The Iranian Revolution Then And Now

Indicators Of Regime Instability

Dariush Zahedi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429976049
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In The Iranian Revolution Then and Now , Dariush Zahedi assesses the Islamic Republic's potential for revolution through an in-depth, theoretically informed, comparative analysis of the present with 1979 pre-Revolutionary Iran. Zahedi discusses how the potential for a revolutionary coup is based on two things: the inherent defects and vulnerabilities in the regime and the coordinated actions of the social groups and individuals opposed to the regime. He also identifies two ideal-typical forms of revolutionary change. }In The Iranian Revolution Then and Now , Dariush Zahedi assesses the Islamic Republic's potential for revolution through an in-depth, theoretically informed, comparative analysis of the present with 1979 pre-Revolutionary Iran. Zahedi discusses how the potential for a revolutionary coup is based on two things: the inherent defects and vulnerabilities in the regime and the coordinated actions of the social groups and individuals opposed to the regime. He also identifies two ideal-typical forms of revolutionary change (the regime collapses on its own, or, the regime is overthrown). He concludes that the chances for overthrowing the present regime are moderate. }

1
Introduction

If violence is the father of every great upheaval, its mother is illusion. The belief which is always reborn in every great and decisive historical struggle is that this is the last fight, that after this struggle all poverty, all suffering, all oppression will be a thing of the past

—Franz Borkenau, "State and Revolution in the Paris Commune, the Russian Civil War, and the Spanish Civil War"¹

One of the most important distinguishing features of the 1979 Iranian revolution was its comparatively enormous popular base. According to the estimations of analysts who were closely monitoring the Iranian political scene during the revolutionary process, about 8 million people, approximately one-fifth of the entire Iranian population at the time, demonstrated against the still-formidable regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi on a religious holiday in December 1978 (Cottam, 1990, p. 3). However, soon after the triumph of the revolution, when it became evident that the forces associated with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had clearly gained ascendancy in the postrevolutionary power struggle, the grand coalition that had managed to topple the shah's regime began to crumble. As a result, active support for the new regime dwindled to a highly committed core base. Composed of a proportion of the clerical establishment, the urban poor, and the lower middle class, this support enabled the regime to consolidate its power.

What is noteworthy about the recent history of the Islamic Republic is the continued corrosion in both the scale and scope of social support for the regime. Iran at the end of the twentieth century is a land of dashed hopes. More than twenty years after its inception, the theocracy is in grave trouble. Disillusioned, disgruntled, and destitute, Iranians in increasing numbers, including those who at one point constituted the revolution's most ardent supporters, have come to assume negative attitudes toward the disappointing outcome of "the greatest populist revolution in human history" (Cottam, quoted in Laipson, Sick, and Cottam, 1995, p. 10).

In an interview with a German newspaper shortly before his death in January 1995, Mehdi Bazargan, Iran's first postrevolution prime minister, asserted that the theocracy had the support of less than 5 percent of the populace (Sanger, 1995). Similarly, a veteran Iran expert, citing anecdotal evidence, recently estimated that not more than 1.5 to 15 percent of the population can be regarded as supporters of the regime (Laipson, Sick, and Cottam, 1995, p. 10). In Iran's most recent presidential election held in May 1997, an astounding 70 percent of the country's electorate voted for Mohammad Khatami, a former culture minister who had been sacked from his position because of his tolerant views and liberal interpretation of Islam. Khatami, who was viewed suspiciously by many of the most powerful figures in the Islamic republic, achieved his landslide victory because of the fact that many of the theocracy's ruling clerics, including Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, had made their support for his archrival abundantly clear. Khatami thus came to be widely regarded, in a manner that neither he nor those who anointed him had anticipated, as the antiestablishment candidate. Khatami's triumph, therefore, may be interpreted as a resounding protest vote against the prevailing order.

