Values in Education

Eva Burman, Maxine Cooper, Lorraine Ling, Joan Stephenson, Joan Stephenson****Nfa******

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• eBook ISBN: 9781134728312
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Based upon an empirical study involving training and practising teachers from seven countries, this book investigates the various attitudes and practices towards the teaching of values and their place in the curriculum. Countries covered include: Australia, Eire, Israel, Slovenia, Switzerland, UK and USA. The findings of each of the countries are compared and contrasted in the light of the diverse cultural conditions which are apparent. This book brings together various approaches currently taken in values education and also suggests a theoretical foundation for decision making. The book culminates in practical examples, drawn from the evidence of the research project, which teachers can adapt for use with their own pupils. This book provides a challenging and imaginative perspective on values in education and comes at a time when educators face a new era which demands dynamic, transformative and reflective approaches.

Part I

BEGINNINGS

1
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Lorraine Ling and Joan Stephenson

Everyone knows what they want from education—until they are asked to spell it out. Then it becomes apparent that many people simply have a’warm fuzzy’ feeling about education.

(Hill, 1991:1)

There is an immense diversity of opinion regarding the place of values in the curriculum and also regarding the strategies and approaches to be employed when teaching values. In times of economic crisis or social upheaval there are inevitably conflicting demands for specific interests and viewpoints to be favoured when the curriculum of schooling is being constructed and reconstructed. One of the areas in which the greatest tension and conflict occurs may be seen to be that of values education. In order to clarify the term Values’, the definition supplied by Hill (1991:4) will be used as the basis for this discussion.

When people speak of values they are usually referring to those beliefs held by individuals to which they attach special priority or worth, and by which they tend to order their lives. A value is, therefore, more than a belief; but it is also more than a feeling.

Theorists have attempted to itemize values, and typologies of values have resulted. Two such typologies are provided by Taylor (1961) and by De Witt H.Parker (1931). Parker distinguishes two kinds of values—‘Real Life’ and ‘Imagination’, Jarrett (1991:13), in his discussion of Parker’s typology, lists the two types as:

[Real Life] health and comfort; ambition; love and friendship; ethical or moral; knowledge; technological (efficiency)

[Imagination] play; art; religion.

In outlining the categories of values as listed by Taylor (1961), Jarrett notes ‘the moral; the aesthetic; the intellectual; the religious; the economic; the political; the legal; etiquette or custom’ (1991:13). He also notes that these typologies do not include sensual values. For the purposes of this project the values which are predominantly referred to are moral or ethical values.

In the current era, educators face a dilemma as they are pressured by particular interest groups to favour particular value positions and thus to reestablish some form of social stability and cohesion in times of upheaval or transition. Yet while this demand for stability is strong there is a concurrent agenda which stems from the fact that in times of change and upheaval the established, traditional values may no longer be appropriate or relevant.

The period of the 1990s leading to the twenty-first century in so-called ‘developed’ countries is being labelled variously as an interregnum (Eco, 1986), a divide (Drucker, 1993) a transformation (Drucker, 1993; Giddens, 1991) and a period of high modernity (Giddens, 1991). Some social theorists contend that the period of post-modernity has arrived (Baudrillard, 1981; Lyotard, 1984) and thus that we have aleady entered a new era. The stance adopted in this book, however, is to assert that we are in a transition period between eras and that continuous change and renewal, restructure and reconstruction, reform and transformation are dominant features. The current era has brought a breaking and blurring of all kinds of boundaries—national, social, political, technological and in communication. An era of globalization has begun in which the traditional boundaries that separated ideologies and communities are being broken so that the values that may have been context-specific and unique in a particular social milieu are being challenged in the light of a global perspective. Knowledges and multiple discourses and literacies are a feature of the current period, and thus the voices of many groups, hitherto silent or at least faint, are being heard. The growth of new social movements such as environmental groups, feminist groups, gay liberation, civil rights groups and the like has led to a social context in which there are multiple agendas, discourses and interests continuously interacting with each other and with the existing social pattern. Approaches to social processes, such as education, which may have been appropriate in past eras, are no longer appropriate and thus new ways are being explored to deal with the challenges of the twenty-first century.

