From Norman Conquest to Magna Carta

England 1066–1215

Christopher Daniell

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781136357046
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

Using a combination of original sources and sharp analysis, this book is sheds new light on a crucial period in England's development. From Norman Conquest to Magna Carta is a wide-ranging history of England from 1066 to 1215 ideal for students and researchers throughout the field of medieval history.

Starting with the build-up to the Battle of Hastings and ending with the Magna Carta, Christopher Daniell traces the profound change England underwent over the period, from religion and the life of the court through to arts and architecture.

Central discussion topics include:

• how the Papacy became powerful enough to proclaim Crusades and to challenge kings
• how new monastic orders revitalized Christianity in England and spread European learning throughout the country
• how new Norman conquerors built cathedrals, monastries and castles, which changed the English landscape forever
• how by 1215 the king's administration had become more sophisticated and centralized
• how the acceptance of the Magna Carta by King John in 1215 would revolutionize the world in centuries to come.

This volume will make essential reading for all students and researchers of medieval history.

1 Hastings and after, 1066–1100

The Battle of Hastings was one of the great turning points in English history, which still generates analysis and debate. It was also a unique event, for it was the only time that a crowned sovereign king (Harold) was defeated on his own soil by a foreign duke (William) (Loyn 1992: 17). Most of the speculation concerns Harold. What if he had died fighting King Harald Hardrada of Norway three week’s earlier at Stamford Bridge? What if he had waited for the rest of his forces from London before fighting William? What if he had retreated into the Midlands, drawing William after him? What if Harold had not died? These can only be answered by ‘counter-factual history’ which looks at other possibilities, rather than what actually happened. What can be said is that the best outcome of 1066 was that there was only one king ruling at the end of the year with the authority to reign effectively across the whole of England – an outcome which was achieved. The worst scenario would have been the three protagonists to have all survived, or for them all to have died. Either way the country would have been left in chaos.

Background and battle

Although England was ruled by an Anglo-Saxon elite before the Conquest, Norman influence had been present in England ever since the arrival of Edward the Confessor’s mother, Emma, with her entourage in 1002. Furthermore, Edward himself had been brought up in the Norman court as a child. As a consequence there was often a tension before 1066 between the Anglo-Saxon nobles and the Norman courtiers. The 1051 rebellion by the Anglo-Saxon Earl Godwine was in part a reaction to the power of Norman courtiers (Maund 1988: 181), one of whom was Robert of Jumièges, Archbishop of Canterbury. The movement of people between the English and Norman courts resulted in a ‘conspicuous cultural overlap’ between England and Normandy (Lewis 1990: 212; Lewis 1994: 123). However, towards the end of Edward the Confessor’s reign the Anglo-Saxon nobility were in the ascendant. Harold, the son of Earl Godwine, had obtained almost regal status in court and following Edward’s death in 1066 Harold took over and proclaimed himself king. This did not go unchallenged and two leaders in particular prepared to seize the throne for themselves: Harald Hardrada, King of Norway, and William, Duke of Normandy.

Harald Hardrada had forged a formidable reputation by fighting for the Byzantine emperors. The emperors paid him well for his services and he returned to Norway with so much gold that twelve young men could scarcely lift it (Shepard 1992: 281). Hardrada was certainly serious about his invasion of England even though the tradition that he claimed the throne was first recorded in the thirteenth century. The catalyst for Hardrada’s invasion may well have been Tostig, Godwine’s son and Harold’s brother. Tostig was made Earl of Northumbria in 1055, but following a rising of Northumbrians in the autumn of 1065 he was expelled from England and fled to Baldwin V, Count of Flanders. From there he launched unsuccessful attacks on the Isle of Wight and Sandwich, before joining forces with Hardarda and launching a joint large-scale attack on York (Higham 1997: 162–7, 184–95). The relationship between Tostig and Hardrada is disputed. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle mentions that Tostig submitted to Hardrada as his vassal (i.e. Hardrada was Tostig’s lord), but modern commentators have seen the York attack as more of a pact (Williams 1978: 164).

