The Dynamics Of Foreign-policy Decisionmaking In China

Ning Lu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429974151
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Lu Ning, former assistant to a vice-foreign minister of China, draws on archival materials, interviews, and personal experiences, to provide unique insights into the formal and informal structures, processes, mechanisms, and dynamics of--and key players in--foreign-policy decisionmaking in Beijing. Lu Ning sheds light on controversial decisions that were made, such as China's entering the Korean War, selling DF-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1986, and cooperating with the Israeli defense establishment.Lu Ning divulges the inner workings of Beijing's foreign ministry, introduces new Chinese language sources, and presents a series of case studies that challenge existing Western theoretical analysis of Chinese policymaking. Based on his examination of the past forty years, Lu Ning makes predictions about likely changes in Beijing's leadership and in its foreign-policy decisionmaking process. This accessibly written, incisive book will be invaluable to anyone interested in Sinology, Chinese foreign policy, comparative foreign policy, and contemporary international relations of East Asia.This second edition contains a fully revised Introduction, and it has been updated through President Clinton's recent visit to China. The new edition also contains new material on the Clinton Administration's varying policy positions toward China.

1
The Foreign Affairs Structure

An Overview of the Political Power Structure

In order to understand fully the foreign-policy establishment and its structure, it is first necessary to briefly examine the general power structure of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The governing regime of the PRC consists of three major vertical systems (xitong): the Communist Party, the government, and the military.¹ At the apex of these systems is the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, which is often further crystallized in the form of a leadership core (lingdao hexin), as after “June 4” and Deng Xiaoping’s formal retirement in 1989, or of a single person—like Mao Zedong, as during the Mao era.

The three major systems operate on five levels: (1) central—zhongyang,(2) provincial (for the party and government)/army (for the military)—sheng/jün, (3) prefectural (civil)/division (military)—di/shi, (4) county (civil)/regiment (military)—xian/tuan, and (5) township (civil)/battalion (military)—xiang/ying.²

Horizontally, on each level there exists a set of seven standard institutions: (1) the Communist Party (CP) Committee, (2) the CP Advisory Committee,³ (3) the CP Discipline Inspection Committee of the party system, (4) the People’s Congress, (5) the government, (6) the People’s Political Consultative Conference of the government system, and (7) the military.⁴

For the purpose of efficiently controlling and running the whole political system, this system is divided into six major functional sectors (xitong or kou for short) that cut across the three major systems of the party, the government, and the military. Each sector is supervised by a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The six sectors are as follows:

1. Military Affairs;
2. Legal Affairs, which includes legislative, judiciary, and law enforcement affairs;
3. Administrative Affairs, which includes industrial and agricultural production, finance and commerce, foreign affairs, health, education, science, sports, and so on;
4. Propaganda Affairs, which includes media and cultural affairs;
5. United Front Affairs, which includes noncommunist political parties, religion, minority, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao affairs;
6. Mass Organization Affairs, which includes union, youth, and women’s organizations and associations.

An important member of the Politburo Standing Committee conducts direct sectoral supervision through an institutionalized body, such as a committee, or a nonstanding organ, like a leading small group (LSG) (lingdao xiaozu). Among the most important of such organs are the CPC Central Military Commission (CMC) (zhongyang jün wei) for military affairs, the CPC Central Political and Legal Affairs Committee (zhongyang zhengfa wei) for legal affairs, the Central Financial and Economic Affairs LSG (zhongyang caijing lingdao xiaozu), and the Central Foreign Affairs LSG (zhongyang waishi lingdao xiaozu).

This system of sectoral division for management known as guikou guanli is an informal one in the sense that it does not appear on any of the formal organizational charts of the party, government, or military.⁵ This system allows the CPC Politburo Standing Committee to exercise centralized control of the whole political system and its processes.

The Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking Structure

The Apex

One of the characteristics of the Chinese political system is the high concentration of political power in the CPC. Within the party, power is further concentrated in the hands of one or a few leaders. Foreign affairs, together with military affairs and party “organizational affairs” (high-ranking personnel), has long been considered one of the most sensitive areas, demanding an even higher concentration of decisionmaking power.

