The European Union and the Nordic Countries

Lee Miles

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• Print ISBN:
  9780415124225
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134804054
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Economy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The European Union and the Nordic Countries provides an authoritative assessment of the intricate relationship between the EU and the Nordic countries. The team of authors includes academics from the five main Nordic countries.
The authors explore the ramification of wider Nordic EU membership for particular subject areas, such as economic and monetary union, social and environmental policy, agriculture, fisheries and foreign and security affairs. The authors argue that the impact of two more Nordic countries becoming EU members will prove positive. However, despite further Nordic accessions seeming inevitable, this will not be easy and will require major changes in public opinion in Norway and Iceland.

Part I

Introduction

1
Introduction

Lee Miles

To a large extent, the countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Sweden have been perceived by others as a ‘Nordic bloc’ of nation states, sharing a large (if at times rather superficial) consensus on many domestic and international issues. The Nordic countries have historically been confronted with a common set of problems when defining their relationships with the European Community (EC) and later European Union (EU).¹ In particular, these countries have all faced the challenge of securing preferential trading relations with continental Europe, while simultaneously maintaining close contact within their own region through Nordic cooperation.

Since the late 1950s, this challenge mainly focused around dealing with the emerging political and economic might of the European Community and managing their growing economic interdependence with it. Yet, although it may have been a shared problem affecting all the Nordic countries, the starting points of the states have differed due to their individual legacies of economic and political contact with the rest of Europe. Denmark for example, has maintained close ties with continental Europe due to her geographical position as part of the European mainland. In contrast, Iceland’s geographical position halfway between the North American and European continents has given it a far more ‘Atlantic’ flavour and a greater reluctance to be an integral part of a supranational Europe. For the most part, postwar attempts at advanced levels of either Nordic cooperation or complete Nordic participation in wider European frameworks have mostly ended in failure (see Chapter 3).

Rather, the preferred point of departure for the Nordic countries was a rather limited affair. Their initial solution to meeting the challenge of closer economic relations with mainland Europe and the EC lay in European Free Trade Association (EFTA) membership and participation in the later European Economic Area (EEA). Denmark, Norway and Sweden were all founder members of EFTA. For Finland and Iceland, full EFTA membership took a little longer. Finland enjoyed associate status under its special FINEFTA arrangement until it became a full member in 1986 and Iceland joined the organisation in 1970. Nordic cooperation and EFTA membership seemed to be complementary as all the main Nordic countries were members of both organisations. Nordic cooperation could still deal with primarily intra-Nordic political questions, while EFTA secured trading concessions from mainland Europe and acted as a counterweight to the emerging European Community.

As will be discussed in Part II of the book, the EFTA and EEA solutions proved to have several shortcomings (see Chapter 4). The dawning of these EFTA deficiencies upon the Nordic countries was universal. However, the speed of realisation and the related domestic popularity of any alternative solutions has varied enormously, helping to ensure that the accomplishment of EC/EU membership has remained a piecemeal affair. Denmark and Norway were the first to seek EC membership as early as 1961. Yet, Denmark, which was also the first of the Nordics to join the EC, took twelve years to achieve this and only became a full member in 1973. Sweden and Finland adopted various approaches for gaining an EC accommodation before they finally applied for full membership in 1991 and 1992 respectively and joined the EU in 1995. Even now, the EU question for Iceland remains problematical (see Chapter 10). Thus, although each of the Nordic countries has secured a trading relationship with the European Community since 1972, the questions of how to improve these relationships or whether to seek full EU membership have been difficult ones for all the Nordic governments.

Nor has the achievement of EU membership (once the decision to apply had been taken) been entirely smooth either. Indeed, two Nordic territories perhaps hold the European mantle for causing the most problems for the EU in terms of membership questions to date. Greenland remains the only Nordic or even European province ever to leave the European Community voluntarily after a plebiscite in 1982. In addition, Norway probably holds a double title. First, for the country which has applied the most times and second, as the only nation state which has rejected full membership in a national referendum more than once. In practice, Norway has applied for full membership four times, reached the point of finalising accession terms twice and rejected full membership in a public referendum twice.

Thus, the relationship between the Nordic countries and EU is of considerable analytical interest for both specialists of the Nordic countries and the European Union. In the first place, it represents a complex patchwork of relations, with some Nordic countries being full members (Denmark (1973), Finland (1995), Sweden (1995)), others enjoying a close relationship through the EEA (Norway and Iceland) and some territories merely having free trade agreements (Færoes, Greenland). This has not only complicated relations between the EU and the Nordic countries, but has affected intra-Nordic relations and EFTA membership. Second, the EU issue has been a sensitive domestic problem within the Nordic countries emphasising traditional Nordic social and cultural divides. In Norway, for instance, the 1972 national referendum proved so painful to Norwegian society that the issue of EC membership was virtually a political taboo for almost a decade (see Chapter 9).

