Christianity After Communism

Social, Political, And Cultural Struggle In Russia

Niels C., Jr. Nielsen, Niels C. Nielsen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429981319
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Sociology

Specialists from Europe and the US investigate the current and changing role of religion in post-communist Russia. Drawing upon Eastern Orthodox, Protestant and Roman Catholic points of view, they examine the Russian religious attitudes, activities and institutions, and explore the ways in which religion will significantly impact emerging social and political questions there. The volume should be of use to scholars of Russian politics, society, and religion and for anyone interested in the emerging culture of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

1
Religion, Revolution, and Order in Russia

Dennis J. Dunn

When Vladimir had the East Slavic peoples baptized into the Orthodox Christian religion in 988, he provided a basis for a new order that slowly evolved on the Eurasian plain. Orthodoxy became the foundation for the states of Kievan Rus, Muscovy, and the Russian empire. The order that was fashioned was not a perfect order, but it was a society, on a rough and dangerous plain, where people could find, more often than not, a measure of justice, a framework for consistent morality, protection from invasion, a strong government, a viable economic system, a rich religious life, gifted artists and writers, support for the family as the basic unit of society, and, finally, the potential for evolving a society of law, limited government, and free inquiry. That the latter potential remained undeveloped, in contrast to Western Christian society, does not diminish Slavic Orthodoxy as a source of creativity, law, and responsible government. For a long stretch of history it was hamstrung by the tradition of caesaropapism. When it attempted to remove that yoke in the 17th century, the Tsar proved to be too powerful, and Peter the Great replaced the patriarch with a government office, the so-called Holy Synod. In addition, Orthodoxy had to contend against the legacy of Mongol despotism in the state of Muscovy and the culturally divisive and secularizing influence of Western political models and ideologies from as early as the seventeenth century, but especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The Tsars were interested in shackling the Church and society to strengthen their power. The importation of Western military technology, Prussian and Swedish government models, and French and German ideology was undertaken to enhance the absolutism and military prowess of the central government. The growing secularization of Russian society, which Western ideologies especially reinforced, soon created a rift between the religious masses and the intellectual elite, and, eventually, between the tsar and the intelligentsia. The Tsarist government led the secularizing drive, but seemingly was oblivious to the damage that secularization was doing to the concept of a religiously-sanctioned monarchy. Russia could have imported Western Christian ideas, which actually were at the root of Western society, but the history of ill-feeling between Western and Eastern Christianity and the disdain and abandonment of Western Christianity by many Western intellectuals precluded that possibility. Some Russian intellectuals, like Peter Chaadayev and Vladimir Soloviev, urged Russia to turn to Western Christianity, but most intellectuals were convinced that the putative Utopia of secular Western ideologies was the only direction for Russia.

As Tsarist Russia pulled away from its religious roots and adopted Western secular ideologies and models, it increasingly found itself with a weakened system of order and civic cooperation. By the end of the 19th century Orthodoxy was still influential, but harmony and amity in Russian society was quickly dissipating. To be sure, Russian society was industrializing and, by the reign of Alexander II, initiating some fundamental reforms, but it was losing its social cohesion, sense of purpose, and shared hope in the future. Russian society increasingly saw class conflicts; social disruption and alienation; disunity; internecine violence; the waging of imperialist wars or policies against Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Poland, Japan, and China; and growing ideological movements that claimed to be scientific and progressive but were in fact quite dogmatic and fatuous.

In the wake of the triple defeats of the Crimean War of 1853-55, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, and World War One, the Tsarist government cracked and eventually fell. It had brought on its own destruction in part through its neglect of the religious base and unwillingness to allow the religious institutions to evolve to reform the social order. It consistently showed poor judgment in pursuing war, blocking land reform, and crippling political change. Ironically, the Tsarist government's move away from Orthodoxy brought on disorder that created opportunities for a reformed Christian order. The Orthodox reformers included Vladimir Soloviev, Nicholas Berdyaev, Sergei Bulgakov, and Sergei Frank who found in Christian teaching the basis for a new order built around human freedom. Fr. George Gapon, furthermore, found in Orthodoxy a social program that addressed the needs of workers and peasants.

The weakened condition of the Tsarist state, however, was an opportunity not only for Christian reformers, but also for the radical ideologists who had become so commonplace by the turn of the century. In fact, the secularizing ideologies from the West had conditioned the Russian intelligentsia to favor a non-religious order, indeed, an antireligious order. In truth, many intellectuals blamed Orthodoxy in part for the failures of the Tsarist government. Under those circumstances, it proved to be quite impossible for Orthodox and other religious reformers to provide a framework for a new order. Instead, the day belonged to the ideologists. The violence and strain associated with World War One shattered the already vacuous Tsarist order, stymied the religious reformers, and opened the door to the most extreme ideological movement on the Russian scene, the Communist party of Lenin. Instead of a government that promoted and protected human freedom and creativity, the people of Tsarist Russia had a Marxist-Leninist government imposed on them. It was a cataclysmal change from the waning religiously-based order of Orthodox Russia.

