Metacognition, Worldviews and Religious Education

A Practical Guide for Teachers

Shirley Larkin, Rob Freathy, Jonathan Doney, Giles Freathy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781000021714
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Religious Education (RE) holds a unique place within the state education system. Yet, the teaching of RE has often been criticised for its tendency to present simplified and stereotypical representations of religions. Bringing together the theory of metacognition with RE curriculum content, this book offers a coherent and theoretically supported approach to RE and beyond that is applicable to a range of subjects and students of various age groups.

Metacognition, Worldviews and Religious Education seeks to support teachers in creating a new and exciting classroom approach. With a focus on putting children and teachers' worldviews back on the RE agenda and developing awareness of these through metacognitive processes, it includes

• Tables, frameworks and checklists to make it easy for teachers to adapt the approach to their own context

• Concrete examples of how the approach can work in the classroom, including case studies from teachers

• Call-out boxes for teachers and others to reflect on their own practice and to consider their own beliefs and values in relation to teaching and learning

Co-authored by three researchers from Exeter University and one experienced advanced skills RE primary school teacher, this book explains in a jargon-free way the theories of metacognition and worldviews which underpin the creation of a unique learning environment, making it an essential read for students, experienced teachers, researchers in RE and anyone interested in taking a thinking skills approach to pedagogy.

Creating a metacognitive environment 1

What do you do when you are faced with a task? As I am currently trying to write this chapter I am thinking particularly about writing, but you might substitute any other kind of task you are faced with at work or at home. One answer you may give is ‘it depends on the task’, and you would be right to think so. I will come back to task creation in Chapter 2. For the moment, as I am engaged in writing I will concentrate on this task. An important starting point is to recognise that as I am the one doing the writing, I cannot view ‘writing’ as something separate from myself. Instead, the act of writing and what I know about myself, my self-concept, become intertwined into a view of myself as a writer. Chandler (1995) suggests that people approach writing in different ways, e.g. some consciously adopt an ‘architectural’ strategy which involves creating a clear plan, sectioning up the writing, writing and then editing. This is probably the way most of us were taught to write, particularly for non-fiction and academic purposes. Other writers, he suggests, adopt a ‘bricklaying strategy’, where each sentence or paragraph is worked on until perfect before the writer moves on. Thus, there is little need for final revisions and editing. Yet others employ strategies more akin to visual artists, e.g. an ‘oil painting’ approach in which writers layer the writing, often deleting whole chunks (painting over) with little planning; these writers write to understand their thinking rather than to report it; in contrast, those who take a ‘water colourist approach’ attempt to complete the writing without revision, staying true to ‘an inner voice’ and keeping the spontaneity of the writing.

It is a neat categorisation and one that may well appeal to us. We understand information by putting things into categories. Our brains like to categorise information; to find pleasing patterns in what can otherwise appear as random and chaotic (Rosch, 1975). Yet if we resist the temptation to jump into one of the writer style boxes and reflect, we might see this from a different perspective. If I decide I am a ‘builder writer’, I could say that I have learned something about my own learning. I now know more about myself in relation to the task of writing than I did before, and so when I come to write again I can use this knowledge and approach my writing as a ‘builder writer’. This bit of knowledge of myself has been added to my self-concept. However, this notion of a ‘builder writer’ was not something that came from me; it was something I read about, recognized myself in and adopted. The question I might want to ask myself then is, ‘To what extent is putting myself in this category helping me to write better?’ This can be a very difficult question to answer, because things that begin as helpful can become restricting and unhelpful over time. In addition, whilst we remain consciously aware of the fact that we have deliberately chosen to adopt the category of ‘builder writer’, it may be helpful for us. It may help us to see how we are writing. It may help us to avoid ‘writers’ block’; to section up work; to add another small brick to the wall; etc. At some point, though, and depending on the age at which we adopt the label, the notion of being a ‘builder writer’ will fall from our consciousness and reside at a sub-conscious level. It may still control how we approach writing tasks, but we may no longer have conscious control over changing it. We could substitute ‘builder writer’ knowledge for the much more ubiquitous and pernicious use of learning style categorisation in education.

