Despatch on War Operations

23rd February 1942 to 8th May 1945

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Travers Harris, Sebastian Cox

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 1995
• Print ISBN: 9780714646923
• eBook ISBN: 9781136790720
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This is the first time that Sir Arthur Bomber' Harris's own papers covering his three and a half years at Bomber Command have been published and made available to the general public. The book also contains an introduction by Sebastian Cox, an Air Staff Memorandum written immediately after the war and a revisionist German viewpoint by Horst Boog. It

Part I.—Introduction

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Bomber Command in February, 1942

The Task Allotted to the Command

The bomber force of which I assumed command on 23rd February, 1942, although at that time very small, was a potentially decisive weapon. It was, indeed, the only means at the disposal of the Allies for striking at Germany itself and, as such, stood out as the central point in Allied offensive strategy.

The German wave of success had reached its peak. In Russia the offensive was halted, British strength at home and in the Mediterranean was gradually building up in spite of everything that the U-boats could do to prevent it, while American armies and air forces were expanding and training in the West. German morale, which had been boosted by initial victories, was at its height, but showed already some anxiety and apprehension about the future.

2. The strength of the enemy defences made it impracticable to depart from the established policy of operating mainly by night. The limitations which this imposed on bombing accuracy largely controlled the choice of targets, since large industrial areas were more suitable for heavy attacks than individual factories and plants. This policy, although based on the meagre chances of direct hits on small targets except under most favourable conditions, was also supported by a study of the results of German night attacks on this country, which indicated that the quickest and most economical way of achieving the aims of the offensive was to devastate in turn the large industrial cities of Germany.

3. The main task, therefore, laid upon the Command by the Air Ministry directif letter numbered S.46368/D.C.A.S., of 14th February, 1942, was “to focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers.”* This was to be achieved by destroying, mainly by incendiary attacks, first, four large cities in the Ruhr area and, then, as opportunity offered, fourteen other industrial cities in Northern, Central and Southern Germany. The aim of attacks on town areas had already been defined in an Air Staff paper (dated 23rd September, 1941) as follows:—

“The ultimate aim of the attack on a town area is to break the morale of the population which occupies it. To ensure this we must achieve two things ; first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction, and (ii) the fear of death.”

4. My primary authorised task was therefore clear beyond doubt: to inflict the most severe material damage on German industrial cities. This, when considered in relation to the force then available, was indeed a formidable task. Nevertheless, it was possible, but only if the force could be expanded and re-equipped as planned, and if its whole weight could be devoted to the main task with the very minimum of diversions.

5. In addition to the main task, however, the Air Ministry directif letter of 14th February, 1942, laid down that the Command should also

1. be prepared to take on particular targets of immediate strategic importance, such as naval units, submarine building-yards and bases ;
2. support combined operations when required ;
3. attack specified factories in France, in order to discourage French workers from producing war equipment for the enemy.

The light bomber force of No. 2 Group was also included in my Command at that time. With the exception of night intruder activity against enemy airfields to assist the heavy and medium bombers (and also to hinder the enemy bombers) this short-range force could play no part in the main offensive against Germany. In daylight operations, executed in conjunction with offensive fighter sweeps, the chief purpose of the light bombers was to bring the enemy fighters to combat.

The Force Available

6. The foundations of the new bomber force—greatly enlarged, and re-equipped with heavies—- had already been laid before I assumed command. The results of this planning were just beginning to appear ; but, on 23rd February, 1942, out of a total of 378 serviceable aircraft with crews (excluding “Freshmen” not yet fit for operations) only 69 were heavy bombers.

7. This force was obliged to operate against Germany almost entirely under cover of darkness and, in consequence of the absence of effective non-visual aids to navigation and target-finding in the dark, was virtually unable to locate its targets. It is not too much to say that, owing to the small size of the force and the primitive methods then at our disposal, we could no more assail the enemy effectively by air than by land or sea. His defences were sufficient to prevent us from operating in daylight, when visual target-finding would have been possible, and by night we could not find our aiming points.

8. I confidently believed, however—and with good reason—that the Command’s main task could be achieved successfully if only we could overcome the handicaps under which, so far, the bomber force had laboured in vain. These were, primarily, lack of suitable aircraft in sufficient number, absence of effective navigational aids, and a serious deficiency of trained crews. Moreover, the handicaps were not only due to lack of material and trained personnel, as there were technical and tactical problems affecting the employment of the force which could only be surmounted by intensive research, continual experiment and unshakeable resolution. How each of these problems was eventually surmounted, stage by stage, is set forth in a series of separate appendices (A-K). A study of these appendices is essential to a proper understanding of the course of operations summarised in this report.

9. In the solution of these problems the value of scientific research has proved inestimable. Indeed, without the Operational Research Section many problems would have remained insoluble, and others would have been solved only after trials and errors extravagant not only in terms of time and effort but also in lives of our aircrews.

