Systems, Self-Organisation and Information

An Interdisciplinary Perspective

Pereira Junior Alfredo, William Pickering, Ricardo Gudwin, Pereira Junior Alfredo, William Pickering, Ricardo Gudwin, William A Pickering, Ricardo Ribeiro Gudwin, Pereira Junior Alfredo, William A Pickering, Ricardo Ribeiro Gudwin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429880148
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Cognitive Psychology & Cognition
• Index: Psychology

Complex system studies are a growing area of central importance to a wide range of disciplines, ranging from physics to politics and beyond. Adopting this interdisciplinary approach, Systems, Self-Organisation and Information presents and discusses a range of ground-breaking research in complex systems theory.

Building upon foundational concepts, the volume introduces a theory of Self-Organization, providing definitions of concepts including system, structure, organization, functionality, and boundary. Biophysical and cognitive approaches to Self-Organization are also covered, discussing the complex dynamics of living beings and the brain, and self-organized adaptation and learning in computational systems. The convergence of Peircean philosophy with the study of Self-Organization also provides an original pathway of research, which contributes to a dialogue between pragmatism, semeiotics, complexity theory, and self-organizing systems.

As one of the few interdisciplinary works on systems theory, relating Self-Organization and Information Theory, Systems, Self-Organisation and Information is an invaluable resource for researchers and postgraduate students interested in complex systems theory from related disciplines including philosophy, physics, and engineering.

PART I

Foundational studies

1

THE IDEA OF SELF-ORGANIZATION

Michel Debrun

The intuition of Self-Organization

The idea of Self-Organization is located at the crossroads between the idea of “organization” and the intuition that we bear about the prefix “self”. This term is a linguistic anchor, constantly related to our experiences of the world, particularly to our perception of the interaction – causal, moral, political, or other – between individuals or groups, and to the evaluation that we make of their respective degrees of autonomy and self-affirmation. In these conditions, a definition of Self-Organization, not admissible in Common Sense, in relation to the meaning explicitly or implicitly attributed to “self”, would become arbitrary or purposeless. That is what occurs with formulations such as the one proposed by von Foerster (1960), in which Self-Organization is seen as an “increase in the redundancy of the system” or a “decrease in the entropy of a system”. Not that those definitions are necessarily wrong. They do not make sense only as long as they cannot be connected to, or rooted in, some intuition, actual or potential, of Common Sense. It could be demonstrated, for example, that the definitions proposed by von Foerster point to an aspect, a condition, or a consequence of Self-Organization, as intuitively defined. This is, therefore, a matter of exploring Common Sense – in the double meaning of unveiling it and using it, systematizing its suggestions or making them more complex, but never overcoming it.

Naturally, that guarantees neither the existence of the phenomena corresponding to these suggestions nor that such phenomena are possible. The concept of Self-Organization might be logically (Fodor, 1980) or logical-mathematically (Ashby, 1962) contradictory. But then, if that were the case, it would be better to renounce the use of the term “Self-Organization” instead of forcefully keeping it to designate, according to certain trends (often found in some scientific areas), phenomena that would be correctly described and explained by other denominations.

Preliminary definition of Self-Organization

Within this “intuitionistic” perspective, we propose an initial, partial, and temporary definition of “Self-Organization”: an organization or “form” is self-organized when it produces itself. Considering that each organization is based on discrete elements, it is essential to state that the self-organized form produces itself not in the void but from its very elements. But these elements cannot be of such a nature that their presence mechanically determines the process that has them as a basis. If that were the case, the intuition that we have of “self-production” would be nullified. The conclusion is, then, that the elements constitute just some material and/or foundation, and that what is new or “emerging” in Self-Organization must have its origin at the level of the process itself, not in its initial conditions nor, we must add, in the interchange – material, energetic, informational, symbolic, or other – with the environment.

Definition of “Self-Organization”

Therefore, we arrive at a new definition that clarifies the first one: there is Self-Organization every time the appearance or the restructuring of a form, throughout a certain process, is due to the process itself – and to its intrinsic characteristics – and, only to a lesser degree, to its initial conditions, to the interchange with the environment, or to the casual presence of a supervising instance.

