Chapter 1
Introduction
Configuring identities in archaeology
Timothy Insoll
Frameworks
Identity today is a âhotâ topic even though it might not be defined as such. Open a newspaper, watch or listen to the news and many of the stories are concerned with, essentially, the struggle of identity manifestations for a voice or for power, be they ethnic, religious, sexual, or related to disability, for instance. Equally, within the Western world (the primary but not exclusive focus of this introduction), related concerns centred around equality and diversity figure prominently, which again can predominantly be grouped within the umbrella remit of identities as well. However, archaeological contributions to this debate are rare, which is unfortunate, for âdebateâ is not always the best descriptive term for what occurs, âpolemicsâ perhaps being sometimes more apt. This is regrettable, for archaeologists, through exploring themes such as past identities, their interactions, and the successes and failures of these interactions, could, importantly perhaps provide a new, or at least an alternative perspective. But it is from sociology or anthropology (see for example Barth 1969; Gellner 1983; Jenkins 1994), concerned as they are with current or recent identity groups, that examples are drawn, upon which theories are developed, and approaches to the study of identities formulated.
However, if we as archaeologists seek for a contemporary relevance for our work (see Meskell 2002: 281; Thomas 2004), this would appear to offer one area at least in which this could be found, and this is a subject which is further considered again later. Yet it should also be stated that the archaeology of identities is not some form of esoteric sub-discipline, rather it forms part of the total endeavour of archaeology, which Gosden (1994: 166) has described as âpart of a perilous, but necessary, search for the things that bind and divide human groups locally and globallyâ. For the issue is really whether one can actually have an archaeology that is not concerned with identity.
Hence this volume indicates, through the contributions chosen, that identities in many different manifestations are approachable via archaeology. However, this is a theme the selections herein are left to convince the reader of, and this introduction is instead concerned with assessing both what is meant by the term identity, and how the notion of identities in all their various forms has been used, and, indeed, misused by archaeologists and others. The emphasis is placed here upon assessing, primarily, definition and concept, as opposed to for example considering the history of archaeological approaches to identities, or what archaeologists have done and where. This is possible for these last themes have been adequately covered by others (e.g. Jones 1997; Schmidt and Voss 2000; Conlin Casella and Fowler 2005), and not least by Meskell in this volume (and see Meskell 2002).
Similarly it is also worth noting that the compilation of any Reader obviously reflects the editorâs personal choice. There are clearly many other excellent contributions which could have been included if cost and word-length restrictions did not impinge, but these did, and they have had to be omitted. Moreover, it should also be stated that unfortunately it has only proven possible to reproduce contributions published in English, which obviously does not reflect all the relevant scholarship. Nonetheless this was a further restriction which had to be accommodated. Finally it should also be indicated that this introduction does not necessarily reflect the views of the contributors herein. Rather it is a personal reflection on the archaeology of identities.
Definitions and categories
The first subject which perhaps needs considering is that of definition. Can we see differences in how the terms we use today with reference to describing and defining identity in archaeological (and other) contexts have altered in their meaning over time? Obviously, this is a subject which has been considered by others, most notably Raymond Williams (1988) and his analysis of âkeywordsâ of relevance here; âethnicâ, âracialâ, and âsexâ. However, understandably, Williams is not concerned with the archaeological relevance or implications of his keywords, and hence in addressing the question of definition and meaning just posed recourse was made to a few selected dictionaries, these being: The Oxford Handy Dictionary (Fowler and Fowler 1986); The Little Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Ostler 1931); An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Skeat 1882); The Spelling and Explanatory Dictionary of the English Language (Bentick 1786); and the Glossographia Anglicana Nova (Brown et al. 1719). While the terms considered were expanded to include âidentityâ, âgenderâ, âqueerâ, âethnicâ, âraceâ, and âdisabilityâ (for religion see Insoll 2004: 6â8). The entries (slightly edited to remove abbreviations) are as follows â
âIdentityâ â âabsolute sameness, individuality, personalityâ (1986: 427); âabsolute sameness; individualityâ (1931: 248); âsamenessâ (1882: 280); âsamenessâ (1786: 183); no entry (1719).
âGenderâ â âclassification (or one of the classes) corresponding roughly to the two sexes and sexlessness (see MASCULINE, FEMININE, NEUTER); (jocular) oneâs sexâ (1986: 358); âany of the classes (masculine, feminine, neuter gender) corresponding to the two sexes and sexlessnessâ (1931: 214); âkind, breed, sexâ (1882: 230); âa sex, kind or sortâ (1786: 166); ââŚis the difference of sex or kindâ (1719: 248).
