Iraq at the Crossroads

State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change

Toby Dodge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781136053207
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

A war against Iraq will spur radical changes in the way the country is governed, how its people live, and its relationship to its neighbours and to the West. This book depicts the evolution of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and describes each side's battle plan and the war's likely aftermath.

Chapter 1

America's War on Iraq: Myths and Opportunities

Judith S. Yaphe

During the summer of 2001, conservative supporters of the Bush administration were still finding their places at the table in the Vice-President's Office, the Pentagon, the State Department, and on the little known and much maligned Defense Policy Board, an advisory group comprised of former government officials from the winning side and the conservative think-tanks that helped plot the election victory. They made clear their strong support for Israel in its war with the Palestinians and their advocacy of regime change in Iraq and Iran. Until September 2001, not much attention was given to their quest to remove Saddam Hussein. Much critical attention, however, was paid to the Bush administration's reluctance to involve itself in the violence that marked the destruction of the peace process begun under the administration of the George H.W. Bush.

This changed with the events of 11 September. After the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City, the Pentagon, and the aborted attack in Pennsylvania, the neo-conservative foreign and defence policy advisers to George W. Bush were catapulted to prominence. Dubbed the neocons by their critics, they espoused the global war on terrorism, which they soon designated by ‘phases’ – Phase 1: Get Osama bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda, and eliminate Afghanistan as a safe haven and launching point for terrorists to attack the United States, its allies and friends; Phase 2: get Saddam Hussein, destroy his Ba'athist regime and establish democratic government in the New Iraq. Some even argued for a Phase 3, in which the state sponsors of terrorism from the present and past – Syria, Iran, Libya, parts of Lebanon, Colombia, even China – would be purged of their evil, unrepresentative, non-elected regimes and brought into the new world of democratic enlightenment.

This paper will examine the debate and the debaters on what policy the United States should pursue regarding Iraq, and consider some of the myths and realities, risks and opportunities that our policy choices represent. This is not intended to be an examination of the second Bush administration's Middle East policy as a whole nor of its efforts – or lack thereof – in trying to resolve tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. The focus here is Iraq.

Washington's myths and myth-makers

As have all administrations, the Bush administration has been inundated with advice from the right and ultra-right wings of the Republican Party, as well as from the Democrats and the remnants or descendants of 1960s liberal-left elements. While the neocons of the Republican Party are the dominant influence on foreign and defence policy-making,¹ all of the groups offering advice have a constituency either in the government, the press, the think-tanks, and/or the private sector. The following list gives a flavour of who is advising what on Iraq to whom:

The truth as released by the administration: In this version, current in the Office of the Vice-President, the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and elements in the State Department and the halls of Congress, Saddam is evil. He is responsible for the death and destruction of Iraq as well as wreaking havoc on neighbouring Iran and Kuwait. He used chemical weapons on his own people and on Iranians during their 8-year war in the 1980s. He has allowed war, economic sanctions imposed by the UN, and a cruel government-controlled system of wage and price controls and monopolies, to reward friends and family while destroying Iraq's once-burgeoning middle class and making all Iraqis more dependent on him for their well-being. He sponsors international terrorist groups, giving them training, safe haven, weapons and operational assistance, although Baghdad still cannot be linked to al-Qaeda directly and the events of 11 September. He is determined to retain and rebuild the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes banned by UN Security Council Resolution 687, particularly nuclear and biological weapons. He will never accede to disarmament by any UN body, be it UNSCOM or its light version, UNMOVIC.² If the US is present in the Gulf to protect its access to the region's energy resources – gas and oil – then he represents a threat to that interest, as well as to neighbours who have allowed the US access to their military facilities to maintain monitoring flights under Operation Northern Watch (out of Turkey) and Operation Southern Watch (from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). Saddam is a danger to Iraqis, to the neighbourhood, to Israel and, existentially, to us. The only solution is regime change and its replacement by a democratically installed government. Vice-President Cheney is in the forefront of those calling for a preemptive attack on Iraq.³

The truth as divined by the Neocons: Conservative think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, its director Richard Perle, and the former director for Central Intelligence James Woolsey expand on the above scenario. They view Iraq as the ‘strategic prize’ and are enthusiastic supporters of Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress. Once liberated, they say, Iraq will provide the spark to transform the region – the Palestinians, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and ultimately even Egypt – from autocracy to democracy. The New Iraq will make peace with Israel and join with us as a strategic partner against Iran, the real threat in the region. Few US forces will be needed. Instead, we can apply the lessons learnt from the war on terrorism in Afghanistan – smart bombs, air power, special forces, and an ally on the ground. No coalition will be necessary – we can do this with only Turkey, Kuwait and the UK, of course, to help us. As these conservatives are fond of saying, ‘Determination breeds success’. If we attack, we will be successful, and ‘they’ will follow. Others call for a more ‘muscular’ response to Saddam in order to prevent the region from becoming a ‘chaotic platform for greater global terrorism’. One prominent editorial writer noted in June that the US needs to rely more on a greatly expanded and intrusive military presence in the region to support diplomacy. ‘American forces,’ he said, ‘would stay for years to help develop and shield new and democratic leaderships in Iraq and in a Palestinian state.’⁴

