Why Good is Good

The Sources of Morality

Robert Hinde

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• Print ISBN: 9780415277525
• eBook ISBN: 9781134472536
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Where do our moral beliefs come from? Theologians and scientists provide often conflicting answers. Robert Hinde resolves these conflicts to offer a groundbreaking, multidisciplinary response, drawing on psychology, philosophy, evolutionary biology and social anthropology. Hinde argues that understanding the origins of our morality can clarify the debates surrounding contemporary ethical dilemmas such as genetic modification, increasing consumerism and globalisation. Well-chosen examples and helpful summaries make this an accessible volume for students, professionals and others interested in contemporary and historical ethics.

I

SETTING THE STAGE

The chapters in this section address some conceptual issues basic to the later discussion. Of special importance are Chapter 2, which outlines the approach, and Chapter 5, which is concerned with the concept of the self-system – an issue important for understanding the nature of morality.

1

WHAT DOES MORALITY INCLUDE?

The first step must be to specify the subject matter. However, this turns out to be more complex than it appears at first sight. ‘Morality’ concerns the distinction between good and evil, and ‘morals’ are usually taken to refer to rules about what people ought to do and what they ought not to do. But, when we talk about ‘moral’ values or behaviour, we usually mean values that we see as ‘good’, or as how someone ‘ought’ to behave. Although – as we shall see – the mechanisms by which people come to hold moral values (in the sense of values seen as good) and behave in moral ways are similar in many respects to those by which immoral (in the sense of bad) values and behaviour are acquired, our main interest is with the former.

Beyond that, morality comes within the province of several academic disciplines, and there seems to be little general agreement on its scope – or, indeed, on the terms used to discuss it. For most people, conventions and rights, morals and ethics are categories with no precise boundaries, and are used rather loosely in everyday speech. Dictionaries make no clear distinction between morals and ethics. In general, morals are concerned specifically with how other human beings should be treated, while ethics is often used more broadly to include such issues as intellectual integrity. Some, however, use ethics to refer to a local group’s set of values, and consider morality to concern issues applicable across groups. As indicated below, some authors do and others do not distinguish morals from conventions. While most, probably all, agree that morality is primarily concerned with prosocial behaviour, cooperation and justice, a number of matters that some consider to involve morality are neglected by others. It would be tedious to attempt to survey these differences in opinion, but it is necessary to situate the approach taken here by brief references to salient aspects of some of them.

Theology

Difficulties emerge even in theological approaches to morality. The moral codes of the main world religions differ in a number of respects, in part because rules conducive to their maintenance inevitably differ between religions, and are seen as moral issues by their adherents. Rules that can seem mere conventions to outsiders, such as the use of the name of the deity in secular conversation, may be seen as moral issues by those inside the system. In addition, there are differences even within any one religious group on what makes a rule a religious rule. For instance, Christian theologians refer to tradition, reason and scripture as sources of moral precepts, but the emphasis they place on each varies considerably. Some refer to the authority of a deity, others to a paradigmatic religious person, or to a religious text, or to the rule’s place in a larger theological framework. ¹ Some modern Christian theologians are discarding the view that moral precepts are given by authority, and adopting a more eclectic approach. For instance, an Anglican bishop writes: ‘Morality tries to base itself on observed consequences, not on beliefs, superstitions or preferences. A wrong act is one that manifestly harms others or their interests, or violates their rights or causes injustice.’² This view is in harmony with the orientation of representatives of other disciplines, but omits issues concerned with respect for the deity, held to be important by most religious people.

Philosophy

Much of the literature on morality has come from philosophers, most of whom would agree that moral precepts, while not necessarily constructed by reason, should be defensible by reason. They are thus primarily (though not exclusively) concerned with deliberating about the moral judgements in Western societies, rather than with the translation of moral principles or precepts into action.³ While some deny that morality should be defined in terms of the content of its precepts,⁴ most agree that the fundamental virtues are those that lead to some sort of prosocial behaviour (roughly, behaving positively to others⁵), cooperation and justice – in other words, morality is concerned with how individuals and groups are to live with each other. Within this, morality has been seen as involving concern for some objective good or value, such as the well-being of humankind; or as a system of rules and obligations; or as promoting the self-actualisation of individuals; or as a means of liberation from enslaving institutions.⁶ Some see moral precepts, such as ‘Thou shalt not kill’, as ends in themselves, arguing that their value is not derived from their utility for external consequences.⁷Some have taken a different view. Thus Rawls⁸ enunciated two principles for a moral system: namely that every individual should have an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others, and that inequalities between individuals should only be such as are to the common advantage and do not affect equality of opportunity.

