The Guy Liddell Diaries Vol.II: 1942-1945

MI5's Director of Counter-Espionage in World War II

Nigel West

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• eBook ISBN: 9781134263301
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

WALLFLOWERS is the codename given to one of the Security Service's most treasured possessions, the daily journal dictated from August 1939 to June 1945 by MI5's Director of Counter-Espionage, Guy Liddell, to his secretary, Margo Huggins. The document was considered so highly classified that it was retained in the safe of successive Directors-General, and special permission was required to read it.

Liddell was one of three brothers who all won the Military Cross during the First World War and subsequently joined MI5. He initially first served in the Metropolitan Police Special Branch at Scotland Yard, dealing primarily with cases of Soviet espionage, until he was transferred to MI5 in 1931. His social connections proved important because in 1940 he employed Anthony Blunt as his personal assistant and became a close friend of both Guy Burgess and Victor Rothschild, and was acquainted with Kim Philby. Despite these links, when Liddell retired from the Security Service in 1952 he was appointed security adviser to the Atomic Energy Commission, an extremely sensitive post following the conviction of the physicist Klaus Fuchs two years earlier.

No other member of the Security Service is known to have maintained a diary and the twelve volumes of this journal represents a unique record of the events and personalities of the period, a veritable tour d'horizon of the entire subject. As Director, B Division, Liddell supervised all the major pre-war and wartime espionage investigations, maintained a watch on suspected pro-Nazis and laid the foundations of the famous 'double cross system' of enemy double agents. He was unquestionably one of the most reclusive and remarkable men of his generation, and a legend within his own organisation.

1943

4 January

Cecil Liddell established touch with a man called Peter Corcoran, who was formerly employed by the Garda Siochana. This man is now employed in a government office over here. He had had passing through his hands certain reports about our military dispositions in Northern Ireland. This he had obtained in the Ministry of Defence. While we do not mind Dan Bryan having this information, apart from the general impropriety of the action, we are rather worried about its passing through a number of different offices in Eire. There is very little to be done about it. If at a later date we have any trouble with the Ministry of Defence we can give them a hint that we know what has been going on in Northern Ireland.

5 January

T.A. Robertson and J.C. Masterman came to see me about the Walenti case. They think that before proceeding the Wireless Board should be consulted as to whether we could co-operate with the Poles on a case of this kind.

Peter Loxley rang me up about five Polish agents who have been condemned to death. He wanted to know whether we had anybody we could possibly exchange. I said that apart from the principle involved, which would be a matter of serious discussion, I did not think we had anybody who would not be able to give away a good deal of information if he were sent back to Germany.

6 January

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris has had conversations with Juan Vigon and General Francisco Jordana. Vigon has made it clear that it is not possible for Spain to enter the war on either side. He did not believe that the Allies intended to attack Spain or Spanish Morocco. He pointed out, however, that an attack on Spanish territory would be rendered less likely if the army, which was already mobilised, was equipped with modern arms and weapons. It would be in Germany’s interest to provide such weapons. He said that in order to give the Allies no pretext for making any attacks on Spanish territory, acts of sabotage carried out from Spain or Spanish territory must cease. A resumption of sabotage activities against Gibraltar was agreed to with certain reservations, and the continued use of posts on Spanish territory for observation of shipping in the Straits was also agreed to, provided that the greater part of the personnel employed at these posts were Spanish nationals. Vigon told Canaris that Jordana’s discussions with Dr Salazar had resulted in a mutual talk on the defence of neutrality and on political and economic support.

Admiral Canaris had discussions with Jordana who took an identical line to that of Vigon. One of the results of this exchange of views was that Canaris made urgent representations to Berlin that the sabotage that is being undertaken from Spanish Morocco should cease, as it is placing difficulties in the way of Spanish acquiescence in German activities.