Once the Communists were in power, they implemented two parallel and mutually supportive policies: they continued the Tsarist policy of separating the people from their religious roots, and, secondly, they forcibly tried to remake society to conform to their a priori ideological convictions. The consequences of these policies were far-reaching. Communist society came to resemble Tsarist society in its yoking of the peasantry and its drive toward centralization, although the new government was no longer hampered by traditional morality as it went about the process of social engineering. Second, a massive persecution of religion was organized. The Communists acted largely because religion, although weakened greatly by the Tsarist government, was still a powerful force among the people and thus a block to the development of an ideological society that wanted no transcendent power to which individual conscience could appeal to justify deviation from the Party's totalitarian rule. In 1928-29, with the beginning of the First Five Year Plan and the policies of collectivization and industrialization, all religions were violently persecuted. No church, temple, or mosque was left untouched. Third, the persecution and growing secularization of Soviet society led directly to violence, class hatred, paranoia, private and public arrogance and selfishness, irrationality, pessimism, civic collapse, and imperialist policies in Asia and Europe. The Leninist-Stalinist society of the 1920s and 1930s was a mindless orgy of brutality where the best and brightest people perished in a river of blood. The state succeeded in industrializing quickly some sectors of the economy only by foolishly wasting the rich resources of the land and talents of the people. It expanded its influence in Mongolia, China, and Eastern Europe only by expending its treasure and allying itself with its mortal enemy, Nazi Germany. It fashioned an order that appeared strong to the casual outside observer, but was feeding on itself, bringing on weakness and eventual disorder. Only massive force and terror kept Soviet society from flying apart, and under those conditions there was little room for human productivity, creativity, and freedom.

The attack against religion in the 1930s was uncommonly brutal. One first-rate observer at the time, William Henry Chamberlain, the Christian Science Monitor correspondent, was shocked at the intensity and vulgarity of the persecution. He concluded that religion in Soviet Russia was quickly being exterminated.¹ The Communists, however, were not satisfied with the results. They were surprised during the 1937 census when some 50 million Soviet citizens, despite years of antireligious propaganda, persecution, and the threat of reprisal and intimidation, announced that they were still believers.² Nadezha Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, warned then that religion was still a profound force which was not withering away any too quickly.³ As a result, the Communists increased their antireligious effort, especially during their alliance from 1939 to 1941 with the other major ideological state, Nazi Germany.

Despite the Communist onslaught, religious belief and institutions persisted. They survived primarily among women and old people, where they were a significant force because of tradition and the attractiveness of religiously-based morality as compared to the politically-based morality of Communism. When the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany went to war, religion obtained a breathing space from persecution and further strengthened its position. The Communists, faced with a direct threat to their regime, looked for any friend or ally. The Russian Orthodox Church was especially cultivated, because it proved itself to be a valuable ally against the Nazis, Stalin allowed the Russian Orthodox Church to elect a Patriarch — Sergei — in 1943 and to start publishing again the Journal of the Russian Patriarchate. The Bolsheviks were impressed with the Orthodox Church for four reasons. When the Germans occupied Ukraine and Belorussia, they allowed the churches to be opened, and the people flocked to them. It was clear that religion had not lost much of its appeal despite decades of Communist persecution, propaganda, and indoctrination. Secondly, when the Nazis attacked, the Church leaders called upon the people to defend Holy Russia and the Soviet government, and the people responded. It was obvious that Orthodoxy was a deep-seated force among the Russian people. Thirdly, believers tended to be honest, hard-working, self-disciplined, and responsible, in other words, reliable and valuable citizens. It was foolish to attack them any time, but especially during a time of national crisis. Finally, the Soviet Union's Western Allies, the United States and England, were concerned about religious freedom in the USSR. It was clear that a tolerant religious policy could pay dividends for the Soviets in the West.

As for other religions, their position depended upon Moscow's internal and external policy needs. Jews continued to be hampered, although their treatment improved because they were seen as useful allies against the Nazis. However, Stalin's anti-Semitism worked against this trend. Catholics, not a significant numerical group after the USSR lost the three Baltic States arid western Ukraine, were attacked less than before, and the Kremlin made some marginal efforts to establish a modus vivendi with the Vatican for whatever benefit it would bring either from Moscow's Western Allies or from the Catholic populations of Eastern Europe. The Muslims also obtained a temporary reprieve from Moscow primarily because it was preoccupied with the German threat and religious persecution was a low priority. All the different religious groups did contribute to the Soviet Union's war effort, and the Soviet government realized the counterproductiveness of pursuing antireligious policies while the country was fighting for its life.

