Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order

Shahram Chubin, Charles Tripp

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781136043925
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Both countries will have strong incentives to test the artificial balance established by the US and from which they are excluded.Each state, in the face of continued embargoes, may find the lure of weapons of mass destruction correspondingly increased.

II Contemporary Questions of Security

10.4324/9781315000435-3

Military Threat Perceptions and Responses

From Iran’s vantage point, the most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is the dominant position of the United States. The US can now pursue policies, such as the Middle East peace process, relatively uncontested. It can target adversaries and selectively punish them with sanctions, although the effects of these are often limited. Iran faces an international order dominated by economic power, of which it has little, with more emphasis on regional politics, which it now conducts with few, if any, allies.

While the rift between the Arab and Persian shores of the Gulf grew in the 1980s, Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait gave Iran a reprieve. Without effacing the memory of Iran as a potential threat, it gave Tehran a chance to redefine its interests and integrate itself into Persian Gulf politics. With Iraq ostracised from Gulf politics, Iran’s importance was correspondingly enhanced. However, this windfall came with a catch: the United States also gained as a result of the 1991 Gulf War and its position in the region was strengthened. The Arab Gulf states were less reticent about enhancing their security ties with the US. The US in turn increased and made more permanent its military presence in the region (amounting to some 20,000 personnel, 200 aircraft and 20 surface vessels at any given time).

The lessons of the two Gulf wars were stark and vivid for Iran. They demonstrated the importance of military professionalism and competence, the advantages of deploying modern weapons systems, and the vulnerability of expensive infrastructures to accurate air strikes. The US has continued to show its readiness to punish the regime in Baghdad with long-range attacks. In view of the US military presence, tensions with Washington and Iran’s own vulnerability, Iran was concerned that these strikes might not in future be limited only to Iraq. ¹ Indeed, in August 1996, US officials began to talk openly of attacks against Iran if it were found to be complicit in terrorist activities against US citizens, whether in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere. Quite apart from the threat implied, the United States’ military forces acted to frustrate Iran’s sense of importance as the largest regional state. For Iran, a strengthened US presence distorted the natural order of regional relationships.

This view was based on a sense of weakness rather than strength. The war with Iraq and international isolation cost Iran dearly. It had lost or run down most of its military equipment, which was becoming obsolescent, and it was unable to acquire spare parts or upgrades from the West that might extend the lives of its key weapons systems. Iran’s land forces were in disarray, its air defences virtually non-existent and its air force in the throes of a major change to a totally new supplier – Russia. The difficulties of Iran’s revolutionary leaders moving from one set of systems to another involves a host of problems in language, logistics, maintenance, training, doctrine and overall assimilation, all of which limit effectiveness for a number of years. In Iran’s case, the problem was compounded by the switch from advanced to less advanced technology, by the absence of a reliable supplier (given the turmoil in the Russian arms industries), by an ideological predisposition to emphasise domestic production and by financial constraints. Iran is also attempting to reorganise its armed forces, emphasising professionalism over ideological considerations and manoeuvre over a static approach to warfare.

Inferences about Iran’s intentions from its pattern of military procurement need to be drawn with caution. This procurement is influenced as much by lessons derived from the war with Iraq and the availability of arms as by any strategic grand design. Similarly, budgets rather than strategy dictate the pace of the arms programme and, given reliance on oil revenues which fluctuate widely, that pace is bound to be uncertain and variable. (For example the third Kilo-class submarine has yet to be delivered to Iran from Russia because of Iran’s financial problems.)

Iran’s annual defence expenditure has been modest compared to that of Saudi Arabia, which has less than a third of Iran’s population and a less varied set of security concerns (for Iran has to consider not only Iraq but also its unstable northern and eastern borders). Considering that Saudi Arabia consistently outspent Iran militarily during the years of the Iran–Iraq war, Iran’s view that its own arms purchases are necessary and minimal while those of Saudi Arabia are unusually large is not surprising. ² Also, given the coalition’s reliance in Operation Desert Storm on the infrastructure in place in Saudi Arabia, Iranian planners must consider whether Saudi arms purchases are intended solely for their own use. ³

From these same perspectives, the United States’ formulation in May 1993 of a ‘dual containment’ policy towards Iraq and Iran bears a striking similarity to the Saudi ideal: the exclusion of the two major Gulf powers and concentration on the centrality of the Kingdom in regional affairs. In this view, the United States and Saudi Arabia have several reasons for exaggerating the threat posed to the region by Iran.