The German agent Gabriel Pry has now confessed that he had a dual mission. In addition to carrying out espionage in the Congo, it was also intended that he should enable the Germans to intercept secret correspondence passing between loyal Belgians in Belgium and Belgian government officials both in London and in the Congo. Thus it was not only intended that he should deliver the letters entrusted to him by Gilson to the persons to whom they were addressed, including the Belgian Colonial Minister in London, but that he should use his best endeavours to see that he was entrusted with the replies and go with them to Lisbon where he was to hand them over to his German masters.

7 January

Plans are going on for the national sabotaging of de Havilland’s by ZIGZAG. Camouflage is to be used.

Fanto, of the MULLET case, has put up a plan to give him the necessary cover for visiting this country and we have indicated that we are prepared to accept him. DRAGONFLY is still having trouble about his money.

8 January

The Director-General told me that after a conversation with Tin-Eye Stephens he thought Charles Boyd was unsuitable for sending to South Africa. I said this case was one on which I should not be prepared to accept Tin-Eye’s advice. Boyd was a type whom he would never really understand. I still thought that there were considerable advantages in sending Boyd to South Africa. I thought that before making up his mind the Director-General should see J.C. Masterman, Len Burt and Buster Milmo.

I spoke to Anthony Blunt about the Turkish Embassy. I thought it was extremely important that we should do our best to get an agent in, owing to two or three important cases of leakage.

9 January

I had a talk with Walter Bell about a memo which Ian Wilson had prepared on the TRICYCLE case. It was fairly critical of the FBI. While I was all in favour of its being shown to Arthur Thurston I thought it undesirable that it should go in writing to the FBI. It would be better to leave it to Thurston to put it over in his own way. The real trouble is that the FBI objectives in running doube-cross agents are somewhat different from our own. The only use they appear to see in a double-cross agent is that he leads them to another whose arrest can be effected.

12 January

Hughes rang me up about a complaint he had received from one of the chief constables that he had not been put into the picture about ZIGZAG. The question was whether Hughes should speak to Special Branch officers who must have heard about the case from their colleagues. The purpose would be to make an appeal to them to keep their mouths shut. The trouble is that if Hughes speaks to the Special Branch officers they would report to the chief constable, who complains that he has not been told. It is of course always open to him to go to the meeting of Special Branch officers but chief constables do not generally make a practice of this.

13 January

Hughes talked to me about the chief constables in his area being informed about ZIGZAG. Unfortunately, they had been talking among themselves, and those who had not been told were up in arms. I saw that I would see no reason for telling any chief constable except those immediately concerned.

17 January

I have had an interesting report from Cyril Mills about the Waldemar Janowsky case, otherwise known as WATCHDOG. He has evidently been through considerable difficulties in getting the case on its feet. The RCMP appear to be totally unfitted to deal with a matter of this kind. Had Cyril Mills not been there the case would have been blown three or four times over. He seems to be using the utmost tact and I feel sure will make good.

According to a Japanese BJ, Dr Richard Sorge’s spy-ring consisted of 246 members, nine of whom are Soviet citizens.

18 January

Waldemar Janowsky has given quite an interesting story about the proposed invasion of this country in 1940. He himself was at the time with the Brandenburg Regiment waiting to come over. It was intended that the Brandenburg Regiment, followed by other troops, should land at night on the flat beaches west of Folkestone. They had been issued with British uniforms captured at Dunkirk. Janowsky’s section was to proceed on motor-bicycles to Dover and capture the dock. Nazi flags were to be hoisted on the docks as a sign to the Luftwaffe to stop bombing. The invasion plans were definitely cancelled at the end of October 1940. According to Janowsky, Dr Rantzau’s stock is very low. Canaris has been blamed for Germany being misinformed about Russia.

19 January

Jim Hale talked about the Wilson case. Wilson was formerly a member of Laurence Grand’s organisation. He was interned because he went bad and committed indiscretions relating to the SOE set-up in Rumania. He had brought an action for wrongful imprisonment. Judgment was given against him and the judge refused to listen to details about SOE, MI5, etcetera. Mr Justice Humphries commented quite severely on the action of the Home Office in holding up Wilson’s petition to the Lord Chief Justice and accepted the Home Office’s apology. He said that any citizen in this country, whether he be alien, enemy alien or British, had the right to communicate with the court. It is feared that this remark may lead to a certain amount of trouble.