âQueerâ â âstrange, odd, eccentric; of questionable character, shady, suspect, out of sorts, giddy or faint (feeling queer); (slang, especially of man) homosexualâŚâ (1986: 729); âstrange, odd, eccentric; of questionable character; out of sorts. (slang) put out of orderâ (1931: 401); âstrange, oddâ (1882: 484); âodd, fantasticalâ (1786: 269); âodd, fantastical, sorryâ (1719: 508).
âEthnicâ â âPertaining to race; heathen; originating from specified racial, linguistic etc., groupâ (1986: 291); âof race; heathenâ (1931: 178); ârelating to a nationâ (1882: 196); âheathenishâ (1786: 144); âheathenish, or which of or belongs to the heathensâ (1719: 209).
âRaceâ â âGroup of persons or animals or plants connected by common descent, posterity of (person); house, family, tribe, or nation regarded as of common stock; distinct ethnical stock (the Caucasian race); genus or species or breed or variety of animals or plants; any great division of living creatures (the human race); descent, kindred; class of persons etc. with some common feature (the race of poets, dandies, etc.)â (1986: 733); âgroup of persons having common ancestor; the posterity of; family; kindred people; a particular breed of animals; genus or species of plantsâ (1931: 404); âlineage, family, breedâ (1882: 487); âlineage, stock, familyâŚâ (1786: 270); no entry (1719).
âDisabilityâ â âthing or lack that prevents oneâs doing something, physical incapacity caused by injury or diseaseâ (1986: 237); âthing that incapacitates or disqualifiesâ (1931: 150); (no entry, 1882) âdisableâ â âto make unable, disqualifyâ (1882: 168); âunfitness, incapacityâ (1786: 122); âbeing unable or unfitâ (1719: 165).
From the above, though it is a far from comprehensive survey, it can be seen that the definitions which have been considered have generally remained broadly similar over time. They share âfamily resemblancesâ (Wittgenstein 1953; and see Insoll 2004: 144â5). The exceptions would appear to be provided by the slang application of âqueerâ to sexual identity, which is a seemingly somewhat recent development, and âethnicâ, which has shifted in meaning from the emphasis placed upon âheathenâ to one denoting racial characteristics (Williams 1988: 119). Similarly the development of the term âidentityâ itself, away from âsamenessâ, and its absence in the earliest dictionary consulted (1719) is of interest. This is because its connection with individuality also seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon. Perhaps this is unsurprising as the very idea of individual identity is something of a recent construct (Williams 1988: 163). As Johnson (1999: 83) has noted, there âis no excuse for taking the modern Western âcult of the individualâ as self-evident, or true for all times and all placesâ. The âconsciousness of selfâ (La Fontaine 1985: 124) might be universal, but the âsocial concept of the individualâ (ibid.) is not. As the studies in Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes (1985) indicate, the notion of the individual varies widely across the world today, and would have done so in the past as well.
These are also issues which have been considered with reference to archaeology by various scholars: Johnson (1999) has already been cited, and Thomas (2004: 147), for instance, has discussed how âwe think of ourselves as unique and unrepeatable, yet possessing a series of attributes that are common to all individualsâ. Besides general theorizing, the concept of the individual has, occasionally, been considered with reference to more specific periods or areas of archaeology. Eleanor Scott (1997: 9) provides a case in point for she has posed the question as to whether, for example, a Bronze Age Briton or a Roman would have had a self-identity. This, she answers, is unlikely; they would have possessed an identity, informed by gender, kinship, or class, but not by individual concerns.
Hence we have to be aware that sometimes there is a danger of potentially recognizing past identities along modern lines which might be inapt, and in so doing we risk, as Meskell (2002: 281) has noted, âan elision of difference, conflating ancient and modern experience in the processâ. Certainly, gender (both male and female), children and other age-related identity manifestations, as well as sexual activity, and disabilities, obviously existed. But beyond this the onus is upon the archaeologist to attempt to prove as far as possible that other identity manifestations existed in the past be they ethnic, religious, or sexual, the last here of relevance when used to consciously create identity. We must not assume that in line with a diverse society today, a mirror image must have existed in the past as well, with âXâ per cent of this group, and âYâ of that present. Arbitrary divisions, perhaps in line with fashionable social theory or policy, or political correctness, are very unlikely to have any validity. We do not want to âoverwriteâ the past with the present, and in so doing substitute âour concernsâ for those of the past (Moreland 2001: 116).
Although we cannot assume that any ânormsâ existed in past societies as has been cogently emphasized via âqueerâ archaeology (Dowson 2000; and see Meskell this volume, and 2002: 283), equally it should be noted that in the pursuit of reconstructing past identities, including sexual ones, it has to be recognized, that our current freedom of expression is not replicated everywhere today, and certainly was not in the past. There is certainly much virtue in âqueerâ readings of the past, but it cannot be assumed, conversely, that all the past was queer. The archaeological evidence should be allowed to âspeakâ where possible, rather than being interpreted according to a pre-existing blueprint be it either normative or âqueerâ.
