Green Parties and Politics in the European Union

Elizabeth Bomberg

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134851447
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Umwelt- & Energiepolitik

Bomberg argues the 'greening' of European politics and the advancement of European integration are inextricably linked and that the EU presents a strategic dilemma to Green parties. In short, how can Greens reconcile their radical, alternative politics with the EU's mainstream, traditional institutions and practices? Bomberg's analysis is based on over 100 interviews with leading green politicians, NGO members, environmental and industrial lobbyists, EU officials and MEPs. She includes appendices showing profiles of green parties in European countries, and key policy-making institutions

1
Green politics in Europe

INTRODUCTION

This chapter places the Greens’ European policy in its wider political and historical context. It begins by outlining the key components and characteristics of ‘green politics’. Section II analyses the extent to which green politics and issues have permeated the politics and policies of the EU and EU Member States. Section III traces the emergence and development of ‘new social movements’, the precursors of the green movement and parties. Section IV examines how these movements developed into other political actors such as pressure groups or political parties. Using the development of the German Green party as an example, this section introduces the key ideological and strategic characteristics shared by green parties in the EU.

I
INTRODUCING GREEN POLITICS

The terms ‘green politics’ and ‘greening’ have entered popular usage but are open to a wide variety of interpretations. The meaning of ‘green politics’ may be clarified by providing a brief outline of its key components.¹ Green politics encompasses more than a concern for the environment. It includes both a unique set of values (content) and practices (process). Works by both political theorists and green activists suggest that the values, beliefs and practices of the green movement differ significantly from conventional politics. At its roots, green ideology encompasses a political, global, even spiritual critique of advanced industrial societies.

Values

Whilst there are many different shades of green politics, a few shared basic components provide its foundation and ideological base. First, green ideology encompasses a wholesale critique of advanced industrial society. Rudolf Bahro (1986:11) summarises green ideology as a critique of the ‘dominant ideology’ which stresses economic growth and man’s domination of nature. By contrast, Greens adopt a holistic ‘ecocentric’ approach that is based on a concern about non-human nature and the whole eco-system rather than purely ‘human’ concerns (Hayward 1995:15).² Green thinking thus demands a reassessment of the relationship between the human race and its natural environment.

The green agenda is consequently ambitious. Greens want basic changes in the ways humans protect the natural environment, produce and consume goods, discard their waste, use and promote science and technology, and defend themselves against aggressors (Milbrath 1988:4). The kind of society that would incorporate these ideological changes is often referred to as the ‘ sustainable society’ (Dobson 1995: ch. 3) or ‘conserver society’ (Richardson 1995:9). Its key components are decentralisation and reduced consumption of resources and material goods, or what Greens call the ‘economics of enough’. Greens see ‘profligate’ consumption and the materialist values underlying it as the main cause of resource depletion and pollution (see Martell 1994:48). They argue that the finite productive limits of the globe make continued consumption at increasing levels impossible, and thus human aspirations to consume must be curtailed.

Green principles also have a spiritual dimension. For instance, Parkin argues (1989:25) that the green celebration of the earth and the ‘interconnectedness of all life’ has strong echoes of ancient wisdoms and cultures which stressed a holistic spirituality as a positive and essential part of both society and politics. This ‘eco-centred spirituality’ could provide for wider and more profound forms of fulfilment than are provided by conventional society. Put another way, Dobson (1995:115) suggests that green politics can fill the ‘spiritual vacuum at the centre of late-industrial society, and the land itself is the cathedral at which we are urged to worship’.

Related to the holistic nature of green thought is the uniquely global outlook and ethos of the green movement. Many green writers point to what they see as the global environmental crisis, reflected in increasing water and air pollution, shortage of natural resources, and exponential population growth (see Meadows et al. 1974; 1992). Green thinking stresses the importance of the finite condition of the planet. Greens suggest that by putting ecology at the centre of plans for personal and collective activities, individuals will discover that ‘the needs of the planet are the needs of the person’ (Parkin 1989:26) and that there are inseparable links between ‘ourselves and the planet on which we depend’ (Porritt 1985:19).

