1
Sport, the government and civilian morale
The question of civilian morale has been a major preoccupation, yet also an elusive one, for historians of wartime Britain. Paul Addison described it as âthe woolliest and most muddled concept of the warâ. âNo oneâ, he argued, âknew how to define morale, measure it, or affect it, but all agreed that it was thereâ.1 For Mass-Observation which was commissioned by the Ministry of Information (MoI) to chart the highs and lows of morale, the concept was equally difficult to pin down. Tom Harrisson, one of the founders of Mass-Observation, thought that the failure âto analyse and define the complex moods covered by âmoraleâ led to major deficiencies, both in writing about it accurately and dealing with it usefullyâ.2 His own organizationâs quasi-definition of morale as âthe amount of interest people take in the warâ was later broadened out to include ânot only determination to carry on but also determination to carry on with the utmost energyâ. For Stephen Taylor, the Director of Home Intelligence at the MoI, morale had to be âultimately measured not by what a person thinks or says, but by what he does and how he does itâ.3 This notion of morale as a âcomposite of attitude and behaviourâ influenced the historian Robert Mackay, who suggested that indicators of âlowâ morale could comprise calmness, cheerfulness, co-operation and high productivity among other things.4 Others have revealed the blurred boundaries between indicators of âgoodâ and âbadâ morale, noting that a âday-to-day erratic resilienceâ, in which people âcould cry and carry onâ, was as typical of âgoodâ morale as exuberance and cheerfulness.5
Morale has been central to the changing story of how the British people coped with war. Articulated first and most clearly by Richard Titmuss,6 the claim that morale held firm and that shared dangers, experiences and privations led to a reinforced sense of social solidarity and national unity has been carefully reformulated and nuanced over recent years after decades of revisionist critique. Andrew Thorpe, for example, has argued that, notwithstanding âserious downturns after military reversesâ, morale remained âhealthyâ and ânever looked like crackingâ; a view endorsed by David Thomsâ work on Birmingham and Coventry and Edgar Jones et al.âs study of the psychological effect of bombing.7 In his detailed book-length examination, Mackay endorsed the view of a people whose morale remained fundamentally âgoodâ through a careful modification of the overly âpositiveâ assessment of Titmuss and others. The role of the government was crucial, he argued, but ultimately it was a âcombination of âpublicâ and âprivateâ factors, operating within a mental framework of common identity and shared destinyâŚthat determined civilian moraleâ.8
The role of entertainment and recreation was an important theme in wartime discussions of civilian morale and national unity. Contemporaries noted their value as signs of normality at times of danger as well as during more routine periods of wartime life. Brad Beaven and John Griffiths, for example, have argued that levels of morale in bombed cities during 1940â41 were shaped significantly by the extent to which pre-war recreational facilities â such as social clubs, pubs and music halls â continued to function. This was crucial, they argue, for working-class people particularly, who identified âin their leisure pursuits traditional cultural icons and a collective purpose during a period of increasing danger and uncertaintyâ.9 The experience of bombing was only one determinant of morale and not always the most important. Mass-Observation found in December 1940 that recreation was considered the fifth most significant factor in âkeeping up oneâs spiritsâ among men (behind âfriendsâ, âhealthâ, âworkâ and âsleepâ) and the eighth most significant (after the same four categories as well as âweatherâ, âmealsâ and âgood war newsâ) for women. People âcopedâ in a variety of ways and chose their own means of âescapingâ from the realities of wartime life, or as one historian has termed it, of âresurrecting the ânormalââ.10
Watching and playing sport was one of these, even though it has ranked well below cinema, theatre, dance, music and radio as popular topics for scholars of wartime Britain.11 This chapter seeks to remedy this situation by unearthing and exploring the complex sets of interests and motivations that influenced official measures towards sport under wartime conditions. The existing historiography has failed to interrogate the role ascribed to sport as a means of raising morale and encouraging national unity in any depth, or to account for fluctuating attitudes over the course of the conflict.12 Interpretations have tended to be one-dimensional, based on superficial analyses of a handful of policy statements and the conclusions of a small number of Mass-Observation file reports. Norman Baker, for example, whose analysis of sport âduring and after the warâ concentrates on reconstruction and the immediate post-war years, has little to say about the detail of policy formation and public attitudes towards sport.13 A similar lack of depth and nuance is apparent in Tony Mason and Eliza Riediâs suggestion that sportâs role in âlift[ing] the morale of servicemen, war workers and civilians alikeâ was âlargely acceptedâ.14 Well-publicised comments such as Home Secretary Herbert Morrisonâs statement that public entertainments acted âas a lubricant, rather than a brake, on the war machineâ and Mass-Observationâs early assessment of the morale-boosting value of professional football, have led historians to neglect or downplay the conflicts, complexities and inconsistencies in both official and public attitudes to wartime sport.15
This chapter exposes the shifting undercurrents of intra-governmental debates over the value of sport for the British at war. Drawing on government archives and Mass-Observation papers that have hitherto not been consulted in any depth, it explores the influences involved in the development of policy in relation to the three spectator sports that held the bulk of the national governmentâs attention in wartime Britain: greyhound racing, horse racing and football. Although underpinned by an understanding that sport could be an important tool in sustaining morale, government policy, and the attitudes that informed it, was never fixed. As in the case of music and the arts, government departments harboured different conceptions of the value of sport, and conflicts consequently arose.16 Balances were struck within a matrix of shifting considerations and interests, including those relating to morale, public safety, war work and transport, and public and political opinion.
This chapter also builds on recent studies of the interplay between claims of national unity and class division in wartime Britain. Geoffrey G. Field has suggested that far from dissolving the boundaries between the classes, the war deepened notions of class identity and increased many workersâ perceptions of âbelonging to a national class, superimposed upon more parochial loyaltiesâ.17 This study argues that, as in the wartime debates analysed by Field, social class was crucial in informing official policy and public attitudes towards sport, and in determining whose morale was prioritised on each occasion. Whatever the precise social mix in reality, football and dog racing were perceived primarily as traditional working-class pastimes; their provision regarded mainly as a means of satisfying the morale of a class rather than the needs of a unified national community. A more genuinely cross-class activity, horse racing was nonetheless often linked to the rich and leisured classes, to privileged groups, as well as to criminals, idlers and gamblers seen as operating at the margins of wartime society. For this reason, it became the most controversial of wartime sports; an ambivalent emblem of public morale, and a prime target for accusations of class discrimination.
The wartime government
The formulation and administration of policy in the wartime government was complex, subject as it was to the interests of a range of new and established â and frequently competing â departments and a âshifting castâ of ministers with contrasting personalities and beliefs.18 Neither was civilian morale an issue confined to one particular branch of government. The MoI, created shortly before the outbreak of war, was allocated a central role in monitoring, measuring and attempting to maintain morale. But it lacked status and authority within Whitehall and was not taken particularly seriously by the Cabinet. Its relationship with other departments was also imprecise, meaning that conflict became âinevitableâ and it was deprived of a secure position âfrom which to defend its authority against powerful adversariesâ.19 The standing of the MoI within the government and among the public did improve later in the war, particularly after the appointment of Brendan Bracken as its head in July 1941.20 But in terms of the development of wider policy it played no significant role, focusing instead on feeding information to other departments and using forms of mass communication to improve morale.
The main considerations related to the continuation of spectator spo...