Kant, Duty and Moral Worth

Philip Stratton-Lake

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• Print ISBN:
  9780415335577
  9780415205245
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134627516
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Kant, Duty and Moral Worth is a fascinating and original examination of Kant's account of moral worth. The complex debate at the heart of Kant's philosophy is over whether Kant said moral actions have worth only if they are carried out from duty, or whether actions carried out from mixed motives can be good. Philip Stratton-Lake offers a unique account of acting from duty, which utilizes the distinction between primary and secondary motives. He maintains that the moral law should not be understood as a normative moral reason but as playing a transcendental role. Thus a Kantian account of moral worth is one where the virtuous agent may be responsive to concrete particular considerations, whilst preserving an essential role for universal moral principles.

Kant, Duty and Moral Worth is a lucid examination of Kant's moral thought that will appeal to Kant scholars and anyone interested in moral theory.

1

DOING THE RIGHT THING JUST BECAUSE IT IS RIGHT

Introduction

For Kant, an action can have moral worth if and only if it is done from duty. Kant's notion of acting from duty is standardly understood as doing what is right just because it is right.¹ There is debate about whether Kant's view is that our action can have moral worth only if it done solely from duty, and about whether acting from duty is compatible with being inclined to do what one should.² Nonetheless, this debate tends to work within this standard understanding of acting from duty.

There are two standard criticisms of this account of moral worth. The first, the Humean one, maintains that one cannot act solely from duty, i.e., independently of any desire, because a desire for X is a necessary condition of being motivated to do X. This type of criticism does not apply to all conceptions of acting solely from duty, since some maintain that to act from duty is to act from a special sort of desire,³ or from the relevant belief–desire pair.⁴ Nonetheless, the notion of acting from duty in its Kantian, cognitivist, form is often criticised in this way. The second type of criticism comes from those who may be broadly categorised as Aristotelians, or virtue ethicists. They criticise acting solely from duty on the ground that it involves a kind of detachment from everyday relations which is alienating, or at least rules out acting from other desirable motives. I have little sympathy for the Humean theory of motivation,⁵ but this is a topic which has received a great deal of attention and I do not wish to add to the literature here.⁶ I shall say something later on in response to the latter criticism. For one of the main aims of this book is to show that the sort of things which worry Aristotelians can be accommodated within a Kantian framework if we interpret the notion of acting from duty as I suggest. I do not, however, want to get involved in this issue at this stage.

What I want to do in this chapter is argue that there is compelling reason to abandon the standard interpretation of Kant's notion of acting from duty. For if Kant is interpreted in this way, he will be unable to maintain that there is an essential and direct connection between morality and rationality. This is not a point about whether moral requirements are categorical or hypothetical impera-tives.⁷ Nor does it rest on a worry about possible conflicts between self-interest and morality, or about whether moral considerations really are self-standing reasons that is, whether they constitute reasons irrespective of whether treating them as such is in the agent's interest, or has survival value, or whatever. It is true that it is harder to show that moral considerations give agents reasons to act than it is to show that, say, desires or self-interest do. But I do not intend to address this issue. What I want to argue is that the particular moral consideration which Kant focuses on does not give us a reason to act. For the fact that I ought to Φ, or my belief that I ought to Φ, is not a normative reason to Φ. This is not to deny that there is an internal connection between my being obligated to Φ and my having reason, or even compelling reason, to Φ. For if one analysed ‘I ought to Φ’ as ‘I have compelling reason to Φ’, as W. D. Falk did,⁸ then it would follow that whenever I ought to Φ I will have compelling reason to Φ. My claim is solely that this reason will never be the particular moral consideration which Kant maintains it is (under the interpretation of Kant we are considering), namely, the fact that I am morally required to Φ.

I begin by outlining John McDowell's argument for this conclusion and argue that it fails. In the next section I offer a different argument in support of his conclusion based on what I call the ‘symmetry thesis’. Then I defend my argument from objections which might be raised against it. Finally, I conclude that if Kant's notion of acting from duty is understood as it commonly is, as doing what one should because one should, then he will be unable to hold onto the view that there is an essential and direct connection between morality and rationality.

