The Roots of Violence

A History of War in Chad

M. J. Azevedo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• Print ISBN:
  9789056995829
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135300807
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Examining conflict and warfare in Chad from both historic and contemporary perspectives, Mario Azevedo explores not only how violence has permeated and become almost an intrinsic part of the fabric of the central-eastern Sudanic societies, but how foreign interference from centuries ago to the present-day have exacerbated rather than suppressed the violence. Although the main objective of the volume is to understand present Chad, it provides comprehensive and analytical discussion of Chad's violent past. This strategy goes beyond putting the blame on the unwise and ethnic policies at Francois Tombalbaye or Felix Malloum; instead, Roots of Violence clarifies the role of violence in both pre- and post-colonial Chad and, thus, demythologizes many of the assumptions held by scholars and non-scholars alike.

Chapter ONE
Environment and Society

There were major socio-political and economic differences and resulting uses of violence as a means of survival, domination, and maintenance of law and order between the state (or cephalous) and stateless (or acephalous) communities in pre-colonial Chad. However, the core of the following chapter, although providing an overview of the country, focuses on the predominantly acephalous societies of Southern Chad, leaving a detailed discussion of Northern Chad to chapter two. Fundamentally, this chapter argues that present research seems to indicate that, stemming from a less developed state of sociopolitical institutions and a lack of relatively advanced technological and military preparedness, the conflict that Southern Chad’s ethnic groups may have experienced in pre-colonial times was less violent and less lethal in its impact. This condition, the chapter notes further, was in sharp contrast to the situation prevailing both in the pre-colonial North and the South following the introduction of Islam and the slave trade.

UNDERSTANDING CHAD

Chad is a former French Equatorial African colony that, like many other colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, achieved its independence in 1960. Unlike many newly-created countries and states, however, its precarious status as an infant and evolving nation-state has underscored the resilience of the region’s ancient problems and conflicts and the seeming failure of the “integrative” colonial policies attempted by the French some hundred years ago. The fifth largest country in Africa, with a surface of 495,755 square miles (1,284,000 square kilometers)—two and a half times the size of France—and a population of approximately 5,500,000 (mid-1990s), it has long suffered from severe political, economic, and geographic ills, making it one of the most unstable countries on the continent. It has experienced one of the longest civil conflicts in Africa (1966–1990s); its per capita income is one of the lowest (Chad is classified as one of the poorest nations on the globe); and it has the world’s highest infant mortality rate and the lowest literacy rate for female children (Europa World Year Book 1993:717).

These problems notwithstanding, Chad has managed to survive as a “nation.” It has continued to be a member of major international organizations, and has attracted the military intervention of several major and minor actors such as France, the United States, Libya, Nigeria, and Sudan, as well as the attention of the Organization of African Unity. As a potentially militarized state, Chad has also caused anxieties among its closest neighbors, particularly Cameroon. Under these circumstances, therefore, one would expect that more scholars would take an interest in the affairs of this intriguing valve of “Africa’s heart.” This has not, however, been the case. Little is written on Chad, except for occasional books (usually written by French scholars) and short articles that appear from time to time, mainly in French magazines and newspapers. Chad is therefore an unknown quantity for the overwhelming majority of the public in America and elsewhere. A U.S. Department of State official once said: “Why should the United States care? Chad is a fly-blown piece of real estate. Only 8 percent of the United States knows what’s going on in Central America so I should think only 1 percent of them would know where Chad is and only 1 percent of them would care” (Blundy and Lycett 1987:186).

The socio-ethnic, political, religious, and economic complexity of the country is undoubtedly a major deterrent to scholars, while the country’s landlocked position fails to attract the attention of the military and economic strategists. In fact, an American diplomat in N’Djamena once joked that one had to have a Ph.D. in international affairs to understand Chad’s complexity (Blundy and Lycett 1987:190). While Chad can be studied from different angles and perspectives, the present work focuses on the role of organized and nonorganized violence, warfare, and the army in the history of the country, not in isolation but in its intercourse with the surrounding societies and states in the region African scholars have called West and Central Sudan. In a sense, therefore, this is a history of violence in Central Africa. In as much as the purpose is to understand present-day Chad and its surroundings, the past becomes a steppingstone and a foundation for the present and the future; the effort of today’s Chad continues to be an attempt to reconcile ancient differences and peoples who were artificially forged into a “nation” by France.

Two tendencies prevail among scholars who show a modicum of interest in the Chadian situation. One has been to ignore the precolonial past and deal with the more manageable post-1960 period and to blame the Sara and the late president, François Tombalbaye, for Chad’s present problems. The second has placed emphasis on the dichotomy between the desert or semi-desert north and the productive south, the conflict between Muslim and Christian, the cleavages between Sara and Arab or Tubu, and the failed French colonial policies that developed the south but ignored the north, leaving the northern region almost intact in its centralized administrative and political structure. Unfortunately, neither of these tendencies alone explains the tragedy and the roots of the civil war in Chad.

