Inequality, Crime, And Social Control

George S Bridges, Martha A Myers

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429979446
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This book brings together the most recent advances in theory and research on the relationship between social inequality and the control of criminal behavior, exploring the ways in which social class, race, gender, and age shape societal and organizational responses to crime.

PART ONE

Introduction

1

Problems and Prospects in the Study of Inequality, Crime, and Social Control

George S. Bridges and Martha A. Myers

Despite decades of social science research, the relationships among inequality, crime, and social control are poorly understood. Theorists from the disciplines of sociology, political science, and law agree that the mechanisms our society uses to control crime help preserve economic, political, and social order. Theorists disagree, however, in their assessment of whether and how inequality influences the use of these controls. Some theorists reason that formal social controls, primarily criminal law and the administration of criminal justice, are reactive: society punishes and controls individuals and groups commensurate with the importance of the norms they violate. The intellectual roots of this perspective extend to the ideas of Durkheim describing punishment as a “passionate reaction of graduated intensity that society exercises through the medium of a body acting upon those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct” (Durkheim 1947: 96).

For these theorists, social control and punishment are little more than responses to crime and deviance. Inequality in society influences control and punishment indirectly, by creating conditions such as poverty or economic disadvantage in which criminality flourishes (Blumstein and Cohen 1973; Black 1976; Blumstein 1982; Langan 1985).

In contrast, other theorists assert that social control is often imposed as a direct function of inequality. Some adopt a Marxian perspective, arguing, for example, that the state and its agents impose social control disproportionately on poor and disadvantaged persons in an attempt to regulate and minimize their burden on society as a whole (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939; Turk 1969a; Spitzer 1975, 1981; Cain and Hunt 1982). Reasoning that such groups are alienated and impoverished, these theorists maintain that the groups pose a significant threat of violence and of political mobilization against the state. According to Spitzer, the groups are “problem populations.” And as societies shift toward capitalistic economies ruled by a small number of economic elites, “the implications for deviance production become twofold: (1) problem populations become gradually more problematic—both in their size and insensitivity to economic controls, and (2) the resources of the state need to be applied in greater proportion to protect capitalist relations of production” (Spitzer 1975: 647). In this same vein, oppressed racial minorities may be especially threatening to the political hegemony of whites. Thus, the legal process is used selectively in areas characterized by extreme racial inequality to control and incapacitate the most volatile segments of the minority population (Adamson 1984; Bridges and Crutchfield 1988). Courts and other control agencies, as arms of the state, promote and protect the interests of those with high political and economic standing by enforcing selectively laws and other norms that foster political and economic stability in society.

Neither the Durkheimian nor the Marxian perspectives, however, have escaped serious criticism and challenge. Critics of the former assert that Durkheimian studies of punishment are often predicated on unrealistic assumptions and tautological reasoning: that there exists within any modern society a “conscience collective”—a unitary moral order— and that punishments imposed by the society accurately reflect the values embodied in that order (see, for example, Garland and Young 1983). Critics of Marxian writing and research are no less charitable. They argue that Marxian or “conflict” studies typically reify the state as an instrument of economic and political elites and often ignore the collective moral bases of punishments and social controls (Ignatieff 1981; Garland and Young 1983; Young 1983; Garland 1990).

In recent years, these contrasting positions have led social scientists to grapple with at least four issues. The first is whether sociologists can reconcile theoretical perspectives on inequality, crime and social control. While debate over the role of inequality is often “mired in a swamp of ‘either-or’ arguments” (Bridges et al. 1987: 356), some scholars call for the integration of competing theoretical perspectives (Liska et al. 1989; Tittle 1989).

Proponents of theoretical integration in the study of crime (e.g., Liska et al. 1989) argue that sociologists must establish more effectively the linkages among different arguments that are common across theories of crime and social control. Scholars generally opposed to integration call instead for greater elaboration and specification of existing theories (Farnworth 1989; Hirschi 1989; Piatt in this volume). Arguing that some theories are predicated upon fundamentally different underlying assumptions, these scholars assert that integration is an “unlikely solution to the ‘crisis’” of reconciling competing theoretical perspectives and that knowledge about crime and its control will advance only if existing theories are extended as far as possible (Hirschi 1989).

