Syria under Bashar al-Asad

Modernisation and the Limits of Change

Volker Perthes

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138452091
• eBook ISBN: 9781136056406
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Syria entered a new phase with the death of its long-serving leader, Hafiz al-Asad, and the accession of his son Bashar in 2000. While the new president has disappointed much of the hopes for political opening which he himself has created, Syria is clearly undergoing a process of change.The author analyses the factors of economic and political change in the country, and gives a portrait of its new leadership.

Chapter 1
Managing Modernisation: Domestic Politics and the Limits of Change

When Hafiz al-Asad, Syria's president for almost three decades, died in June 2000, the question of succession was already settled. Nonetheless, the way state and party institutions handled the change was still impressive: within hours of the announcement of Asad's death, Syria's parliament or People's Council (majlis al-sha'b) had changed the constitution, lowering the minimum age required for the presidency from 40 to 34, thereby allowing Bashar al-Asad, the president's son, to stand for the job. Within two weeks, the Ba'ath party and the parliament had made the younger Asad the official and only candidate for the presidency. Within less than six weeks, a referendum had been held, Bashar al-Asad had duly been elected with an official 97.3% result, and had been sworn in.¹

With this quasi-monarchical succession, Bashar al-Asad assumed the leadership of a highly centralised, authoritarian presidential system shaped during his father's rule. He also moved into all of the latter's formal positions: even before his election as president, he was made commander-in-chief of the Syrian army and general-secretary of the Ba'ath party. As the president, he also heads the Progressive National Front, mostly referred to simply as the Front (al jabha), a formal alliance that joins a number of smaller tolerated parties with the 'leading' Ba'ath party. He appoints and dismisses the cabinet, judges, provincial governors, university presidents and other senior officials; he can dissolve parliament, parliamentary decisions need his consent to become law, and he has legislative powers of his own. All formal chains of command thus come together at the president's office.

When taking office, Bashar al-Asad made it clear that his immediate priorities lay in the domestic rather than the foreign-policy field. Hafiz al-Asad had spent most of his time and energy on regional politics, not least the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process. Syria's course in this field was not in dispute; the young president promised continuity and reconfirmed that peace was the country's 'strategic choice'. However, contrary to his predecessor, he would pay more attention to Syria's developmental 'performance'. Bashar al-Asad spoke extensively of the need to reform, improve and modernise the economy, education and administration. He also raised expectations of political change by emphasising 'democratic thinking' and 'the principle of accepting the opinion of the other'.²

As the succession process had come about more smoothly than many had expected, Syrian and foreign observers began to ask whether Bashar al-Asad would manage to consolidate power; whether he would be willing and able to change domestic political structures; and whether he would set the country on the path of economic reform and recovery. The three tasks were clearly interrelated.

Changing generations

Bashar al-Asad owed his position to the regime at the top of which he had been placed. At the outset, therefore, it seemed that some sort of collective leadership would emerge, whereby the president would have to share power with other members of the leadership, particularly those who had been brought into their posts by his father. Three years into his tenure, Bashar al-Asad is still not the source of all power, as his father had been, but he has become the prime decision-maker. Occasionally, he has had to compromise over policy issues and personnel decisions. When a new cabinet was formed in 2003, the party leadership blocked the appointment of some more reform-minded candidates on the prime minister's list — and the president chose not to support these candidates. Some of Hafiz al-Asad's influential barons still play an important role, but they do not constitute a threat to the president's position. These barons are usually referred to as the 'old guard' — a concept that oversimplifies when used not only to describe the composition of Syria's political elite, but also to explain political processes.

Bashar al-Asad's power derives from various sources. First, of course, he is the president. Within the party, as well as within the Alawi sect to which his family and most security chiefs belong, he enjoys legitimacy as his father's heir. Beyond this circle, he is regarded as representative of the younger generation in a regime that had become gerontocratic during his father's long tenure. He also possesses the advantage of knowledge vis-à-vis those representing the old regime élite. After the death of his older brother in 1994, Bashar al-Asad built an image for himself as a counsel to his father and a succession candidate who knew what globalisation and new technologies were about. In contrast to most members of the regime élite, Bashar al-Asad could claim to be up to date with the world. Furthermore, and again in contrast to most of the old regime, he enjoys some popularity.

Finally, Bashar al-Asad has consolidated his power by systematically appointing trusted people to important positions. The transition was thus accompanied by a wide-ranging change in leadership personnel: within less than two years, three-quarters of the 60 or so top political, administrative and military office-holders had been replaced. Within the first weeks of the new era, all editors-in-chief of the state-run media were removed. In the following months, practically all provincial governors and provincial heads of the Ba'ath were replaced. In 2002, elections to lower-level party leaderships brought about significant changes among functionaries. In 2003, a new parliament was voted in. While its political colouring did not change — the Ba'ath party's majority had been officially fixed beforehand — the turnover was impressive: 178 of the chamber's 250 members were newcomers.