As a result of these past approaches, the theme of violence, organized warfare, both modern and ancient, and the role of the army, have been considered within the general context, which most often confuses rather than clarifies the issues at hand. This volume, I hope, will prove, from both the historic and contemporary perspectives, that violence has become almost an intrinsic part of the fabric of the Central Sudanic societies, and will show how foreign intervention and interference, from centuries ago to the present, have exacerbated rather than weakened the sources of violence in the north as well as in the south.

The subject of the roots of violence in Chad is difficult to study and comprehend, as no country can be frozen in time. Ethnicity, demographic shifts, economic typologies, linguistic commonalities between and among diverse ethnic groups, and the emergent role of proselytizing and trade-centered religions, all played an important role in shifting and shaping the Chadian social fabric. As a result, Chad’s society was left in a volatile flux of transition, bifurcated between the non-Muslim south and the Muslim north, two geopolitical segments that were subsequently engaged in unending conflict. Compounding this conflict were external factors contiguous to Chad, as well as pressures from beyond the continent. While the rise and fall of Islamic regional potentates was one such contiguous factor, France’s intervention was the other.

Sandwiched between Arab Africa to the north and east and African Islam and African Traditionalism to the southwest, Chad suffered at the hands of both the North African imperial and trade designs as well as from the Nigerian Fulani religious, economic, and political crusades. As if this were not enough, the Europeans also had a hand in churning the Chadian historical soil, fertilizing it with Christianity dressed as deliverance from heaven. The upshot of all this was and still remains the lethal and volatile social “cocktail” of political tumult and turmoil played out on the Chadian sands, with factions pulled and tugged in different directions by forces within and by currents in the region and from the outside. In light of all this, can there be a heuristic framework for analyzing the roots of Chadian violence? This book will seek to address this question in an historical context. However, before embarking on an analysis of the social, economic, and political factors that may have led to the prevalence of violence in the country during the past decades, a word on the geographic features of the country and their impact on the people of Chad is called for.

GEOGRAPHY AND HUMAN HABITAT

As noted above, Chad is a huge landlocked basin surrounded by mountain ranges (the Wadai mountains in the east, the volcanic Tibesti massif in the northeast, 11,200 feet high, the Oubangui plateau in the south, and the Adamawa and Mandara ranges in the west), and stands surrounded by Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon in the west, Central African Republic in the south, Libya in the north, and Sudan in the east. Chad experiences two major seasons, the rainy, from June to October, making the south almost impassable by vehicle for most of the period, and the dry season, from November to May, which makes the north and the center of the country a barren, arid zone. Geographers have divided the country into three major climatic zones—the Saharan (the northern third of the country), characterized by an annual rainfall of fewer than 200mm of rain; the Sahelian zone, with rainfall ranging between 250 to 500mm annually; and the humid tropical zone, located in the third tier of the country, which experiences an annual rainfall of between 500 and 1,200mm.

The country’s great geographic differences account for the sharp economic disparities and the meager natural resources of most of its regions. In the true desert area, practically nothing is grown, except a few dates and some grain in the few oases, and the population is sparse, consisting mostly of nomads who herd sheep, goats, and camel. As one moves into the Sahel, one witnesses increased herding of cattle, goats, camels, horses, sheep, and donkeys (particularly in Wadai, Kanem, Batha, and Chari-Bagirmi), and a semi-sedentary transhumance (a lifestyle that varies according to season), coupled with limited market garden production, particularly between parallels 11 and 13. Contrary to most accounts, however, the north, invariably portrayed as totally arid, has a relatively diversified economy, while the claim that this region is inhabited by nomads must be qualified since there are people here who are also either sedentary or semi-sedentary (Buijtenhuijs 1978:10–39). This is why making a distinction between the northern desert and the Sahel is important. The Sahel is also uniquely blessed by the fact that it can sustain cattle, due in part to the absence of the tsetse fly, whose presence has prevented cattle herding in the most productive southern tier of the country. In Biltine and Wadai, furthermore, gum arabic has provided some financial resources to local governments.

The south, in contrast, is endowed with more and better resources. This accounts for the fact that 90 percent of Chad’s population lives in this tenth portion of the country, roughly the area below N’Djamena, the capital, with major demographic centers in the Mayo-Kebbi and Chari-Bagirmi Prefectures (850,000 and 830,000 people respectively). Two major export commodities are grown here, namely, cotton (the mainstay of Chad’s economy and industry, employing more than 600,000 people) and rice, while millet, sorghum, corn, and cassava fulfill local consumption needs. The southern tropical grassland, at times becoming forest, has a diversified wild animal life. In fact, although little known to experts and lay people, the Zakouma National Park is one of the richest animal reserves in the world (Decalo 1987:3). With the discovery of oil in the north (in Kanem) and parts of the south (in Moundou), and despite Chad’s acknowledged poverty, some experts believe that the country has the potential to do better than many other African countries, as long as the tsetse-free central plains continue to provide pasture for an increased number of cattle and the south undertakes major agricultural enterprises (AID 1985:58).