Both before and after his inauguration in August 1997, Khatami has consistently emphasized his desire to institutionalize the rule of law, curb the theocracy's irksome (social and private) restrictions, and promote the establishment of a vibrant civil society. He has even been able to take some, albeit tentative, steps toward the realization of his vision. His efforts, however, have been continually resisted, and in some instances reversed, by the president's powerful conservative rivals, who control most of the nation's levers of power. Underscoring their desire for meaningful change and liberalization, Iranians nonetheless continue to be overwhelmingly supportive of Khatami and his vision. Responding to an opinion poll conducted by the Islamic Republic's news agency (IRNA) on the first anniversary of Khatami's May 1997 landslide victory, a staggering 75 percent of the nation's populace once again expressed continued support for the president ("Reformists Score Points as Iran Marks Two Decades of Revolution," 1999). In February 1999, proreform candidates associated with President Khatami captured approximately 80 percent of the ballots cast in nationwide elections for municipal councils (a provision of the Constitution that had up to then not been implemented), with 24 million of the 39 eligible voters going to the polls (Abdo, 1999b, p. 9). In what was widely regarded as an expression of popular dismay toward the politically dominant conservative faction, which has doggedly resisted reforms, Abdullah Nouri emerged as the top winner in Tehran. Nouri served as Khatami's minister of interior until June 1998, when he was impeached by the conservative-dominated Parliament. The conservative members of Parliament disapproved strongly of Nouri's "liberal" interpretation of the Constitution as well as his proclivity to authorize proreform rallies. Subsequently, Nouri was physically assaulted by Hezbollahi zealots in September 1998, and he was imprisoned in November 1999 because the newspaper that he directed had published articles that many from the conservative establishment considered deleterious to the system ("Iran: Reforming Win," 1999, p. 42). In February 2000, more than 80 percent of Iran's young and politically awakened electorate went to the polls and provided the reformist camp associated with Khatami with the majority of the seats in Parliament. In explaining the delegitimization of the ongoing system, primary weight is generally accorded to the ruling clerics' gross ineptitude in managing the Iranian economy, their repressiveness, and the blatant abuse, on the part of many in their ranks, of their power and privileges.

The Disintegration of the Iranian Revolution

Initially, the revolutionaries pledged to reverse the course of dependent economic development—favoring economic growth and rewarding a few well-connected families—pursued by the Pahlavi regime. Instead, they promised to create an economically developed and independent Iran in which the fruits of economic growth and prosperity were to be combined with equity and social justice. Civil liberties as well as the right of citizens to petition their government through the formation of voluntary associations and political parties were to be assured. Above all, however, both government and society were to become morally uplifted through piety and strict compliance with the dictates of Islam.

Socioeconomic Crises

In fact, precisely the reverse has occurred. The revolutionaries have reneged on all of their promises. Economic independence and prosperity have proved elusive, as the faction-ridden clerics have been unable to agree on what constitutes a viable "Islamic" economic system. A bloated and corrupt public sector, a climate of political uncertainty, and an apparent lack of direction have undermined confidence. As a result, investors—domestic and foreign—have largely refrained from risking their money in the Iranian market. The decline in the price of oil and Iran's massive debt burden have further damaged the economy. In the last few years, there have been seven major spontaneous riots over spiraling prices and appalling living conditions.

Shortly after the revolution, in search of self-sufficiency, the Iranian government nationalized a vast proportion of Iran's large-scale industries, as well as banking and insurance. Some of these businesses were appropriated by the government itself, while others were entrusted to largely autonomous, parastate "foundations" (Karshenas and Pesaran, 1995). The foundations have since amassed great power, operating largely above the law. Enjoying extensive access to the cheapest exchange rates, they have been able to monopolize many industries. Their practices have had the effect of compromising efficiency, discouraging competition, and undermining confidence. They have also contributed to the mushrooming of bureaucracy.

The number of individuals currently employed by government and quasi-governmental sectors has nearly tripled since the shah's era (from 800,000 in 1977–1978 to 2 million in 1992–1993). "According to the Organization of Employment Affairs, the productive labor of each government employee is less than one hour per day" (Ehsani, 1994, p. 21). Jealous of its enormous power and prerogatives, the bureaucracy was instrumental in derailing President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's initiatives toward economic rationalization and privatization.

Iran's efforts to attract investments (themselves a tacit abandonment of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's goal of independence from the West) are also impeded by Iran's image abroad, which has been tarnished by the assassination of opposition figures overseas, Khomeini's religious decree in 1989 sanctioning the death of Salman Rushdie (the British author of The Satanic Verses), and Iran's rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process (Ehsani, 1994, p. 18). Moreover, many investors are wary of committing resources to "an unstable country with a government that has been in an undeclared state of war with the world's premier power" (Shirley, 1993, p. 107). As a result, most of Iran's trading partners, including the United States prior to the initiation of President Clinton's unilateral trade embargo in 1995, have been prepared to trade with Iran only on the basis of cash or short-term credit, refraining from large-scale investment (barring the capital-intensive and relatively secure oil and gas sectors).