• Such a threat rationalises the massive transfer of arms when such costs are causing concern in certain Arab Gulf states.
• In Iran’s view, it opens the door to the ‘selective proliferation’ of arms that require US transfers, but brands those destined for Iran (or Iraq) as inherently destabilising.
• It also keeps the GCC together, close to Saudi Arabia and dependent on the US for security, whose presence is thereby justified. ⁴ Iran registered ‘extreme concern’ when Kuwait concluded a ten year defence cooperation agreement with the US in late 1991. It similarly opposed subsequent agreements with other Gulf states.

The United States has drawn public attention to Iran’s alleged military build-up, including chemical weapons, on and around Abu Musa island. ⁵ It has repeatedly declared that Iran is aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, ⁶ and has leaked reports that in straitened economic circumstances Iran might resort to aggression, block the flow of oil and seize Arab territory. ⁷ Iran is concerned that the aim of US allegations and Israeli threats regarding the impermissibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is to justify a preventive attack on its facilities and infrastructure. ⁸

Iran’s attitude towards the US presence in the Gulf has evolved as relations have become more strained. In March 1991, Rafsanjani characterised the presence as giving rise to tension, but not constituting a threat. ⁹ By 1994–95, Iran’s attitude had changed and warnings (and protests to the UN) about the US military presence in the Gulf had become more frequent, with one leader calling it a ‘stupid show of strength’. ¹⁰

Iranian military exercises anticipate and plan for the possible use of force by the US in several of the following scenarios:

• an attack (unilaterally or with Israel) against it; the targets may be production facilities of nuclear or other WMDs, research facilities or sites housing relevant technology.
• punitive strikes against military and/or infrastructure targets. These might be retaliatory strikes for participation in terrorism or warning strikes for supporting terrorist groups or opposing the peace process.
• US assistance to an Arab state in support of its claims in a territorial dispute with Iran, such as to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over Abu Musa. In this case, US forces might launch a surprise attack and occupy the island, thereby creating a difficult-to-reverse fait accompli.

In none of these cases would the United States act alone; in all scenarios, regional states would be implicated in some way. Consequently, Iranian strategy revolves around deterring a US attack and preventing assistance by regional states. Iran might target the key state, Saudi Arabia, and in effect hold it hostage. Iran could threaten to respond against Saudi oil facilities (15 minutes’ flight time from Iranian bases) if it were attacked. Long-range missiles might be the preferred weapon for this scenario.

A related strategy would be to deter or inhibit the entry of the US Navy into the Persian Gulf in times of crisis. This would be consistent with the acquisition and deployment of missiles, mines and submarines. But these weapons are more impressive as threats than in actual use. In any case, most US naval operations against Iran could be conducted from ships stationed outside Gulf waters. Blocking the entrance to the Gulf would also harm Iran, since with no overland pipeline routes for its oil exports it is more dependent on the flow of oil through the Gulf than Saudi Arabia or other regional states.

In trying to impress the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Iran has to avoid frightening them off. This nuance is not easy for a state which has many contradictory inclinations and pronouncements. Iran must convince its neighbours not to ignore it without actually threatening them. To improve and emphasise its military preparedness Iran undertakes a regular series of military exercises which include amphibious forces, missile forces and combined arms in both the northern and southern Gulf.

In April 1994, Iran offered to hold joint land exercises with its Gulf neighbours. Kuwait responded in August that it would consider the offer and submit it to the GCC. In September 1994 Iran’s Foreign Minister proposed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the conclusion of a ‘defensive security pact’ among the littoral states of the Gulf. This included the suggestion that all states should become parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention and that provisions for inspections and monitoring of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons be undertaken on a regional basis. Regarding conventional weapons, Iran called for a limit to military expenditures, a ceiling on arms imports and information exchanges to improve transparency. ¹¹ This offer has not been elaborated further, but remains on the table until political relations make cooperation easier.

Yet Saudi Arabia is perplexed by Iran’s intentions. As one Saudi paper put it in 1993, ‘The passage of time has actually increased the unclear nature of the picture vis-à-vis its relations with neighbours’, stating that the Saudi hope was to ‘persuade Iran to make its relations with all the region’s states clear and coherent without resorting to duality, telling the Iranian scene one thing and its neighbours another’. ¹² It is partly for this reason that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states have pressed ahead, taking unilateral measures to ensure their own military security, generally in close collaboration with the US and other Western states. For all the improvement in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent defeat of Iraq, Iran has done nothing since to justify a fundamental revision of Saudi threat perceptions or defence strategies.