For the European Union, the Nordic countries also raise three aspects of special interest. First, the Nordic countries illustrate some of the more deep-seated national concerns over EU membership and its future obligations. Toivo Miljan (1977) for example, identified the Nordic countries as the ‘reluctant Europeans’ and in many ways, their reluctance on such issues as federalism and the development of comprehensive supranational frameworks still remains. However, their reluctance is now felt inside the EU as full members rather than as non-member states. Thus, as Denmark has shown over the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Nordic countries’ primary rationale for EU membership is still economic and Denmark’s profound scepticism regarding a federal Europe is still apparent even after over twenty years of full membership. Second, the Nordic countries also provide a recent indication of some of the problems for the EU in dealing with richer European states and not just poorer ones, when negotiating an enlargement.

Finally, as wider Nordic EU membership becomes a reality, the Nordic countries also bring with them their own baggage which the EU must learn to carry. These countries have their own and, in many ways, common agenda which will come to bear. Policies, such as greater transparency in EU decision-making (see Chapter 5) will be boosted by their membership. The EU’s focus will once again become more Northern orientated, reducing the Mediterranean bias evident since the 1981 and 1986 enlargements. However, if the relationship between the Nordic countries and the European Union is to be more fully considered, then clearly the Nordic countries themselves must be further explored.

CONSIDERING THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

The Nordic countries can be compared in many different ways. In historical terms, they represent a mixed bunch of old and new nation states. Sweden and Denmark can be regarded as relatively old nation states in Europe while Norway (1905), Finland (1917) and Iceland (1944) all became independent states this century. However, the Nordic countries do share a common history and the existence of the nation states in the region are very much interlinked. For example, both Norway and Finland have been parts of the Kingdom of Sweden during periods of their history (see Chapter 2).

In constitutional terms, they are all parliamentary democracies some of which are quite old; for instance, Norway’s constitution (Grunnloven) originates from 1814, even if her existing status as a sovereign nation state only dates back to 1905. Some, however, are new and two Nordic constitutions have been rewritten comparatively recently: Denmark in 1953 and Sweden in 1974 (Petersson 1994a:23). However, the Nordic countries can be broadly divided into two separate groups. On the one side, the monarchies of Denmark, Norway and Sweden and on the other, Finland and Iceland as a separate group of republics. However, these are only nominal classifications. The division of the two groups does not necessarily correspond to the levels of political influence that their respective executives constitutionally maintain. For instance, it is widely recognised that the Swedish monarch holds the weakest amount of constitutional power regarding the political affairs of the state, while Denmark and Norway still theoretically provide for a prominent role for their monarchs (Petersson 1994a: 24–7). In contrast, the Finnish President has considerable power, particularly in foreign affairs and has comparatively greater political influence than any of the three monarchies.

From a parliamentary perspective, the Nordic countries do resemble one another, sharing more commonalities than differences. In particular, since Denmark and Sweden abandoned bicameral parliamentary systems in 1953 and 1971 respectively, the Nordic countries all operate unicameral parliaments, although even here this has to be qualified as the Norwegian Storting is divided into two sections. The Nordic constitutions also contain, albeit to varying degrees, advanced numbers of safeguards aimed at protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual and embodied in strong traditions of open government.

In modern times, this has been translated to mean that Nordic citizens are endowed with social rights based on universality and equality under which they are entitled to direct support from the state. This principle has been one of the main reasons for the development of comprehensive welfare provisions in these countries and Stein Kuhnle (1991) has argued that their commonality has been financially and economically apparent through the existence of their welfare state systems. The Nordic countries share a stronger commitment to state intervention, the maintenance of large public sectors and higher levels of employment in social and educational sectors than most comparable European states. Most noticeably, social rights are based on citizenship and not related to participation in the labour market or levels of income.

In political terms, the Nordic countries also share a basic five-party system, based around a rough socialist-non-socialist divide. It has been widely argued that a system of five parties seems to be a typical configuration for nearly all of the Nordic countries, although this system is under threat in several of them. On the left, there is usually a Social Democratic party and a Commurïst party, while on the right there is a grouping of non-socialist parties consisting of an agrarian-based Centre party, a Liberal party and a Conservative party. The respective sizes and dominance of the parties do, of course, vary; for example, the Social Democratic parties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden are large political forces, and the agrarian-based Centre parties in Finland and Norway are still very influential.