When considering the concept of values in education, then, educators are faced with multiple agendas and a plethora of interests, motivations, tensions and conflicts about values and the teaching of values. It has always been essential for educators to have a firm, considered and well articulated theoretical framework within which to function effectively. It is now, however, even more important for educators to draw upon a well synthesized, soundly conceived theoretical perspective to inform their decisions regarding curriculum and their interaction with it. Theory is apparently a frightening and awe-inspiring word, if the fear and anxiety which it engenders in some educators is any indication. Educators need to be concerned with practical issues and that is not in question here. It is asserted that in order to deal most effectively and critically with practical issues, educators are required to base their practice upon firmly constructed theoretical positions. This demands that educators reflect, read, think critically and analytically, select and synthesize a variety of stances and that they selectively and reflectively construct for themselves a firm theoretical position from which to proceed. Unless this is done, the work of educators at all levels of the system is in danger of being ad hoc, of lacking in cohesion and consistency, of being eclectic and haphazard and thus potentially ineffective. While it may be the case that curriculum decisions generally are under-theorized, the area of values in education reflects an even greater theoretical void. Values teaching is often avoided in classrooms or is ad hoc and unstructured.

Values education is the poor cousin of other core areas in the curriculum…The openness of value debates, in which clinching proof of a position is often hard to pin down, easily leads to the view that such studies are ‘soft’ and ‘vague’… Values education remains a vague and woolly notion. This state of affairs is reflected in the nickname given by students [at a school] to social studies—they call it ‘social slops’.

(Hill, 1991:3)

There is, then, an urgent demand to provide, for educators, theoretical perspectives which inform the teaching of values and the place of values education in schools, so that they may themselves selectively and critically construct a theoretical foundation for their practice in the area of values. In this chapter a brief sketch of a variety of theoretical positions is presented, and a specific framework for the interpretation of the data collected in each country throughout the course of the research project is articulated.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The ancient Greeks, and Socrates in particular, seem to be an accepted starting point for considering theoretical perspectives on values. Central to Socrates’ philosophy were the two elements of morality and logic. These two elements were seen to be congruent in that when moral issues were considered, logic was called upon as the basis for action and decisions. Socrates based his theory upon the notion that we all want and seek ‘the good’ but a lack of logic leads to our doing things which we ought not to do. Therefore in order to avoid acting immorally, people are required to clarify their thinking logically. Thus, from a Socratic perspective, values teaching may involve such strategies as values clarification, critical thinking exercises and conversation in which values positions are articulated and critically appraised.

Aristotle, however, was concerned with moral virtues which included friendliness, honesty, justice and courage. For Aristotle, people were able to decide upon a moral course of action by considering the extremes of two actions or attitudes, for example honesty—dishonesty, patience—impatience, courage—cowardice, hard work—slothfulness. After considering the extremes people were then able to arrive at an understanding of a middle or appropriate course of action. Action follows a rational assessment of a situation, and choices are made after a consideration of the extremes of responses available. Taking Aristotle as a basis for teaching values, strategies may include comparing and contrasting behaviours and actions, role plays of situations where opposite actions are taken in a given situation, debates and activities where choices are provided and options are available.

A pervasive stream of thought running parallel with the philosophy of the ancient Greeks and also especially evident at the beginning of the nineteenth century was ‘hedonism’. The most extreme version of hedonism may be traced back to the fourth century BC to the Cyrenaics, who

claimed that the art of living consists in maximizing the enjoyment of each moment through pleasures of the senses and of the intellect. In contrast, the Epicureans laid emphasis on the attainment of enduring pleasures and the avoidance of pain, stressing the role of prudence and discipline in securing the supreme good.

(A Dictionary of Philosophy, 1979:138)

Bentham’s version of hedonism towards the end of the eighteenth century became known as ‘utilitarianism’. Bentham claimed that there were two masters governing the universe—pleasure and pain. In order to act to produce the greatest possible happiness one is required to consider the possible good for the greatest number of people. This may involve a reduction of one’s own personal pleasure for the sake of the greatest good for the greatest number. Following the thinking of Bentham, John Stuart Mill (1806–73) introduced the notion of a qualitative distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Mill considered that there was a need to distinguish between pleasures which were qualitatively different and then to choose action. These utilitarian concepts form the basis of ideological stances taken by governments in the framing of laws to protect people from the actions of others and also from their own actions. If this kind of theoretical framework were to be used as the basis for the teaching of values in classrooms the strategies employed might involve the study of democratic principles, activities involving voting and determining the consequences of action for groups and individuals.