Saudi strategy remains largely geared to deterring aggression – principally from Iraq or Iran – and in this the US has a central role to play. Even before the bombs which were targeted at the US military presence in the Kingdom, the Saudi government was well aware of less conventional threats to its security, such as domestic reaction against a government that is too close to the West and to the US in particular. It also recognises the possibility of an increasingly disaffected officer corps should the expansion of the Saudi armed forces outstrip existing forms of supervision and control. At the same time, the King must cultivate the consensus of the ruling family’s senior princes, not all of whom are convinced that a strong public defence association with the US is the best guarantee of Saudi Arabian security.

Subsequent to Iraq’s defeat in 1991, the Saudi government had to decide how best to defend of the Kingdom. Possibly impressed by the size of the Iraqi armed forces and by the size of the allied force assembled to defeat Iraq, some in the Saudi ruling elite began to talk of creating a Saudi defence force of 200,000 men. This, they argued, would allow the Kingdom to take care of its own defence and thus avoid calling in the assistance of outside powers in a direct and, some argued, humiliating way. ¹³

Although this plan captured the imagination of some and appealed to the sense of independence and desire for self-sufficiency of many, it was not a practicable solution. Not only would it require the introduction of general conscription, but it might also create armed forces that could, in time, threaten the very regime that had created it – as in the case of most of the other Middle Eastern states that had rapidly expanded their armed forces.

At the same time, to respond to ideas in the region concerning the importance of ‘collective regional security’, and to reduce dependence on forces from outside the Arab world, Saudi Arabia, together with the other members of the GCC, Egypt and Syria, signed the Damascus Declaration in March 1991. This declaration envisaged creating a defence pact whereby Egypt and Syria would provide the manpower for a force that would be financed by the Gulf states and stationed in the GCC states to boost the numbers and credibility of their own forces. Building on the cooperation established in the war against Iraq, this was intended to be a ‘culturally sensitive’ way of organising the defence of Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states.

In fact, this approach proved to be ‘culturally sensitive’ in more ways than one. The Saudis and others soon realised that the presence of Syrian and Egyptian troops in the Gulf would limit their own ability to determine the priorities in Gulf security. The GCC states were also not prepared to subsidise these forces on the scale expected by the Egyptian and Syrian governments. Finally, if the military threats which these troops were meant to counter were likely to come from Iraq and Iran, then the record of Egypt and Syria, which had taken opposing sides in the Iran–Iraq war, was not a reassuring one.

As a result, Egyptian and Syrian troops were withdrawn in 1991 and the Damascus Declaration lost its viability. It lived on as a forum in which the eight countries could meet from time to time, providing yet another platform from which to express general views relevant to whatever happened to concern them at the time.

However, as far as Saudi Arabia was concerned, the GCC was also an unsuitable vehicle for any effective defence against the military threats represented by either Iraq or Iran. This attitude did not prevent the Saudi government from lending its support to commissions of enquiry within the framework of the GCC aimed at exploring what the implications might be should the Council seek to transform the largely token Peninsular Shield Force into an effective military force. Most notably, this led to the proposal by Oman that, in order to be taken seriously, the GCC would have to create a force of at least 100,000 with a command independent of any of the Council’s governments and answerable to the GCC collectively. ¹⁴ The implications of this for Saudi dominance within the GCC, as well as for the authority of the Council as an organisation (as opposed to that of the states’ rulers) ensured that the plan was shelved.

One of the principal values of the GCC for Saudi Arabia was the ‘security cordon’ it provided, not so much in terms of military security, but of internal security. Mistrustful of Iran’s intentions, as well as of sections of its own population, the Saudi government still fears Iran’s capacity to threaten it through subversion and internal political agitation. These suspicions are never far from the surface.

The Tehran regime … raises its voice in lamentation and wailing over the loss of trust between Iran and neighbouring sta...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Table of Contents
• Copyright Page
• Introduction
• I. The Record of Relations 1979–1991
• II. Contemporary Questions of Security
• III. Ideological Competition: An Islamic Cold War
• IV. Oil Politics, Revenues and Economic Security
• Conclusion
• Notes