There were other claimants for the English crown, though without the force or political power to pose a serious threat. Swein Estrithson of Denmark, nephew to Cnut and one of the last survivors of the royal house of Denmark, claimed that Edward the Confessor had promised him the kingship of England in 1042. An Anglo-Saxon claimant was Edgar the Ætheling, the grandson of King Edmund ‘Ironside’ who ruled in 1016 before being defeated by Cnut. As a 12-year-old Edgar’s claim was never a strong one, but he did have royal blood (Williams 1978: 164–5). On the sidelines was Baldwin V of Flanders, who was related to Harold and Tostig (Tostig had married Baldwin’s half-sister), and to Duke William of Normandy (William had married Matilda, Baldwin’s daughter). Baldwin allowed Flemish mercenaries and ships to fight for both William and Tostig, but Baldwin remained neutral and neither actively supported nor hindered either party (van Houts 1995: 843; Nip 1998: 151). The two strongest contenders for the throne were the de-facto king, Harold Godwineson, and Duke William of Normandy. Both believed that Edward the Confessor had promised them the throne, and therefore they were the rightful heirs.

At the centre of the dispute was the relevance of the dying King Edward the Confessor’s wishes. At this point the Anglo-Saxon and Norman traditions clashed. Duke William had been promised the crown by Edward the Confessor in 1051 and Edward’s magnates – including Stigand, Archbishop of Canterbury and the powerful earls, Godwine of Wessex, Leofric of Mercia, Siward of Northumbria all swore to accept him on Edward’s death. William’s position was made stronger by the fact that he had rescued Harold after he had fallen into the hands of Guy, Count of Ponthieu. Whilst in William’s court he swore an oath that he would be William’s deputy in Edward’s court and would ensure William received the throne (Davis and Chibnall 1998: 67–77). In Norman tradition once a bequest or oath had been made it could never be revoked, even by deathbed testament. The combination of Edward’s promise and Harold’s oath took precedence over all other forms of bequest (Williams 1978: 165). This version of events has been disputed as Norman propaganda in order for William to claim the throne, but the facts leave the issue open to doubt (Golding 1994: 15–26).

In Anglo-Saxon England an oral deathbed bequest (verba novissima) by the testator to the priest who administered last rites took precedence over all over bequests, so long as it was executed in the correct legal form. Harold therefore claimed his nomination took precedence over all previous promises. Harold, using Anglo-Saxon tradition, and William, using Norman tradition, each believed they had been legally promised the crown (Williams 1978: 166–9).

Whatever the truth of the matter, Harold succeeded to the crown when Edward granted it to him on his deathbed. The E version of The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle states that ‘Earl Harold succeeded to the kingdom of England, just as the king had granted it to him – and also men chose him for it’ (Swanton 2000: 196).

William and Harold prepared for the forthcoming fight. Harold readied the fleet and called out the fyrd, the trained militia, along the south coast. During the summer there was a phoney war, with both sides preparing for action but nothing of consequence happened in military terms.

Duke William had by far the greatest challenge in front of him. Although he could raise an effective army, the ships needed to carry that army and their provisions had to be constructed or acquired. One document, known as the Ship List, is reputedly a list of William’s barons with the number of ships they should supply. The list has often been seen as a later invention, although van Houts has argued that it is a contemporary text written in Normandy, after 13 December 1067 or c.1072 (van Houts 1987: 174). The list shows that three barons along the Seine were expected to supply a total of 160 ships between them, a feat which would have required half the forest reserves of the Seine basin. The likelihood is they might have purchased or hired ships from Flanders (Gillmor 1984: 116, 119–21). If the ships were indeed built from new (as shown in the Bayeux Tapestry) then the speed of working was incredible. In early February 1066 Roger II of Montgomery promised sixty newly constructed ships in less than six months, on average one being built every two working days (Bachrach 1985: 17).