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* Later expanded by directif issued by Combined Chiefs of Staff on 21st January, 1943, to include the general disorganisation of German industry.

Part II.—The Course of the Campaign

1942 — 1945

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The Preliminary Phase, February, 1942—February, 1943

10. As long ago as November, 1940, the Command had emphasised the need for the provision or a radar aid which would enable crews to bomb specified targets even when they could not locate them visually. When I assumed command sixteen months later this was still one of the many problems awaiting solution—perhaps the most urgent of them all. We had to wait until the beginning of 1943 before this vital need was met by the introduction of “OBOE” and “H.2.S.”

11. During the intervening period many fundamental lessons had to be learned in bombing strategy, tactics and technique, and entirely new methods evolved in relation to many changing factors. Indeed, the whole course of the subsequent campaign was moulded by the developments which occurred between February, 1942, and February, 1943, amounting to a complete revolution in the employment no less than in the composition of the bomber force. Meanwhile all available effort was required for maintaining operations against Germany and Italy, although a considerable part of the force was non-operational owing to conversion from medium to heavy aircraft.

12. The size of force employed against industrial cities was generally the largest available at the time, excluding training and conversion units. Whereas in the past the tendency had been to attack a number of targets simultaneously with small forces, from 1942 onwards the bulk of the effort was normally directed against one objective on every night suitable for operations.

Bombing Technique (Navigational Aids)

Introduction of “GEE”

13. My assumption of command coincided with the introduction of the first radar navigational device, and the preliminary stages of the development of others. Great hopes were entertained of their performance. The use of “GEE” was expected to have a profound influence on navigation at night. It was hoped that it would enable new tactics to be employed, in particular, improved concentration and co-ordination of the individual aircraft of the attacking force. It was, also, expected by the Air Ministry that “this equipment should enable an aircraft to bomb a selected area in or through 10/10ths cloud and thus increase the average number of effective operational nights per month from, say, 3 to possibly 20 or more.” (Air Ministry (D.B. Ops.) paper on “Area Attack employing ‘GEE’” 16th January, 1942.) Although it was realised that the accuracy to be obtained from “GEE” in that part of Germany lying within its range (then about 400 miles from the ground stations), might not be quite as high as that obtained on service trials over this country, the provisional estimate by Air Warfare Analysis Section (upon which the Air Ministry Directif of the 14th February, 1942, was based) suggested that 47 per cent. of bombs would fall on Essen in 10/10ths cloud, and that “GEE” should therefore “be regarded as a blind-bombing device and not merely as a navigational aid.”¹

14. On this optimistic basis, the Command (with an average available force, excluding “Freshmen” crews, of some 50 light, 260 medium and 50 heavy bombers) was expected to “destroy completely” Essen, and other West German industrial cities, in the course of three months intensive operations following the introduction of “GEE.” During this period only a small part of the bomber force was equipped with this instrument, and experts predicted that the useful life of “GEE” over enemy territory would be much restricted by jamming within a maximum of six months. Both the object and general method of attack for these operations was laid down by the Air Ministry.

15. To prepare for these operations and to ascertain how “GEE” could be employed to best advantage, both as an aid to routeing and concentrating aircraft, as well as to assist in hitting targets, No. 1418 Experimental Flight was established at the request of the Command (refer Appendix A) ; and the Operational Research Section applied itself to the many problems which arose both before and after the first “GEE”-assisted operation (Essen, 8/9th March, 1942). Two experimental exercises (“CRACKERS” and “CRACKERS II”) were carried out in February, over the Isle of Man and North Wales respectively, to discover how best the small “GEE”-equipped force could lead the main (non- “GEE”) force to the target. The method used was that of dropping and maintaining a concentration of flares over the aiming-point. Although valuable information concerning the use of flares was obtained, the first of these experiments was spoiled by failure of one of the ground stations ; while photographs taken by “GEE”-equipped aircraft during the second experiment suggested that the majority of aircraft would have bombed within a radius of 2 or 3 miles from the aiming-point. The use of sticks of flares to act as a beacon for attracting the main force to the area was highly successful, but their value for visual identification of the target was offset, in the opinion of most crews, by the dazzle effect produced in cloudless but slightly hazy conditions. Thus, from the outset there were some reasons for thinking that the employment of “GEE” on operations might fall far short of the theoretical standard upon which the Air Ministry directif was based. Nevertheless it was confidently expected that “GEE” would bring aircraft within visual range of their objectives, and thus unable navigator/bomb-aimers to identify the target without prolonged search.