Field Marshal Smuts has refused to have Charles Boyd, whom we wished to send to him as a double agent.

Tommy Harris and J.C. Masterman came to see me about GARBO. GARBO was asked to send some of his ink to CARELESS. The latter is an extremely indiscreet and truculent fellow, who is in detention and has refused to write to the Germans unless he is released. The mistake has been to allow GARBO to make contact. If CARELESS does not write, the Germans may well think that GARBO has given him away. I have spoke to Tin-Eye Stephens and asked him to have another go at CARELESS. He tells me that he has tried every sort of interrogation but that CARELESS is adamant.

20 January

Buster Milmo reported at the Wednesday meeting that there had been a large influx at Camp 020. The main increase is in spies going to South America. He mentioned the case of Johannes de Graaf, a Belgian who had come down an escape route and had been temporarily employed at the British Embassy in Madrid. De Graaf admitted that he had been in contact with the Abwehr but said that he had done so in order to escape. He was carrying pyramidon and tooth-picks. He was caught through a clever link-up on the information index at the Royal Victoria Patriotic School, which showed that he had been put on the escape route by someone known already to be working for the Abwehr. He is now beginning to come clean. He was highly trained both in espionage and sabotage and appears to have corresponded with German occupied territory after his arrival in Madrid.

Another interesting case is that of the SS Reidar. SOE appear to have got in touch with three members of the crew at Lerwick on the false grounds that they were SOE agents. It now seems fairly clear that one or all of them are German agents.

Dick White is firmly convinced that MAX, alleged to be a German agent operating in south Russia, is in reality a Russian double agent. The Sofia–Meldekopf traffic appears to work for the Bulgarian police as well as for the Abwehr. The name of Samoiloff, who appears on the traffic as a Russian traitor, was given to the Russians, who do not appear to take much interest. There are no inward messages to Sofia picked up by the Radio Security Service and the material covers a wide area from Leningrad to the Caucasus. Everything seems to point to MAX being an imaginary agent controlled by the Russians.

We had a joint meeting with SIS today in London. The case of one Wurmann, an Abwehr agent captured in North Africa was discussed. It was agreed that we should house him, look after him and give him a certain measure of liberty. He would be regarded as a useful reference book on Abwehr matters. Authorised persons would be allowed to have direct access to him. Other matters discussed were the Chinchilla Kobbe case, Herbert Hart’s suggestion for the improvement of our relations with Censorship, the Kameradschaftdienst and the situation in America.

22 January

Waldemar Janowsky has got through to the Germans from Canada.

I had a meeting with Dick White, Tin-Eye Stephens, T.A. Robertson and Tommy Harris about CARELESS and GARBO. CARELESS is still adamant about writing to the Germans. We decided therefore to send him to Huntercombe, and to offer no excuse to the Germans for the cessation of correspondence. GARBO is very worried but personally I think we shall get away with it.

23 January

The report from the Polish Military Mission about BRUTUS is favourable. Meanwhile contact has been established in a new place and the wireless side of the case is working satisfactorily.

TRICYCLE is getting a little restless and has put up various possible plans for his getting abroad to recover direct personal contact with the German secret service.

DRAGONFLY has not yet been paid and is therefore still silent. It seems however that the Germans are trying to make the necessary arrangements.

Cyril Mills telegraphed that contact had been made by WATCHDOG. He has been giving interesting details about the Brandenburg Regiment. Details that he has given about the Abwehr in Belgium are far from convincing, however.

SIS have agreed that ZIGZAG shall be allowed to return to France via Portugal.