Consequences of the definition

Due to the limited objective of the present chapter, we will postulate that this definition is neither contradictory nor meaningless – although still vague – and that it corresponds to objects that can be either actual or possible. Once this “black box” is accepted, some immediate conclusions can be drawn from the definition:

a The greater the chasm between the complexity of the final form and the complexity of the sum of the influences (and of casual interactions between these influences) received from the initial conditions and other conditioning circumstances, the greater the degree of the Self-Organization.

b Self-Organization is always, to some extent, a creation. This does not necessarily mean that it is incompatible with the principle of determinism. If it is compatible (by means of, perhaps, a certain bending or even a redefinition of the idea of determinism), that will force us to speak of “deterministic creation” in the same sense that some speak of “deterministic chaos”. But this issue will not be examined here.

c Considering that Self-Organization is not an absolute issue but a relative one, principles other than that of Self-Organization can intervene beside it, or compete with it, in the organization of a being, of an artifact, or of a situation. In these cases, according to the importance of each principle (planning, for example, or the “Darwinian” combination of blind determinism and chance), Self-Organization can either play the role of “main contractor” or of “sub-contractor”.

d Even though Self-Organization is creation, it continues being a process. It is not an indivisible and almost atemporal act, in contrast to “autopoiesis” (Maturana and Varela, 1980). The latter consists of declarations or definitions that carry out the existence of the object or act to which they refer. For example, if I say, “I promise”, I, in fact, promise. Similarly, for Spinoza, the essence of God (or the definition of this essence) – being the essence of “a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (Spinoza, 1985, p. 409) – entails the existence of God. Denying it would, in Spinoza’s eyes, be contradicting in an absurd way the infinity inscribed in the essence of God. But that is not what happens in a process of Self-Organization. We recognize, however, that the duality proposed here between Self-Organization and autopoiesis does not seem to be consensual for many of the most respected theorists of Self-Organization (see, particularly, Dupuy, 1982).

e In these conditions, Self-Organization is not a mere consequence of its own beginning. Should that be the case, it would become, precisely, autopoiesis. The beginning would work as a law of construction of what comes next. But the process of Self-Organization only “inherits” this beginning, which it will consider in a very variable way. The beginning is important because it introduces a rupture with the past and with the context, which allows the process as a whole to become independent, in part, from the “remainder of the universe”. The beginning also offers orientation or impulse towards a certain direction. In one way or another, it will be integrated into the process, contributing to give it meaning or vigor. It is not known, however, how the previous phases of the process will react to its beginning. The reaction can even be negative.

The meanings of “Self”

But what exactly does this definition mean? The process of Self-Organization is spontaneous; it is “itself”.

Three aspects must be pointed out:

a We have stated that the process is partly autonomous in relation to its starting conditions. That, however, does not entail trivial indeterminism, a capacity to “leap” out of a given situation. On the contrary, in the case of a self-organized process, some of the initial conditions allow the process to fly on its own, to overcome the starting conditions and depart from them. This is different from the evolution of a classical dynamical system, which only expresses or states its initial conditions, even if it results in a “deterministic chaos”. For example, let us suppose that among the initial conditions, there are elements of a certain type. On the one hand, they are “actually” and not “analytically” distinct since they are not redundant in relation to one another, that is, because they do not display connections, affinities, and so on, actual or potential, apart from the fact that they are all equally subject to general laws of nature. This causes these elements to “meet” each other, rather than to condition (each other or one and another reciprocally), becoming, therefore, free for new and unheard of connections – which will emerge “hic et nunc” – and not only for being actualized or revealed. On the other hand, these elements must be “loose” to a greater or lesser degree. An element will be considered “loose” when, independently of the facts and causalities that preceded its meeting with other “distinct” elements, it “breaks with” or ignores that past. If, for instance, two soccer players feel a certain friendliness for one another, inherited from the past, this feeling will be forgotten or adjourned once the two teams are together on the field. A loose element is an element without memory, disconnected from the context in a general way, and it will only acquire a new memory (that is, participate in the elaboration of a short collective memory, consolidated throughout the game) as a result of its interaction with other distinct and loose elements. Hence, these elements, disconnected from each other and from the remainder of the universe (which is, of course, a limit situation), must invent the formula for their collective Self-Organization, even if there is, occasionally, some kind of determinism ruling the opposition of these two elements or, more plausibly, some kind of determinism being constituted – as determinism – throughout the opposition.