It should also be remembered that identities are not necessarily chosen by free will but can be ascribed; as the existence of the caste system in India indicates (Hocart 1950; Quigley 1996). The foundational underpinnings of the archaeology of identities, largely secular Western democracy with its accompanying freedom of expression, unfortunately do not accord with the contemporary situation in much of the world, and would not have done for the past either. Hence the same identity categories as those we note today may have existed in the past, including those requiring âproofâ rather than assumption as to their prior existence, but how they may have been manifest could have been covert or hidden, and, moreover, their current identification may not always be welcome (see Insoll 2005). Thus there is a certain ethical dimension which must also be acknowledged within exploring the archaeology of identities. The solution is far from universal, but must be considered on a case-by-case basis rather than by what might be, in the grand hermeneutical scheme of things, more perhaps a fleeting window of social expression, or academic popularity.
Furthermore in pursuing social interpretations we should not forget other facets of the hermeneutical framework. So that, for example, we need to recognize that our bodies are not purely socially constituted â biology obviously plays a major factor as well! As Caldwell (2005: 30) has noted, âour bodies need to be biological bodies if they are also to be social onesâ. Yet there sometimes seems to be within the archaeology of identities an emphasis upon forgetting the prosaic, but equally important foundational rudiments such as biology, in favour of the more popularly perceived social theoretical elements. Moreover the empirical body from which adequate interpretation and theory are generated in pursuing past identities must also not be neglected; otherwise there is a danger that empty shells are created.
Similarly it could also be noted that the current unpopularity of economic interpretations in favour of social ones is not necessarily useful. Both deserve merit, but not to the exclusion of the other; they need not be mutually exclusive. The archaeological recognition of childhood and other age-related identity categories is a relatively recent phenomenon (see Sofaer this volume; and Chamberlain 1997; Kamp 2001), and an admirable one, but we would not want, for example, to forget the economic potential of children in favour of ascribing them an individual worth along the lines of the modern, frequently, but not exclusively, Western concept of the child, i.e. what Giddens and Pierson (1998: 123) have referred to as âthe prized childâ. This is a concept, the development of which they describe as reflecting the decline in economic importance of having children and the concomitant rise of a âsemi-mythical statusâ (ibid.) around the child. Of course, it is slightly reductionist to appear to deny love and emotional bonds to children in pre-modern (Western) conditions, which is of course absurd, but the general premise is noteworthy, namely that the economic element of childhood should not be forgotten entirely in favour of an emotional one; the two can of course be combined.
This point would certainly seem to be of relevance for archaeology. Cooper (2002: 139â40), for instance, in an engaging discussion of the archaeology and history of the Andaman Islands, describes how the contribution of random foraging by children to the diet was âsignificant enough to warrant mentionâ. Similar economic motivations connected with childhood have also recently been discussed by Kamp (2001: 2, 14â18). Such an economic role and the requisite ancillary skills involved could well feature in many areas during prehistory as well, and in recognizing childrenâs identity it should not be forgotten. In other words our identity categories should continually be evaluated so that we do not merely provide mirror images of what we might be used to or what we think should exist in the past.
However, it is undeniable that the identity categories which we as archaeologists discuss have broadened out considerably over the past couple of decades, reflecting, in part, the debate which is occurring. Age, as represented by the archaeology of childhood as just described, is one category, only really recently considered. But age is of great significance, obviously, for we are not born with our identities complete, these can be both created over time and alter as we complete our âlife cyclesâ (see Gilchrist 2000). Yet this said, equally it would be unwise to attempt to wholly define our identity categories, according to what Cornell (2004: 177) describes as, in âSartreanâ terms; i.e. that âidentity often lives only for short momentsâ (ibid.). Obviously, this is based upon the work of Jean-Paul Sartre (1960), the existentialist philosopher, but it can be criticized as regards potential archaeological applications at least, for although the notion that identities are changeable and not always fixed or stable is fully accepted (see Rowlands; Meskell this volume), emphasizing the transient moments of identity could equally be irrelevant in relation to what are frequently more permanent categories, i.e. some of those related to age, and, for example, ethnic, or religious identities.
Age can also be of great significance in dictating what we might know via the agency of experience, or conversely what we might be allowed to know via the operation of age sets or grades, secret societies, initiation groups and suchlike. Admittedly via archaeology our insights into this area of identity are perhaps sometimes limited. Though examples of the possible recognition of initiation rites are discussed by Kamp (2001), including ancient Egyptian circumcision rites, Aztec initiations, and the interpretation of certain caves used during the Neolithic in Abr...