The Paramount Leader and Leadership Nuclear Circle. On May 31, 1989, on the eve of the “June 4” crackdown, Deng Xiaoping, in his talks with CPC Politburo Standing Committee members Li Peng and Yao Yilin, proclaimed that the leadership nucleus (lingdao hexin) of the CPC’s first generation was Mao Zedong, that of the second generation leadership was Deng Xiaoping, and that of the third was going to be Jiang Zemin.⁶ Although the speech was meant to admonish the two to submit to the leadership of the newly nominated Jiang Zemin, it revealed that in the Chinese political system the ultimate power rested in the hands of a single paramount political leader. Foreign affairs has always been one of the key areas where the ultimate decisionmaking power is retained by the paramount leader. This paramount leader, also known as the leading nucleus, may or may not be the Chairman or General Secretary of the CPC or the State President, but most often he controls the military as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).⁷

The paramount leader creates an informal nuclear circle consisting of one or two members often personally designated by himself. In the Mao era, this nuclear circle included Liü Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai in 1949–1966, Lin Biao in 1966–1971, Zhou Enlai in 1971–1974, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, and Hua Guofeng in 1976. In the Deng era, there was Chen Yün, and before 1986 Hu Yaobang, before 1989 Zhao Ziyang, after 1989 Jiang Zemin, and after 1990 Yang Shangkun. Up to late 1992 the circle consisted of Deng, Chen, Yang, and Jiang.⁸ Since Yang retired in late 1992 and Chen died in April 1995, Deng, Jiang, and Li Peng have made up the small circle. In reality, as Deng’s health deteriorated, he was no longer involved in decisionmaking.⁹ Jiang and Li Peng formed the post-Deng leadership nuclear circle long before Deng’s death in early 1997. After the election of Zhu Rongji as premier and Li Peng’s move to head the National People’s Congress in March 1998, Li, though retaining the official number two position within the party, saw his policy role diminish while Zhu’s role increased. By 1999, most of the important decisions on foreign and defense policy issues were made by Jiang and Zhu in conjunction with their Politburo Standing Committee colleagues and their top aides in the party, government, and military systems.

The paramount leader and the leadership nuclear circle wield the ultimate foreign-policy decisionmaking power in China in that they can, in reality if not in law, veto or ratify decisions made by the Politburo.

The Politburo and Its Standing Committee. The Politburo is the most important institution of political power in China. It stands at the apex of the formal foreign-policy structure under the informal personalized arrangement of supreme political power of the leading nucleus and nuclear circle. However, the Politburo consists of members from provinces and other cities than Beijing, and its size is comparatively large. These two factors make it too cumbersome to decide on foreign-policy issues that often demand immediate attention or direction. Therefore de facto foreign-policy decisionmaking power rests with its Standing Committee. However, most important foreign-policy decisions such as war and peace and a major shift in foreign-policy orientation are still subject to deliberations by the Politburo. This was true even during the Mao era, if only for legitimization.

In more recent years, the Politburo has often been used as a training ground for future senior political leaders.¹⁰ Except for the members overseeing specific foreign affairs functional departments in the government and the party and for the Standing Committee members, most of the Politburo members are marginally involved in the making of foreign-policy decisions.

Internally, the highest foreign-policy decisionmaking institution is the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Normally the Standing Committee includes the Chairman of the CPC, the Chairman of the CMC, the State President, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

The party constitution adopted at the 12th Party Congress stipulates that the General Secretary, the Director of the Central Advisory Commission, the First Secretary of the Central Disciplinary Commission, and the Chairman of the CMC must be members of the Standing Committee. At the time these posts were held respectively by Hu Yaobang, Chen Yün, and Deng Xiaoping. The three other members were State President Li Xiannian, NPC Standing Committee Chairman Ye Jianying, and the Premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang.

Members of the Standing Committee of the 13th Party Congress were Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang, Premier Li Peng of the State Council, Hu Qili, Yao Yilin, and Qiao Shi. Both Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili were forced out of office after the “June 4” crackdown in 1989 and were replaced by Jiang Zemin and Li Ruihuan.