The “conditions of the initial conditions” also contribute to the autonomy of the process. This is a matter of chance in the sense stated by Cournot (1843). These can be casual approaches (or, at the limit, shock, but this possibility is not of interest here) between various elements (such as a “casual series”, when, for instance, a series of economic facts “meet” a series of political facts). Or they can be decisions made by individuals, groups, entities, or others (for example, the Brazilian Soccer Confederation decides that a certain game between a certain two teams will happen on a certain day at a certain time). These are chances or decisions that cause really distinct and loose elements – added or not to other kinds of elements – to be gathered at a certain moment in a certain configuration (a stadium or a park, for example), visible or invisible. We will name the set formed by the configuration and the elements included in it an “organization device”. The organization device has variable probability of becoming a Self-Organization process (whether or not it is successful). When the device is simply delineated – due to, for instance, the distance between the elements (for example, the initial “great distance” or “reciprocal stanching” between two ideas in someone’s mind), we will refer to it as simply a “jumble”. Another initial condition that is capable of stimulating or enhancing (or stopping) the autonomy of the process is the frame in which it develops. This frame is formed by institutional dispositions (the definition of legitimate targets, of rules of functioning, of possible sanctions, and so forth), in the case of competitions that can be playful, sportive, economic, political or cultural, and/or actual limits. For example, the process of the Self-Organization of a crowd that tries to escape a building on fire will have a greater probability of being autonomous and creative in relation to these initial conditions if there are multiple possible solutions than if there is just one. In the latter case, the initial conditions tend to rigidly determine the closure, and Self-Organization tends to be replaced by the evolution of a common dynamical system.

In a nutshell, depending fundamentally on itself, that is, being autonomous, is the first condition for an organized process to be “self”, to be “itself”, to be intelligible to itself. Autonomy with respect to the initial conditions, in turn, is favored by something that, at first sight, seems to be antagonistic to it: the very initial conditions or part of them.

b But the process is “self” in a second sense: it develops through a task of itself on itself. This second aspect implied by our definition is the most controversial one and is found, directly or indirectly, in the aim of authors such as Ashby (1962) or Fodor (1980). How can we understand this “twist” of the process on itself? Is not this just a play of words? It could be proved, probably, that none of the stages that occur throughout a self-organizing process are rigidly unitary, that such a process always allows for some distance, greater or smaller, depending on the case, between its elements or parts. And that certain parts, at certain moments, can be “more organizing”, while other parts are “more organized”, with possible interchangeability of roles. This is what makes it possible for the Whole to organize itself, in spite of the conjunctural inequalities.

c Finally, as it evolves towards the constitution of a form – or towards the restructuring of a given form – the process is “self” or itself in a third sense: the form is not a passive result of the process. The form becomes, through a final organizational adjustment, a resisting gestalt (capable of self-reference in certain cases). It has an identity, or it is an identity, which reproduces, in a certain way, in relation to the whole process, the autonomy of this process in relation to its initial conditions.

The engine of Self-Organization

What is the engine of this “self-structure”? What makes it move and causes the Self-Organization process – as a task of itself on itself, whose beginning is a “giver of autonomy” (when it constitutes a real rupture in relation to a previous situation) – to progress and advance towards the constitution or the restructuring of a form?

The main engine of Self-Organization lies in the very interaction between “actually distinct” (and loose) elements, as we suggested earlier, or, we would like to add, in that between “semi-distinct” parts within an organism. In this latter case, the expression “semi-distinct parts” means that the organism is not a holistic being, in which everything fuses to everything else. It means, however, that the parts form an “interiority” or develop an “entangledness”, expressed in the fact that each part “knows” about the others, about its own capability to replace them or not, and about its own ability to play one role or another (see Figure 1.1). The problem is to determine how and to what extent this ambiguous situation is compatible with the idea of Self-Organization.

Primary Self-Organization

In the first case of interaction, within a configuration and a possible framework of rules, Self-Organization can be seen as the task of a “macro-agent” of itself on itself, the “process without subject” mentioned by Althusser (1965). This does not mean that this macro-agent has, at least at the starting point, its own objectives, tendencies, and so forth: the only targets – legitimated or not by the frame of interaction – are the participants. It can be, in fact, that some of these elements try to convey a certain orientation to the whole (for example, around a “national project”). But what will actually decide whether or not there is collective Self-Organization is the way in which the proposal is internalized, applied, redefined, diluted, and so forth as the subsequent interactions occur. In any case, the eminent causality of the process is interactive causality, unless, of course, there is the emergence of an agent – individual or collective (for example, a powerful elite) – capable of imposing one course of events or another. But, in that case, it is no longer a matter of Self-Organization but of hetero-organization.

In the same way, when agents associate around a cooperative proj...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of contributors
• Introduction
• Part I Foundational studies
• Part II Biophysical and cognitive approaches
• Part III Practical issues
• Part IV Semiotic studies
• Index