16. For several reasons even this hope was not fulfilled on operations. It was eventually proved that “GEE” accuracy was seriously diminished in the Ruhr area. This was partly owing to a systematic error which had the effect of causing aircraft to “undershoot” the target, and partly to the difficulty of obtaining fixes with precision while aircraft were passing through a very heavily defended zone. Moreover, from the heights at which the flak obliged aircraft to operate (e.g., from above 13,000 ft.), it was only in the most exceptional circumstances that it was possible at night to see and recognise particular towns in the smoke-laden atmosphere of the Ruhr.

17. Not until May, 1942, was there sufficient night-photographic evidence to assess the operational accuracy of “GEE.” It was then found that the results obtained were about a third as accurate as those which No. 1418 Flight obtained over this country, the 50 per cent. zone being about 5 miles in radius. On the evidence then available² it appeared that only 5-10 sticks of bombs would be expected to fall within the limits of the built-up area of Essen if 100 aircraft attacked the city, relying entirely on “GEE.” Only two or three sticks of bombs would fall on the area of the Krupp Works. Consequently it was evident that the Command would be unable to carry out “blind bombing” operations effectively using “GEE.” Until, therefore, the arrival of “OBOE” and “H.2.S.”, the bomber force remained as much as ever dependent upon visual means of finding the target, and every effort was concentrated upon improving such means (see Appendix B).

Continued Importance of Visual Identification

18. The multiplication of enemy decoy-fire sites in the course of 1942 greatly added to the problems of target location—as the Luftwaffe had found over here. “GEE” was not sufficiently accurate to indicate whether a promising-looking fire was one started by our own aircraft at the aiming point (or, mistakenly, in the wrong place), or was an enemy decoy some miles distant from the target. Only in clear weather conditions and with the assistance of moonlight could we have reasonable hopes of success. Even in the best possible conditions, however, industrial haze generally prevented visual recognition of Ruhr targets.

19. There was no doubt that the proportion of aircraft reaching the vicinity of the target on dark nights had been much improved as a result of the use of “GEE” ; furthermore, though “GEE” was a complete failure as an aid for destroying the industrial centres of the Ruhr, rather better results were obtained at targets such as Cologne. There, the configuration of the Rhine made visual recognition of the target a practicable proposition when weather was favourable. Nevertheless, night photographs showed that the majority of crews still failed to bomb the target even when part of the force was successful. The great problem now was to ensure that the leading aircraft should be able to draw the rest to the aiming point by marking it unmistakably, not merely by fires, since realistic enemy decoys (and the jettisoning of incendiaries en route by aircraft which had got into difficulties) rendered that method of marking most unreliable. The necessity for navigator/bomb-aimers, especially those of the leading “GEE”-equipped aircraft, to be proficient in the difficult art of visual target-location was clearly recognised. Accordingly air bombers were introduced to relieve navigators of this part of their task, and to allow them to give full attention to their “GEE” equipment on the run-up to the target. This part of the problem was speedily handled by the Training Organisation (the principle was accepted by the Air Ministry on 29th March, 1942) but the development of a distinctive target marker took much longer. I asked³ for such a marker as an urgent requirement in March, 1942, having urged its development many years previously, but it was not until January, 1943, that the Target Indicator Bomb was available for use on operations. Meanwhile, the use of various types of incendiaries as a substitute for the marker proved quite unsatisfactory.

The Pathfinder Force

20. “The formation of specialist squadrons to initiate raids” was recommended within the Command as early as December, 1941,⁴ and the subject of special target finding units was much discussed during the first half of 1942. No one could dispute the necessity for the leading “GEE“-equipped “marker force” to be manned by thoroughly trained and experienced crews—particularly in regard to navigators and air bombers. This aim was, as far as possible, achieved in practice from the time of the introduction of “GEE.” When (between April and June, 1942) the Air Ministry pressed for the establishment of an independent target-finding force of picked crews, I was entirely opposed to creaming off the best crews of all the Groups in order to create a corps d’elite in a special Group. This could be calculated to have a bad effect on morale in the Command as a whole, and furthermore, human nature being what it is, it would undoubtedly be difficult to extract the majority of the best crews out of the Groups, because, naturally enough, not only would the Groups want to retain their best personnel to take command ot flights and squadrons, but the best personnel themselves would strongly object to leaving squadrons in which they had half-completed a tour of operations and in which they had been looked up to as the best crews, in order to be sent to another squadron and start again at the bottom as new boys. In this view I had the unanimous support of my Group Commanders who agreed with me that the best system would be to form inside each Group special target-finding squadrons which could be used as group markers for smaller operations and, combined with those of one or more of the other Groups for bigger operations. That, in fact, was the logical development o...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Editorial Preface
• Introduction
• Harris – A German View
• Aircraft, Armaments and Results of the Bomber Offensive
• The Despatch
• Original Contents page
• Part I – Introduction
• Part II – The Course of the Campaign
• Part III – Summary of the Bombing Effort and Results
• Part IV – Conclusions
• Part V – Statistics and Graphs
• Appendices
• Air Staff Memorandum