From 1992 to 1997, the Politburo Standing Committee of the 14th Party Congress consisted of CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier of the State Council Li Peng, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC Qiao Shi, Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference Li Ruihuan, Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, Vice Chairman of the CMC Liü Huaqing, and Hu Jintao, a member of the Secretariat.

On the first Plenum of the 15th Party Congress Central Committee held in October 1997, Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, and Hu Jintao, together with newly elected Wei Jianxing, Secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee, and Li Lanqing, Vice Premier, formed the new Politburo Standing Committee.

Within the Standing Committee, one member, usually one with more experience in the field, takes charge of the foreign affairs sector—waishi kou—as the head of the CPC Central Foreign Affairs LSG. From 1977 to 1987, it was Li Xiannian. From 1987 to early 1998, it was Li Peng. When Li moved from the premiership to head the NPC Standing Committee in March 1998, Jiang Zemin personally took charge of foreign affairs as the head of the Central Foreign Affairs LSG.¹¹ Thus for the first time since its creation in 1958, the Foreign Affairs LSG was headed by the paramount leader himself.

The Secretariat. In the official power structure, immediately under the Politburo there is the CPC Secretariat. However, its role has been ill-defined and has changed over time. From the late 1940s up to 1956, the Secretariat was the supreme decisionmaking body within the CPC, serving as the present-day Standing Committee of the Politburo.¹² In the party organizational restructuring that took place during the 8th Party Congress of 1956, the Secretariat as we know it today was created in subordination to the Politburo to carry out day-to-day operations. It was abolished during the Cultural Revolution but reestablished at the 5th Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 1980 by Deng Xiaoping to circumvent his political rival, Party Chairman Hua Guofeng and the conservative-dominated Politburo.

In June 1958, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued a joint circular titled Circular [C]oncerning the Establishment of Financial and Economic, Political and Legal, Foreign Affairs, Science, and Cultural and Education Small Groups, in which it stipulates: “The decisionmaking power concerning major policy orientations and principles and guidelines rests with the Politburo. The Secretariat is responsible for making detailed plans and overseeing [their implementation]. … The actual implementation and decisionmaking authority regarding implementing details belong to government agencies and their party groups.”¹³ According to the 1982 Party Constitution, the Secretariat is the executive body (banshi jigou) of the Party Center to handle the day-to-day work (chuli dangzhongyang richang gongzuo). Therefore, the Secretariat is not officially a decisionmaking body. Rather, as the executive body of the Politburo, it plans and supervises the implementation of decisions made by the Politburo.

Of the three major systems, the Secretariat has always exercised direct leadership over the party bureaucracies, but its control of the government and particularly the military has not been consistent. When it was first recreated in 1956 under Deng Xiaoping, it managed all three systems with the Secretary General of the CMC, who was in charge of the day-to-day work of the military, a permanent member of the Secretariat. When it was revived in 1980 after its abolition during the Cultural Revolution, it continued its past tradition of a broader role that encompassed the military.

Its power reached its zenith at the 12th Party Congress with a total of twelve members. But with the downfall of its General Secretary Hu Yaobang in 1987, its influence declined. At the 13th Party Congress, to further weaken the power of Hu’s associates who remained in the Secretariat, the Secretariat’s role was limited to running party affairs. Senior government and military officials were withdrawn from its ranks. Its size was reduced to six. This was done under the pretext of separating the party from government. After “June 4,” four members of the Secretariat were dismissed. Of the four members of the new Secretariat, three were members of the Politb...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Acronyms
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: An Emerging Giant?
• 1 The Foreign Affairs Structure
• 2 The Organization and Processes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• 3 The History and Political Culture of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• 4 Main Actors: The Central Leadership
• 5 Main Actors: Institutions and Individuals
• 6 Changing Dynamics in Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking
• 7 Western Theories and Chinese Practices
• Appendix I: Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking Structure
• Appendix II: The Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council
• Appendix III: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Appendix IV: The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC)
• Appendix V: The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council (HMAO)
• Appendix VI: The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (TAO)
• Appendix VII: The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (OCAO)
• Appendix VIII: Xinhua News Agency
• Bibliography
• Index