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The course of the Revolution![]()
2
The impact of war
In 1914 the Russian Empire found itself in the midst of a political crisis. It was most obvious in the strike wave that had escalated rapidly after the bloody repression of striking miners in the Lena goldfields of Siberia in April 1912, with 4,098 strikes (officially) recorded in 1914 (McKean 1990:193). Moreover, a growing section of educated, liberal society found itself increasingly alienated from the autocracy as the Tsar, Nicholas II, urged on by the reactionary elements dominant in the court and the country, reneged on the modest commitment to constitutionalism conceded in the October Manifesto of 1905. He sought to restrict the powers of the state Duma, the representative assembly (with real, if limited, legislative powers) created after 1905 (Pearson 1977:16–19). Some, such as the Moscow industrialists P.P.Riabushinskii and A.I.Konovalov, leaders of the liberal Progressist Party, had become so embittered that, incredibly, they were even prepared to help finance the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary activities (Thurston 1987:187). Within the peasantry, too, resentments festered. Continued dissatisfaction at not receiving all the land when they had been freed from serfdom in the Emancipation of 1861 was exacerbated by the the agrarian reforms of the recently assassinated Prime Minister, P.A.Stolypin, which, in seeking to create a wealthy, independent and loyal peasant class, threatened to destroy the village commune. These resentments became manifest in a series of agrarian disturbances, 17,000 of which were recorded in European Russia between 1910 and 1914 (Channon 1992a; 117).
Whether these challenges amounted to a revolutionary crisis temporarily diverted by the wave of patriotism precipitated by the outbreak of World War I, as the Bolsheviks later were to claim, remains questionable. The so-called ‘general’ strike of July 1914 reveals the reasons for doubt: it was limited to the then capital, St Petersburg (renamed Petrograd on the outbreak of war with Germany), where little more than one-quarter of the work-force participated, compared to the four-fifths in February 1917; it failed to attract support from liberal and professional quarters; and the army, in particular the city garrison, remained loyal to the autocracy (McKean 1990:315–17). However, they do bring into question the view that the reforms precipitated by the 1905 revolution —limited constitutionalism; the legalisation of trade unions; and Stolypin’s efforts to recast the countryside along capitalist lines, to create a new social basis for the autocracy—had ushered in an era of peaceful, liberal evolution (Mendel 1971:17–26). In a seminal article Leopold Haimson cast scorn on this optimistic prognosis, arguing that the existence of two unbridgeable splits in Russian society —between the autocracy and educated society, and between the latter and the worker and peasant ‘dark masses’ —precluded the harmonious development of Russia along liberal, democratic lines (Haimson 1964; 1965)
Haimson’s conclusions echoed those of P.N.Durnovo, formerly Minister of the Interior and a leading Russian conservative. In his now justly famous Memorandum of February 1914 to Nicholas II he warned the Tsar of the disastrous consequences for Russia of a future war with Germany, emphasising in particular the different aspirations of the ‘dark masses’ and the Liberals.
Document 2.1 Durnovo’s Warnings of the Impact of War on Russia
…Certainly Russia, where the masses without doubt instinctively profess to socialist principles, represents an especially favourable soil for social tremors. Notwithstanding the oppositional attitude found in Russian society, itself as instinctive as the socialism of the broad masses of the people, a political revolution is impossible in Russia, and any revolutionary movement inevitably will degenerate into a socialist revolution. Nothing stands behind our opposition; it has no support among the people, which sees no difference between a government official and an intellectual. The Russian plebeian, the peasant and worker alike, does not seek political rights, which he does not need or understand. The peasant dreams of being alloted gratuitously someone else’s land, the worker of expropriating all the capital and profits of the factory owner, and their horizons do not extend beyond this longing…. The opposition in Russia is nothing but intellectual and this is its weakness, since between the intelligentsia and the people there is a deep gulf of mutual misunderstanding and mistrust…. However much the members of our legislative institutions harp upon the trust that the people have in them the peasant sooner will believe the landless government official than the Octobrist landowner who sits in the Duma: the worker regards the factory inspector who works for a wage with more trust than the factory owner who also acts as legislator, even though the latter professes all the principles of the Kadet party…
…If the war ends in victory, the suppression of the socialist movement will not pose any difficulties…. But in the case of defeat, the chance of which in a struggle with such an opponent as Germany it is impossible not to foresee, social revolution inevitably will manifest itself in its most extreme forms. As was already indicated, it will start with the Government being held responsible for all the failures and misfortunes. In the legislative institutions a furious campaign against it will begin, as a result of which revolutionary actions will commence throughout the country. These actions immediately will advance socialist slogans, the only ones which are capable of stirring up and rallying the masses: the initial slogan will call for Black partition [the division of all the land among the peasants], followed by the call for the complete division of all valuables and property. The defeated army, by then having lost in the course of the war its regular and most reliable troops, in its greater part seized by the elemental peasant yearning for the land, will be found to be too demoralised to act as a bulwark of law and order. The legislative institutions and the opposition parties of the intelligentsia, devoid of real authority in the eyes of the people, will be unable to turn back the waves of uncontrollable popular protest stirred up by themselves, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the end of which cannot even be foreseen…
Source: E.Tarle, ‘Germanskaia orientatsiia i T.N.Durnovo v 1914g’., Byloe, 19, 1922, pp. 172–4.