The campaign logistics

The logistical problems facing William in gathering ships, men and horses were enormous. Modern estimates of the numbers of men needed for the invasion put the total at about 14,000 with 3,000 horses. A camp was set up at Dives sur Mer. A reference by the contemporary writer, William of Poitiers, indicates an organised supply of provisions at the camp, for he states that ‘an abundant provision was made for the soldiers and their hosts and no one was permitted to seize anything’ (Davis and Chibnall 1998: 103). In other words, the soldiers did not have to scavenge or plunder the neighbourhood. It has been suggested by Bachrach that the internal organisation of the camp was masterminded by Roger II of Montgomery and that it was likely that every person was assigned to a tent and unit within the camp. To make 1,000 ten-man tents, 36,000 hides were needed (Bachrach 1985). For a month’s stay, the material requirements for the camp have been calculated as: 420 tons of firewood; 210 carts of wine; and a daily minimum (assuming routine and very boring diet) of 28 tons of unmilled wheat grain and 14,000 gallons of fresh water. The horses in turn produced 5,000,000 pounds of faeces and 700,000 gallons of urine and required 8,000–12,000 horseshoes, which in turn required 75,000 nails and 8 tons of iron (Bachrach 1985: 11–14).

The order and scale of the camp have led historians to query what template William was using, for it is unlikely that such a successful camp was created without any model to follow. There are two basic theories: William was using either Byzantine/Roman or Viking systems. William’s Roman template may have come from the military writings of Caesar and Vegetius, which were known in Normandy (Bachrach 1985: 5). However, the alternative is that William was following the logistics of large Viking ‘round forts’, which could house hundreds of men. A round fort has been discovered on one of the Dutch islands, relatively near to Normandy (Roesdahl 1986). There have been similar discussions as to whether the design of the ships to transport the horses came from Byzantine and Sicilian practices (Waley 1954; Bachrach 1985) or previous Viking practice (Gillmor 1984; Grainge and Grainge 1999: 120) and whether the Norman vessels used rowers or only sail (Gillmor 1984: 110; Grainge and Grainge 1999: 120).

The size of William’s fleet is also unknown. The late twelfth-century poet, Wace, was told by his father that the Conqueror’s fleet had 696 ships, which sounds more accurate than the undoubtedly over-inflated report of 3,000 by William of Jumièges and the extravagant 11,000 claim by Gaimar (Gillmor 1984: 105). However, how realistic is the figure of 696 ships? In an analysis of Wace’s work, Bennett suggests that Wace ‘does little better than most medieval authors when dealing with numbers.… It was simply not fashioable to count. Even his figures of seeming exactitude, like the like the 696 of Duke William’s invasion fleet … are dubious’ (Bennett 1988: 44). Even though the number might not be exact, most commentators take the figure as a good starting point.

With the fleet built, the waiting game started because the winds were constantly in the wrong direction for sailing. As well as military preparations, William also commenced a diplomatic offensive, winning the support of the papacy for the venture and converting most of public opinion in Latin Christendom to his cause (Allen Brown 1980: 6; van Houts 1995: 832). Potential enemies were also neutralised through marriage, wars or alliances (Douglas 1964; Beech 1986: 14). Spiritual concerns were also important and the dedication of La Trinité in Caen on 17 June 1066 in front of the Norman assembly has been seen as a key element in William’s spiritual preparation for invasion (Danbabin 1993: 111). Pope Alexander II sent William a banner to ensure God’s protection for the army and thus an overlay of Holy War to William’s plans of conquest (Maccarini 1983: 173). To increase further his chances of winning, William of Poitiers reported that William wore round his neck ‘the relics whose protection Harold had forfeited from by breaking the oath that he had sworn on them’ (Davis and Chibnall 1998: 125).

