Debates in Psychology

Andy Bell

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• eBook ISBN: 9781134651382
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Debates in Psychology tackles some of the major issues and controversies within the field of psychology. The book includes a discussion of the major debates in psychology prescribed by the AQA Specification A-Level syllabus, such as free will and determinism, whether or not psychology can (or indeed should) be a science, reductionism, and the nature-nurture debate. Additionally, the 'mind-body question' is examined as an example of reductionism in psychology. A chapter on behaviourism is also included in order to draw together the debates covered throughout the book.
Each topic covered in Debates in Psychology is presented in a highly readable and accessible manner. The book will be invaluable for students wishing to gain a greater understanding of this exciting area.

1

Introduction to debates in psychology

Psychology and philosophy
How this text is structured
Knowledge and truth in psychology
How the debates relate to each other
Summary

Psychology and philosophy

The ‘debates’ covered in this text concern philosophical issues related to psychology. The word philosophy comes from Greek and literally means ‘love of wisdom/truth’. Thus, this text is mainly concerned with presenting a series of debates which examine just how ‘true’ various beliefs are concerning psychology. For example, Chapter Four includes arguments for and against the idea or belief that mind and body are separate, but somehow causally connected, ‘things’. But just how reasonable is it to hold such a belief? Any individual may hold many beliefs, but clearly not all beliefs are necessarily true.

When a debate is held in Parliament, individual politicians provide arguments for and against certain stances (or positions) concerning a particular issue. The strength of an argument should ideally be related to just how convincing a particular argument is. In other words, it should be related to how ‘true’ the line of argument being proposed is considered to be. This is inevitably related to an appraisal of the evidence presented by the speaker to support what is being said. The same applies to the various debates in psychology covered here. Each chapter presents arguments and evidence for and against the particular issues addressed. Just as politicians debating in Parliament may hold very different and often completely opposing views, the same can be said of psychologists. The reader of this text, then, should try to be engaged in weighing up the evidence presented. Indeed, good answers to questions posed in the A-level psychology examination will do just that. They will present a balanced and logical argument which fully addresses different positions held by different psychologists on a particular issue.

How this text is structured

It is intended that each chapter here builds upon material already presented. Thus when Chapter Five is reached concerning whether or not psychology can be a science, key debates covered in the chapters that precede this are brought back into the discussion. If free will (Chapter Two) is an illusion and all behaviour and mental life is the result of deterministic chains of cause-and-effect relationships, then establishing these relationships very much fits in with the traditional goal of the scientific endeavour. And thus, logically psychology should adopt a ‘scientific’ approach. The issue of reductionism is dealt with in Chapter Three and here the emphasis is upon whether or not it is fruitful for psychologists to break down human beings into smaller units in order to understand how they work. This approach again is quite typical of what is often meant when we refer to science. This is followed by an account (Chapter Four) of the mind–body problem. Here, it is intended as a good illustration of the problems inherent in scientific reductionism.

After Chapter Five has attempted to tie together issues raised in the preceding chapters, there follows an account (Chapter Six) of the nature–nurture debate. This prepares the ground for the chapter which follows on behaviourism. Here the validity and usefulness of behaviourism’s extreme environmentalist argument – nurture – are examined.

Knowledge and truth in psychology

The debate as to whether or not psychology should or could be a science (Chapter Five) is really concerned with issues related to how knowledge is collected and interpreted by psychologists. It also concerns the truth status of knowledge. In other words, the extent to which such knowledge is actually true. Some methods (or approaches) to psychology are, of course, more scientific than others. What this really often means is that some approaches to gaining knowledge in psychology are more objective than others. However, many psychologists would argue that the main problem associated with objectivity is that the inner world of the individual lies outside of the publicly observable, objectively available, domain. Now, the problem with this is that surely this inner world is exactly what psychologists should really be interested in.

This concern for subjectivity and objectivity has given rise in recent years to the so-called qualitative–quantitative issue in psychology. Whereas some psychologists would insist that the only true way of gaining knowledge is by direct measurement of readily observable facts, others insist that other methods are more appropriate. Objective measurement of reaction times and information processing speeds may well be an effective way of conducting research in cognitive psychology. But when, for example, it comes to investigating the psychological and emotional impact that divorce has on married couples, would it not be more productive to ask men and women actually involved in the process of divorce about their own subjective experiences? In other words, would it not be more fruitful to put to one side the obsession with objectivity that is associated with traditional science, and in its place to make subjective experiences the focus of study? In this example, this would involve taking the things that men and women might say about their own personal and private thoughts and feelings, etc., as representing the ‘truth’. If philosophy is defined as ‘love of wisdom/truth’, then doesn’t it make sense to argue that what the individuals themselves have to say somehow gets closer to the truth in terms of how events have impacted upon them?

