Taiwan

Nation-State or Province?

John Franklin Copper

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429808319
• Edition: 7
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic History
• Index: Economics

In this newly revised and updated seventh edition of Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Copper examines Taiwan's geography and history, society and culture, economy, political system and foreign and security politics in the context of Taiwan's uncertain status, as either a sovereign nation or a province of the People's Republic of China.

Analyzing possible future scenarios and trends that could affect Taiwan's status, the author argues that Taiwan's very rapid and successful democratization suggests Taiwan should be independent and separate from China, while economic links between Taiwan and China indicate the opposite. New features to this brand-new edition include:

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• The triumph of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2016 elections.

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• The impact of the Trump administration on US–Taiwan relations.

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• The rise of popularism.

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• The shift in cross-Strait relations with China given their increased power on the world stage.

This revised and fully up-to-date textbook will be essential reading for students of Taiwan, China, US–China relations and democracy.

1 The Land and the People

In this chapter the author examines the so-called permanent features about Taiwan that give some indication, cum proof, that Taiwan is or should be a sovereign nation-state or that it is to be regarded a part of China. However, some are not as permanent as it would seem, or at least how they are interpreted has changed. Also considered in this chapter are topics that provide information about the propagation of perceptions of Taiwan that relate to its status as a nation-state versus it being a part of China, both in Taiwan and elsewhere.

Geography is one of the fixed ingredients in the debate about Taiwan’s national or provincial status. Related to its geography, Taiwan’s climate, land and natural resources tell us whether it is “natural” that Taiwan be seen as different and therefore separate from China, or not. Taiwan’s population also says a lot. Ethnicity tells us even more about whether Taiwan and China should become one, more than simply looking at population data.

Culture is another permanent or at least semi-permanent fixture. On the one hand, it came from China and in some respects over the years changed less in Taiwan than in China. On the other hand, Taiwan has a unique culture influenced by Taiwan’s early connections with other peoples in the region through trade and commerce. It was later impacted by Western colonization, self-rule, governance by China, Japanese colonization and ties with the United States. To many residents of Taiwan culture defines its nationhood and that helps decide if Taiwan fits the definition of a nation-state and, if so, what is its future.

Finally, how the just-discussed factors help one formulate a view that Taiwan is a nation or not are transmitted and/or interpreted via its transportation and communications facilities, the media and its tourists. These are the less fixed variables, but are nevertheless important.

All of these “factors” must be seen in the context of Taiwan’s history, politics, society, economics, politics and foreign relations that are assessed in the chapters that follow. China being a fast rising power with now formidable global influence is another variable; more is said about this in the last chapters of this book.

Physical Setting

Taiwan comprises most of the land area of the nation known officially as the Republic of China (also called Nationalist China, Free China, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the Republic of Taiwan) but most often referred to as just Taiwan. Taipei is its capital. In the West, Taiwan was formerly known as Formosa. The term Formosa has fallen into disuse, though it has been revived by advocates of Taiwan’s independence looking for a non-Chinese term for the island. Some also like Formosa because of its nice meaning—beautiful in Portuguese. Aborigines call for using the word “Ketagelan” or some other native word for Taiwan.¹ Chinese leaders in Beijing regard Taiwan not as a nation but rather as territory belonging to the People’s Republic of China and refer to the island of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and some other islands close to Taiwan as “Taiwan Province.”

In addition to the island of Taiwan, under the Republic of China’s governance are more than a dozen smaller islands, and numerous islets that surround it that are considered geologically linked to it. Among the most important are the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands, 64 in all—19 of which are inhabited; Orchid Island (Lan Tao); Green Island (Lü Tao); and some smaller islands off Taiwan’s eastern coast. The Republic of China also claims two Offshore Island groups that lay very close to China (Quemoy and Matsu and some other small islands near them) and some islands in the South China Sea—that are not geologically part of Taiwan or China.² The People’s Republic of China claims all of the territory under Taipei’s control.

Approximately 230 miles long and 85 miles wide at the center, the surface area of the island of Taiwan is 13,814 square miles, about the size of Holland or the U.S. states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut combined. The Pescadores adds another 49 square miles, Quemoy about 68 square miles, and Matsu ten square miles. However, Taiwan island constitutes 99 percent of the territory of the Republic of China. If the land under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China were regarded as a province of China, it would be the People’s Republic of China’s second smallest province (the smallest before Hainan Island was made a province in 1988). Taiwan has less than 1/260th of China’s land area. Yet if Taiwan were seen as a nation, it would rank above average in population (number 56 of 233 countries listed) though just below average in land area (number 136 of 264).³

