The sword is not enough

Arabs, Israelis, and the limits of military force

Jeremy Pressman

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781526146175
• eBook ISBN: 9781526146168
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

In this lucid and timely new book, Jeremy Pressman demonstrates that the default use of military force on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict has prevented its peaceful resolution.Whether called deterrence or war, armed struggle or terrorism, the history of the conflict reveals that violence has been counterproductive. Drawing on historical evidence from the 1950s to the present, The sword is not enough pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. Violence weakens the security situation, bolsters adversaries, and, especially in the case of Palestine, has sabotaged political aims.Studiously impartial and accessibly written, this book shows us that diplomacy is the only answer.

Chapter 1

THE ARAB–ISRAELI FIGHT

In the wartime environment of 1948, the Khairi family was expelled from their home in what is today Ramle, Israel. The Khairis, a Palestinian family, ended up in the West Bank. After the 1967 war, which brought the West Bank under Israeli rule, Bashir Khairi, a young boy in 1948, visited his former home in Ramle. But he was never able to regain control of the home or move back to it. Khairi, later a leader in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, drew a very clear lesson from the experience: ‘Force expelled us from our land, he reasoned, and only force will get it back’.¹

In 1956, Moshe Dayan, then the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, delivered the eulogy at the funeral of Roi Rutenberg, a Jewish resident of Nahal Oz, a kibbutz near the Gaza Strip. Rutenberg had been killed in an ambush. Dayan mentioned the temptation to despair and to fail to face up to the meaning of Rutenberg’s death. But in the end, Israelis could not look away from the hard meaning of the loss: ‘This is our life’s choice – to be prepared and armed, strong and determined, lest the sword be stricken from our fist and our lives cut down’.²

This book illustrates and critiques the beliefs that Arabs and Israelis hold about how best to achieve their fundamental political and security goals. What is the best way to get what one wants in international affairs? In the Arab–Israeli context, the dominant belief has been that (1) military force is the best way to achieve one’s goals and (2) negotiations and concessions are a sign of weakness that only invite further demands and military attacks.³ In contrast, the major alternative belief is the reverse, meaning that (1) negotiations and concessions are the only way to secure a stable and peaceful future and (2) a reliance on military force is often counter-productive. This book’s primary focus is on assessing and understanding the effectiveness of force, the dominant belief. Of course, because these two beliefs are inter-related, many of the judgements about the success or failure of using military force have implications for the success or failure of negotiations as well.

To be clear, my interest is in analysing and evaluating what political actors believe about the policies or means that they may pursue. I am not evaluating their beliefs about the ends, goals or interests. Instead, I take as given that the Arab states, Israel, and the fragmented Palestinian national movement have the standard array of ends and national interests such as the desire for security, for maintaining independence, for ensuring state survival, and for protecting the integrity of their borders and territory.

I provide evidence that the dominant belief is that using force is the best way to get what you want. I also note evidence of the main alternative belief, the efficacy of negotiations. The dominance of the belief in military force has meant that war and confrontation characterize much of the Arab–Israeli relationship. That said, there are examples of where the alternative idea broke through and negotiations were the favoured means, whether with a successful result (an Egypt–Israel treaty in 1979 and an Israel–Jordan treaty in 1994) or not (the Oslo diplomatic process, 1993–2001; the Annapolis diplomatic process, 2007–2008).

Despite the continued dominance in policymaking circles of the idea that force is the best foreign-policy tool, that very emphasis on force has three major shortcomings. First, negotiations – not force – are the only means by which to conclude a peace agreement. Military means fall short, so a continued policymaking commitment to force precludes moves toward ending the conflict. Second, the use of force has often led to greater insecurity, the exact opposite of what its proponents desired. In short, the belief in the success of military force often has proved counter-productive. Third, this same belief in force has resulted in missed diplomatic opportunities.

I do not mean to suggest that military force and diplomatic negotiations are wholly separate. Governments may be pursuing both pathways simultaneously. Some overlap between different tactics is inevitable. Rather, my concern is about the emphasis. Which one is primary in their thinking? Which one do officials view as more likely to produce national security and other important outcomes they seek?

There are already many excellent histories of the Arab–Israeli conflict, and I do not seek to replicate them here.⁴ Most of them take a detailed, chronological approach. Instead, this book is a work of historical explanation. It draws on existing theoretical and historical work and uses brief case studies to illustrate different understandings of force, negotiations, and their interactions in the Arab–Israeli conflict. I cannot describe what I hope to do better than in the words of Theda Skocpol, a professor at Harvard University: ‘Some books present fresh evidence; others make arguments that urge the reader to see old problems in a new light. This work is decidedly of the latter sort.’⁵ This is neither a comprehensive history nor a theorygenerating work. Rather, it is a stylized, selective history that, I hope, will deepen the reader’s understanding of the Arab–Israeli relationship.