The final topic of debate to be addressed in this text (Chapter Seven) concerns behaviourism. As will clearly be understood, behaviourism is not just an approach to psychology – it is a philosophical position. And this can be described as a philosophical position because the behaviouristic approach, as will be seen, insisted that only publicly observable behaviour was to be taken as ‘true’ data. Again, we come back to this idea of ‘love of wisdom/truth’. Now, behaviourism’s approach, as will be seen, insisted upon establishing truth from the researcher’s point of view. What the animal (usually a rat or a pigeon) actually did was objectively observed and measured by the investigator. By adopting this approach, behaviourism claimed somehow to get close to an undeniable truth concerning exactly what caused an animal to behave in a particular manner. On the other hand, the move towards the qualitative approach described in the example concerning divorce is also a move towards a ‘love of wisdom/truth’. But in this case it is not a question of truth from the point of view of the researcher. On the contrary, the viewpoint of those who are actually the subjects of the research is here made of central importance. Here the emphasis shifts away from the ‘truth’ as the researcher sees it, to the ‘truth’ as those actually under observation might see it.

How the debates relate to each other

The various debates covered in this text tend inevitably to overlap and to cross-relate to each other. For example, one position on the mind– body question (Chapter Four) is referred to as ‘materialism’. This proposes that what we call the mind can actually be reduced to physical processes. Chapter Four provides arguments for and against reductionism with reference to the mind–body problem. As such this provides a detailed example of the issue of reductionism that precedes this in Chapter Three. This also relates to Chapter Five because if mind really is reducible to physical brain processes, then this implies that psychology itself should ultimately concentrate on solving the mystery of the mind at the levels of biology and physics. And biology and physics have had great success as traditional sciences. If human beings are really reducible to a complex collection of atoms, then those atoms all obey the laws of physics just like anything else in the world, and thus, logically, it can be asserted that they can be studied in the same way as the natural sciences.

Behaviourism is covered in the final chapter because it is intended to provide a good illustration of the issues already presented in the chapters that precede this. It should hopefully become very clear just why this particular debate is so connected to the other issues dealt with throughout this book. A student answering a question in an examination concerning any of the debates in psychology covered in the syllabus should find that much of the material provided in the chapter on behaviourism can be drawn upon in order to illustrate the answer to that particular question. For example, in terms of the nature– nurture debate (Chapter Six), behaviourism comes down strongly on the side of environmental determinism (nurture). Behaviourism of course is thus a position which argues very convincingly against the idea of free will (Chapter Two).

Chapter Two, Free will and determinism, examines the extent to which our behaviour, and indeed the way that we think, is the product of free choice. The common sense view tends to be that it’s just a fact that people tend to regard themselves as being free and that, as we go through our daily lives, we actually feel that we make decisions and choices that come from within. Furthermore, these choices are then responsible for directing our behaviour. Extreme behaviourists however, such as Skinner and Watson, proposed that all behaviour is the product of environmental factors. Far from being a product from within, behaviour is seen as being shaped by events in the world outside.

Summary

Each chapter presented here is designed to stand alone in presenting arguments for and against various positions concerning the debates that are covered. This text, however, should be read in full. As has been outlined above, the debates themselves do not really stand in isolation. They relate to each other. In answering an examination question concerning a particular debate, a good essay, whilst actually answering the question set, will point out the ways in which other debates can, and must, be referred to. Material from various chapters can be presented in order to illustrate various points. Thus an essay on the nature–nurture debate may well need to cite behaviourism as a strong environmental (nurture) stance. The materialist position on the mind– body question is essentially an argument for one type of reductionism. An essay on free will may include comments concerning the ways in which both nature and nurture dictate and shape human behaviour and experience. And so on. As you read through this book, make notes concerning some of the connections that are made, and perhaps some that you think of yourself, between the various debates. Doing this would be helpful to you with respect to the final Review exercise in Chapter Seven.

Further reading

Hospers, J. (1990) An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 3rd edn, London: Routledge.

Hospers’ text provides further reading on (1) the mind–body debate; (2) free will and (3) scientific knowledge. It also serves as a good reference text for philosophy generally. Hospers illustrates his arguments with many clear and useful everyday examples. This makes the text very readable. Although perhaps a little more advanced than A-level.