Underlying Iran's economic deterioration has been the country's exploding population. In the course of the last twenty years, Iran's population has nearly doubled, reaching 64 million people, some 30 million more than at the end of the shah's rule. Iran's population explosion was ignited immediately after the revolution by the clerical elites' reintroduction of child marriages and discouragement of contraception (Hoodfar, 1994; Zonis, 1993). During the Iran-Iraq war, Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged Iranians to beget as many children as possible. Iran's increased population, Khomeini reasoned, would strengthen the country, providing it with more soldiers to become martyrs in Iran's holy war against the infidel armies of Saddam Hussein as well as in its struggle against the "world-devouring" United States. Subsequently becoming aware of the potentially devastating political ramifications of a rapidly expanding population, the Iranian government "issued a national birth control policy, which Ayatollah Khomeini ratified shortly before his death in 1989" (Hoodfar, 1994, p. 12). Partly due to this policy, but due even more to declining standards of living, the population growth rate was reduced from 3.2 percent in the 1980s to 2.3 percent in the early 1990s (Ehsani, 1994, p. 19). (According to some commentators, by the mid-1990s, the growth rate dropped further, to 1.8 percent [Ehteshami, 1995, p. 115].)

Iran's population explosion, however, has already taken its toll, and it is likely to present the regime with even more devastating consequences in the future. Largely concentrated in the country's urban centers, a large proportion of Iran's expanding population has joined the ranks of the dispossessed. Shortages and the failure of the government to meet fundamental needs have, as noted, sparked several spontaneous uprisings. The unemployment rate for those aged fifteen to twenty-four is twice the national average, which currently hovers around 30 percent. According to one estimate, among those who are fortunate enough to work, underemployment has climbed to 75 percent, while inflation on basic items now fluctuates from 40 to 200 percent. The unemployment and underemployment figures are likely to deteriorate in the future, inasmuch as the economy, even were it to undergo a miraculous recovery, would be hard-pressed to accommodate the huge pool of individuals seeking gainful employment or higher education. At present, about one-half of Iran's population is under fifteen, and a colossal 70 percent is under thirty. Even today, less than one-tenth of those who want to attend university are able to do so.²

The mismanagement of the Iranian economy, the population explosion, and the enormous cost of the devastating Iran-Iraq war ($650 billion, according to a conservative estimate) have pauperized Iran's population (Amirahmadi, 1992, pp. 260–262). Average per capita income in Iran today is only one-fourth of what it was in 1979, the year in which the Islamic Republic was established. Foreign diplomats stationed in Tehran estimate that close to 60 percent of Iranians live below the poverty line. Rather than combining prosperity with social justice, the revolution has resulted in the maximization of wealth and power for the few. The latest figures put out by the regime itself indicate that the collective income of the wealthiest 10 percent of Iran's population is 27.3 times greater than that of the poorest 10 percent. These figures indicate that the income disparity between rich and poor in Iran is twice the average for underdeveloped nations.³ This is an especially abysmal record for a regime whose "pivotal claim has been that it speaks for the 'powerless' or 'disinherited' of the whole world, not merely of Iran or even the Muslim world" (Ramazani, 1989, p. 166).

The impoverishment of the Iranian populace has been accelerated recently by the plummeting of Iran's oil revenues and, in turn, the ballooning of its debt. After the conclusion of its war with Iraq, which it nearly lost outright, Iran began to borrow heavily overseas in order to finance hitherto neglected infrastructure projects and to import customer goods. The consumer imports, designed to placate the public after the chronic shortages of the war, were financed by short-term letters of credit, which came due just as the nation's oil revenues fell off (Economist, July 26, 1994).