Equally inseparable are concerns for the well-being of the individual and global peace. Greens ask how security can be assured in a world of nuclear weapons designed to ensure mutual mass destruction. They fear that the major and constant risk of a nuclear holocaust persists, even after the end of the Cold War. For Greens, security through nuclear deterrence is by nature a system of global insecurity (see Hegedus 1987).

The Greens’ emphasis on environmental disasters and the nuclear threat makes explicit the link between individual and global responsibility: ‘We are part of nature, not above it;…all our massive structures of commerce— and life itself—ultimately depend on wise, respectful interaction with our biosphere (Spretnak and Capra 1986:28).

Greens believe that it is possible and desirable to increase public awareness of how foreign policies affect local communities. Greens seek to mobilise local action in response to those policies: they urge individuals to ‘think globally, act locally’. Belief in this mode of action helps explain the Greens’ advocacy of participation in transnational institutions such as the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), European Parliament (EP) and the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP). For example, Greens embraced the 1992 UNCED Summit’s global action plan for sustainable development, ‘Agenda 21’, which called on local authorities throughout the world to consult with communities to develop their own ‘Local Agenda 21’ (see Gordon 1993; Real World Coalition 1996).

These local activists challenge deeply rooted traditions that assume that action on foreign and international policy issues are chiefly matters to be dealt with by state authorities in national capitals. Green actors insist that the ‘intrinsic character of global issues is such that they affect all human settlements’ (Alger 1988:332). The existence of a’global consciousness’ often seems overstated in their rhetoric, but Greens insist on the need to examine the transnational implications of human activity.

Thus, green ideology is based on a set of values and concerns considerably different from today’s dominant ethos. The post-industrial ‘good life’, revolving around economic growth, sophisticated technology, expanding services and material goods is replaced by a simpler lifestyle offering a cleaner planet, less resource depletion, a nature-centred spirituality, and local action to solve global problems.

Practices

The green movement is characterised not only by its values and beliefs, but also by the way it expresses and pursues these beliefs. Green practices differ sharply from conventional policy methods. Grassroots democracy, holism, and a positive emphasis on diversity are defining elements of the ‘green politics’ process.

The importance of grassroots democracy is expressed in the German Greens’ party platform: ‘Grassroots-democratic politics means an increased realisation of decentralised, direct democracy. We start from the belief that the decisions at the grassroots level must, in principle, be given priority’ (die Grünen 1980:2). Green activists advocate a radically participatory society. In a ‘green’ decision-making process, ‘discussion takes place and explicit consent is asked for and given across the widest possible range of political and social issues’ (Dobson 1995:26). More generally, Parkin argues (1989:19) that perhaps the most relevant test of the ‘greenness’ of an organisation should be its approach to a decision, problem or issue.

‘Holistic’ thinking is a green strategy as well as a goal. Such thinking implies that all aspects and consequences of a policy choice be reviewed. Green thinkers argue that greater recognition of mutual dependence and influence will encourage a sensitivity in our dealing with the natural world. ‘The best knowledge is…acquired not by the isolated examination of the parts of a system but by examining the way in which the parts interact’ (Dobson 1995:39).

This holistic concern, however, is accompanied by an emphasis on individual diversity. A wide range of views and concerns are ensured by an emphasis on individual input and open, decentralised decision-making structures. Policy decisions are to be made at the lowest possible level and matched with local requirements. Thus, despite its ‘macro-cosmic’ emphasis on the ‘interconnectedness of all life’, the way in which green thinking may be taken up and adapted to suit local needs and customs is extremely varied. Greens argue that this is necessary to ‘oppose and reverse present trends towards homogeneity, over-centralisation, the abuse of power, and an uncaring society’ (Myers 1985:254). Within the green movement, in other words, diversity is not only tolerated, but celebrated.

Coherency?

Green beliefs and practices represent a fundamental challenge to existing values and norms. However, green political thought does not yet represent a coherent or consistent ideology. Nor are Greens a coherent or monolithic set of thinkers or actors. In particular, several inherent contradictions, schisms and logical weaknesses plague green thought.

First, several of the green beliefs and practices outlined above are themselves contradictory. For instance, the practices of holism and diversity—both of which are central to green politics—lead to an inherent tension between individual diversity, on the one hand, and the need for holism and collective decisions, on the other. Greens ignore the question of how to attain desirable action whilst allowing for diverse forms of behaviour. Similarly, green politics reflect ‘a considerable tension between advocating certain essential policy outcomes and valuing (direct) democratic procedures’ (Saward 1995: 64).³ For instance, green calls for grassroots, direct democracy do not always mesh with the need for a sustainable society and the imposition of regulations such a society may require.