A second issue involves the conceptualization of inequality in theory and research. Sociologists concerned with crime and its control have, at least historically, directed most of the attention on inequality to very few categories of subjugated persons or groups—primarily racial minorities and members of the lowest social class. For example, studies of inequality in the imposition of criminal punishments in the United States have focused almost entirely on racial differences in sentencing and on whether persons of color accused of crimes receive more severe penalties than comparable whites (see, e.g., Kleck 1981; Kempf and Austin 1989). Some scholars argue that sociologists have completely elided other, equally important dimensions of inequality such as ethnicity and gender. Very little writing, for example, has described or thoroughly documented differences among white ethnic groups or between men and women in the imposition of social controls. This elision has restricted the development and specification of theory, and the result has been a distorted treatment of control and punishment. In the preface to her history of women’s prisons, Rafter recognizes this limitation in previous writing: “In recent years, historical research on crime and social control has grown rapidly and become an important field of inquiry in both the United States and Western Europe. Yet most of the new work ignores female criminals. . .. By paying little attention to institutions for women and girls, even recent prison histories present a skewed picture of the evolution and nature of incarceration” (Rafter 1985: xiii).

A related concern is that theories are based upon erroneous assumptions about the causal relationships between inequality, crime and social control. Most sociological theories offer monolithic explanations of control, assuming that dimensions of inequality such as race or class influence the forms and levels of control in manners that are unidirectional and consistent, regardless of the contexts or historical periods in which they occur. Donald Black’s (1976) treatment of social stratification and law is illustrative. Arguing that social control varies with the quantity or level of stratification, Black (1976: 23) suggests that the law-stratification relationship is invariant across time and context: “To one degree or another, the same principle applies everywhere. It might be added that a judge or other official higher in rank than a litigant is less likely to find merit in his case. In a trial by jury, a party to a case has a disadvantage if the jury members are wealthier than he, but an advantage if they are beneath him. At every stage, in every legal setting, a downward case is stronger than an upward case” (emphasis added).

In contrast, many recent studies document the importance of historical periods and contexts in explaining variation in social controls (Peterson and Hagan 1984; Myers and Talarico 1987; Myers 1990; Tolnay and Beck 1994). Their findings underscore the need to develop theories that accommodate and explain regional and temporal differences in the effects of inequality.

The third issue sociologists must examine is whether there exist important relationships among different forms of social control. Despite longstanding theoretical interest in these relationships (Durkheim 1947, 1978; Foucault 1977; Garland 1990), researchers have restricted empirical studies to examining one or two types of sanctions. Over the past two decades, for example, sociologists have restricted most of their research on social control to studies of criminal sentencing and imprisonment. While this emphasis has advanced knowledge about these particular types of sanctions, relationships among these and other forms of social control are poorly understood.

There is limited knowledge about relationships among social control mechanisms in at least two important areas. The first is the direction of these relationships. Some sociologists suggest that social controls imposed within society often lie in oppositional (i.e., inverse) relation with each other. Different forms of control may serve as substitutes for each other or may displace each other over time—that is, as one increases in frequency or use, others decrease (Spitzer 1975; Scull 1977, 1979; Black 1980). For example, as hospitalizations for mental illness increase in a particular area or region, imprisonments for crime within the same area may decrease (see Bridges and Beretta in this volume). However, other scholars argue that the imposition of one type of control reinforces or parallels the imposition of another type of control. In this case, controls increase or decrease parallel to or in conjunction with each other in relation to other social forces (Inverarity and Grattet 1989; Massey and Myers 1989; Liska 1992; Arvanites 1992). For example, Arvanites (1992: 148) argues that the linkages between mental health and criminal justice apparatuses of the state enable “them to complement each other in controlling socially unacceptable behavior/’

The second area about which we have little knowledge is the mechanisms intervening between forms of control. Though many sociologists agree that forms of control are related, they often disagree about the process by which one form actually influences or is related to another. Some argue that the relationship is direct and that common social forces may influence different forms (Spitzer 1975; Bridges and Beretta, Tolnay and Beck in this volume). Others suggest that forms of social control, though driven by common factors, may be indirectly related through a complex causal sequence separating forms of control (Inverarity and Grattet 1989; Massey and Myers 1989; Liska 1992; Hagan and McCarthy, in this volume). One such possible sequence is through reciprocal causal effects between forms of social control and the threat created by social or economic inequality—that is, where social threat and social control influence each other (Liska, 1992). In this circumstance, Liska (1992: 181) argues that “as one form of social control expands, it reduces social threat, which reduces other forms of social control.”