The idea that learners can be categorised into particular types (e.g. visual, auditory, kinaesthetic) has taken hold in some schools despite there being no evidence for either the existence of specific learning styles from a neuro-scientific point of view, i.e. this is just not the way the brain works (Greenfield, 2000), nor is there any evidence that a learning style approach improves learning (Lilienfelf, Lynn, Ruscio and Beyerstein, 2010; Coffield, Moseley, Hall and Ecclestone, 2004). No doubt there are many adults, including a number of teachers, who were categorised as visual or auditory learners as children and continue to believe and behave as if this were the case. We noticed that at the start of the project in primary RE, many activities involved pupils in creative work such as making displays, using religious artefacts as models for creating individual pieces, colouring and collaging. We argue that a focus on creative activities in primary RE restricts children’s view of religions, reducing them to a collection of artefacts, symbols and stories which can be re-created and manipulated and implies that RE as a subject is only about personal interpretation. Through education we not only build knowledge of the subject but also knowledge of ourselves as learners and thinkers in relation to that subject. Thus, the activities we provide for pupils in RE are crucial to the development of self-knowledge as well as subject-specific knowledge.

This knowledge built up over time, and with experience related to our own thinking or learning, is termed metacognitive knowledge.

Metacognitive knowledge

Metacognitive knowledge is one element of the broader concept of metacognition. In the next few sections I will build up to the full theory of metacognition, but having researched and worked with teachers on metacognition for the past 15 years, I am aware that sometimes the terminology used causes difficulty. Shying away from the use of technical terms, however, leads people to use such vague terms as ‘thinking about thinking’ or ‘learning about learning’. These phrases do not do justice to the richness and variety of research and educational programmes which have flourished in the field of metacognition since the term was first used in the 1970s. It is important that we use the correct terms if we are to understand the research evidence. Metacognition is not the same as thinking skills, critical thinking, Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy of higher order thinking, learning to learn or thinking together. Metacognition is a specific theory developed by developmental and cognitive psychologists to describe the reflective nature of the human (and some non-human animals) mind. It is a theory or set of ideas which requires empirical testing to provide evidence of its existence, its nature and its impact on learning.

The prefix ‘meta’ denotes something which comes after or goes beyond. The word ‘cognition’ refers to all mental processes by which we obtain knowledge. These are often categorised as reasoning, perceiving and intuiting. When we speak of something being ‘meta’, we are referring to something which goes beyond the normal state to a higher, more abstract level. In the case of knowledge, we can build up knowledge about a whole range of subjects throughout our lives. This knowledge is stored in long-term memory, and we can recall it when necessary. We also build knowledge about our own cognitive processes as we go through life, e.g. how we think or process information under different conditions; how reliable we believe our memory to be; how our own thinking differs from that of others or differs depending on the subject or task we are undertaking. This type of knowledge is described as metacognitive knowledge because it focuses not on what is in the world but on what is in our mind.

The most widely cited model of metacognitive knowledge is that created by Flavell (1979). In this model, metacognitive knowledge is broken down into three variables which interact together: person, task and strategy. The person variable focuses on what we know about ourselves in relation to our thinking processes; the task variable relates to our knowledge of the nature of the task and how this will impact on how we approach it. Task knowledge can include: the type of task; how the task is structured; whether all the information needed is present; and how similar the task is to other tasks. The strategy variable refers particularly to strategies which are aimed at our own information processing, e.g. strategies we might employ to help us to remember better; strategies which evaluate how well we know something; and strategies which focus on how we might approach a task and track our progress (planning, monitoring). These three variables interact to affect our learning. Whilst we may have gained some metacognitive knowledge of self, task and strategies, this does not mean that the knowledge we have is accurate, or that we always make use of it. It is quite possible to build up erroneous metacognitive knowledge about our thinking, e.g. that we are unable to tackle certain types of tasks or that we only think in one way (as a visual learner, for example). Just like other kinds of knowledge, our metacognitive knowledge may change over time, depending on our experiences. It can be inaccurate, redundant or we may forget what we know about our thinking processes. There is some dispute as to the extent to which metacognitive knowledge must be conscious, but most theorists agree that metacognitive knowledge should be at least available to consciousness (Baker, 1994), i.e. that we can retrieve the knowledge when prompted.