I saw Sir Alexander Maxwell and explained to him our plan about Wurmann. The latter was particularly anxious to get some assurance about British nationality. He naturally thought that this could be done at the stroke of a pen. We have explained to him that this was quite impossible, but that we hoped we could get some letter from the Home Office which would give him grounds for thinking that if he behaved himself his naturalisation would be considered in due course. Maxwell has promised to let me have a letter stating that if Wurmann keeps to his bargain his naturalisation will be considered after the fulfillment of the statutory conditions and that the period of five years should be taken to start from his arrival in this country. In addition he will say that it is not the custom of the British government to deport aliens if by so doing they will be liable to persecution by their authorities. Wurmann has now changed his identity and is being fixed up with papers in the name of Count Stenbock. He will take the identity of a Baltic baron.

25 January

According to Wurmann, England is badly covered by the Abwehr. The best information comes from Funk Uberwachung. Wurmann saw the periodical results of this wireless traffic and says he was terribly upset to realise how useless the Abwehr work was when compared with the splendid wireless intercept service. Wurmann says that, as a result of this service, everything is known about the distribution of the different divisions in England, their numbers, etcetera. He saw similar results in Athens resulting from the wireless service in Egypt. The Athens information came from General Rommel, who sent it also to Berlin.

This information ties up with the following statement by one of the Panzer generals now in our hands: “I am always worried in case they should crack the code. All our communications with Japan are by wireless. All the things we hear when the English are using their wireless are startling when they are worked out. They don’t worry about it all . . . of course they may be doing it purposely . . . it was quite amazing up to the time I was taken prisoner. At that time our successes were partly due to that, otherwise it would not have been possible at all. Bayerlein and I actually gave our orders accordingly. Not exclusively, but at any rate it was very important information for us.”

26 January

Wurmann is giving us some interesting sidelights on past events. The following refers to the incident some years ago when two German staff officers travelling by plane fell into the hands of the Belgians and were found to be carrying important documents giving the German invasion plans against Belgium. He says:“In January 1940 a Luftwaffe major arrived at Cologne en route for Munster, carrying with him the exact details of the part to be played by the Luftwaffe and paratroops in the invasions of Belgium. Before proceeding to Munster by train, he called on an old friend, a German air force major commanding the Cologne aerodrome. The two old friends cracked a bottle of wine together. The first bottle had, of course, to be rounded off by a second, and the excellence of the Rhenish wine, combined with the convivial atmosphere, sufficed to lead to an agreement that instead of going on to Munster by train that night, the messenger should wait over until the next morning, and to be flown there by his old friend. The two majors duly took off the next morning, and for causes not yet ascertained, but probably not unconnected with the quality of the wine they had drunk the preceding evening, they mistook the Maas for the Rhine, and made a perfect landing on an aerodrome near Brussels. Their first thought on realising their mistake was to burn their precious plans, but these two highly placed representatives of the most efficient nation in the world did not possess a single match between them, and the plans duly fell into the hands of the Belgian authorities. ¹¹

The German General Staff was torn with doubts as to whether the Belgians would really believe in the authenticity of these plans and the stupidity of the officers who allowed them to fall into Belgian hands, and finally concluded that the risk was too great to be taken. They thus postponed the offensive, which was planned for January 1940, until May 1940. Had the offensive taken place on the date originally fixed, the terrific frosts which set in at the end of January 1940 would have caught the German Panzer divisions in the middle of the Ardennes, and the whole of the 1940 campaign might have ended very differently. Was this luck, or was it Hitler’s intuition?

28 January

Buster Milmo tells me that a Danish subject called Borisson, who is interned at Dartmoor, has written to the King’s Bench Division, having read about the Wilson case in the papers. Camp 020 took the precaution of withdrawing all papers dealing with this subject, otherwise we might have had a flood of applications to the King’s Bench for habeas corpus.

As from Tuesday last we have been getting German BJs from Dublin. These are likely to prove highly interesting and will fill in an important gap in our information.

29 January

Edwin Herbert h...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• EDITOR’S NOTE
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• PERSONALITIES
• EXECUTIONS
• BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENTS
• GLOSSARY
• GLOSSARY OF OPERATIONAL CODENAMES
• INTRODUCTION
• 1942
• 1943
• 1944
• 1945