Iraq

Sanctions And Beyond

Anthony H Cordesman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429979262
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume provides analysis of the state of Iraqs security and of current Western policy toward the country in the wake of the Gulf War. It also examines the political, economic, and security impact of sanctions, Iraqs future role as an oil exporter, the U.S. policy of dual containment in relation to Iraq, and options for dealing with Iraq in the future. }This volume provides analysis of the state of Iraqs security and of current Western policy toward the country in the wake of the Gulf War. It also examines the political, economic, and security impact of sanctions, Iraqs future role as an oil exporter, the U.S. policy of dual containment in relation to Iraq, and options for dealing with Iraq in the future. }

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Introduction

Iraq’s current regime presents unambiguous security threats to the other states of the Gulf and to the West. While Iran’s regime may offer some hope for constructive engagement, Iraq is virtually certain to be a revan-chist and aggressive state as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. Even if Saddam and his coterie should fall from power, their immediate successor will most likely consist of another Sunni authoritarian elite, made up of other members of the Ba’ath party, senior military officers, or a combination of both.

It may well be a decade before any political transformation occurs in Iraq that produces a stable, moderate government. In the interim, Iraq may go through several short-lived regimes and even civil war. Its politics are likely to remain the politics of violence, many of its future leaders are likely to seek revenge for the Gulf War and its aftermath, and its political elites are likely to reassert Iraq’s search for hegemony in the Gulf and seek to become the leading regional military power.

This does not mean that Iraq cannot change, and should not be encouraged to change. It does not mean that sanctions and isolation are the only way of dealing with Iraq, or that Iraq’s people should be punished indefinitely for the actions of its leaders. It does mean, however, that the Gulf and the West must be realistic in shaping their policy towards Iraq, and must have a realistic understanding of its current regime and military potential.

The Policy Options for Dealing with Iraq

The West and the other states in the Gulf must find ways to live with Iraq, seek to moderate the conduct of its regime, and create a climate for positive political change. The basic issue for policy is how this can best be done. There are several major policy options that the West, other Gulf states, and other nations can pursue:

•Lifting political and economic sanctions under conditions that leave Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath elite in power, and which effectively recognize that Iraq will not fully comply with the terms of the UN cease-fire.

•Continuing the present UN sanctions that isolate Iraq politically and cripple its economy, in order to force Saddam Hussein from power and to create a successor regime that will be less aggressive and willing to trade changes in the regime’s behavior for a lifting of sanctions;

•Lifting all or most political and economic sanctions in return for a large degree of Iraqi compliance with the terms of the UN cease-fire, requiring full Iraqi compliance in providing reparations and the recognition by Iraq of its new borders with a sovereign Kuwait, but leaving Saddam Hussein and the present regime in power;

•A step-by-step lifting of political and economic sanctions under conditions which trade specific changes in the conduct of Iraq’s regime for each step in reducing the present sanctions, while leaving Saddam Hussein and the present Ba’ath and military elite in power;

•Seeking to create an alternative “centrist” regime that is still based on the Ba’ath, Sunni elites, and/or the military, but drives Saddam Hussein and his coterie from power by maintaining a mix of sanctions, using other economic and political pressures, using covert action, and persuading neighboring states like Turkey and Jordan to support such a “peripheral strategy”;

•Adopting a “peripheral” strategy that combines sanctions with covert action, which attempts to mobilize the Kurds and Shi’ites against the central regime, and which seeks to persuade neighboring states like Turkey and Jordan to support such a “peripheral strategy” and;

•Pursuing an individual national policy towards Iraq that seeks to maximize political and/or trade benefits in dealing with Iraq, regardless of the character of its regime and its conduct towards other states.

The UN is still committed to a policy of sanctions, but it is clear that there no longer is such a degree of international unity in pursuing this policy.

•Some states—such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain and the US—continue to favor a hard-line approach because they believe it is impossible to deal with Saddam Hussein’s regime. Even Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, however, did not fully support the US during the Kurdish crisis of August-September, 1996.

•Other states, including major outside powers like France and Russia, believe that sanctions now harm Iraq’s people without offering any guarantee of changes in its leadership or the character of its regime. They are more concerned with debt repayment and resuming trade, arms sales, and other economic relations than with containing and deposing Saddam Hussein.

•Other nations support the containment of Iraq’s military build-up but oppose continuing with sanctions that cause massive hardship for Iraq’s people and block oil exports, other trade, and investment. These states include many Arab, European, and Asian states friendly to the US, as well as friendly Gulf states like Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.

•There are also a number of developing states which believe that the UN resolutions now take the form of an oppressive or “neo-imperialist” interference in the national affairs of Iraq. Still other states pursue a policy of covert opportunism, laying the ground work for future economic ties and arms sales to Iraq.

These divisions within the international community create growing uncertainties as to whether a policy or strategy that relies on sanctions can be successful. In spite of continuing discoveries that Iraq has lied to the UN about its holdings of weapons of mass destruction, a combination of legitimate humanitarian concerns and Iraq’s oil wealth and economic potential make it doubtful that a sanctions policy can remain in force for more than a few more years. One can never underestimate Saddam Hussein’s unique ability to alienate world opinion, but policy must begin to look at other options, including how to live with Iraq on different terms.