These conflicts help explain the ideological and strategic splits found amongst green actors and thinkers. The Greens described in this book embrace in broad terms the key beliefs and practices outlined above. But they do so to varying extents and with varying levels of enthusiasm or consistency. Not all attach the same importance or priorities to these values and practices. Even when ends are agreed, means remain contested. The most noticeable ideological split is that between ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ ecology (Naess 1973) .⁴ All Greens stress the importance of nature and the interconnectedness between humans and the environment. Proponents of deep ecology go further to argue that a new political and moral philosophy is needed that treats human beings as part of nature rather than superior to it. They call for the extension of intrinsic value, rights and moral standing to the non-human entities in the environment (Martell 1994:6). ‘Deeps’ insist that only a fundamental, radical and immediate shift in the nature of the economy and society will bring about necessary goals of ecological sustainability.

Advocates of a ‘shallow’ green approach adopt a reformist line, arguing that whilst far-reaching reforms may be necessary to achieve sustainability, these can be achieved incrementally, and by working within the present structures of society. Shallow environmentalists tend towards anthrocentrism. For them, according to Giddens (1994: 204), ‘Nature is regarded as perhaps an object of beauty, separate from human beings, but not as intrinsic to the definition of an acceptable form of human life.’ The focus is on the more modest aim of limiting the damage that humans impose on the physical world. The two schools differ on strategies as well as beliefs. ‘Shallows’ would view schemes such as ‘green consumerism’ or the EU’s ‘Ecolabel’ scheme (see Chapter 2) as valid, although incomplete, means towards environmental change. Such strategies are eschewed by ‘deeps’ as nothing more than a capitalist ‘green con’ (see Irvine 1989).

Yet the effect of these conflicts and splits should not be over-estimated. They do not diminish the force of the green challenge which advocates a transformation of modern industrial society. All Greens discussed here share a broadly similar ecological critique of modern society and its dominant values. Above all, Greens ‘share the conviction that current political practices and beliefs must change fundamentally if the world is to have the chance of peaceful, equitable and lasting survival’ (Lambert 1995:xi). However, the precise speed, nature and form of this change remain unclear and open to debate.

II
THE RISE OF GREEN POLITICS IN EUROPE

The rise of green politics has been an important feature of the post-war evolution of European politics more generally. Moreover, to a significant extent, the development of the EU as a more important level of government in Europe has been advanced by growing environmental awareness, as ecological problems by their nature demand transnational solutions. Yet, European integration in itself has prompted concerns— across a wide political spectrum—about the centralisation and bureaucratisation of European political life, problems that have long been central to the green critique of the modern state. The ‘greening’ of European politics and the acceleration of European integration thus have become intertwined. This section explores how and why this process has occurred.

Environmental awareness

Environmentalism has a long history, in some countries dating back to naturalist movements or conservation movements of the nineteenth century (see Goodin 1992: ch. 1; Dalton 1994: ch. 2). But modern green politics have more recent origins. Their emergence needs to be understood in the context of a broader shift from industrial to ‘post-industrial’ politics. This shift is evident in both public and private behaviour on matters of key concern to green actors.

Beginning in the late 1960s, the political, economic and social landscapes of Western Europe began to change radically. Growth in the size of the service sector and the decline of productive manufacturing, rising education levels, expanding bureaucracies and rapid technological development marked the advent of a new era in the political economy of industrial democracies. By the early 1970s, Western Europe appeared to be ‘on the threshold of post-industrialism, a coming society where economic growth and technological advance would reduce to a minimum the drudgery of labour and satisfy the material needs and aspirations of the population’ (Urwin 1990:116).

For younger, better educated citizens in particular, the prosperity and rise in living standards enjoyed in the post-war era formed the backdrop for a change from materialist to ‘post-materialist’ values, or from ‘old politics’ to ‘new politics’ (see Inglehart 1977; 1981; Raschke 1985; Tarrow 1988; Poguntke 1993a) .⁵ Rising affluence meant that the basic material needs (i.e. food, shelter, etc.) of a far higher share of the population were being satisfied. Thus, many Europeans—particularly those entering political adulthood in the 1960s—shifted their political attention from materialist concerns to ‘quality of life’ issues, such as enhanced political participation, gender and racial equality and, perhaps above all, environmental protection.

