European Crisis Management and Defence

The Search for Capabilities

Hans-Christian Hagman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781136052569
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Assesses the EU and NATO's tools to prevent conflicts and manage international crises. It offers a unique insight into European security policy and questions the realism of the political goals. It argues for more coordination among European states, and an enhancement of the EU's strategic decision-making capabilities.

Chapter 1

Capability Initiatives

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NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative

NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is often perceived as a reaction to the European deficiencies highlighted by Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999.¹ According to the US Department of Defense (DoD), the European allies were particularly weak in precision strike, mobility and command and control and communications (C³), and lacked sufficient strategic lift and aircraft for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (European nations did, however, have sufficient tactical and operational airlift).² Poor doctrinal and technical interoperability among the allies were seen as further challenges.³

In fact, the DCI began as a US initiative in June 1998, designed to address the growing technological gap between the US and its NATO allies, the strategic de-coupling of Europe and the US and declining European defence budgets and procurement. Increased European defence spending and off-the-shelf procurement of capabilities were seen as the solution. By late 2002 and the NATO Summit in Prague, however, little had changed in US and European perceptions of capabilities.

The DCI was seen in the US as a blueprint for NATO's response to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Joint Vision (JV) doctrines.⁴ However, faced with obvious European weaknesses during the Kosovo campaign, the DCI was transformed into NATO policy just ahead of the Washington Summit, and was adopted with little debate.⁵ Significantly, the goals were not the result of a comprehensive NATO assessment, nor were they linked to any specific scenarios.⁶ With hindsight, the DCI was narrowly focused on military capabilities and towards conventional military crisis management. Nevertheless, the DCI did add momentum to European defence restructuring, and its effects will be felt throughout the decade.

The DCI identified 58 vital upgrade goals in deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, the survivability of forces and infrastructure and command-and-control and information systems.⁷ Several involved the military use of commercial sea and airlift, the sharing or pooling of transport assets, establishing multinational logistic units and expanding logistics and support forces. Other goals included acquiring precision-guided munitions, all-weather weapon systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and non-lethal weapons. Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection and C3 were also covered, as were ‘softer’ areas to do with concepts, policies and doctrines. Several goals related to battlefield ground surveillance (such as Joint-STARS) and theatre- and ballistic-missile defence.⁸ The DCI was noticeably similar to the ‘wish-lists’ of the US and the Western European Union (WEU), and the French and British after-action reports on Kosovo.

Of the 58 goals, a number were seen as ‘low-hanging fruits’ – delivering additional capabilities reasonably quickly, and without great cost. Most coordination, cooperation and training objectives fell into this category. The DCI was also seen as a mechanism for increasing interoperability in peace-support operations. A majority of the goals were applicable to NATO partners, and were channelled to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) planning and review process.⁹

Different perceptions of the DCI

Within the alliance, national interpretations of the DCI varied widely. In general, most Eastern European NATO members saw it as a long-term project to be dealt with after they had adapted their own armed forces, a process expected to take ten years or more. Thus, the DCI was seen as geared mostly towards the UK, France and Germany, because most of its elements are expensive, involve advanced technology or take for granted a certain degree of interoperability. Smaller NATO countries welcomed the DO, but claimed that there was little prospect of them contributing to its large, high-tech projects. France and the UK seemed to interpret the DCI as a confirmation of their own defence-restructuring efforts and as support for some of their pet national projects; the big gain for Europe, they argued, would be if Germany transformed its armed forces in line with DCI goals. Germany took a selective approach to the DCI, stating that only three elements were of interest: strategic lift, command and control and intelligence. Much could be done through increased interoperability, joint doctrines and multinational exercises, and not everything had to be high-tech. In both France and Germany, there was a widespread perception that the DCI was a US shopping list, not least since the only way to quickly acquire new and advanced combat systems was to buy them off the shelf, and that essentially meant buying American.

