Feminist Philosophy

Herta Nagl-Docekal, Katharina Vester

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780813341897
• eBook ISBN: 9780429980107
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Are we in a post-feminist era? Has the term, feminist, grown out of its resisted stance? What from today's standpoint is an appropriate concept of feminist philosophy? And is it not the case that all people thinking democratically must share its central concern? In this book internationally acclaimed philosopher Herta Nagl-Docekal discusses and critiques the theories of today. Her study ranges across philosophical anthropology, aesthetics, philosophy of science, the critique of reason, political theory, and philosophy of law. Continually confronting the persistent problem of the hierarchical relations of the sexes, Nagl-Docekal affirms the importance of feminist thought as she presses for effective approaches to common problems.

1
ON THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SEXES

Why there is no natural order of the sexes

THE CORE CONCERN OF FEMINIST CRITICISM is to expose the manifold ways in which men are privileged and to oppose discrimination against women. Consequently, we must first address what we mean when we say woman and, by extension, man. The meaning connected to each term is essential for all further theorizing. In what sense, then, can we speak about men and women? Where do we start?

It seems reasonable to first examine the colloquial use of these expressions and the ideas conveyed by them. On the one hand, the terms "woman" and "man" are used to express the obvious bodily differences of each sex. On the other hand, a number of idiomatic expressions refer to social roles, for instance, child rearing as women's work or politics as men's business. These expressions are based on normative ideas.

Take the expression women's work. From a woman's perspective, this means because my body shows female sex characteristics, I am expected to choose my occupation within a certain limited spectrum. Although I might be perfectly capable of working in a certain field, I am often overtly or indirectly excluded because this domain is assumed to be for males only. If I try to break through these barriers, I am socially sanctioned and my behavior is viewed as unfeminine.

Those who defend a sexual differentiation of social roles, talents, and so on, believe—even if not explicitly—that the social structure can be justified by "nature." Just because a man and a woman have different bodies, they cannot share social roles. By portraying the "order of the sexes"¹ as natural, this view suggests that this social structure is incontrovertibly valid. Those defending this understanding use two different forms of justification. The division of labor is described as (1) "given by nature" or (2) "wanted by nature." The first regards the social order as based directly on nature, and the second assumes that it needs to be implemented through norms referring to "Nature's intentions." The latter, for instance, informs the still commonly heard rule that it is a "woman's nature" to run the household or choose a helping occupation, such as nursing. Both forms lead to fundamental problems.

From the beginning, feminist research has exposed the conflation of bodily characteristics and social norms. Numerous studies of the life and thought of European and Western modernity document that (in contrast to the egalitarian ideas of the early Enlightenment)² from about the middle of the eighteenth century the image of the ideal couple (the man and the woman) designated different social tasks for each sex, men being assigned to the public domain and women to the domestic. This conception retains its normative significance to the present. This research also demonstrates that the gender model originally tailored to the bourgeoisie patronizes and disadvantages women.³ Thus, the reference to nature still serves to legitimate patriarchal structures.⁴

Historical reconstructions of this kind attempt to decode current asymmetries between the sexes from the perspective of the bourgeois experience. Moreover, they expose historical contingency: As they demonstrate that the "order of the sexes" that prevails in many ways today is hardly more than two centuries old, and they disprove the idea that this is a natural institution. This result corresponds with investigations of earlier periods of history (i.e., about epochs before the Enlightenment)⁵ as well as with ethnological studies of non-European cultures, since they confront the natural argument with a variety of highly diverging gender relations. With regard to the tasks carried out by men and women or the virtues cultivated by them, there is no constant allocation model independent from history.

The notion of the natural character of the reigning order is disproven not only by historical and ethnological research. Analysis of the logic of attempts to justify social norms by referring to nature reinforces their dubiousness. As already mentioned, two widely used forms of argumentation can be characterized as given by nature and wanted by nature. The first variation leads to biological determinism, as the order of human communities is not basically distinguished from animal cohabitation. The division of labor between the sexes is assumed to have been determined in a way similar to the functions in a beehive. This theory, on closer examination, cannot prove the natural character of social norms, since its conceptual frame offers no place for norms. The term norm only makes sense in the context of a theory of freedom—however it may be conceptualized in detail. As I will explain below, norms appeal to people who face a decision. If all human activities are considered natural events, then they can be explained by instinct. Recourse to norms means an inconsistency in this line of argument, since it insinuates that certain human activities cannot be described as animal behavior.

