Introduction to Global Military History

1775 to the Present Day

Jeremy Black

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780429671616
• Edition: 3
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Introduction to Global Military History provides a lucid and comprehensive account of military developments around the modern world from the eighteenth century up to the present day.

Beginning with the background to the American War of Independence and the French Revolutionary wars and ending with the recent conflicts of the twenty-first century, this third edition combines fully up-to-date global coverage with close analysis not only of the military aspects of war but also its social, cultural, political and economic dimensions and repercussions. The new edition includes a fully revised chapter on conflicts during the eighteenth century, updated coverage of events post-1990 and increased coverage of non-Western conflicts to provide a truly international account of the varied and changing nature of modern military history.

Covering lesser-known conflicts as well as the familiar wars of history and illustrated throughout with maps, primary source extracts and case studies, it is essential reading for all students of modern military history and international relations.

CHAPTER 1

The world of war in the eighteenth century

▐ Introduction

▐ Assessing significance

▐ Publications and experimentation

▐ Tasks for assessment

▐ Naval power

▐ Power projection

▐ Outcomes and choices

▐ The West and the rest

▐ The American War of Independence, 1775–83

▐ War between the USA and Native Americans

▐ Europe before the French Revolution

▐ The French Revolutionary Wars, 1792–9

▐ The rise of Napoleon

▐ Asian conflicts in the 1780s and 1790s

▐ Conclusions

INTRODUCTION

The eighteenth century was a key period in global history, one in which Russia became a great power, the United States became a distinct unit and independent, the Chinese greatly extended their power over non-Chinese people and the Mughal (Indian) and, even more, Safavid (Persian/Iranian) empires collapsed. Yet, this period is commonly discussed, typecast and largely dismissed by historians, both military and otherwise, in terms of the phrase ancien régime. This approach ensures that, first, there is a focus on the Western world and, secondly, that the period is less allegedly significant than the age that began with the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789. If challenged, this account is adjusted to begin with the American Revolution (War of Independence) in 1775, but, otherwise, rests unchanged. There is, therefore, a teleology in force, an assumption of an inevitable development toward nationalism, peoples’ warfare and the industrialisation of war, each of which is seen as more effective, with even greater effectiveness then derived from their interaction. From that perspective, an earlier age appears anachronistic, its warfare limited, its militaries bound to fail, or at least be superseded, and its command practices and cultures outmoded, unprofessional, effete and ready for replacement.

This account, however, is inadequate. There were significant developments during the period, as well as highly effective militaries. Moreover, the account and teleology referred to are of limited value on the world scale, and also as far as naval warfare is concerned. As far as chronology is concerned, far from the prerevolutionary eighteenth century sitting between two others of greater consequence, there is a need to consider it, not least in terms of the struggles determining the relative position of the West, as well as the questions ‘Which West?’ and ‘Which East?’ were to prevail.

ASSESSING SIGNIFICANCE

These questions are linked to the issue of significance and, thus, of what the scholar should cover, a topic that should be addressed explicitly. There is the repeated problem of focusing on a particular military, for example the Prussian army under Frederick II, the Great (r. 1740–86), and treating this military as if it defines progress and therefore importance, while victory, in turn, underlines relative capability and thus demonstrates this progress. Aside from the serious conceptual and methodological problems posed by such circular arguments, there are also those posed by a disinclination to draw sufficient attention to the failures of these supposed paradigm powers, for example Prussia’s repeated inability to inflict significant defeats on Austria in 1761–2 or 1778–9, as well as the disinclination to engage sufficiently with political contexts, both domestic and international. Much of the discussion of both Frederick the Great’s campaigns and those of the French Revolutionaries is weak as a consequence of these points.

This focus is linked to a related conceptual issue, the established interest, among writers and readers, in a small group of key powers, their arrangement in a sequence, and a discussion of military developments in terms of moving from one to another. This approach has always short-changed certain powers and risked distorting those that do receive attention. However, this approach reflects not only intellectual strategy but also academic factionalism, fashion and careerism. These greatly encourage a focus on certain topics and the neglect of alternatives.

Technological changes were not crucial to these questions ‘Which West?’ and ‘Which East?’ It is appropriate, nevertheless, to note that there were major developments in weaponry and the use of weaponry in the period. In particular, the development of firearms-mounting bayonets was an important shift. It was accomplished in Europe in the 1690s–1700s, but then applied elsewhere, notably in northern India by the late eighteenth century. The combined armed tactics resulting from the earlier ‘Military Revolution’, of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in which different types of weapons were employed in the same battle, had been far easier to discuss in training manuals, which emphasised drill, and to attempt in combat, than they were to execute successfully under the strain of battle. Moreover, the contrasting fighting characteristics of the individual arms – muskets, pike, cavalry and cannon in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – operated very differently in particular circumstances, which posed added problems for coordination. So also did the limited extent to which many generals and officers understood these characteristics and problems, which affected the ability to triumph in battle.