The US has seen the DCI as a way of getting its allies to ‘field a 21^st century force’.¹⁰ The problem is that the US and Europe have different perceptions of what such a force should be. For the US, there is a direct parallel between the DCI and its transformational JV 2010 and 2020 (‘net-centric warfare’) doctrine. The two are part of a common US understanding of the kind of capabilities ‘required to address the future security environment as seen by the US and NATO’.¹¹ Although many of the buzzwords from JV 2010 have found their way into the UK's Strategic Defence Review, NATO's Strategic Concept, allied communiqués and the DCI, European willingness to sign up should not be taken for granted.¹²

It would be wishful thinking to believe that all NATO allies agree with the interpretations of the RMA prevalent in the US debate, and much less with a US-led RMA for the alliance. While there is recognition of the need for interoperability with US forces and a growing realisation that technological advances ought to be better exploited for European defence and security, few if any European states have indicated that their own acquisition priorities match those of the US.¹³ Furthermore, not all Europeans are yet prepared to accept US-designed concepts for future joint warfare or the US military transformation model.¹⁴ Although these transformation concepts contain valuable components and guiding ideas, for the majority of European defence forces, with a different baseline, different missions and different priorities, the US vision in its entirety lies far over the horizon.

Regardless of the vocal US agenda and the DCI's preoccupation with high technology, its emphasis on interoperable, mobile and effective military capabilities is relevant in most types of international coalition warfare, whatever its nature. Several of the DCI goals – strategic airlift, for example – have less to do with NATO missions in the Euro-Atlantic area or with net-centric warfare visions than with land-based coalition warfare of the kind seen in Iraq in 1991 and in Afghanistan in 2001, and the kind which will characterise future large-scale US-led war-fighting coalitions. Where such DCI goals match EU scenarios and ambitions, the prospects for implementation are probably the best. However, the DCI has enjoyed only limited progress, at least in relation to US objectives. From its launch in 1999, few in NATO's International Staff in Brussels or at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) have been optimistic about the process. The DCI has made little if any difference to the development of European military capabilities.

The WEU audit of assets

In late 1999, European states finalised an audit of the assets and capabilities available for Petersberg tasks.¹⁵ The audit was based on the Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU – a catalogue of national forces potentially available for WEU operations), and those committed to the NATO/PfP planning and review process. Although much of the terminology was the same, the audit differed from the DCI in that it focused more on what Europe would need for autonomous operations.

Although the WEU had the necessary forces in terms of numbers to conduct military operations across the Petersberg spectrum, the audit identified a number of capability gaps and weaknesses.¹⁶ ‘severe gaps’ were found in airborne C³, suppressive electronic warfare, combat search and rescue, stealth technology and precision-strike capabilities. The audit concluded that European forces were ‘very weak’ in military strategic heavy lift, and relied on civilian assets in this area. Capabilities were ‘very limited’ in intelligence provision at strategic political and military levels, and in deployable secure tactical communications in theatre, air mobility, psychological warfare, deployable combined joint headquarters, deployable combined air operations centres and electronic/signals intelligence. There was also a serious shortfall in the capabilities required for evacuation operations. The audit pointed out that European forces depended on roads for their ground mobility, and that air mobility (helicopters and tactical air lift) was lacking. Although few states reported on civilian assets, the audit concluded that civil-military coordination was also unsatisfactory. Reconstruction and administrative capabilities were weak, and only one country claimed to be able to provide full assistance to a population affected by an NBC attack. Surprisingly, the audit concluded that interoperability, readiness and sustainability were acceptable – a point which questions its credibility given that these remain huge challenges.

In ‘realistic’ quantitative terms, the audit counted 66 infantry battalions, 18 armoured regiments, two special-forces battalions and four field hospitals.¹⁷ Maritime forces included three aircraft carriers, ten amphibious ships, 75 destroyers and frigates, 59 mine-countermeasures craft, 34 submarines and 62 sealift and support ships. Ship-based air power was deemed sufficient for self-defence, but extremely limited in any strike or area air-defence capacity. In the air, European forces could muster some 152 air-defence fighters, 137 attack aircraft, 144 light-to-medium transport aircraft (C-130S and smaller), 126 small-to-medium lift helicopters, 24 reconnaissance aircraft, 26 air-to-air refuelling aircraft and seven airborne early-warning (AWACS) aircraft. Only one mobile combined air operations centre was committed. While the capability of this asset would initially be limited, it would increase to a level of 600 sorties a day after three months in theatre.