No comparably wide-ranging change in membership of the political élite had occurred since Hafiz al-Asad's takeover 30 years earlier.³ Although Bashar al-Asad continues to rely on some advisors inherited from his father — among them Foreign Minister Faruq al-Sharaa, who has held that office since 1984 — a new generation took over on almost all levels. From the president's perspective, such a thorough renewal and rejuvenation of the political and administrative élite was necessary not only to gather support for his ideas about reform, but also to increase, albeit gradually, the number and weight of people within the institutions of power who owed their position, and thus their loyalty, to him - not to his father or to the old regime.

Bashar al-Asad's personal choices and priorities seem to be best represented in the cabinet, particularly with regard to portfolios dealing with economic policy issues, technology, training and education. Most of these ministers are technocrats oriented towards technical modernisation and integration into the world economy. Most hold university degrees from Western countries, often in engineering or economics. Several members of what can be called Asad's reform team are 'independents': they do not belong to the Ba'ath or any of the Front parties; several are leading members of the Syrian Computer Society (SCS). Bashar al-Asad presided over the SCS until his ascent to the presidency. This was the only official position he held at that time, and it helped him to build his image as a moderniser.

Rejuvenation was not restricted to political appointees. In March 2002, the government decreed that all civil servants over the age of 60 would be retired. The decision, which affected some 80,000 employees, allowed younger cadres to be promoted, and offered opportunities for new entrants. Some exceptions to forced retirement proved necessary, particularly in the foreign ministry, where diplomats with ample experience were scarce, and in the security apparatus. The regulation allowed the current leadership generation to quickly gain dominance over the civil service.

This wide-ranging renewal of state and party personnel clearly includes neo-patrimonial aspects, in that it enables the president to build his own network of loyalists. Nonetheless, most new appointees represent better and more effective governance. These newcomers also have a more discursive and transparent style than their predecessors, particularly in dealing with the public. Ministers now give press conferences, or respond to critical questions at public gatherings. Most of those appointed to relevant state or party positions under Bashar al-Asad are also regarded as relatively 'clean'. While the same did not apply to many of those the president inherited from his father's team and to some members of his own wider family, recruitment policies have certainly heeded Asad's proclaimed commitment to fighting corruption. Political loyalty or active membership in the Ba'ath party are no longer sufficient to enable a move into senior administrative positions. The Ba'ath party itself has made an effort to raise the formal qualifications of its functionaries: for the 2003 parliamentary elections, Ba'athist candidates standing in the 'peasant and worker' category — for which half of seats are reserved — were required to hold a high-school certificate, and all other candidates at least a bachelor's degree.⁴

Many low- or mid-level party cadres in their thirties and forties tend to view the process of personnel change at the higher levels of the party and the state in generational terms, not in terms of political orientation. They emphasise that their generation is more modern, more technologically versed and more open to the world; they complain that, except for the president himself, the 'generation Bashar' is not represented in the highest political leadership, and they insist on the need to 'improve the quality' of state and party functionaries. This does not, however, indicate that the new generation necessarily has an alternative agenda to its predecessors or those it seeks to replace. Bashar al-Asad, in an interview with al-Arabiyah TV, was frank on this: if the 'old guard' were seeking to safeguard their interests, the 'new guard' might be those who 'want to join the group and do the same thing'. Many officials had been replaced, but the real issue was 'one of the general system'.⁵ As a senior intelligence figure put it: 'Our main problem is not the old guard. It's the old structures'.⁶

Reforming the system or modernising authoritarianism?

Bashar al-Asad's accession to the presidency raised expectations that the era of authoritarianism in Syria would eventually come to an end. Whether because of his growing influence or because the regime felt more secure than it had in earlier periods, Syria's authoritarianism had become milder in the last years of Hafiz al-Asad's rule. But the structures that the elder Asad built to secure his regime were all still in place when Bashar took power.

Inherited structures

Syria never developed into a totalitarian or, as Alan George has it, an 'Orwellian' state.⁷ Under Hafiz al-Asad, an authoritarian system and a strong security state emerged, supported by an often extreme personality cult, but this system did not try to build society according to one ideology, or enforce thought control over its subjects.⁸ Hafiz al-Asad's regime was highly personalised; in a way, Syria became Suriya al-Asad, as so many banners or murals told the public. Asad's control over the system was partly achieved by 'neo-patrimonial' means, particularly the use of patronage networks built on family, tribal, confessional and regional ties.⁹