Durnovo’s prognosis, that the Liberals’ desire for measured constitutional reform would be swept away by an elemental peasant and worker revolution, proved to be an uncannily prescient (and came to be shared by leading Liberals, as Document 2.10 reveals). However, this warning was ignored by the autocracy. It had already suffered a loss of credibility when it had backed down in 1908 in face of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Afraid that a similar surrender would intensify the domestic challenges facing it, in the summer of 1914 it resolved to mobilise to assist Serbia resist the threat to its independence posed by Austro-German machinations (Lieven 1983:153). The outbreak of war, and the patriotism that it engendered, initially muted the challenges that had faced the autocracy, no doubt facilitated by the mobilisation of many militant workers to the front and the exile of others (Gaponenko 1970: 124). But whether all of Russia was seized by patriotism and the desire for unity is more doubtful. Many peasants and workers, if not educated society, appeared at best passively to have accepted their lot, while British consular reports from the non-Russian periphery of the Empire suggested a marked lack of enthusiasm for war (Hughes 1996:79; Rogger 1966:105–9). Moreover, whatever unity had emerged in 1914 did not survive for long. As the Russian army experienced repeated defeats the Liberals revived their criticisms of the autocracy, its alleged incompetence and corruption, as they sought, in vain, to exploit the country’s plight to extort political concessions from Nicholas.
In part, Liberal criticisms of the government, especially its failure to provide adequate supplies of war materials, were supported by General A.A.Polivanov (in the view of Alfred Knox, British military attaché to the Russian army, ‘undoubtedly the ablest military organiser in Russia, but dismissed by Norman Stone as “the Duma politicians’” friend’), who had replaced General V.A.Sukhomlinov, the scapegoat for Russia’s defeats, as Minister of War in June 1915 (Stone 1975: 191).
Document 2.2 Report of General A.A.Polivanov, Minister of War, to the Council of Ministers on the Military Situation, July 16, 1915
I consider it my civic and official duty to declare to the Council of Ministers that the country is in danger.
Enjoying an enormous superiority in artillery and an inexhaustible supply of shells the Germans forced us to retreat by artillery fire alone. As they were firing almost on their own our batteries had to remain silent even during serious clashes. Thanks to this, having the opportunity not to use its infantry, the enemy suffered hardly any losses, while our soldiers were killed in their thousands. Naturally our resistance daily grew weaker while the enemy onslaught grew stronger. Only God knows where to expect the retreat will end…. The soldiers are without doubt exhausted by the continued defeats and retreats. Their confidence in final victory and in their leaders is undermined. Ever more threatening signs of impending demoralisation are evident. Cases of desertion and of voluntary surrender to the enemy are becoming more frequent. It is difficult to expect enthusiasm and selflessness from men sent into battle unarmed and ordered to pick up the rifles of their dead comrades.
…there is yet one other development especially fraught with danger about which it is no longer possible to keep silent. There is growing confusion at General Headquarters. It is also seized by the fatal psychology of retreat and is preparing to retreat deep inside Russia…. Back, back back —that is all that is heard from there. No system, no plan is evident in its conduct and orders. Not one boldly conceived manoeuvre, not one attempt to exploit the mistakes of an over-confident enemy. Moreover, Headquarters continues jealously to guard its authority and prerogatives. In the midst of a growing catastrophe it does not consider it necessary to consult close colleagues. Neither army commanders nor commanders-in-chief of the fronts once have been summoned to Headquarters to discuss the situation, or possible ways out of our difficulties…. General Ianushkevich rules over everyone and everything. Everyone must silently carry out orders issued by him in the name of the Grand Duke. No initiative is permitted. Silence, no discussion—this is Headquarters’ favourite cry. But the blame for our present troubles falls not on HQ but on everyone else…. The generals, the regimental and company commanders are to blame…the Minister of War is to blame, the government is to blame…the rear is to blame. In a word, everyone is guilty, except for the one body which bears any direct responsibility.