McDowell's argument

John McDowell is, to my knowledge, the first to cast doubt on the view that the fact that one ought to do some act can be a reason to do it. He does not couch his criticism in terms of duty, or the thought of duty, but in terms of ‘ought’ or ‘should’ statements. But his criticism is aimed at Kant, so he clearly makes no special distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘duty’ statements. An ‘ought’ statement is one which has the simple form ‘x ought to Φ’. Ought statements can relate either to particular acts, or to types of acts. They can thus express the fact, either that one ought, here and now, to Φ, or that one ought in general to do acts of type Φ. In either case, McDowell maintains, such statements do not express reasons for action. This is not the familiar Humean claim that mere thoughts, or beliefs are, by themselves inert. On the contrary, McDowell's criticism occurs in the context of a critique of this Humean thesis. Rather, his claim is based upon the view that a reason for acting ‘must involve some appropriate specific consideration which could in principle be cited in support of the ‘should’ statement’.⁹ If we think of moral requirements in this way, we will, he writes, be freed of

the insane thesis that simply to say ‘you should...’ to someone is enough to give him a reason for acting; as if, when he protested ‘But why should I?’, it was sufficient to reply ‘You just should, that's all’.¹⁰

The ought statement does not, McDowell maintains, support, or justify the obligatory action. But if it is not this moral consideration which justifies this action, what does? According to McDowell it is the reason (or reasons) why A is required to do this act. Whatever this is, it cannot be (or include) the fact that this act is morally required. Rather, it is the concrete specific considerations in the situation that call for this action, such as the fact that B is in need. A's failure to see that she ought to help B may stem from the fact that she failed to see that B needed help. If C pointed out this fact in response to A's enquiry, then he would have offered her a reason to help B, for he would have offered at least a prima facie justification for his claim that she ought to help B. He will not, however, have done so if he simply continues to insist that she ought to do this act.

McDowell's argument seems to run as follows:

1. (1) If F is a normative reason why I ought to Φ, then it must be possible to answer the question, ‘why ought I to Φ?’ with reference to F in an informative manner.
2. (2) If F were the fact that I ought to Φ, the answer to the question ‘why ought I to Φ?’ would be ‘because I ought to Φ’.
3. (3) But this answer would be uninformative.

Therefore,

1. (4) The fact that I ought to Φ fails to meet the requirement stated in (1).

Therefore,

1. (5) The fact that I ought to Φ cannot be a normative reason why I ought to Φ.

This argument is plausible, but as it stands, it is not compelling. For one could capture the intuition expressed by the requirement stated in (1) in a way that enables the ought statement to function as a reason as follows:

(1*) If F is a normative reason for me to Φ, then it must be possible to answer the question ‘what reason is there for me to Φ?’ with reference to F in an informative manner.

The fact that I ought to Φ could satisfy this requirement. For although it is uninformative to say that I ought to Φ because I ought to Φ, it is not uninformative to say that the normative reason I have for Φ-ing is that I ought to Φ.

One might respond to this objection as follows. One might claim that, in relation to reasons for belief, the following is true:

(RB) any reason I have for believing that P must be able to function at the same time as a reason for me to believe that P is true.

If, for example, the results of the opinion polls over the last three weeks are reasons for me to believe that Labour will win the imminent election, then it must be possible for these results to be reasons for me to believe that it is true that Labour will win the imminent election. McDowell may try to link (1*) with (1) by an analogous principle in relation to normative reasons to act. This principle would run as follows:

(RA) any reason I have for Φ-ing must be able to function at the same time as a reason why Φ-ing is right.

Granted this, McDowell could argue that if the fact that I ought to Φ can be a reason for me to Φ, it must not only be able to satisfy (1*), but would have to satisfy (1) also. But although it can satisfy (1*) it cannot satisfy (1). Consequently, it cannot be a reason for me to Φ, even though it satisfies (1*).

The degree to which this argument is successful will depend upon the degree to which we have reason to believe (RA). What reason do we have, then, to believe that (RA) is true? The only argument for this seems to be that it is the practical analogue of (RB). But this is not enough unless the reason why (RB) is true is applicable to (RA). If it is not, the mere fact that (RA) is structurally similar to (RB) will not give us reason to think that it is correct. What, then, is the reason for believing (RB)? There seems to be a very simple reason why (RB) is true, which is that to believe that P and to believe that P is true are equivalent. It is for this reason that anything which is a reason to believe that P will be a reason to believe that P is true. There is, however, no analogous equivalence in relation to (RA). My act of Φ-ing is not equivalent to my act's being right. I could not believe that P unless I believed that P is true, but I could Φ if Φ-ing were not the right thing to do. There is, therefore, no analog to the reason to believe (RB) in relation to (RA). But in the absence of such a reason, it is difficult to see how (RA) could be justified in a way that would not clearly beg the question at issue against those who believe that the fact that I ought to Φ can be a reason for me to Φ.

One could attempt to reformulate McDowell's argument by utilising a distinction Philippa Foot makes between verdictive and evidential moral considerations.¹¹ A verdictive moral consideration is the content of the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning about the deontological status of some act. It is an overall verdict about whether some act is morally right, wrong or permissible, either in some specific situation or in general. Evidential considerations, on the other hand, are those which support, but do not constitute overall moral verdicts. These may be couched in overtly moral terms, such as considerations of rights, fairness, equality, or maximisation of good, but they need not be.¹² Someone's being in pain, or depressed, may be an evidential moral consideration, but is not expressed in overtly moral terms. Put in this language, McDowell can be understood as claiming that ‘ought’ statements are verdictive, but not evidential considerations. To hold that the ought statement is a reason to do the required act would be to treat this overall moral verdict as a piece of evidence which supports this very verdict. But no verdict constitutes evidence in support of itself, and, a fortiori, no verdict can be regarded as the sole piece of evidence for itself.