There is disagreement amongst philosophers even on the extents to which moral precepts are to be seen as absolute and as universally binding. For instance, Williams⁹ emphasizes that moral matters are felt to be fundamental. Although disagreement about moral issues is possible, such disagreement is to be taken seriously: there is a feeling that people ought to have a common view about morals. On this view, moral statements are not merely attitudinal statements: although one can change one’s mind about moral matters, that usually involves merely how ‘fundamental precepts’ should be applied to the matter in hand, or the relative weight to be given to apparently conflicting considerations, each of which seems to be fundamental. Other philosophers make a distinction between universally binding moral rules, and those which are accepted only by limited groups of individuals. A somewhat extreme example is Strawson.¹⁰ Recognizing that certain human interests and virtues (e.g. mutual aid, honesty) are a necessity for any conceivable moral community, he also emphasizes that the ideals by which people live may differ markedly, even between individuals.

Moral principles are seen by most philosophers to be so deeply ingrained in development that acting on them does not depend on fear of detection – though, of course, this is true also of many quite mundane habits and conventional actions, such as how to use a knife and fork. Most philosophers hold that actions are moral only if they are intentional; accidents do not count. Taken to an extreme, this would imply that spontaneous action cannot be moral, a view with which many would disagree (see p. 48). Others would go farther, and say that actions are moral only if they are motivated by the consideration that they are morally right and by no other consideration at all: in practice – since motivations are multi-layered, and many actions have multiple foreseeable sequelae – this would be a very difficult distinction to make.

But, even given that moral precepts are primarily concerned with prosocial behaviour, cooperation and justice, there is still room for disagreement and for cultural differences concerning which types of behaviour are prosocial, and about what constitutes cooperation and justice. General agreement about the content of morals or morality would thus be difficult to obtain. The editors of a volume on the issue¹¹ refer to a number of properties which have been suggested: moral precepts are universal (at least within a cultural group); are prescriptive or proscriptive; are more important than other precepts and override them; have particular forms of sanctions associated with them; and are defined by reference to their content. They point out that none of these can be seen as a sufficient condition for a principle to be a moral principle, and all present difficulties as necessary conditions.

Often, and especially when dealing with public policy issues, it is useful to make a distinction between private and public morality. M. Warnock¹² sees private morality as grounded in a mixture of principle and sentiment, which together give rise to an imperative to the person concerned, and public morality as concerned with what is publicly acceptable and seen widely to be proper. Private morality is based (in her view) on the recognition that others are as important as oneself: it may involve postponing one’s own immediate wishes for the sake of a principle – a principle, such as truth or loyalty, usually concerned with the well-being of others.¹³ Thus, a keen footballer who foregoes a match in order to help a friend is showing private morality. Public morality requires one to defend something in the interests of all members of the group to which one belongs, such as the right to freedom of movement or speech.

A different kind of distinction between public and private contrasts the public world, in which individuals are anonymous, with the private world of personal relationships.¹⁴ According to this view, value in the public world of modern societies often tends to be placed on self-advancement, power and consumption, and other individuals are valued only in so far as they are means to an end; while in the private world individuals are the repositories of special values and emotions, and friendship is pursued for its own sake. In the public sphere the law courts are the guardians of morality. In the private sphere one helps others, does things for friends, and so on, not (usually) by compulsion or out of a sense of duty but (in the ideal case) because one wants to: one’s own well-being is the well-being of one’s family and friends. While this distinction is unacceptable to many, and certainly cannot be pressed too far, it is a not uncommon view that it is inappropriate to judge action in the public world by the moral precepts applicable in the private one. That, however, raises the question of whether different standards are used in the public domain for pragmatic reasons, or because basic standards of morality ‘ought’ to differ.