From this brief overview, it seems that there are an unusually high number of commonalities between the Nordic countries, although for the most part they still remain at a generalised level. As Petersson (1994a: 33–4) argues the Nordic countries share high levels of commonality built roughly around two interconnected main areas—namely a specific type of public policy and a specific type of polity. In short, Petersson assumes that first, the Nordic countries share comparatively similar welfare policies, which are comprehensive and institutionalised and aim to create solidarity; and second, they attempt to unite capitalism, parliamentary democracy and the welfare state through the existence of powerful state machinery and participatory interest groups. This view is reinforced by Elder, Thomas and Arter’s (1988:2–28) assertions that the Nordic countries are indeed ‘consensual democracies’ enjoying low levels of opposition to the system governing political conflict resolution, a small degree of conflict over the actual exercise of power and are characterised by a high degree of concertation in the determination of public policy.

It can be argued then that the Nordic countries will provide something qualitatively different to the EU and this could be related to the common characteristics of the Nordic countries. In short, the main features of the Nordic countries are:

• Mature parliamentary democracies characterised, albeit to varying levels, by long traditions of consensual decision-making and a low degree of opposition to their respective political systems.
• Competitive market economies incorporating elaborate corporate procedures for economic policy-making. Their systems encompass the widest possible spectrum of viewpoints through effective parliamentary channels, such as the Swedish Commissions of Inquiry and the ‘Remiss Procedure’. There is also an attachment to collective bargaining, which is reflected in widespread membership of representative organisations and low levels of industrial disputes. For instance, trade-union membership includes 80 per cent of the registered workforce in Sweden.
• Comprehensive welfare provisions and social and environmental standards. This is politically supported by the Nordic populations and economically by reasonably high levels of GDP per capita. In fact, until recently, there has been strong, traditional public confidence in their economic strength and the merits of state intervention.
• Common Nordic traditions of open democratic government, incorporating freedom of information, public accountability and a commitment to human rights.
• An attachment to national sovereignty and strong defence. The individual defence policies of the Nordic countries have, however, varied. Denmark, Iceland and Norway are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Sweden and Finland preferred non-alignment. Indeed, for a long period, the concept of the ‘Nordic Balance’ predominated; a non-aligned and neutral Sweden being balanced to the West by Danish, Icelandic and Norwegian NATO membership and to the East, by Finland’s sensitive relations with the USSR through the 1948 Fenno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.
• ‘Internationalist’ and a shared preference for a free trade global economy, owing to the sensitivity of their comparatively open export-orientated economies and active participation in international and humanitarian organisations, such as the United Nations.
• A strong regional affinity promoting a ‘Nordic identity’ and cooperation through the Nordic Council. This has facilitated limited sectoral integration—such as the Nordic Passport Union and the Common Nordic Labour Market.

However, there are numerous problems associated with determining universal Nordic characteristics and thus, the concept of a ‘Nordic model’. In many ways, the concept is still ambiguous and has been used collectively to describe entities that are to some extent different in kind. For instance, the term ‘Nordic model’ has been used to identify both political and economic features within these states. Second, the diversity among the Nordic countries also makes conceptualising completely delineated characteristics virtually impossible. There are still many differences among the states and sources of friction, especially among the weaker Nordic countries over Swedish or Danish leadership within the region. Finally, the impact of severe recession during the early 1990s, especially in Sweden and Finland, has led to a widespread reappraisal of their internal features and whether a successful or unique ‘Nordic model’ exists at all.

FIVE PLUS THREE?

Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Nordic countries can be restricted to an elite club of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. There are also the three autonomous areas of Åland, the Færoes and Greenland which have now gained such a large degree of self-government that they have developed their own political institutions. Åland, for example, has a special status within Finland and shares many linguistic, cultural and economic ties with neighbouring Sweden. Ever since the 1921 League of Nations decision to subject the islands to Finnish sovereignty, it has also been ensured that they also enjoy a considerable level of autonomy. The 1991 Act of Self-government stipulates that the islands are governed by an Executive Council responsible to a parliament (Landting). In similar vei...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• FIGURES
• TABLES
• CONTRIBUTORS
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• PART I: INTRODUCTION
• PART II: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION-NORDIC RELATIONS
• PART III: THE NATIONAL DIMENSIONS
• PART IV: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES: AN ISSUE-BASED APPROACH
• PART V: CONCLUSION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY