The Death of Public Integrity

Robert Roberts

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367348434
• eBook ISBN: 9781000586862
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

From the late nineteenth century through the 1970s, several government reform movements succeeded in controlling traditional types of public corruption. But has this historic success led to a false sense of security among public management scholars and professionals? As this book argues, powerful special interests increasingly find effective ways to gain preferential treatment without violating traditional types of public corruption prohibitions. Although the post-Watergate good government reform movement sought to close this gap, the 1980s saw a backlash against public integrity regulation, as the electorate in the United States began to split into two sharply different camps driven by very different moral value imperatives.

Taking a historical view from the ratification of the U.S. Constitution through to the Trump administration, The Death of Public Integrity details efforts by reformers to protect public confidence in the integrity of government at the local, state, and federal levels. Arguing that progressives and conservatives increasingly live in different moral worlds, author Robert Roberts demonstrates the ways in which it has become next to impossible to hold public officials accountable without agreement on what constitutes immoral conduct. This book is required reading for students of public administration, public policy, and political science, as well as those interested in public service ethics.

1

FROM HOPE TO DESPAIR

Many of the early colonialists to the New World placed their faith above anything else. They risked everything for the opportunity to practice their religion without governmental interference. Many viewed the English monarchy and Anglican Church as morally bankrupt. Particularly in New England where Puritanism constituted the dominant faith, government had the responsibility to assure that the “moral code of the church was enforced.”¹ Many early colonial leaders applied this value structure to the performance of duties as public officials. Public service meant serving the public interest and not serving one’s self-interest. This view of morality did not fit well with the corrupt world they left.

In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England and Europe, a clear definition of public corruption did not exist. In England, the British government made use of various methods to purchase the loyalty of members of Parliament and key administrative officials. Members of Parliament often expected to be paid for their votes. The English political system was corrupt to its core.² The political culture of England did not distinguish between personal and public interests.³ Public officials saw nothing wrong with using their public positions for personal gain. Periodically, public corruption scandals did force the resignation of high-level English officials. These scandals did little to disrupt the “corrupt” status quo. Through much of the eighteenth century, British, Scotch, Irish, and American political observers accused the British Crown of subordinating parliamentary independence “by granting economic privilege in a way that eroded balanced government and, with it, checks on the Crown.”⁴

Colonial critics of this “corrupt” system blamed the corruption for the refusal of Parliament to allow the colonies greater independence from English rule. According to this argument, the Crown effectively bought the loyalty of members of Parliament which permitted the King to violate the fundamental rights of British citizens including those living in the American colonies.⁵ Through much of the eighteenth century, colonial leaders attacked the integrity of royal governors and British officials responsible for collecting taxes on behalf of the Crown.⁶ Many colonial leaders believed permitting corrupt British officials to collect taxes from colonists provided the British more money to hire “additional tax collectors, and pay mercenaries to come to America and complete the process of ‘enslaving’ colonists.”⁷ The American Revolution constituted a moral revolution as well as a political revolution.

The battle for independence had a profound impact on how those in leadership positions viewed their role as public officials. If the citizens of a community, state, or nation asked an individual to accept a position of authority, the individual had a moral duty to accept the call to serve and conduct the public business with the highest standards of personal and professional integrity. Public service became a calling to many who took public positions after the Revolution.⁸ Because many colonial leaders came from established families, most did not see public service as a path to upward mobility. George Washington, for instance, could have easily returned to Mount Vernon to live out the remainder of his life. He chose not to. This does mean that some colonial leaders had personal skeletons in their closet. It did mean that colonial leaders faced strong social pressure to serve as role models.

Integrity and Public Service

The U.S. Constitution provided no guidance regarding how to staff the new federal government. Every reason existed to believe that the leaders of the Federalist and anti-Federalist factions, if given a chance, would reward their supporters with government positions in new federal departments. From this perspective, loyalty, not competence, should take top priority in staffing the new federal bureaucracy. This did not happen. Elected as the first president of the United States, George Washington entered the presidency with an impeccable personal and professional reputation.⁹ Washington recognized that he needed to build confidence in the new federal government. If he staffed his new administration only with Federalists, it would make it next to impossible for Washington to gain the trust of those who opposed him.¹⁰ To prevent this from happening, Washington put in place a de facto merit system to screen applicants for new federal positions. This meant he sought to limit appointments to individuals with reputations for honesty and integrity in their communities. This came to be known as the “fitness of character” test.¹¹ In theory, the “fitness of character” test did not limit appointments to individuals from well-established families. However, the fact that the best educated Americans came from wealthy and well-established families did mean that elites had a much greater chance of obtaining an appointment than less educated individuals.¹² In the long run, this fact proved to be the ultimate downfall of Washington’s de facto merit system. The public came to view the young federal bureaucracy as elitist and not representative of the country.