Key Policy Complications in Dealing with Iraq

Finding such a new strategy for dealing with Iraq will not be easy. There is no question that Saddam Hussein and the present Iraqi regime are repressive and represent a serious threat to regional peace. At the same time, there are a number of other variables that must be considered in trying to shape such a policy towards Iraq, and in developing a consistent and workable policy approach to deal with the Iraqi regime:

•The humanitarian issue is very real, and raises growing questions about how much an entire nation can be punished for the actions of an authoritarian elite. Iraq is a nation of over 20 million people, with a high birth rate, and a population that is two-thirds non-Sunni Arab. The UN sanctions have begun to inflict so much hardship on Iraq’s people that they threaten widespread malnutrition. Most of the costs of these sanctions are being paid for by Iraqis who are victims of Iraq’s authoritarian leadership.¹

•The Gulf and the West must live with the Iraq that UN sanctions are creating. The suffering caused by UN sanctions is creating broad Iraqi resentment of the US, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—who are now seen as largely responsible for the continued enforcement of sanctions. The resulting revanchism may well survive Saddam Hussein, and could play an important role in shaping Iraqi politics and actions for several decades.

•The terms of the cease-fire accords call for massive Iraqi reparations and offer no clear path to stable peaceful relations. Coupled to the impact of sanctions over the half-decade since the cease-fire, a literal enforcement of current reparations agreements is certain to increase Iraqi revanchism, just as the “economic consequences of the peace” following World War I helped create the extremism that destroyed the Weimar Republic and brought the Nazis to power.

•There are many well-educated and moderate Iraqis, but there is no meaningful moderate political opposition with any popular standing. Iraq has long been an authoritarian state ruled by small, violent, ruthless factions within its Sunni minority. It has no tradition of legitimate representative government, or of providing representation that reflects the ethnic and sectarian differences within its population. Further, Saddam’s alliance with the Kurdish Democratic Party in September 1996 allowed him to drive most of Iraq’s weak opposition elements out of the Kurdish exclusion zone in Northern Iraq. It is easy to talk in vague terms about the emergence of a more representative regime, but there is no real political base for such change.

•Iraq is a deeply divided nation that could be torn apart by civil war. Recent CIA estimates indicate that 63–68% of Iraq’s population is non-Sunni (60–65% Shi’ite) and that 20–25% are non-Arab (15–20% Kurdish).² These sectarian and ethnic divisions within Iraq have already created a separate Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq and a civil war between the Kurdish factions in this entity. They have led to civil war between the Iraqi regime and some of its Shi’ites. Any policy towards Iraq must deal with the Kurdish question, and the risk of Shi’ite separatism.

•The Kurdish question cannot be dealt with as an Iraqi issue alone. It affects Iran, Syria, and Turkey, countries with sizable and restive Kurdish minorities.

•Iraq cannot be dealt with in isolation from Iran. A weak, divided Iraq might lead to Iranian efforts to divide or absorb part of Iraq. At the same time, there is always the risk that Iraq may be willing to strike a “devil’s bargain” with Iran, and that both nations may act in unison to threaten the Gulf or try to break out from containment.

•Iraq is a major oil power with vast oil reserves that have a major impact on world energy supplies. Virtually all projections of future energy balances call for large-scale Iraqi oil production to ensure an adequate world supply of oil and to keep oil prices moderate. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects Iraqi oil production at 4.4 million barrels per day (MMBD) in 2000, 5.4 MMBD in 2005, and 6.4 MMBD in 2010. These projections would make Iraq the second largest oil producer in the Gulf, providing nearly 7% of all world oil production.³

A Lack of Present and Future Consensus

Iraq is a case where all the available policy options have powerful negatives. No policy can avoid the contradictions inherent in choosing between the near-term security provided by sanctions and containment, and the resulting costs in terms of Iraqi revanchism and human suffering.

There are several small, moderate, and democratic Iraqi opposition movements, but they have little power or internal influence in Iraq. Iraq’s politics are highly nationalistic and violent in character, and they are the politics of small competing Sunni power elites and clan groupings. Even if Saddam falls, his most likely successor would be another s...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables and Illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Internal Political Developments Since the Gulf War
• 3 The Informal Politics of the “Center”
• 4 The Formal Politics of Iraq’s Instruments of State Power
• 5 The “Periphery”: Opposition Movements and Ethnic and Sectarian Issues
• 6 The “Periphery”: Political Alienation and Abuses of Human Rights
• 7 Sanctions and Economic Instability
• 8 Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities
• 9 External Relations
• 10 Military Developments
• 11 The Threat from Iraqi Land Forces
• 12 The Threat from Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces
• 13 The Threat from Iraqi Naval Forces
• 14 Unconventional Warfare and Terrorism
• 15 The Threat from Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction
• 16 The Problem of Policy: Beyond Sanctions and “Dual Containment”
• Sources and Methods
• Notes
• About the Book and Authors