Fishing has been a major source of livelihood for many Chadians, as Chad has two relatively long rivers—the Chari (about 750km) and the Logone (close to 602km long). They are fed by several tributaries and meet at N’Djamena before emptying their waters into Lake Chad (3,861 to 9,651 square miles in size depending on the season), the country’s lowest area. Fresh water provides fish and enhances trading activities within this landlocked country and between Chad and the neighboring states, some of which— Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria—participate in the management of the Lake. Furthermore, the two rivers are partially navigable, as is the case of the portion between N’Djamena and Lake Chad, and can be developed into a major transportation network.

CLASSIFYING CHADIAN SOCIETIES

The complexity of Chadian societies has presented a major challenge to scholars wishing to provide a logical basis for classifying the various ethnic groups in the country. Some end up by simply listing the ethnic groups and highlighting some of their characteristics. Others have classified them according to language, while others have used religion or lifestyles to provide a coherent picture of the country’s social diversity. Dennis Cordell (1985:11–13), for example, singles out religion and conquest as major classifying tools in his study of Dar Kuti. He uses the concept of a “frontier zone,” whereby the predominantly Muslim inhabitants of the northern desert and the semi-arid region, the “intruding society,” saw the southern non-Muslim populations, “the indigenous societies,” as a frontier zone into which they could expand their kingdoms and power and acquire needed human and physical resources. Cordell (1985:13) denies, however, the common corollary of the frontier theory, which holds that, ultimately, the intruding society ends up controlling the indigenous society. Although Cordell’s concept is useful, it presents a problem when applied to Chad, as it might give the impression that Islam was the primary motivating force leading to the hegemony of certain Muslim Kingdoms in Southern Chad. William Zartman (1986a:14) figuratively uses instead the expression “shutter zone” or movable screen for the Central Sudan.

Unlike Cordell, S.P.Reyna (1990:18) divides Chadian societies essentially according to their physical environment or ecology, livelihood, and lifestyle, and explains the migrations and the intermingling of people in the area as a result of the major environmental changes, particularly the continuing desiccation of the Chadian basin after A.D.1200. Thus he distinguishes the pastoralists, the micro-environmental specialists, the cereal producers, and those who combine pastoralism with limited agriculture and fishing, who could perhaps be called “diversified survivalists.”

Archaeologists still have much work to do to provide us with a better picture of Chad’s ancient past. The Sao civilization, likely a creation of the forefathers of the modern Kotoko, noted for its fortified walled cities, seems to date as far back as 3000 B.C. Unfortunately, the turbulent history of the country since its independence has made it difficult for archaeologists to undertake sustained and significant work, particularly in the north, around Lake Chad, and all along the banks of the Logone and Chari rivers, areas that seem to be rich in buried art objects, tool making techniques, and remnants of past lifestyles (Griaule 1943 and Lebeuf 1959). Yet, in spite of Chad’s obscure remote past, it is clear that, for centuries, the region has been a crossroads of religions, trade, and lifestyles between east and west and between north and south, particularly after the migratory movements that intensified in the post-fifteenth century period.

The desiccation of the Sahara and the insularity of Lake Chad and its shrinking waters, as well as those of the Rivers Chari and Logone, in particular, have contributed significantly to the low or the high demographic density of certain regions, some people looking for farming land, others for fishing opportunities, others for trade routes, and many others for cattle pasture. The introduction of iron techniques, which did not reach most of Chad until the founding of Kanem during the ninth century (Lange 1988:216), certainly had a major impact on the securing of durable and more effective ways of improving agriculture and on developing the stronger weapons that revolutionized the political structures in some regions, especially the Sahel. The introduction of Islam from north to south, in particular, brought the rudiments of an alien Arab civilization, which added to the ever growing local social and cultural complexity. With time, Chad also became an important route to Mecca via Abéché and Khartoum, bringing transients and pilgrims from West Africa on the hadj, some of whom stayed in Chad and even built zaribas or quarters and engaged in business activities including the slave trade (Works 1976:170–171). The introduction of the camel among the Tubu and the Zaghawa, probably from North Africa or the Nile Valley by the first Christian millennium, assisted Chad in developing an extensive commercial link with North Africa, particularly between Fezzan and Lake Chad, enhanced by the existence of many oases and wells along the route (Lange 1988:216), and between Eastern Chad, Darfur, and Kordofan.