Voyage and arrival

Meanwhile in the north of England another threat had suddenly emerged for Harold, for Harald Hardrada and Tostig had joined forces and landed in Yorkshire. The puzzling element about Hardrada’s invasion, and then Harold’s attack at Stamford Bridge, is the element of surprise in both cases (Allen Brown 1980: 6). Harold was informed of the invasion as he disembarked in London, but there had been no early warning system, no moves to mobilise the forces in the north and nothing comparable to the calling out of the fyrd on the south coast. Even the northern earls – Edwin and Morcar – did not put a system of defence into operation. Moreover a fleet of more than 300 ships collecting in Norway and meeting in Scotland with Tostig’s forces would have been hard to conceal. That Harold should have no intelligence of such a dangerous opponent as Tostig, his own brother, is perplexing. Whatever the reasons, a surprise it was and Harold marched north to meet the threat. Hardrada marched on York, defeating a local force in a bloody skirmish led by the northern earls Edwin and Morcar on 20 September at Fulford Gate. Some of the victims were probably buried in the local cemetery of St Andrew’s Fishergate, just outside York (Daniell 2001).

Victorious, Hardrada claimed York and then retreated to Stamford Bridge, presumably to await hostages. The reason why Stamford Bridge was chosen is problematic. Apart from a bridge crossing the Derwent there is no obvious tactical advantage in retreating from York with its superb fortifications. Perhaps there was the fear of an uprising by the local inhabitants who had previously ousted Tostig from his position as Earl of Northumbria. Another possibility was that Stamford Bridge was a deliberately provocative choice as it was probably part of Harold’s estate of Catton. The Vikings had therefore moved onto Harold’s own land to show they were in control (Williams 1980: 184–5).

Harold marched north and surprised Hardrada at Stamford Bridge. The battle, fought on 25 September, was long and vicious. Initially a single Viking warrior held the bridge until an English soldier climbed into a barrel, floated under the bridge and ‘stabbed him through under the mail-coat’, as The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle records (Swanton 2000: 198). The English stormed across and in the ensuing battle Harald Hardrada, Tostig and large numbers of Vikings were killed. The Battle of Stamford Bridge marked the end of the era of large-scale Viking invasions (Allen Brown 1980: 7). In the meantime William was preparing to sail from his base camp at Dives sur Mer.

But before the crossing the fleet collected at St Valéry. Some scholars have suggested that St Valéry was deliberately chosen to improve the chance of a south wind and to avoid Harold’s ships at the Isle of Wight (Gillmor 1984). However, a counter argument has been made which states that after William brought the fleet out of harbour at Dives he was forced northwards by the winds. This was far from ideal, for the shoreline of St Valéry was notoriously treacherous and some men may have been drowned (Grainge and Grainge 1999: 136–7).

As a straight line St Valéry to Pevensey is 97 km, but an additional 30–40 kms should be allowed for tidal currents (Neumann 1988: 127). Some incidental details of this momentous crossing have survived: the ships were fitted with lanterns on their masts for the night sailing and when the ship carrying Duke William lost contact with the others – a potentially disastrous occurrence – a sailor climbed up the mast to see the other ships. Taking into account all the calculations about tides and winds, there is general agreement that the crossing was straightforward, though the actual date of arrival at Pevensey is unclear, being either 28 September 1066 (Neumann 1988: 221) or the morning of the 29 September (Grainge and Grainge 1999: 139).

The shape of the Sussex coastline today is very different to that of 1066 and little is known about the coastal ports of the south coast in the eleventh century (Neumann 1988: 227; Gardiner 1999: 88–93). On his arrival at Pevensey, William quickly set up a secure base, built a wooden castle, organised patrols and added to the fortifications of the captured Roman fort (Bachrach 1985: 21). William’s choice of Pevensey to base his fleet was probably governed by the fact that it was a good harbour away from strong Anglo-Saxon settlements. Of equal importance may have been that Pevensey was in easy striking distance of Harold’s lands. The following day William’s forces marched to Hastings, built a castle and began to ravage the countryside as an act of provocation. Like Hardrada at Stamford Bridge, William was dishonouring Harold by attacking his homelands, which in turn would demand retaliation and a rapid response (Allen Brown 1980: 10)