2

Free will and determinism

What exactly is the free will and determinism debate?
Why the problem concerning free will persists
Science and causal relationships
Psychology and causal relationships
Determinism and fatalism
The construct of free will
Psychology, science and free will
Is our behaviour determined and predictable?
Ethological studies
Free will and responsibility
Feeling free and being free
Existentialism
Summary

What exactly is the free will and determinism debate?

This debate concerns the extent to which it is reasonable to assume that our behaviour is under our own control. Those who believe that this is so would argue that individuals possess some kind of internal agent that directs behaviour. The term agent simply means anything that produces an effect. Manufacturers of soap powders often refer to their product as a ‘cleaning agent’. This means that their product has the desired effect of cleaning clothes. To believe that human beings possess free will, then, is to believe that human beings possess something inside themselves which can produce an effect on their own behaviour. This something is often referred to as free will. It is important to stress that this thing called free will must act independently of all external forces. The other side of the argument is presented by those who believe in determinism. This term means that our behaviour is caused by forces beyond our own control.

The issue concerning free will and determinism is particularly difficult to address for a variety of important reasons. Indeed, students doing a degree in psychology at university are usually faced at some point in their studies with examination questions such as: Is belief in free will rational?; Is all of our behaviour determined?; Do we determine our own thoughts and beliefs?; To what extent are we free? And so on.

For a number of reasons, the very fact that the question continues to be posed at all is probably quite a healthy state of affairs. One of the main reasons being that, unlike in physics where it is generally agreed that the world follows more or less lawful, and hence determined and determinable, paths, the world that psychologists study is not quite so straightforward. At least to some extent, human beings are often considered to be self-determining in a way that, for example, a tree or a volcano is not.

Why the problem concerning free will persists

The free will and determinism debate inevitably involves the issue of causation. Put simply, if it is true that every event in the world is caused by something else, then this would not only include the physical world out there, it must also include ourselves because we too are a part of the world. In other words, it would suggest that human behaviour and experience, the subject matter of psychology, are also determined by causal chains. And if we are really the product of causal chains, then how could we ever be said to be free? This question is now addressed in some detail.

Science and causal relationships

Another popular question that students will often face concerns the appraisal of whether or not the discipline of psychology is, or indeed ever could be, a science. Most people’s understanding of scientific endeavour is that science should concern itself with knowing the world. In particular, this concerns knowing about causal relationships within the world. Terms related to the word science, or usually related to – or applied to – the activity of scientists, concern their attempts at objectivity in establishing what the causal relationships might be. Hence, the scientist needs to observe the world in order to see exactly what influences or causes what, under what circumstances, etc. What are the determining factors associated with one thing happening rather than another?

Establishing causation

The emphasis here, then, is upon objective observation rather than subjective speculation about how the world actually works. In order to establish what it is that actually influences or causes what, the scientist conducts observable experiments. These, of course, often involve the manipulation of a possible causal factor, termed the independent variable, in order to observe what effect such manipulation might have upon another, dependent, variable. This way of establishing causal relationships, of course, has been prevalent in psychology. The following example is presented as an illustration.

Milgram (1963) conducted an experiment where participants were required to administer electric shocks with increasing severity to confederates of the experimenter. Each time the confederate made an error in a memory test, a shock was to be given as ‘punishment’. Of course, no shocks were really administered at all. The real issue under investigation by Milgram had nothing to do with memory; it concerned just how far participants would go in administering the shocks. The study thus involved deception and was in fact concerned with examining the extent to which participants would obey the experimenter’s instruction to shock the confederate. When the experiment had been completed, many participants stated that the reason for or cause of their behaviour was that they were deferring to the authority of Yale University. That is, that although they were anxious about their own behaviour, i.e. ‘administering’ harmful electric shocks, they frequently reported after the experiment was completed that they didn’t really believe that a prestigious university such as Yale would allow an experiment to proceed that would do any lasting harm. Here, then, participants were reporting on one of the causes of their willingness to continue administering the electric shocks. This causal factor was identified as participants somehow feeling safe in having the famous institution of Yale University behind them. Thus, following what J. S. Mill termed the ‘rule of one variable’, Milgram repeated his experiments in a city centre location without mentioning to the participants that the experiments had anything to do with Yale. Of course, the ‘rule of one...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Acknowledgement
• 1
• 2
• 3
• 4
• 5
• 6
• 7
• 8
• Glossary
• References