Iran's foreign debt was recently officially estimated to stand at $32 billion, most of which is owed to Japanese and European firms ("Country Report: Iran," 1995, p. 23). About $12 billion of this debt came due in 1995; Iran, lacking the resources to pay, was forced to refinance. However, U.S. pressure prevented Iran from arranging multilateral rescheduling through the Paris Club of Bankers. Consequently, Iran had to negotiate nineteen separate debt agreements (Waldman, 1995). This burden has had lamentable implications for Iran's fragile economy. Iran was obliged to repay $4.5 billion in 1996 (one-third of its projected oil revenue) and $7 billion in 1997 (one-half of its oil revenue).

Compounding Iran's numerous economic problems is the decline in the value of the dollar. Iran receives about 85 percent of its foreign-exchange earnings from its oil, which is sold in dollars.⁴ However, the dollar has lost about 25 percent of its value since 1994. As a result of this drop, offset by only a small rise in oil prices in the same period, oil-producing nations are now losing 20 percent of potential revenue (Middle East Economic Digest, 1995, p. 16). This situation is especially burdensome for Iran, since most of its debt is owed to Germany and Japan, two nations whose currencies have appreciated the most against the dollar.

Meanwhile, Iran is obliged to spend at least $2 billion a year for the next five years to improve and expand its oil fields, 88 percent of which have already passed their peak (Ehsani, 1994, p. 21; Iran Times, May 26, 1995). Prerevolutionary production was almost twice its present level. Back then, Iran's average daily oil production was 5.5 million barrels a day, 500,000 barrels of which were consumed domestically and the remainder exported. Today, the nation produces approximately 3.5 million barrels of oil per day, of which roughly 1.5 million barrels are consumed domestically (Mossavar-Rahmani, 1999, p. 32). At the same time, Iran's per capita oil income (which composes 85 percent of the country's export earnings) has plummeted from $1,300 during the final years of the shah's rule to less than $200 today (Amirahmadi, 1999, p. 88). It is especially important for Iran to invest in its oil-extraction capacity and to reduce its domestic consumption, for at current levels, domestic requirements will leave nothing for exports by the end of 2010 ("An Economy in Disarray," 1994, p. 29).

Political Oppression

The disappointment in the political realm has been just as devastating. Civil liberties have been trampled upon, and the murder of political dissidents both inside and outside the country has continued ("The Connection: An Exclusive Look at How Iran Hunts Down Its Opponents Abroad," 1994). Strict official censorship has been imposed on domestic publications, broadcasts, and movies, and effective measures have been introduced to encourage self-censorship. The initial constitutional right of free expression has been amended to require the media to "enjoin the good and forbid the evil." This vague law has been abused by the regime to arbitrarily intimidate, harass, or imprison those whose activities and pronouncements are deemed to be "un-Islamic." Since January 1995, numerous publications have been shut down by the government, while several others have been forced to cease operating because the subsidies for paper accorded to them have suddenly been revoked (Wright, 1996, p. 171).

The former director of the American CIA, John Deutsche, recently asserted that since 1989, the Iranian regime has "murdered at least 48 [of its] opponents abroad" ("Tehran May Become More Aggressive," 1996, p. 15). In December 1995, a United Nations panel voted to condemn Iran's human rights compliance. In condemning Iran, the UN resolution cited the following factors as particularly reprehensible: "the high number of executions, cases of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. . . lack of adequate protection for religious minorities . . . excessive force in suppressing demonstrations, restrictions on the freedom of expression, thought, opinion and the press and widespread discrimination against women" ("UN Panel Knocks Iran Human Rights," 1995, p. 15).

In a relevant report, the UN Human Rights Commission has estimated the number of Iran's political prisoners as standing at 19,000, suggesting that the Islamic Republic is one of the most repressive regimes in the world (Teimourian, 1994, p. 70).

Although the formation of political parties is sanctioned by the regime's c...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Dedication
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Problem of Revolution
• 3 The Social Underpinnings of Present-Day and Prerevolutionary Regimes: The Intelligentsia, the Clerics, and the Bazaaris
• 4 The Social Underpinnings of the Monarchy and the Theocracy: The Business Community, the Middle Class, and the Dispossessed
• 5 The Oppositional Forces: From Temporary Cohesion to Large-Scale Demoralization and Disorganization
• 6 Comparing the Nature and Leadership Qualities of Prerevolutionary and Postrevolutionary Authoritarian Regimes
• 7 Conclusion: The Problem of Revolution Revisited
• References
• Index