These assets were compared with the 1996–97 WEU Illustrative Profiles/scenarios, drawn up by the WEU and elaborated and developed by the NATO Combined Joint Planning Staff. For the high-end Separation of Parties scenario, involving two divisions (with equivalent air and maritime forces) in a 12-month operation 6,000 km from Brussels, it was concluded that Europe had sufficient land forces, but lacked air assets for strategic lift, suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) and electronic warfare. For the conflict-prevention scenario (involving a brigade and equivalent air and maritime components, for less than a year, up to 3,500 km away) Europe had all the assets and capabilities required. In the lower-end scenarios, including humanitarian aid and assistance and evacuation operations, European forces could meet almost all of the requirements. In short, in 1999 Europe had the capabilities to manage a small, high-intensity operation, and any lower-intensity conventional military operations. European forces were not capable of larger, complex and/or distant land operations like KFOR, or major air operations like Allied Force.

The audit was solely a quantitative exercise based on conventional military forces earmarked for the FAWEU, or identified in NATO's planning processes. Qualitative issues – whether forces were available, deployable, sustainable and interoperable – were not assessed. A majority of declared forces were already double- or triple-hatted or more, and a significant proportion were deployed in peace-support operations. For WEU operations, many assets would have had to be taken out of NATO reaction forces. WEU military staff complained that much of the national data were superficial, and information provided by some states was clearly unrealistic. Unconventional capabilities beyond the traditional Petersberg spectrum (for example defence against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) weapons or counter-terrorism) were generally not included in the audit.

The audit was generally critical and realistic in its assessments of Europe's conventional military capabilities. Both WEU military staff and the nations reporting their assets knew that the findings would not be binding, nor would they form the basis for any operational planning within the WEU. The audit also appeared to have been less influenced by national defence-industrial politics than the DCI. By applying the WEU label, which was seen by NATO and the US as relatively harmless, the EU could also use the audit as a springboard towards the Headline Goal, which was agreed at Helsinki in December 1999.

The Headline Goal and the Helsinki Catalogues

The Headline Goal added the first real substance to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).¹⁸ Under the Goal, by 2003 EU member states committed themselves to being able to deploy and sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000–60,000 personnel). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat-support services and air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and to provide smaller rapid-response elements more quickly than this. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.¹⁹ The following year, in November 2000, the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference resulted in the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC), which constituted the current sum of national commitments. In addition, the Helsinki Headline Catalogue (HHC) represented an assessment of what the EU would need to fulfil the scenarios developed from the Headline Goal. In effect, the HFC and the HHC reflected what EU member states wished to commit to the Headline Goal in 2003, and what capabilities they wanted to create.

At the Cologne Summit in June 1999, EU members agreed that action would be taken ‘without prejudice to actions by NATO’.²⁰ At Helsinki, the phrase ‘where NATO as a whole is not engaged’ replaced this formula.²¹ This wording guarantees the EU full freedom to act autonomously. In EU operations that can be conducted without recourse to NATO assets, the EU is not dependent on NATO consensus, although US and NATO support would be a bonus. The single institutional framework and decision-making autonomy of the EU in EU-only operations is considered non-negotiable. As in any other organisation, the members are sovereign in deciding if, when and with whom they are prepared to cooperate. This includes inviting non-members to participate in EU operations.²²

The HFC included only a fraction of the EU's 1.8 million soldiers, 160 destroyers and frigates, 75 tactical submarines and 3,300-plus combat aircraft in 2000.²³ The majority ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Glossary
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 Capability Initiatives
• Chapter 2 Developing the EU's Instruments for Managing International Crises
• Chapter 3 A New EU-US Strategic Partnership and Future EU-NATO Relations
• Chapter 4 Europe's Operational Limitations
• Chapter 5 Practical Steps To Increase European Capabilities
• Conclusion
• Appendix
• Notes