The truth as designated by the Military: For the Joint Chiefs and the Combatant Commander of US Central Command, General Tommy Franks, the picture is more complicated and risky. We can do it, they say, but don't ask us now with your plans and under your conditions. Even under the Clinton administration, military plans called for 200,000 to 300,000 ground forces in addition to air power and the new generation of smart weapons. Different strategies are being discussed. Should it be a war with few US troops and Iraqi ‘allies’? Should it be a multi-prong attack or an inside strategy focused on taking Baghdad? I leave this discussion more appropriately to military analysts.⁵

The truth as determined by the New (or Old) Left: In contrast to the neocons, the neoleft depicts war as immoral and war against Iraq as illegal. It will only punish the Iraqi people; they rarely mention the regime or Saddam. Members of groups such as Voices in the Wilderness and the Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC), which do charitable good works, also naively believe Saddam has been demonised and his Iraq with its malevolent security service maligned. Some political neophytes who have visited Iraq talk of the absence of any government monitors because they could not ‘see’ any. Most buy into the official Iraqi line that the United States is responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people under sanctions and the destruction of this once-powerful, modern country, the most advanced and Westernised medically, scientifically and educationally in the region. The only answer is to remove sanctions, welcome Iraq back into the community of nations – which they believe is self-policing – and help rebuild the country. They have a telling argument in one respect. The neoleftists, joined in spirit for a short time by Republican conservative Richard Armey, charge that a war would be illegal under US and international law. They point out the implications at home and abroad if the US were to attack Iraq without sufficient provocation, without a UN mandate and without coalition backing. Furthermore, Armey points out, no war can occur without the advice and consent of Congress. They are, in my view, essentially correct, in particularly regarding the impact on American civil society and how Americans view their making of their foreign and defence policies. They are correct, too, in terms of the image of the United States held by many people abroad living under the cloud of repressive regimes; for people who tend to believe in the principles of American governance without liking the American government, the US historically represented the rule of law, rights guaranteed in a written constitution, human rights, the right of citizens to enjoy and participate in a free and vibrant civil society.

The truth as defined by the K Street corridor: The mainstream think-tanks that line Washington's main streets – the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Institute for Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Council on Foreign Relations, and even the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom – are all venerable institutions representing the political centre, the slightly to the left of centre, or in the case of the Nixon Center, the moderate right. Wanting to have influence with whatever administration occupies the White House, they say that we can do Iraq but it will be costly in terms of money and manpower and, by the way, few of us have knowledge of Iraq, experience in the region, or a military background. Before deciding on war as the ultimate answer to our Iraq problem, they are exploring ways to make arms inspections more effective, what to do about people displaced by war, how to make smart sanctions smarter, and how to win over our European and Asian friends to our cause.

The truth as revealed by the regional special interest crowd: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the Middle East Institute (MEI) profess to be non-partisan in their research on appropriate policies for the US government to pursue regarding Iraq, but objectivity is in the eye of the beholder. Both are eloquent spokesmen for very special interests – WINEP speaks for Israel and its publications advocate policies as defined by Israeli officials and pro-Israeli researchers; MEI is no less an advocate for the Arab voice in US policy-making. WINEP has long been an advocate for the ‘Iraq as Strategic Prize’ thesis, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Chalabi, the creation and funding of an Iraqi Liberation Army, as well as regime change in Iran and Saudi Arabia. MEI until this spring worked with the State Department to bring together various elements that comprise the opposition to Saddam in exile, including the INC, the Iraqi National Accord and the many military and civilian Iraqi exiles with the skills, knowledge and desire to help rebuild Iraq after Saddam is gone.

Realities in US policy towards Iraq

All US governments have defined their policy choices regarding the Persian Gulf and Iraq in ‘real’ terms. It's the oil, even if we purchase less than 20% of our oil energy needs from Gulf states. It's the trade, even if we are not now a major trading partner of Iran or Iraq, and the total purchasing power of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states cannot possibly purchase enough over time to sustain American economic growth. It's in our interest to preserve a balance of power in the region to protect our friends, even if they are autocrats who do not share our interests in democratic institutions, participatory democracy and human rights.