After the war and into the 1950s the Soviet government continued with its expedient approach, which meant a particular religion's status depended upon its usefulness to Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The Orthodox Church was tolerated because of its wartime effort, its usefulness in support of Soviet foreign policy, especially peace campaigns, and its leadership's willingness to support Soviet policies, including Soviet antireligious policy. Muslims were publicly put up with because of benefits that such a policy provided the USSR in the Muslim world, but privately the government worked to secularize Muslim life. Jews, for their part, were persecuted because of traditional anti-Semitism and Soviet suspicion of Israel's ability to influence Soviet Jews. Catholics were persecuted vigorously, too. The Ukrainian Uniate Church in Galicia and Transcarpathia was forced to join the Russian Orthodox Church. The Latin Catholic Church in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had some of its bishops and priests arrested. Catholic Churches throughout Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe were also generally persecuted as Moscow attempted in the late 1940s and early 1950s to force the satellites to adopt the Soviet model. Protestant sects were also attacked, and certain groups, like the Pentecostals, Seventh Day Adventists, Initiativniki Baptists, and Jehovah's Witnesses were outlawed.

In short, the general approach of the Soviet government toward religion from 1941 through most of the 1950s was ambivalent — some religions were tolerated and others were persecuted. The inconsistent approach ended in late 1958 when the Soviet government launched a massive antireligious campaign, including arresting clergy, imprisoning believers, and closing churches.⁴ The campaign was started by Khrushchev, and it was continued, with varying degrees of intensity, by Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev. The post-Khrushchev campaign was not as intense or heavy-handed as Khrushchev's persecution, but it was still persistent and only really waned on the eve of the celebration of the millennium of the Christianization of the East Slavs in 1988.⁵ One of the most heinous aspects of this persecution was the placing of police agents and collaborators in positions of religious responsibility in all of the major religions of the Soviet Empire, but especially in the Orthodox Church.⁶

The motivation for this onslaught was undoubtedly linked to religion's growth, and the challenge which that expansion implied. Religion grew for two reasons. The inconsistency of the Communist persecution enabled religion to survive and gain a foothold. Secondly, the continuing failure of ideological policies applied to the social, political, and economic order made religion attractive as an alternative source of order. The Communists tried to cultivate deserts, reverse rivers, maintain a huge military backed by heavy industry, change human nature, establish imperialist bases around the world, make Stalinists popular, increase nuclear weapons while avoiding nuclear war, challenge yet coexist with capitalists, and control heretical Communists, especially Chinese deviationists. Violence and terror, although tempered by Stalin's successors, permeated the social fabric. The Communist policies were incredibly expensive, wasteful, and consistently unsuccessful. "Super" status was achieved as a military and space power, but the society could not feed itself and the standard of living remained low. Disillusionment and cynicism sprouted among the people, and arrogance and selfishness among the Communist elite. In the four decades following the end of World War Two, the Communists maintained the system by milking the resources of Eastern Europe, tightening the belts of the Soviet citizenry, using up the rich natural resources of the Eurasian plain, especially the oil and gold, building a huge espionage network to ferret out technical and security information abroad, and obtaining occasional subsidies from the capitalists who were mystified by the ideological gyrations of the Kremlin. The foreign policy of expansion and the domestic policy of censorship and isolation kept the world in a fog about the true weakness of the Soviet Union, that it was essentially a sprawling empire, held together by force but otherwise lacking any tolerable system of cooperation and order. It was an undiagnosed sickman.

The Soviet state's weakness was an opportunity for religion. As the trauma of Stalinism and World War Two abated and disillusionment with Communism set in, religion stood ready to offer itself as a basis for a new order, and it soon found supporters from among two groups that the Communists thought were firmly in their camp or under their control: intellectuals and nationalists.

The intellectuals were attracted to religion after th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• About the Editor and Contributors
• Introduction
• 1 Religion, Revolution, and Order in Russia
• 2 Church and Society in Russia Today
• 3 Ethics and Economic Activity in Russia
• 4 The New Religious Press in Russia
• 5 Christian Democrats in Russia, 1989 - 1993
• 6 Sociological Models of Religion in Post-Communist Societies
• 7 Current Developments in Russia and the Response of the Russian Orthodox
• 8 Your Prophets Are Our Prophets
• 9 The West Wants Chaos
• 10 Visions in Conflict: Starting Anew Through the Prism of Leadership Training
• 11 The Roman Catholic Church in Post-Communist Russia: Opportunities and Challenges
• 12 The Role of Religious Communities in the War in Former Yugoslavia
• About the Book