Do you make use of any metacognitive knowledge of self, task or strategy?

In addition to metacognitive knowledge, theories of metacognition also include two processes, which may not necessarily be conscious, but which run whilst we are doing a task. These are usually referred to as monitoring and control processes and are described as ‘on-line metacognition’, in contrast to metacognitive knowledge which is described as ‘off-line metacognition’.

Monitoring and control

Monitoring and control processes are also termed regulation of cognition and include processes such as goal formation, attention control, planning, evaluating and revising. These processes are governed by executive functions in the frontal lobes of the brain (Luria, 1973), and there is considerable evidence of the importance of executive functions for enabling us to organize our thinking, adapt our behaviour to new situations, transfer knowledge from one situation to another and to self-regulate by inhibiting unhelpful behaviour. There is also some evidence that our higher levels of thinking such as those related to morality and ethical behaviour are dependent on our executive functions (Ardila, 2008). Studies of people with specific types of brain injury which affect the frontal lobes have found that following the injury, people have difficulty with abstract reasoning, decision making, organizing and planning (Jurado and Rosselli, 2007).

Nelson and Narens (1990) first described the processes of monitoring and control as functioning at different levels. They distinguish between self-monitoring, which refers to ongoing tracking of where you are in relation to a specific goal, and self-regulation, which is a more top-down process of employing the executive functions as control mechanisms. They describe an object level and a meta-level and liken the processes of monitoring and control to a telephone. The meta-level listens in to (or monitors) what is going on at the cognitive level. We may not be aware of this monitoring until something at the object level brings it to consciousness; most often this will be some kind of obstacle. When this happens, the control function sends a message back to the object level telling it what to do to overcome the problem and to remain on track. A good example of this is when we are reading. Fluent readers are not conscious of the skills they are using when reading; instead, the focus will be on comprehension, enjoyment or some specific goal such as finding particular information. However, if we come across an unfamiliar word or something unexpected in the text, the monitoring function, which has been operating (listening in) in the background will stop the flow of reading and identify the problem. The control function will then send an instruction back to the object level. This might be to ‘ignore the word and continue reading’ or to ‘look the word up’ or perhaps to ‘note the word down to define later’. The control message will be dependent on the goal of reading. If we are reading for pleasure, it may be appropriate to skip the odd word, whereas if we are reading life-threatening information it will be important that we understand each word. The whole monitoring and control process can be so quick that we are barely aware of it, or it can be much slower and we may deliberate before taking action and continuing with the task. The monitoring and control processes interact with and draw on our metacognitive knowledge and can be influenced by context and social interaction; e.g. in collaborative group work, the group may act as a monitor and control on individual thinking and learning. Group work can both stimulate these processes and make individual monitoring and control processes visible.

The development of metacognition is the development of metacognitive knowledge and the development of monitoring and control processes. The next section considers why metacognition is important for learning.

Metacognition and learning

One of the most commonly asked questions at metacognition workshops is ‘Will developing metacognition lead to better exam or test results?’ The answer is that it is difficult to give a definitive answer. There are studies which have shown an increase in test scores following a metacognitive intervention in mathematics (Elliot, 1993; Mevarech and Fridkin, 2006); reading (Juliebö, Malicky and Norman, 1998); and science (Leopold and Leutner,...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of tables
• About the authors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Creating a metacognitive environment
• 2 Meta-thinking zone
• 3 The worldview zone
• 4 Resources zone and lesson planning
• 5 A practitioner’s approach
• 6 The project and assessment
• 7 Pupils and teachers developing metacognition
• 8 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index