Similarly, US governments have had choices in how to deal with Iraq. In the 1980s, we provided military assistance when it seemed the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran would win the war and threaten not only Iraq but the fragile states of the GCC as well. The first Bush administration was loath to pursue charges of Iraq's use of chemical weapons or miserable human rights record because of the lure of trade and investment. Iraq's bullying of its Gulf Arab neighbours and invasion of Kuwait changed all that. Twelve years after the invasion of Kuwait and imposition of sanctions, American choices in dealing with Saddam and his regime – and conversely Iraqi options in dealing with the US – are narrowing as the rhetoric heats up and each side restates its non-negotiable position.

Saddam's position is that Iraq does not have a WMD capacity so all sanctions have to end now. His strategy of a diplomatic offensive resulted in the Arab summit's Beirut declaration in March 2002, which protested against an American attack on Iraq, called for an end to sanctions, and embraced Iraq as a reinstated member of the Arab fold. This diplomatic strategy is closely linked to an economic offensive that includes new deals with Russia and an expanding import-export construction, and cheap oil trade with Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran. All these governments have fragile economies dependent on doing business with Iraq. They understand Baghdad's warning that a war now would not only destroy Iraq's economy, it would place the fragile economies and governments of its neighbours at risk as well. The possibility that Saddam will do an about-face – as he did in 1975 when he decided to make peace with a stronger Iran to end the chronic Kurdish wars, at least temporarily, and concede to the Shah, also temporarily, his territorial demands in the Shatt al-Arab waterway – seems remote.

For Washington, the choices are few: impose sanctions on him, ignore him, accept him as the ultimate survivor, eliminate him, or pray someone else will. Sanctions and seeking to eliminate him as the ruler of Iraq are options the US is willing to pursue. Ignoring Saddam or accepting him, while preferable to some governments, remain unacceptable choices for the United States. Whatever the option, Saddam Hussein and the country he rules cannot be ignored, accepted, or eliminated without great risk.

Should sanctions-based policy continue? Sanctions initially were seen as a way to influence, shape, or modify the behaviour of a wayward state in much the same way as parents deal with a wayward child – you will not develop and use weapons of mass destruction, you will not frighten or invade your neighbour, you will not terrorise or oppress your people or any other people. Two kinds of sanctions were applied to Baghdad under terms of UNSCR 687 and 688 in April 1991: economic sanctions, which could be lifted when Iraq was found by the UN Security Council to be in compliance with the resolutions calling for elimination of its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles; and a second set of sanctions that prohibits acquisition of military hardware and must be removed by a separate UN Security Council vote. Saddam Hussein must comply with UN Security Council Resolutions dictating Iraqi surrender for destruction all WMD programmes, stockpiles and sites, return to Kuwait all prisoners of war and stolen property and pay reparations to those harmed by his military occupation and near destruction of Kuwait. Saddam was also to end persecution of Iraq's so-called minorities – so-called because the ‘minority’ Shia Muslim Arabs comprise nearly 60% of the population of Iraq and the Kurds comprise approximately 20%.

Sanctions as policy were further refined by the administrations after George H.W. Bush. In 1993, the Clinton administration enshrined sanctions in its policy of dual containment. Dual containment was meant to force the ‘rogue’ states of Iran and Iraq to modify their behaviour and abide by international norms and UN Security Council resolutions.⁶ Policy on Iraq became containment plus WMD inspections by UNSCOM, along with military operations when Iraq was found to be ‘in breach’ of the UNSCRs,⁷ and at the end of the Clinton administration, regime change. Red lines for US military operations were also defined: if Saddam deployed weapons of mass destruction, if he threatened his neighbours and if he attacked the Kurds.

Sanctions worked in denying Saddam sovereignty and unfettered use of Iraq's oil revenues, in weakening his military and in denying him the ability to easily acquire componen...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Biographies
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 America’s War on Iraq: Myths and Opportunities
• Chapter 2 A Possible US-Led Campaign Against Iraq: Key Factors and an Assessment
• Chapter 3 Cake walk, Coup or Urban Warfare: the Battle for Iraq
• Chapter 4 A Few Days After: State and Society in a Post-Saddam Iraq
• Chapter 5 Saddam’s Power Structure: the Tikritis Before, During and After the War
• Chapter 6 The Iraqi Army and Anti-Army: Some Reflections on the Role of the Military
• Chapter 7 The Kurdish Dilemma: The Golden Era Threatened
• Chapter 8 Economy and Society in Iraqi Kurdistan: Fragile Institutions and Enduring Trends
• Chapter 9 Clerics, Tribes, Ideologues and Urban Dwellers in the South of Iraq: the Potential for Rebellion