Furthermore, this variant of the natural argument does not do justice to the everyday self-understanding of human beings. On the one hand our body performs automatic reactions (i.e., reactions that we do not cause deliberately). For example, if an object approaches our face at a certain speed, our eyes close; this is a reflex (i.e., involuntary) reaction, not an action. On the other hand, we are constantly confronted with situations that require us to make a decision. This is the experience that philosophical theories of freedom examine more closely. While freedom is often interpreted (and misunderstood) as omnipotence, here it is considered in a restricted frame: The situation in which I am called on to make a decision must not be created by my doing, and it can present me with alternatives in which I must choose the lesser evil. My specific perception is decisive for the situation in which I find myself. It depends on my previous experiences and my educational background, my understanding of the situation, the options for action I see and my standard for evaluating them. It refers to the conventions of language and the interpretation of my time and my social environment. In this sense one must state an unavoidable situatedness of action. However, that we make decisions in a certain context does not speak against freedom as it is here understood—as fundamentally distinguished from natural performances. What is crucial is whether it is up to me—in the above specified meaning—to make a choice. If so, I am called on to act and expect the solution of the problem that I face not from a pattern of involuntary behavior. (This decisionmaking renders the distinction between the terms action and behavior meaningful-)⁶ I cannot possibly avoid the choice, as our everyday experience shows. If I decide in a certain situation to refuse to make a decision, then I act too, since such a decision can only be dealt with adequately in the field that is discussed under the term freedom.

Some have defended biological determinism by depicting the concept of freedom as generated by self-deception. An occurrence that presents itself subjectively as an action can be explained in terms of human species-specific behavior. This statement, however, does not take into account that two different perspectives are here in play: Certain forms of animal and human behavior are examined empirically from the outside, while the perspective of the first person arises from the inside. When a person faces two different options (e.g., different job offers) the decisionmaking cannot be facilitated or evaded by the consideration that the behavior pattern characteristic to the species will take its course anyway. Rather, the person is confronted with the question of what is the right thing to do. This call for a decision presents the starting point for a philosophical discussion of freedom. The first-person perspective is sufficient to justify the use of the term freedom. The question of whether we can produce a theoretical proof of freedom can therefore be left open in this context. The limits of the empirical method are obvious: A purely observational perspective is incapable of grasping adequately what it means to consider and evaluate the various possibilities of action in a certain situation. Of course, actions are also empirically perceptible events. But calling an observable event an action implies that we assume that in this case a decision from the perspective of the first person has been made. Ascribing actions to cerebro-physiological or biochemical processes cannot visualize the reasons for or against the discrete options weighed by the person under consideration. Thus the empirical sciences can neither explain nor refute freedom.

A philosophical theory of freedom must deal with a number of concepts that play a role in my further reflections, including autonomy, morals, ethics, rights, politics, power, and history. The expression norm or social norm acquires meaning only in this context. Only when people feel called on to decide between different options can norms have relevance as guidelines for their actions. (When norm is understood more generally as principle of action, it can refer to Kant's conception of the maxim. According to Kant, unless an action can be referred to a maxim, it cannot be conceived of and justified as a real action based on a deliberate decision.)

Researchers working in comparative behavior have attempted to derive morals phylogenically. Certain animal behavior patterns are characterized as "the inhibition of killing clan members, incest taboos, mating for life, devotional care of the brood, selfless readiness to fight for the protection of the weakest."⁷ This behavior is evaluated as evidence for the "instinctive bases of human moral systems."⁸ But this method is problematic for several reasons. First, the difference between action and behmnor is not taken seriously Whoever attributes the mild outcome of a conflict to a "killing inhibition" assumes that there was no deliberate decision and therefore no action based on moral norms. Konrad Lorenz speaks of merely "moral-analogous" behavior with reference to animals.⁹ But this expression only reveals the deficiency of theories that locate the basis of human morality in behavior patterns. The logic of analogies has not been sufficiently thought through. One characteristic of the analogy is that it starts with a difference: Phenomena perceived as undoubtedly nonidentical are being connected. Lorenz's use of the expression moralanalogous suggests tiiat nothing but a comparison is made—between instinctive behavior on the one hand and moral action on the other. But how could a behavior that is considered moral-analogous be the origin of morality in the actual meaning of the term? It is only possible to speak of a phylogenic genesis of morality if the analogy that is drawn in the beginning is denied in the next step.