In the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche’s writings became significant and have exerted an influence on the theory underpinning moral and values education. For Nietzsche the basic drive behind all human action is power or, in his terms, ‘the will to power’.

Appeals to reason and truthfulness are merely one means among others (such as physical force) by which one ‘will’ can, in appropriate circumstances, assert its power over another. All reason…is rationalization; all ‘truth’ a perspective issuing from the centre of some ascendant ‘will’… What actually matters about a belief is not so much whether or not it is ‘true’, but whether or not it is ‘life-affirming’, that is, capable of giving to those who entertain it, feelings of strength, power and freedom.

(A Dictionary of Philosophy, 1979:248)

Here then the assertion is that it is necessary to be strong. If educators were to employ the Nietzschean philosophy in the teaching of values, activities might include discussions about power and authority, about dilemmas involving power struggles and tensions between opposing viewpoints or motivations, and about the ability to make a strong and ‘tough’ decision based upon one’s belief that strong and creative people are those who control and dominate in society.

If we were to adopt a Kantian perspective based upon the thinking of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) we would base our actions upon our sense of duty and responsibility and upon the fact that such action could become a universal principle for action. Kant refers to ‘categorical imperatives’ for action which provides a source for moral principles and action. For Kant it is never morally correct to act according to feeling or emotions. On the basis of Kantian thought, the teaching of values would involve consideration of universal principles and a development of a sense of duty and responsibility. Here strategies which might be employed in classrooms could include discussion of global issues which affect the population of the world, civil and human rights, environmental issues, moral dilemma situations based on universal principles as distinct from personal gain or good, and development of a sense of the consequences of one’s actions through role-play and discussion.

For John Dewey (1859–1952) the context was the central concern rather than direct instruction in values.

Direct instruction in morals has been effective only in social groups where it was part of the authoritative control of the many by the few. Not the teaching of it but the reinforcement of it by the whole regimen of which it is an aspect made it effective. To attempt to get similar results from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to rely upon sentimental magic.

(Dewey, 1916 quoted in Jarrett, 1991:57)

Dewey is not opposed to moral education so long as it is seen in the whole context of the environment and so long as morals are viewed as social relationships. For Dewey, then, there should be no separate area of the curriculum for dealing with values and moral education. Rather these areas of the development of the individual should be an integral and inevitable part of all of the experiences and activities through which a learner passes. Thus if an educator takes a stance based upon Dewey’s thought, the values dimension would be seen as part of all teaching and learning activities.

Any place where ‘intercourse, communication, and co-operation’ go on, any situation that extends the ‘perception of connections’ is educational, morally educational…anything that promotes ‘growth’ is an instance of moral education.

(Jarrett, 1991:57)

It is also pertinent to note that, for Dewey, there could be no predetermined curriculum in a learning context as it is necessary for the learner to learn through experiences, and thus the curriculum is emergent and non-prescriptive.

In the late 1930s the ‘emotivist’ perspective came into prominence as discussed by Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and by C.L.Stevenson in Ethics and Language (1944). The emotivist stance contends that ‘all moral utterances are essentially an attempt to persuade others to share one’s own attitude’. Stevenson concludes that ‘the purpose of moral discussion is to reach agreement through persuasion’ (A. Dictionary of Philosophy, 1979:104). Thus in the emotivist perspective, all value judgements are made on the basis of a moral imperative and an emotional commitment to a specific point of view. This view involves a belief that moral reasoning is not subject to logic, reason or rationality nor is it grounded in fact or knowledge. If this perspective is to provide the basis for the teaching of values in schools, activities may include debates, persuasive presentations and writing, and development of techniques to expound a position or opinion lucidly.

The thought of Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) has been especially influential in shifting the emphasis from the individual in society to the group as a social entity.

Durkheim argued that society was not ‘a mere sum of individuals’, and that ‘the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics…’ ‘If we begin with the individual’, Durkheim maintained, ‘we shall be able to understand nothing of what takes place in the group.’

(Beilharz, 1991:72)

If appeal is made to the conc...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Part I Beginnings
• Part II Perspectives
• Part III Outcomes
• Part IV Reflections
• Appendix I Values Education During the Training of Aspiring Teachers for the Secondary Grade i at the University of Berne
• Appendix II The Questionnaire
• Index