The island of Taiwan is positioned between 21˚459 and 25˚509 north latitude, which in the Western Hemisphere would be just north of Cuba. The northern part of Taiwan shares the same latitude as southern Florida. The Tropic of Cancer bisects the island just below its center. Taiwan is bordered on the east by the Pacific Ocean, on the west by the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait (95 miles from China at its closest point), on the northwest by the East China Sea and on the southwest by the South China Sea. To the north, less than 80 miles away, lie the Ryukyu Islands, Japan’s southernmost territory—the closest land area to Taiwan. The island of Kyushu (the southernmost of Japan’s main islands), however, is 700 miles away, and Tokyo is 1,274 miles distant. Less than 100 miles to Taiwan’s south, separated by the Bashi Channel, are the Philippine Islands, though the island of Luzon is 230 miles from Taiwan. East of Taiwan is the great expanse of the Pacific Ocean and finally Mexico.⁴ Of the major cities in the region, Hong Kong is the closest to Taiwan—483 miles away. Next in proximity is Guangzhou, which is 564 miles distant. Manila is 705 miles from Taiwan, Seoul is 885 miles and Beijing is 1,677 miles away.

Most of the islands that are territory of the Republic of China lie close to Taiwan except Quemoy and Matsu and islands in the South China Sea. The Penghu Islands lie 25 miles off Taiwan’s west coast, slightly south of the island’s center. Orchid Island and Green Island off of Taiwan’s east coast are about the same distance from Taiwan Island. The Quemoy group west of central (six islands, two of them controlled by the People’s Republic of China) is located within shouting distance (at the closest point) of Fukien Province of the People’s Republic of China, west of central Taiwan. This island group is situated strategically near the port of Amoy. The Matsu group is located northwest of Taiwan and, like the Quemoy group, is close to the Mainland. It is near the Chinese port of Fuchou (Fuzhou). Both the Quemoy and Matsu island groups are geologically part of China.⁵

Islands claimed by the Republic of China in the South China Sea are further away.⁶ Here Taipei lays claim to some of the Pratas (Dongsha) Islands and Spratly (Nansha) Islands—in fact, the largest islands in both groups—and it maintains military forces on islands in both groups. These island groups are small but are strategically located adjacent to important sea-lanes. In addition, ownership may provide the basis for claims on some of 3.5 million square kilometers of disputed ocean territory plus undersea minerals, including oil and gas, around the islands.

These claims involve Taipei in territorial disputes with the People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.⁷ Taipei’s position vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China differs, however, from its disputes with the other claimants; it is not about whether or not the islands are Chinese territory but to which China they belong.

Both Taipei and Beijing make claim to the islands and most, around 90 percent, of the South China Sea waters based on the “Nine Dash Line” delineation of China’s territory made in 1947 by the government of the Republic of China when it ruled both the mainland and Taiwan. Taipei also makes a claim based on Japan’s control cum jurisdiction over the area the Republic of China assumed after World War II.⁸

In recent years, the dispute has become more contentious owing to offshore oil drilling in disputed waters and due to military clashes between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines there. In the last few years, the issue has turned into a hot one, even resulting in some labelling the South China Sea an international “flashpoint” as China has aggressively pursued its claims, causing blowback among other claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia) and the United States naval vessels transiting the area thus challenging China’s presence.

In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled the 1947 Chinese map was “no basis” for China’s (or Taiwan’s) claims. The United States supported the decision, as did a host of other countries. China rejected the ruling. So did Taiwan. Taiwan’s position was based more on opposition to The Hague’s interpretation of international law notably that Itu Aba (Taiping in Chinese) was not an “island” (that can support human life) but rather an islet or “rock.” China’s claim was based more on history and the Nine Dash Line.⁹

At the time Washington asked Taipei to play down the Nine Dash Line argument and support the Court’s ruling. The Tsai administration, while increasingly hostile toward China and while wanting to curry favor with the United States, did not comply. One reason suggested was that popular opinion in Taiwan was against giving away any of its territory or territorial claims (as witnessed when some advocates of independence earlier proposed abandoning Quemoy and Matsu in order to completely sever ties with China). In any event, Taiwan’s stance supported China’s view.¹⁰

Taipei also claims ownership of the Senkaku or Tiaoyutai (Diaoyutai)—meaning “fishing stage” in Chinese—Islands: eight tiny, uninhabited “islets” just over 100 miles northwest of Taiwan. This claim was made in 1971 after the U.S. government agreed to return the Ryukyu Islands (which included the Senkakus) seized by U.S. military forces at the end of World War II and subsequently controlled by the United States. Taipei based its claim on the fact that Taiwanese fishermen had been using the islands for some years as a stopping-off place to gather bird eggs and dry their nets. Because the islands are geologically part of China’s continental shelf and inasmuch as Taipei claimed sovereignty over all of China, it also made an argument based on geography. Finally, Taipei cited the peace agreement with Japan at the end of World War II as the basis for its claim. Beijing laid claim to the islands ...