Meanwhile the Anglo-Saxons under Harold were in disarray. There are many unanswered questions about the Anglo-Saxon preparations and their response to the invasion. Harold had called out the Anglo-Saxon militia (the fyrd) along the south coast as he had expected an invasion from Normandy during the summer. Both William and Harold were probably fretting about the lack of wind. Harold’s fleet was based at the Isle of Wight, but The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle recorded that ‘in the end it was to no avail. Then when it was the Nativity of St Mary (8 September), the men’s provisions were gone, and no one could hold them there any longer. Then the men were allowed to go home, and the king rode inland, and the ships were sent to London’ (Swanton 2000: 196). The ‘all or nothing’ nature of the fyrd was a serious drawback to Anglo-Saxon defences, for there seems to have been no element of rotation of the troops, or any ability to mobilise extra troops in rapid response to any threat. The Anglo-Saxon troops went home, having used their provisions. It seems that whereas William had ease of acquiring men and horses, but difficulty in finding enough ships, Harold had the ships, but the fyrd was more of a problem. With the fyrd back home the south coast was left without adequate defences.

The Battle of Hastings

After a forced march from the north, Harold arrived to confront William’s army at Senlac Hill – or Battle as it was called soon after. The numbers facing each other are broadly agreed by historians. Each side had roughly 7,000–8,000 soldiers. Calculations suggest that William had brought 14,000 men over with him, with 1,000 men manning the garrisons at Pevensey and Hastings, 3,500 sailors (five for each of the 700 ships), and then a contingent of non-combatants, including cooks, servants, carpenters, smiths, clerks and monks (Gillmor 1984: 106; Bachrach 1985: 2). A contemporary account by the Poitevin chronicler of St Maixent also records 14,000 men, but how he came to know this figure is a mystery (Beech 1986: 16).

Although the core of the invasion force was Norman, as many as one-fifth of the army may have been non-Norman. The Flemish connection was a strong one as William’s Queen, Matilda, was the daughter of the Count of Flanders (Rowlands 1980: 146). There were probably three main contingents of nationalities, Franco-Flemings, Normans and Bretons, each deployed with archers and crossbowmen in front, heavy infantry behind, knights/cavalry in the rear (Cook 1978: 100). Other nationalities included a Poitevin contingent led by the Count of Poitou, Aimeri.

On the English side the professional core of the army consisted of Harold’s own housecarls and those of his brothers, Gyrth and Leofwine, as well as of the other great lords. There would also have been troops from the provinces. The traditional view of the status of the housecarls was that they formed a distinctive element in the Anglo-Saxon military organisation, though this has been challenged and they have been described as ‘indistinguishable from their neighbours, and together with their tenants the thegns the housecarls formed the shire hosts’ (Hooper 1984: 175).

At the time of the battle the two sides had roughly equal numbers. However, if Harold had waited he might have greatly increased his army’s strength. The E version of The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle states that Harold fought ‘before all the army had come’, and Florence of Worcester reported that Harold ‘gave them battle, before a third of his army was drawn up’ (Allen Brown 1980: 8). A case has even been made for a potential Anglo-Saxon manpower pool of 375,000 (25 per cent of a population of 1.5 million in Saxon England) with a select fyrd ranging from 14,000 to 20,000 (Bachrach 1985: 25). The Norman explanation for Harold’s speed of action was that Harold intended to take William by surprise, a v...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Introduction
• 1 Hastings and after, 1066–1100
• 2 Peoples and families, 1066–1215
• 3 Boundaries and networks
• 4 Court life and power
• 5 Government and justice
• 6 Religion
• 7 Economy and society
• 8 The arts in England
• Postscript
• Appendix: significant dates and facts about the monarchs of England, 1066–1216
• Bibliography
• Index