The civilizing mission is entrenched within the project of colonialism.10 The concept of civility, in its most basic definition, articulates a difference between those who demonstrate the proper elements of civilization, and those who are considered to be uncivil. Federal Indian Law scholar Robert Williams, Jr. argues that the link between civility and conquest is deeply embedded in Western society, going back to Greco worldviews.11 Throughout Vitoria’s argument, this distinction between civil and uncivil is constantly at work, most notably in his framing of all Native peoples as “barbarians” in violation of natural law. In today’s terms, the discourse of civility extends into determinations of proper citizenship, respectability, and normalcy.
The origins of modern universal rights
Spanish King Charles V called upon Vitoria in 1537 to legally justify the project of colonialism and its institutions.12 Responding in part to the narratives of brutal conquest by the conquistadores, Vitoria needed to demonstrate that Spanish conquest was operating under the proper legal accordance.13 In particular, Vitoria was called to demonstrate that the Spanish had appropriate “just title,” or legal rights, to be in the New World. Delivered forty years after Columbus landed in the Americas, Vitoria’s work reflects the terms of the massive shift in sociopolitical relations, which by that point had violently conjoined Europe, the Americas, West Africa, and spread into the Philippines and south Asia through the coherence of systemic racial chattel slavery, emergent capitalism, and the missionizing spread of Christian conquest.14
In answering the question of what title justified the Spanish colonial conquest, Vitoria was confined to the legal justification of the late Middle Ages. However, as Vitoria delineated throughout the lecture On the American Indians, none of the standard justifications worked in this instance.15 Vitoria himself held that when the Spanish landed in the New World, they had no just title for conquest: “In conclusion, the Spaniards, when they first sailed to the land of the barbarians, carried with them no right at all to occupy their countries.”16 Because of earlier precedence he had to follow, Vitoria also dismisses legitimate title on the basis of “discovery,” and spreading Christianity. Though these two concepts will surface again as determinants for intra-European colonial competition, they are not the foundational basis on which the origins of colonialism are legally legitimized.17
Vitoria provided the legal justification for Spanish colonial expansion into the Americas as predicated on the denial of Native societies’ exercise of universal rights through their relegation to the uncivil. Vitoria utilized the framework of a universal, which does not actually contemplate inclusion for all, but rather privileges inclusion only for the civil European. Vitoria could not rely on the traditional medieval frameworks of European law to justify the colonial project, because none of them actually work to justify Spanish conquest. It was of a new order. Vitoria had to articulate a legal standard that would allow the lucrative endeavor of Spanish colonialism to continue, so that Spain was not found in violation of legal doctrines and potentially forced to forfeit its expansive project to another European crown.18 In order to solve this dilemma, Vitoria resorted to a reformulation of a millennia-old Roman legal concept: the law of nations, which enables all nations to exercise the universal rights to trade, travel, and preach.19 Vitoria espoused that the law of nations serves as the authority to create binding rights under which all nations operate. He further legitimated this notion of rights by claiming it would create a “common good” for humanity.20
The law of nations is important because it allowed Vitoria to place European and Native societies into the same plane of legal jurisdiction.21 Through the law of nations framework, Vitoria determined that the Spanish were legitimately occupying their New World holdings through the right of the Spanish to travel,22 preach,23 and right to trade.24 This allowed him to justify the extension of European governance, sociopolitical relations, and law into the Americas. By establishing this jurisdictional framework, Vitoria argued that the Spanish were entitled to exercise these universal rights as the legitimate grounds for colonial expansion. Furthermore, under the medieval doctrine of Just War, the universal right to trade legally legitimate the enslavement of Black people kidnapped into enslavement from continental Africa.25
Once Vitoria configured the law of nations as the universal framework joining the vast sociopolitical orders of the new world and the old world, he determined that the exercise of universal rights were not applicable for societies that were considered uncivil.26 He explained this through the grounding of the law of nations in “natural law,” which is governed through reason: “What natural reason has established among all nations is called the law of nations.”27 Reason is the demonstration of civility, which Vitoria argues Native peoples possess. Vitoria states, “The proof of this is that they are not in point of fact madmen, but have judgment like other men. This is self evident, because they have some order (ordo) in their affairs … which indicates the use of reason.”28 However, Vitoria determines that Native societies possess only the capacity for reason as demonstrated by their uncivil aberrant cultural practices, which in turn justifies disciplining them into conformity with civilized Christian standards.29
The determination of reason does not entitle Native people to legitimately govern their own land. Vitoria uses the formation of a universal jurisdiction that binds all societies in order to hold that European ideology should be the standard for global governance and social relations. Under the right to preach, Vitoria justifies the imposition of civility through spreading Christianity to correct those who are in a state of sin and violation of natural law as the duty of the Spanish: “Since all those peoples are not merely in a state of sin, but presently in a state beyond salvation, it is the business of Christians to correct and direct them. Indeed, they are clearly obliged to do so.”30 By constructing Native societies as in possession of universal reason and within the same universal jurisdiction, Vitoria could claim that because their sociopolitical practices differ from Europeans, they must be properly brought into accordance with true reason—as civility, justified under the law of nations.
Vitoria bases the determination of incivility upon “natural law violations,” which included but was not limited to sodomy, lesbianism, polygamy, buggery, bestiality, and cannibalism.31 Violations of natural law are categorically marked in opposition to proper comportment with Christian European standards. These violations of natural law that form the basis of Vitoria’s justification of the civilizing project are the foundational premises of colonial heteropatriarchy.
Additionally, Vitoria stated that if Native people resist Spanish conquest they are in violation of the Spaniards’ universal rights to trade, travel, and preach: “If the barbarians attempt to deny the Spaniards in these matters which I have described as belonging to the law of nations, that is to say from trading and the rest … and they insist on replying with violence, the Spaniards may defend themselves, and do everything needful for their own safety. It is lawful to meet force with force.”32 Vitoria argued that if the Spanish are doing no harm then Native societies are not legitimately entitled to resist Spanish occupation.33 Any Native resistance, read as a violation of universal rights, then subjects Native societies to legitimate warfare, conquest, and enslavement under the doctrine of Just War: “But if the barbarians deny the Spaniards what is theirs by the law of nations, they commit an offense against them. Hence, if war is necessary to obtain their (Spanish) rights, they may lawfully go to war.”34
Vitoria relied on the reconfiguration of the law of nations because there was no precedential legal doctrine that justified the large-scale development of the project of colonialism. As political theorist Duncan Ivison explains, rights are a reflection of social relations.35 I argue that Vitoria’s work refle...