Feminist philosophers

While most philosophers, perhaps inevitably, have based their discussions round abstract principles whose applicability to particular issues is discussed in terms of justice, fairness, and the interests of individuals, recent writings on ethics by feminist philosophers provide a rather different perspective. Here issues of personal relationships, caring and nurturance are accorded greater priority than issues of justice and fairness. Instead of a focus on justice, they have emphasized responding adequately to others’ needs and fostering relationships. As feminists recognize, pitting justice against care in a masculine/feminine arena runs the risk of consigning women to their traditional roles, though care for self is to be considered alongside care for others. It is therefore important to emphasize that the distinction is between what women and men value, not between their styles of behaviour or between behaviours that are appropriate to either.

While gender differences in moral reasoning have probably been exaggerated (pp. 109–11), the debate has raised other important issues. In particular, and perhaps because of the emphasis on care in relationships, many feminist writers advocate attention to the particulars of each case, with attunement to particular relationships, and are less concerned with ubiquitously applicable principles of right and wrong. Thus context is seen as critical, so that it may be right to behave in a particular way in one relationship and not in another. The focus is on decisions that have to be made in everyday life with real people.

Although there is less concern with impartiality and with the universality of moral precepts, this does not mean that abstract principles do not apply: rather they must be interpreted in the context of the particular circumstances. People are seen as individuals, sharing a common humanity but with differing histories and personalities. Decisions often involve a conflict between responsibility in relationships and personal integrity, where formal rules are of little help in differentiating between good and bad. The difficulty, and even the impossibility, of making moral decisions in the face of conflicting needs, loyalties and principles is recognized, and it is accepted that decisions are inevitably often made intuitively rather than by considered thought.

In any case, most feminists do not see justice and care as necessarily incompatible: some see justice as more appropriate for public interactions, care for interpersonal interactions with family, friends and casual acquaintances, while others argue that justice and care are interdependent, each providing a brake on too great a focus on the other.¹⁵

Psychology

Morals are not the province only of theologians and philosophers, and other disciplines have their own emphases. Psychologists are concerned with the acquisition of morality, and with the relations between moral precepts and action, and not so much with deliberating about what is right. Most Western psychologists are concerned with behaviour conducive to the harmony of relationships and societies. Thus they tend to emphasize the welfare of others and justice as the critical issues, though, as we shall see, some are concerned also with issues of individual autonomy and rights. In defining morality, most psychologists tend to place less emphasis on the underlying intention than do many philosophers, accepting that motivation may be complex. Indeed moral actions are often regarded as spontaneous rather than the product of considered calculation.

But the approaches of psychologists to morality are diverse. Many developmental psychologists, concerned primarily but not exclusively with Western cultures, distinguish between moral and conventional issues on the basis of the strength of the affective reactions aroused by infringements. Others make an absolute distinction between the two, arguing that those precepts that are clearly moral are determined by criteria other than (secular) authority, agreement, consensus, or institutional convention; and tend to concern justice and the rights and welfare of others. Conventions, unlike moral issues, are concerned with the rules and norms of the social system, and are valid only in the local context. Moral precepts are regarded as obligatory, and moral transgressions as more serious than actions that defy convention. Those who break conventions may arouse indignation, and even be seen as outrageous, but they are unlikely to be seen as evil or ‘bad’. Moral rules are such as would be seen as right or wrong in the absence of a rule or law, and are valid even if they are not observed in other cultures. Some would argue that morality has meaning only with regard to others’ rights.

Considerable evidence suggests that the distinction between morals and conventions is widespread.¹⁶ It has been argued that moral and conventional issues depend on distinct conceptual domains: justifications for judgements on moral issues include promoting welfare, justice, fairness, rights, truth and loyalty, and also preventing harm; while justifications for judgements about conventions require understanding the social organization, including the nature of social authority and customs, and the importance of social coordination.¹⁷ However, one can find exceptions to virtually all the criteria that have been proposed. For instance, the implementation of moral precepts is not always context-independent, for there are contexts in which some would relax the precept ‘Thou shalt not kill’; religious people would argue that moral principles are based on authority; conventions often do involve the rights and welfare of others; and conventions can be affectively important, for the inadvertent breaking of a convention can lead to social rejection...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• PART I. Setting the Stage
• PART II. Where do Moral Precepts come from?
• PART III. Some Practical and Theoretical Issues
• Notes
• References
• Name Index
• Subject Index