How does one resolve the problem of Chad’s social complexity? Reyna (1990:18) classifies the camel pastoralists, whose typical example are the Tubu (Daza and Teda), who have lived for centuries in the desert and the arid north, as one distinct social group in what, after the French conquest, became Chad. Pastoralists are essentially herders of camels, sheep, and goats, and not cattle-raisers, because the latter require much more water and pasture than can be found in the desert and semi-desert areas.

Just below the camel pastoralists, in the Sahel zone, lived the “diversified survivalists” who established such states as KanemBornu (near Lake Chad), Bagirmi (along the Chari River, southeast of Bornu), and Wadai (in the eastern border highlands). Included among the state societies were the Kotoko “principalities” on the lower Chari and Logone rivers and a number of small sultanates such as Massalit, Dar Tama, Dar Runga, and Dar Sila, most of which were vassal states of Bagirmi and Wadai, or vassals of each other, as was the case of Dar Runga, which made Dar Kuti its own Muslim client state or colony in the south (Cordell 1985:11). Here, livestock was a major source of revenue, and drought-resistant crops (sorghum and millet) were possible. Fishing as well as foraging, tax collecting, and raiding were important survival and business enterprises, as the discussion below will illustrate.

The next social cluster is that of the cereal producers, below the Sahel states, in what Reyna (1990:18) calls “moist Sudan and the Sudano-Guinean” zone, where agriculture is practiced, with such export crops as cotton and rice. Included in this category would be the usually acephalous Sara, Massa (Banana), and Moundang, who were very specialized in food production. The last social group, in Reyna’s classification, encompasses the “micro-environmental specialists,” who for centuries have found ways to survive in such rugged terrain as around Lake Chad, whose surrounding environment is dry and whose water levels increase or decrease according to seasons. The montagnards are also found here, making a living on the mountain ranges of Chad. Among these are the Hadjerai of the Guéra hills, who have mastered the art of terracing. For those around Lake Chad fishing has been an important source of livelihood, while for the Dangaleat, the Sokoro, the Soba, and the Kenga, kin to the Hadjerai, as well as for the Fulani or Fulbe of the Adamawa mountains, farming and limited herding have made survival possible in an otherwise rugged environment.

CHAD’S MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS

In order to provide a better picture of the nature of the relations that prevailed among pre-colonial societies in Chad, a discussion of the linguistic and cultural manifestations of the most prominent ethnic groups in Chad follows. At present, linguists have identified some 200 ethnic groups and some 110 languages in Chad, although twenty-five of these are still in the initial stages of identification (Grimes 1992:215–219). Complicating the matter further are ethnic diversity and linguistic commonality. There are some societies in Chad that are classified as separate ethnic groups but that do not have a language of their own and communicate in the language of the dominant or conquering society in which they find themselves living.

Without going into much detail, it is useful to note that some linguists characterize Chadian languages as Afro-Asiatic, which, with the exception of Hausa, have Sudano-Mediterranean roots, and are spoken between Niger and the Wadai plateau; and Nilo-Saharan, prevalent along the Niger River, from Jenne to Gaya, with the major subgroups comprising Zaghawa, Teda, Daza, and Kanembu-Kanuri (Lange 1992:218–219). Other linguists, however, classify Chad’s languages as Sudanic, including Sara, Tupuri, Banana, Moundang, Bagirmi, Youlba, and Runga; Nilotic, comprising Wadai, Kodoi, Malange, Madaba, Debba, Abissa, Dekker, Djema, Massalit, Lisi, Bulala, Kuka, Midogo, Abusemeu, Mubi, Karbo, Mesmedje, Kenga, Babalia, Diongor, Saba, Yalna, Tunjur, and Torom; Arabic, which includes Hassauna and Djoehina Arabic; and Saharan, made up of Kanembu and Turubu (Hugot 1965:25–27). This list still does not do justice to various other languages spoken in Chad, but there is not much one can do at this stage of our knowledge of the region’s idioms.

The following discussion of Chad’s ethnic groups is based not on their geographical location but their potential impact in the country derived from their numerical size. The classification therefore goes from the largest to the smallest groups known by anthropologists. The Sara, the largest group in Chad are a patrilineal, p...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• WAR AND SOCIETY
• INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• CHAPTER ONE: ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY
• CHAPTER TWO: CHAD’S CENTRALIZED SOCIETIES AND THE USE OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE
• CHAPTER THREE: THE ARMY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL SUDAN
• CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE DURING THE COLONIAL ERA
• CHAPTER FIVE: INDEPENDENCE AND CIVIL WAR IN CHAD
• CHAPTER SIX: THE NATURE AND USE OF VIOLENCE IN POST-COLONIAL CHAD
• CHAPTER SEVEN: FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN CHAD
• CHAPTER EIGHT: AT THE CROSSROADS: LESSONS AND PROSPECTS
• REFERENCES