Source: A.N.Iakhontov (ed.), ‘Tiazhelye dni. (Sekretnye zasedanii Soveta Ministrov 16 Iiulia-2 Sentiabria 1915 goda)’, Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, XVIII (1926), pp. 15–16
Notwithstanding Polivanov’s alleged political sympathies, a shortage of munitions did contribute to the reverses that Russia suffered in the first year of war. However, its impact has been much exaggerated. Contrary to continued Liberal accusations, it was resolved by 1916 when the government, at the cost of expenditure well in excess of tax revenue, had succeeded in mobilising state and private industry sufficiently well to supply the army adequately. Equally, if not more important in explaining the defeats that befell Russia, were the other causes adduced by Polivanov: poor military leadership; falling morale; and the administrative confusion and in-fighting that permeated the General Staff and also bedevilled relations between the army and the government (Gatrell 1994: 234; Stone 1975:12–13, 94–5).
In the summer of 1915 the Liberals within the Duma sought to take advantage of Russia’s parlous military situation, which had left the government vulnerable to renewed political challenges. For a time it appeared ready to appease the Liberals. Sukhomlinov was dismissed, and the conservative Minister of the Interior, N.A. Maklakov resigned, as did the reactionary V.K.Sabler from the Holy Synod and I.G. Shcheglovitov from Justice (Pipes 1992a:220–1). Conciliation was urged by more moderate figures in the government, most notably A.V.Krivoshein, the Minister of Agriculture. He hoped to create a coalition of moderate conservatives and Liberals within the Duma which would support him as head of government His objective was to rally educated society behind the government in order to revive the war effort. Equally, such an alliance would act to check the baneful influence of the Tsarina, Alexandra. Her politicial power, it was feared, would rise when, in August, Nicholas decided to depart the capital to take charge of the army. These developments prompted a majority of Duma members (up to 70 per cent), ranging from Progressive Nationalists on the Right to the Progressists on the Left, to coalesce into what came to be known as the Progressive Bloc (Pearson 1977: 39–56).
Document 2.3 The Programme of the Progressive Bloc, August 25, 1915
The undersigned representatives of factions and groups in the State Council and State Duma, convinced that only a strong, firm and active government can lead our country to victory, and that such a government can only be one that is based upon the confidence of the people and is capable of organising the active cooperation of all citizens, have come to the unanimous conclusion that the most important and urgent task of creating such a government cannot be fulfilled unless the following conditions are met:
1 The formation of a united government of individuals who enjoy the confidence of the country…
2 A radical change in the methods of administration employed to date, which have been based on a mistrust of public initiative, in particular:
(a) strict observance of the principles of legality in government;
(b) abolition of the dual authority of the military and civil authorities in questions which have no immediate bearing on the conduct of military operations;
(c) the renewal of the personnel of local administration;
(d) a rational and consistent policy designed to maintain civil peace and the elimination of discord between nationalities and classes.
To realise these policy ends the following measures, both administrative and legislative, must be adopted.
1 By means of an Imperial amnesty the termination of all actions against those accused of purely political and religious crimes…, their release… and the restoration of their rights, including participation in elections to the State Duma, zemstvo and municipal institutions…
2 The release of those administratively exiled for political and religious offences.
3 A complete and definite end to religious persecution on whatever pretexts…
4 A solution to the Russo-Polish problem, namely: the abolition of all limits on the rights of Poles throughout Russia, the rapid preparation and introduction in the legislature of a bill granting autonomy to Poland, and, at the same time, the revision of the laws relating to Polish landownership.
5 A beginning made to abolish the restrictions on the rights of Jews, in particular, further steps toward the abolition of the Pale of Settlement, the easing of [Jewish] entry to educational institutions and…to a variety of the professions. Restoration of the Jewish press.
6 A conciliatory policy toward Finland should be adopted, in particular, changes in the composition of the administration and the Senate, and an end to the persecution of officials.
7 The Little Russian ...
