within. The external menace came predominantly from Japan which, uneasy at the strident claims of Chinese nationalism and itself weakened by the world Depression, had from 1931 to 1933 turned its economic sphere of influence in Manchuria into the puppet state of Manchukuo, and had then started to exert pressure on China to enter into an ever closer political and economic relationship. Internally Chiang Kai-shek faced the problem that his power-base was more or less confined to the lower Yangtse valley and that his government’s authority outside that area relied on a series of fragile alliances with rival KMT leaders and recalcitrant warlords. From 1928 his regime had been faced by a number of rebellions, the most serious of which was that led in the province of Kiangsi by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a problem which also complicated China’s relationship with the Soviet Union.

The problem for Britain in this situation was to work out how best to protect its stake in China. Should it side with the Nanking regime and renounce its claim to outdated imperial privileges such as extraterritoriality and the Treaty Ports in the hope of a fruitful relationship with the new China? Or should it co-operate with Japan and seek a division of China into spheres of influence, recognizing that otherwise the militarists of Tokyo would simply brush it aside? This conundrum was complicated further by the fact that Britain could not consider its future in East Asia in isolation. Relations with Japan and China covered a plethora of issues which also concerned other powers, and consequently any decisions Britain made would inevitably have repercussions on its ties with countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union and Germany. The overstretched bulk of the British Empire meant that for Whitehall events in East Asia were inextricably linked to those in Europe, and vice versa.

THE ROOTS OF FOREIGN OFFICE POLICY

The controversy within the British government over policy towards East Asia can be dated from February 1934, when the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, which had been established to study the state of Britain’s military preparedness, produced its first report and suggested that Germany rather than Japan had to be considered the main threat to British interests. That report led the Treasury, and to varying degrees the service ministries, to push for a policy of reconciliation with Japan, only to find that what had seemed to them a logical response to the situation met with substantial opposition from the Foreign Office.

The basis of the Foreign Office’s position throughout the period 1934–6 was that any bold initiative to improve relations with Japan was laudable in theory, but that the complexity of local conditions in East Asia meant that such a policy was barely practicable. From their perspective the central element in the politics of the region was the troubled state of Sino-Japanese relations, and there was a belief that any policy which failed to address this problem was doomed to failure. It was ...