At the same time, an institutionalised form of authoritarianism came into being. This concentrated vast powers in the hands of the president, guaranteeing in practice that the president cannot be replaced by constitutional means unless he himself decides to leave office. The system rests on three main pillars: the centralised government bureaucracy, the Ba'ath party (officially hizb al-Ba'ath al-'arabi al-ishtiraki), and the security apparatus. The Ba'ath, one of the torch-bearers of pan-Arab nationalism from its establishment in the mid-i940s, has been the de facto regime party in Syria since 1963. Under Hafiz al-Asad, a handful of smaller Arab nationalist or leftist parties were readmitted to politics on the condition that they allied themselves with the Ba'ath and accepted its leadership within the Progressive National Front. The existence of the Front as well as the leading role of the Ba'ath within it was written into the constitution. Soon after Asad's takeover, the party was reorganised in a more hierarchic, centralised manner, and committed to supporting the leader; membership was inflated and the party effectively turned into an instrument of mobilisation and control. Corporatist elements, notably so-called 'popular' or mass organisations such as the General Federation of Trade Unions and the General Peasants Union, introduced an element of representation and enhanced the regime's ability to penetrate and control the active parts of society.

Ultimately, the power of the regime depends on the security apparatus, that is the army and the various intelligence or security services, generally referred to as the mukhabarat. The latter remain the main instrument of control, and certainly the most powerful agencies in the state. They are deeply involved in the day-to-day running of the country. Security clearances are needed for any public employment or promotion, and for social and, of course, political activity; even office or promotion within the Ba'ath party needs the prior agreement of the fira' al-amn, the relevant 'security' branch. The services maintain a vast network of informers, and can still arrest and hold people at will. While they often choose less repressive methods, they make their presence known, watching universities and public gatherings, screening relatives and neighbours and keeping under surveillance tolerated opposition groups and individual dissenters. Outside Damascus, the country is practically governed by the mukhabarat. This is done through so-called security committees, which consist of the provincial governor, the head of the party branch and the mukhabarat chief. While the latter's formal rank is lower than that of the others, his word is weightier. The national heads of the security agencies are considered to be within the innermost decision-making circle.¹⁰

Signs of openness

Bashar al-Asad's ascent to power set off widespread expectations of change. Bashar al-Asad himself nurtured such hopes and expectations, through his initial statements, through practical measures of high symbolic significance and through the introduction of fresh blood into the political and administrative élite.

The new president's inaugural speech in particular was widely regarded as a declaration of reform intentions.¹¹ Asad's talk of 'democratic thinking' and the 'principle of accepting the opinion of the other' lent itself favourably to a liberal interpretation. In substance, however, he did not commit himself to democratic reform, let alone a transformation of the political system to liberal democracy —speaking, rather, of the need to 'have our democratic experience which is special to us' and commending the Progressive National Front as a 'democratic example'.

Despite such vagueness, Syrian as well as foreign observers were impressed by the speech. It did, at least, reflect on domestic policy and structures, and it clearly emphasised the role of institutions, the need to respect the law, administrative reform and the fight against waste and corruption. Asad also laid out a series of steps that signalled a move towards greater political openness. Some had practical implications, others at least symbolic importance. Thus, an import ban on satellite receiver dishes — which had not been very effective anyway — was scrapped. Later in the year, the Mezze military prison outside Damascus, the temporary 'home' for generations of political opponents, was declared closed. Some 600 political prisoners of Islamist and leftist tendencies were given amnesty. A memorandum by 99 Syrian intellectuals published in the Lebanese press, calling on the authorities to scrap martial law, set free political prisoners and grant political freedoms, did not see any of the signatories arrested or harassed by the mukhabarat; some were even allowed to publish articles in the local, state-controlled press. The authorities let it be known that the president, while not particularly happy about being approached through foreign newspapers, did not, in principle, object to statements of citizen concerns. The release of the memorandum itself was a sign of change: it demonstrated that a public political debate had begun in Syria, and that — to use the oft-quoted term of Syrian writer Abd al-Razzaq Aid — the 'complex of fear' ('uqdat al-khauf) that had so long paralysed Syria's civil society had been broken. In stark contrast to the subdued and largely stagnant political atmosphere that had characterised most of Hafiz al-Asad's era, Syria found itself engaged in a broad political debate. This was neither totally open nor all-encompassing, but it involved voices and views that had hitherto been marginalised.

The political spectrum

Within the regime élite itself, three broad tendencies shaped the debate and affected political developments in the wake of Bashar al-Asad's rise to power.

The first tendency can be characterised as conservative. Its proponents want to maintain the political system and, to the extent possible, the domestic and foreign-policy course that Syria stood for under Hafiz al-Asad. Representatives of this tendency acknowledge that mistakes have occurred and 'corrections' have to be made, but their mai...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction Syria in a Period of Change
• Chapter 1 Managing Modernisation: Domestic Politics and the Limits of Change
• Chapter 2 Economic Challenges and Policy Responses
• Chapter 3 Coping with External Challenges
• Conclusion Domestic Demands and Regional Risks
• Notes