A fourth issue of sociological concern is the matter of “human agency,” that is, the ways in which the values and beliefs of individuals and groups are transformed into the policies and practices of controlling institutions. Sociologists generally agree that the policies of institutions such as the police, courts, corrections, and child welfare and mental health agencies reflect the values and ideologies of groups in society. However, the mechanisms by which any one individual’s or one group’s beliefs and values are transformed into policies and programs of the society’s institutions of social control are poorly understood (Turk 1969a, 1969b). Some scholars have examined this issue historically, focusing on the emergence of reformist movements in controlling institutions. For example, numerous studies of child welfare reform in the United States have documented the birth and evolution of the juvenile court (Piatt 1969; Sutton 1988, 1990), stressing the important and related roles played by upper-middle-class “child savers” and expanding state governments at the turn of the twentieth century. Typically, these studies conclude that the values shared among reformist groups, in particular, their beliefs about the severity of specific social problems and needed reforms, are translated into law and governmental programs by state agencies or legislatures for the purpose of regulating threatening groups or classes within the larger population. A major limitation of these studies has been their reliance on simplistic assumptions about the relationships among reformist groups, governmental institutions, and other aspects of social structure (Ignatieff 1978, 1981; Rothman 1971, 1983; Sutton, in this volume). Further, relatively few studies have identified how these relationships vary over time and across societies.

Most sociologists, however, have approached the question of human agency quite differently. Over the past three decades, countless studies have examined the values and perceptions of justice officials as they influence inequality in the application of criminal sanctions. Of central interest in these studies is a determination of the relevance of the race, ethnicity, gender, and social class of the accused. For example, some scholars assert that racial differences in punishment are consequences, in part, of race itself. These consequences are variously manifested—as racial prejudice and discrimination by social control agents or as insufficient social and economic resources (e.g., effective counsel) to counter accusations of criminality successfully (Bridges et al. 1987).

More recently, researchers have shifted attention from the status characteristics of the individual to the contexts within which crimes are committed and social controls imposed (Peterson and Hagan 1984; Myers and Talarico 1986, 1987). To what extent does the importance of one’s social standing depend on perceptions of justice officials or broader features of the community and the organization of its formal social control agencies? Of crucial significance is the assumption that the relationship between one’s social standing and responses to one’s behavior shifts significantly over time and space.

Scholars disagree about which contexts are relevant and precisely how or why they are linked with inequality, crime, and social control. Studies of urbanization and punishment, for example, have sought to determine whether courts in rural areas are more discriminatory than courts in urban areas. Some scholars argue that the political and legal cultures of rural areas favor an informal and arbitrary system of justice, in which prejudices and fears about minorities result in more severe treatment (Austin 1981; Hagan 1977a; Myers and Talarico 1987). Other scholars suggest that the informal justice of rural areas may in fact have the opposite effect. To the extent that rural officials are more paternalistic and view minorities as dependent and in greater need of rehabilitation, they may treat minority group members more leniently than whites (Bridges et al. 1987). In contrast, the large caseloads and bureaucratic procedures so characteristic of urban courts may militate against informality and the intrusion of personal prejudices. Race may recede in importance, and racial differences in punishment, if any, are attributable solely to racial differences in criminal behavior (Kleck 1981; Peterson and Hagan 1984; Myers and Talarico 1987).

This book is divided into four sections, which address each of the concerns specified above. Following this introductory first part, Part Two, Directions for Theory, examines the state of sociological theories of crime, inequality and social control, focusing on new directions for theoretical development. Part Three, Dimensions of Inequality, addresses the question of how inequality is conceptualized in theory and research. The fourth part, Linkages Among Forms of Social Control, explores the state of knowledge about relationships among forms of control and whether there exist common patterns in these relationships. The final part, Human Agency, examines how the values and beliefs of individuals and groups are transformed into laws and legal policies that produce inequality in the imposition of social control.