A further problem (apparent in the description of behavior patterns quoted above) lies in the circularity of the argument: The claim to "derive" morality phylogenically presupposes that morality is projected onto the animal kingdom with the help of anthropomorphizing language. How can animals have a concept of taboo, disqualify polygamous forms of life, or orient themselves toward a norm of selflessness? Certainly an observer can use the same words to describe certain behaviors among human beings and animals. For instance, newborns receive care for a while. But both cases cannot be explained in the same way. A term like morality can't be used for animals because norms direct action differently than instinct governs behavior. If I have a moral rule in my mind in a certain situation, it does not automatically orient my decision toward it. Thus people who care for children see good reasons for doing so and act in accordance with them. But they are not governed by an instinct that leaves them no choice but to "care self-sacrificingly for the brood." Again, the term morality only makes sense when there is freedom of decision. If norms functioned like instincts, it would be impossible to distinguish between responsible and immoral action, and the concepts of norm and action would be contradictory.

Special attention must be paid to the content of the norms, which the theory of evolution claims to trace back to a biological foundation. Obviously these norms are not notions of correct actions shared by all people. We are confronted here with the strategy of keeping historically contingent concepts of social order beyond debate by attributing to them a natural origin. If there is a foundational correlation, it runs in a contrary direction to the one claimed: The so-called morality of animals is intentionally characterized in a way that corresponds to the defended social order. The questionability of this strategy is immediately clear: There are animal behaviors that cannot be explained in terms of a steady relationship or an incest taboo. Since an arbitrary selection is at work here, the statement of the phylogenic origin of morality must be based on a strong interest in the legitimization of certain social norms. Consequently the philosophical debate on these issues is dismissed and the customary rules adjudicating serious scientific research are grossly violated.¹⁰

The wanted by nature argument leads to comparably great difficulties. Initially the first-person perspective, which is decisive for action, is taken seriously. One of the different options at hand is said to correspond with the intention of nature. This, so the expectation, will bring the agent(s) to conclude that this option is the one that is best justified and is therefore to be carried out. The difficulties of this line of thought become obvious in light of the two dimensions of everyday experience addressed above. Because we have reflexes, it seems legitimate to speak of humans' having "natural" processes. The Aristotelian way of defining nature in opposition to art is relevant in this context, even if the ontological frame in which this distinction is formulated in Aristotle can no longer be defended. It makes sense to call an event "natural" only if it takes place (spoken from the perspective of action) automatically—if it is not due to intentional planning. No norms are required for such processes to take place. A norm makes sense only in regard to the second dimension of experience— when we can or must make a decision.

In this second context we need to clarify our own intentions, and a reference to an intention of nature does not have a compelling character. Those who assume that it does, risk a performative contradiction. The fact that an ought is formulated at all suggests that the case in question is not left to the discretion of a natural course.¹¹ I can orient myself toward natural processes and, for example, retire for the night as early as the birds do. But in such a case, too, I act in the narrow sense of the word: It is my decision to use the evening behavior of birds as a model. My retiring for the night does not happen by itself; rather, it comes from my decision to choose this particular option, To sum up, when we are called on to decide and to act (although only in this regard), it can be said (in a variation of a well-known formulation from Herder) that human beings have always been enfranchised from nature.

These distinctions support a feminist rejection of any attempt to legitimate a division of tasks between the sexes, in the private or the public sphere, by ascribing them to an intention of nature.¹² Th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: Feminist Philosophy Under Post-feminist Conditions
• 1 On the Anthropology of the Sexes
• 2 Art and Femininity
• 3 Reason: A Concept with Connotations of Masculinity
• 4 For a Nonessentialist Politics
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index