This is not to say that a verdictive moral consideration cannot at the same time function as an evidential moral consideration. The verdict that I ought to Φ may function as a piece of evidence in support of the verdict that I ought to Ψ, if, for example, Φ-ing is the only way in which I can Ψ. But this does not change anything. For although a moral verdict can function as evidence in support of a different moral verdict, it cannot function as evidence in support of itself. No verdict can do this.

One could attempt to support one's verdict that one ought, here and now, to Φ, with the statement that one ought always to Φ in situations of a certain type, along with the belief that this situation is of the relevant type. That is, a particular verdict could be supported by a generalised version of this very verdict. But this merely relocates the problem. For it is always meaningful to ask of any generalised version of an ought statement: ‘Why ought I always to act in this way in this type of situation?’; and one does not answer this question simply by saying, ‘because you ought always to act in this way in this type of situation’. Rather, to answer this question one would have to cite the general type of evidential moral consideration, or considerations, on the basis of which one judges the generalised ought statement to be true. But once this is done it will become apparent that it is not the generalised moral verdict that supports the particular verdict, but an instance of the type of evidential moral consideration which is cited in support of the generalised moral verdict. But then we are back where we started.

McDowell's line of argument can be further illuminated by considering the analogous case in relation to beliefs and reasons for believing, if we assume that such reasons are evidence which can be cited in support of a belief. The fact that I judge P to be true is not a reason for believing that P. For P's being true is a verdictive epistemic consideration, and as I have already noted, verdicts do not constitute evidence in support of themselves. Rather, the reasons for believing that P will be the reasons for judging that P is true – that is, they will be the evidence which can be cited in support of my belief that P. Whatever this evidence is, it will not include the fact that P is true. For I do not even explain why I believe that P simply by stating that P is true, let alone offer anyone else a reason to believe this.

It may, however, be conceded that the fact that I ought to do some act is not a sufficient reason to do it, but maintained that it is a necessary reason. So although we may have to reject the interpretation of Kant according to which an act can have moral worth only if it is done solely from duty, duty could, nonetheless, be a normative reason. Consequently, it may be objected that McDowell has gone too far in saying that duty is not a reason to do what morality enjoins, and that what he should have said is that it is not a sufficient reason. But if no verdict constitutes evidence for itself, then it will not only be the case that it cannot be the sole reason in support of itself; it cannot be a reason in support of itself either. So far then, this construal of McDowell's argument looks good.

Nevertheless, as it stands, his argument is not strong enough to support the strong conclusion that when one Φs solely because one ought to Φ, one acts from no reason at all. For although this verdictive moral consideration cannot be cited in support of itself, it may be argued that it can be cited in support of the action – that is, the act of Φ-ing. For the act of Φ-ing is not itself a moral verdict; and if the verdict is distinct from the action it favours, it may be held that the former may be used to justify the latter. The thought here would be that the evidential moral considerations will support the verdictive moral consideration, and this verdictive moral consideration will in turn support the doing of the action which is morally required. So understood, one's moral verdict will not be understood as evidence for itself, but for doing the required act.

It seems, therefore, that no formulation of McDowell's argument can be made to succeed. What I want to do now is offer an argument which supports McDowell's conclusion, but which is not vulnerable to the above objections.

The symmetry argument

My argument rests upon what I shall call the symmetry thesis. Christine Korsgaard proposes a strong version of the symmetry thesis and claims that Kant assumed this thesis in Groundwork I. She writes:

Kant is analysing the good will, characterised as one that does what is right because it is right, in order to discover the principle of unconditionally good action. The assumption behind such an analysis is that the reason why a good-willed person does an action, and the reason why the action is right, are the same. The good-willed individual does the right thing because it is the right thing, so if we can discover why the good-willed person does it, we will have ipso facto discovered why it is the right thing.¹³

As it is formulated here, the symmetry thesis is the claim that:

(S) The reason why a good-willed person d...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• CONTENTS
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Doing the right thing just because it is right
• 2 Respect and moral motivation
• 3 Acting from respect for the moral law
• 4 An alternative account of acting from duty
• 5 Filling out the details: Ross's theory of prima facie duties
• 6 On the value of acting from duty
• 7 Constructivism, autonomy and side-constraints
• 8 Conclusion: absolutely universal principles and context sensitivity
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index