Directions for Theory

Concern over the state of sociological theory prompts the four authors in this section to examine problems and prospects for new developments in theory. The four chapters included in the section adopt quite different approaches in addressing this concern. Two chapters offer systematic overviews of sociological theories that examine the role of inequality in the study of crime and social control. Although both chapters identify important new avenues for the development of theory, one stresses the importance of theoretical integration, while the other calls for the elaboration of existing theories. Both chapters suggest specific directions for future empirical research. Another chapter reviews prospects for new developments in critical theory. It reveals how recent changes in the political order of socialist and communist states have influenced the study of crime and social control. The final chapter examines the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist whose work has been only recently translated, on the role of symbolic capital in the regulation and control of social problems. The focus of this chapter is the application of Bourdieu’s ideas to policing in the United States and whether contemporary policing actually reduces the symbolic capital of the lower class. The chapter uses these ideas as the framework for an innovative theoretical approach to the study of inequality and social control.

Charles Tittle, in “The Theoretical Bases for Inequality in Formal Social Control,” argues that inequality in sanctioning and in the imposition of formal social controls is an inherent assumption of major sociological theories of crime and its control. Tittle reasons that among each of the most general theories, inequality in sanctioning is an inevitable result of important social forces. However, theories differ significantly in their explanations of why inequality emerges in sanctioning and how its patterns vary. For example, Tittle maintains that although conflict and consensus theories assume the existence of inequality in the sanctioning of crime and other deviant acts, the theories differ significantly in their explanations of how inequality emerges. Whereas consensus theory reasons that widely shared collective judgments about threats to social and political order give shape to sanctioning policies and practices that are directed at those threats, conflict theory reasons that the judgments of special interest groups and elites dictate which threats the larger society must regulate and sanction. Finally, arguing for theoretical integration, Tittle weaves themes from each of the major theories into a framework for a comprehensive and integrated theory of inequality, crime and social control.

In Chapter 3, “Modeling the Conflict Perspective of Social Control,” Allen Liska offers an overview of contemporary theories of social control that, in contrast with Tittle’s call for integration, stresses the need for theoretical elaboration of the conflict perspective. Liska asserts that this perspective has dominated all other theoretical perspectives over the past two decades in writing and research on social control. Nevertheless, he argues that contemporary specifications of conflict theory, despite their dominance, are vague and inconsistent. While conflict theory hypothesizes that inequality in the application of social controls is associated with threats to special interest groups and elites, Liska is concerned about ambiguity in the concept of threat. He asks, “What and who are threatening to whom?” Liska claims that conflict theorists have inadequately defined the nature of social threats and insufficiently specified the conditions under which threats translate into social control. His chapter ends with an approach to modeling the conflict perspective that clarifies and extends its logic. Further, the approach offers a framework for empirical inquiry that will facilitate elaboration of the theory.

Anthony Piatt in “Rethinking and Unthinking ‘Social Control’” offers a departure from the previous two chapters by examining recent changes in critical inquiry on social control. In reviewing major weaknesses in Marxist and conflict writings, he argues that the role of coercive institutions and the rationality of the state in maintaining social order have been overemphasized. For example, Piatt stresses that recent work, which has been motivated in part by the political collapse of socialist and communist states, moves beyond the rigid economic determinism of traditional Marxist ideology. He draws from postmodernist and feminist writing to identify new directions for the study of social control. He calls for a multidisciplinary approach to the elaboration and extension of critical theory, the development of “inclusive” theoretical concepts that bridge different dimensions of social control within society, and a heavier reliance on studies of “human agency” to explain the relationships between the agents and subjects of controlling institutions.

The final chapter in Part Two, “The Police: Symbolic Capital, Class and Control” by Peter K. Manni...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Preface
• Part One Introduction
• Part Two Directions for Theory
• Part Three Dimensions of Inequality
• Part Four Linkages Among Forms of Social Control
• Part Five Human Agency
• References
• About the Book
• About the Editors and Contributors
• Index