Growing environmental concern amongst the public was heightened by the continued degradation of the European environment. Anxiety about the effects of air, water and land pollution increased in the 1970s among the public at large. For instance, acid rain, caused by burning of impurities (especially sulphur) in fossil fuels, has had an enormous impact on the quality of life in Europe. By the late 1980s, acid rain had caused serious damage to historic buildings and 77,000 square miles of European forests. It was also responsible for $1 billion of damage to crops each year in the EU (Hagland 1991:261). Emissions of so-called ‘greenhouse gases’ such as nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide from freight and passenger vehicles rose by 50 per cent between 1973 and 1993.⁶ The scientific and economic uncertainty surrounding these issues increased public anxiety as the ultimate effects of such degradation on environmental and human health simply were not known.⁷

In addition to pollution worries, nuclear issues formed a core of public concern in the 1970s and 1980s. In the aftermath of the 1973 energy crisis, several European governments embraced nuclear energy as an alternative to oil in an attempt to lessen their dependence on a commodity whose price had quadrupled overnight. The accelerated construction of nuclear plants awakened or reinforced fears about the safety of nuclear power and the problems of disposing of nuclear waste (see Nelkin and Pollack 1981). The nuclear issue represented more than an environmental threat:

Not only did it stand for a strategy of further unlimited economic growth with allegedly negative effects on the ecological balance… [it] also epitomised the departure into a ‘nuclear state’ where the immense potential dangers of handling large amounts of radio active material would necessitate the perfection of state surveillance in order to prevent nuclear terrorism.

(Poguntke 1993b:382)

Major nuclear accidents, such as those which occurred at Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), fuelled the anti-nuclear concerns. These were accompanied by non-nuclear environmental disasters, such as at Flixborough in the UK (1974), the Seveso chemical spill (1983) and the Sandoz chemical fire on the Rhine (1986).

Public opinion polls revealed that these disasters made an impact. By 1992, the protection of the environment and the fight against pollution had become an ‘immediate and urgent problem’ in the view of 85 per cent of EU citizens (CEC 1992a). Moreover, polls indicated growing awareness of the cross-national dimension of these issues and growing support for transnational (especially EU) action as opposed to strictly national measures. Eurobarometer surveys in 1989 and the early 1990s registered that up to 91 per cent of EU citizens expressed support for a common European policy for protecting the environment (CEC 1992c). At least eight out of 10 citizens in each Member State expressed their support for this policy. Questions on the environment evoked stronger and more positive support for unified EU action than did questions concerning any other area of policy (see Kivell 1989:47). In short, the increased salience of environmental issues appeared a boon to European integration.

Public interest in environmental issues reached a peak in the early 1990s. In a climate of severe recession, especially in Western Europe, environmental concerns appeared to become less salient and the state of the economy became the most pressing issue for many voters. However, even as support for drastic environmental measures waned, opinion polls indicated that overall awareness of the environment was actually higher than in the 1980s.⁸

Whilst the end of the Cold War has decreased the saliency of peace and the anti-arms movement, other global concerns have risen in their place. The unification of Germany brought to the fore the urgency and scope of environmental threats facing Eastern Europe. Moreover, new threats or concerns, such as global warming and the protection of the ozone layer, have joined past fears of nuclear security and chemical spills. In short, whilst the intensity of environmental concern may wax and wane, the environment has become an ingrained fixture of European politics and public consc...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Series editor’s preface
• Introduction
• 1 Green politics in Europe
• 2 Green issues and environmental policy-making in the European Union
• 3 Green visions of Europe
• 4 Green transnational strategiesand electoral performance
• 5 Greens and the European Parliament: an inside look
• 6 The Greens’ policy influence in the European Union
• 7 The Greens’ policy-making role: three case studies
• 8 Conclusion
• Appendix 1 Green parties in the European Union: profiles
• Appendix 2 Key policy-making institutions of the EU
• Notes
• Bibliography