Ideas and methods

I use the terms ‘beliefs’ and ‘ideas’ interchangeably. Either way, I am interested in how Arabs and Israelis, and especially their leaders, think and talk about the usefulness of military force and negotiations. The last few decades have seen a lot of scholarly attention devoted to ideas, especially with the introduction and growth of ‘constructivist’ thinking in the study of international relations.⁶ Professor Jeffrey Legro’s definition of ‘beliefs on instrumentality’ accurately captures the object of my interest in Arab–Israeli relations. In Legro’s words, I study ‘beliefs about effective means for achieving interests or how states think about achieving their ends (“instrumentality”)’.⁷ Like Legro, I describe each belief and its specific content. However, whereas he was most interested in explaining why such beliefs change, I am more interested in the negative consequences that have resulted from the specific dominant belief that I study. What is the impact of the ideas?⁸

To assess the Arab and Israeli beliefs about the usefulness of force and negotiations, I look closely at speeches, statements, and foundational documents. I evaluate what policymakers said. The tradition of analysing speech, discourse, rhetoric, and narratives has been widely used in the study of politics.⁹ As Alan Finlayson and J. Martin explained, ‘The political speech can provide a glimpse into the process by which ideas and beliefs are manifested in argumentative contexts’. Speeches, they added, seek to get others ‘to see situations in a certain light’.¹⁰ I looked for details and themes that were repeated across several speeches, with the idea that repetition means an idea or belief is more important than a one-off point.¹¹ While I rely on a wider set of statements, scholars have sometimes based a political argument on a close textual reading of a single important speech or important document.¹²

In addition to looking at speeches and statements, the other main method in this book is the historical case study.¹³ Such studies are especially important for allowing me to flesh out in chapters 3, 4, and 5 the shortcomings of the belief in the success of using force. In other words, historical case studies help illustrate what can result from a deep, abiding belief in the power of military force to get one’s way in international affairs. By providing multiple historical examples, I seek to rebut in advance the idea that one can come up with one example for just about anything. Rather, these short cases illustrate a continuing tendency in the conflict’s history. Because I aim to give multiple examples in each chapter, the cases do not have the depth of a full-blown case study, but they still provide some convincing evidence and demonstrate a little bit wider applicability of the thesis or claim.¹⁴

Historical case studies also shed some light on events that confirm or disconfirm either the advantages of force or the advantages of negotiations. As Legro noted, events can undermine or reinforce a dominant or an alternative idea. If the new idea can ‘generate desirable results’, it may stick.¹⁵ Yet events that should bolster or undermine a belief do not automatically do so. Existing beliefs may be resilient in the face of recent events and episodes.

Overall, though, what also becomes apparent is that the belief in the success of relying upon military force as the primary policy often has been resistant to events that seem to challenge its central tenets. The idea of using force is resilient. In contrast, the belief in the success of negotiations has been more quickly undermined by events that challenge its central tenets.

I should note that the cases here are not selected to test certain theories or to develop new theories or one new grand theory. Instead, the cases are illustrative, meant to exemplify my probing of the dominant idea that the other side understands only force. Overall, I want to evaluate a common, central belief (that force is the best tool in the foreign-policy toolbox) that is often held by people, both inside and outside the Arab–Israeli conflict, regarding that conflict. I demonstrate that that belief creates certain problems. In order to do so, I highlight some historical episodes that illustrate those problems. I aim to help people better understand the Arab–Israeli conflict, and thereby affect the meaning of the conflict in people’s minds, rather than test political science theories or build a new grand theory.

Rival beliefs: military force versus negotiations

States have the choice of at least two different beliefs about the use of force and negotiations in international affairs. On the one hand, international actors may believe that military force is more likely to lead to success in foreign policy. On the other hand, they may prefer negotiations.

The dominant idea: force

A belief in armed force as the preferred policy instrument means that countries, or the Palestinian national movement and its constituent elements, and their leaders assume that things like threats to use force, arms buildups, strong and militant rhetoric, high spending on national security, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and, when necessary, violence, conflict, and war are the key elements in a country’s or organization’s foreign-policy toolbox.¹⁶ At the same time, actors may recognize that there are other diplomatic and cultural approaches – I am especially thinking of negotiations – but they nevertheless hold that such efforts are secondary to military strength, force, and coercion. If I threaten or use military force, my adversary will capitulate and concede, and I’ll get what I want.

The different ways that states or organizations may use force in this way are as follows:

(1) internal military buildup (internal balancing)

(2) formation of military alliance (external balancing)

(3) supply of military aid (may include arms)

(4) exhibiting a military posture (e.g. alert, mobilization) – military moves that fall short of the actual use of military force

(5) language of force (rhetoric that includes threats to use force or doctrinal or ideological support for force)

(6) civilian direct action (violent demonstrations)

(7) structural violence against people or property (may include arrest, detention, expulsion, sexual assault, torture) – repression or violence against civilians by the state’s military establishment, including counter-terror activity

(8) unconventional violence, that is, not by the state’s military establishment and indeed often against the state’s military establishment, such as terrorism and political assassination, using –

(a) knives, stones (weapons short of guns)

(b) small arms (guns)

(c) suicide or car bombings, IED (bombs)

(d) sexual assault, abduction, torture

(9) conventional force used by armed actors (state or non-state), often called ‘war’ –

(a) closure, blockade

(b) occupation of territory

(c) small-arms attack (i.e. with a weapon that can be carried)

(d) artillery and ground attack, rocket fire (usually if both, then 9d subsumes 9c)

(e) aerial attack

(10) use of massive unconventional force – chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear.¹⁷

Better understanding how military force has affected the Arab–Israeli conflict contribut...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1 The Arab–Israeli fight
• 2 Force as the dominant policy
• 3 Peace cannot be forced
• 4 Force, insecurity, and failure
• 5 Missed diplomatic opportunities
• 6 Changing the dominant idea
• Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index