The presidential election of 1800 ended the Federalist presidency monopoly. Observers expected that Jefferson would replace most federal employees with his supporters. He didn’t. Jefferson did replace many high-level appointees but left untouched a sizeable percentage of lower-level clerks.¹³ Jefferson understood that federal departments needed the expertise of lower-level clerks. Almost all the federal government’s revenue came from tariffs collected by treasury agents located at ports of entry into the United States and revenue agents that collected excise taxes on distilled spirits. Because most federal employees hired during the Federalist presidential administration had little or no policy-making responsibility, it made little sense for Jefferson to fire them and replace them with his appointees.¹⁴ After 1800, federal department became even more dependent upon employees with certain types of expertise. In 1818, for instance, Congress provided for the appointment of “well-qualified” customs appraisers to be stationed in six major ports. Congress took the action due to growing concerns that treasury agents did not have the expertise to evaluate the value of imports entering the United States.¹⁵ This cost the federal government badly needed revenue. Congress set their salaries at $1,500 per year, except for the New York City appraisers who received $2,000.

Scholars continue to debate the amount of public corruption from 1800 through the 1828 presidential election victory of Andrew Jackson.¹⁶ Due to the lack of modern financial controls, federal employees had ample opportunity to steal or divert federal revenue for their own use. Incidents did occur when federal employees and even high-level presidential appointees violated the public trust. But little evidence exists of widespread public corruption at the federal level. This fact proved important in helping to build public trust in the new federal government. Yet, the continued use of a de facto merit system had one major drawback. It left in the hands of future presidents’ discretion to set the qualifications for appointments in federal departments.

To the Victor Goes the Spoils: The War on Public Integrity

The founding fathers did not anticipate the rise of the modern political party and the impact of political parties on public integrity. From the 1820s through the 1850s, the “spoils system” took hold at the local and federal levels. With the extension of voting rights to almost all adult white males, political parties needed funds to mobilize a much larger electorate. This included organizing millions of new immigrants. During the same period, the demand for public service exploded, particularly at the municipal level. Federal departments such as Treasury and Post Office Department needed to hire more employees. Municipal governments needed to hire more police officers and other municipal employees. The line between politics and administration quickly ceased to exist. A new generation of political entrepreneurs emerged seeing nothing wrong with making use of public power to help build political parties and for personal financial gain. This new generation of public leaders cared little about the public interest and cared everything about political and ideological loyalty.

Elected to the presidency in 1828, Andrew Jackson provided an “ideological justification” for the “spoils system.”¹⁷ First, Jackson argued that the upper class should not have a monopoly on government jobs. Second, he argued that a system of “rotation in office” reflected the nation’s democratic values. All citizens should be given the opportunity to serve their fellow citizens by working for the government. Third, Jackson argued that it did not take a great deal of education and experience to do government work.¹⁸ As Jackson explained in his 1829 message to Congress, “[t]he duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance…”¹⁹ Patronage appointments did not go to the common man. Appointments went to individuals who were vital to building and maintaining effective political machines.

The spoils system significantly reduced the inefficiency of federal departments. It also had a devastating impact on municipal governments. This came a particularly bad time. The period from 1840 through the 1880s saw a huge increase in the population of the United States fed by massive immigration. These new residents needed government services to protect their health and safety. Instead, they got corrupt political machines that drove up the cost of government. Between 1865 and 1930, political machines ruled cities such as New York, St. Louis, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit.²⁰ Political machines depended upon the support from Irish, Italian, and eastern European immigrants who faced widespread discrimination. To gain the support of poor voters, political machines provided poor urban residents help finding jobs, housing and dealing with police and the courts.²¹ The combination of strong support from immigrants and corrupt election practices enabled political machines to successfully fight off good government reform efforts.

The spoils system made a bad situation worse for government employees and placed pressure on them to engage in corrupt conduct. Through the nineteenth century, government salaries remained low. Political mach...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 From Hope to Despair
• 2 Rebellion and Reform
• 3 Ethical Invincibility and the Golden Age of Public Administration
• 4 Public Ethics Polarization and the Breakdown of Civility
• 5 The Public Integrity Counter-Revolution
• 6 Political Polarization and Administrative Evil
• 7 The Appearance of Propriety
• 8 The Morality Firestorm and the Campaign of 2016
• 9 What Occurs at Trump Tower Does Not Stay at Trump Tower
• 10 The New Public Integrity: From Despair to Hope
• Index