Issues of firepower and tactical coordination help explain the significance of the move in the 1690s–1700s away from the musket–pike combination that had become dominant in Christian Europe in the sixteenth century, one in which soldiers carrying muskets were accompanied by soldiers carrying pikes, to the fusion presented by firearms-mounting bayonets, in which each foot-soldier carried a similar weapon. The simultaneous shift from matchlock to flintlock muskets improved their reliability as ignition systems, notably in damp weather and in the wind, and also increased the ability to rely on firearms to offer strong protection against cavalry and infantry attack. These changes possibly increased the effectiveness of Western armies more than had the earlier changes to gunpowder weapons by themselves. These armies contested the dominance of the Western world as well as fighting non-Western forces, notably in South-East Europe and India.

It is not always easy to recreate what happened in battles, a point the Duke of Wellington was to make about his victory at Waterloo in 1815. Therefore, it is difficult to appreciate the reasons for success and to assess the related issue of military decisiveness. The precision of tactical formations certainly repeatedly appears to have meant less in terms of fighting quality than the experience and morale of troops. As far as weaponry was concerned, the widespread use of firearms ensured that their possession in itself was of limited value in terms of a capability gap between arms. Nevertheless, much can still be gained in assessing victory by the consideration of tactics, unit cohesion, experience, leadership and related factors.

Tactics that were particular to the individual battle, rather than formulaic to the manual, were the most significant. Command skills were involved in the choice of position, and an understanding and assessment of detailed topography were important. The topography and vegetation affected a host of factors, including the advantage of slope for all arms, and site lines for cannon, as well as the softness of the ground, which made cavalry advances especially difficult. These factors of terrain are often difficult to appreciate today, not least because of changes in surface drainage. So also for the detailed consequences of currents, winds, shoals and sandbanks for conflict at sea.

Linked to this, it can be very difficult to assess battles, not least because surviving sources can be scanty and may contain serious discrepancies. This is an important qualification of much of the writing about military history, with its habit of readily narrating and explaining what were often complex and obscure battles, and of running together events that could take several, if not many, hours. Indeed, most battle accounts, and for both land and naval battles, are questionable, if not highly questionable.

PUBLICATIONS AND EXPERIMENTATION

At the same time, the world of print did seek to describe events and practices in order to pass on knowledge. Contemporary writings on war reflected the sense that not only were there lessons to be learned, but that they needed learning. Thus, in Britain, officers and former officers, and of all ranks – for example James Callandar in 1782 – published military observations. Translations, moreover, spread knowledge and opinion, and this was a key aspect of the Western culture of print. The Dutch general Menno van Coehorn’s treatise on fortification, published in Dutch and French in 1685, was translated into English in 1705. The treatise and its translation reflected the importance of fortification, and notably to protect the Low Countries (modern Belgium and Netherlands) from French expansion. Coehorn was the Dutch counterpart to the French expert, Vauban.

Publications were not limited to Western Europe. Ernst Braun’s Novissimum fundamentum und praxis artilleriae (1682) appeared in a Russian edition in 1709, with 1,000 copies printed. The text contained many new military terms that entered the Russian language. It reflected the significance of artillery in providing the Russians with greater battlefield effectiveness against both Swedes and Turks. Peter the Great, Tsar from 1689 to 1725, was especially keen on Westernisation as a means to achieve greater capability. Indeed, the major changes made to the Russian army and, even more, navy in Peter’s reign help counter the suggestion that the ancien régime was one of relative inconsequence. These changes were both specific and systemic. They were designed to ensure that Russia was an effective competitor, although Ivan IV and Alexis (r. 1645–76) had deployed effective forces in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, respectively. The most striking change was that of the navy, not least because Russia had not earlier had a Baltic coastline that could be used as a basis. Peter founded St Petersburg as a fortress and a naval base in 1703, and he rapidly created a fleet able to support operations against Sweden in the Northern War of 1700–21. These capabilities were to be sustained by his successors.

In a key aspect of the use of printing in order to record learning on the job, new editions of books led to emendations. For example, the changes between the 1756 and 1774 editions of the mathematician Francis Holliday’s An Easy Introduction to Fortification and Practical Gunnery included material on the theory of projectiles. Robert Anderson, a London silk weaver by trade, published The Genuine Use and Effects of the Gunne (1674), in which tables showed the results of his experiments with elevation, range, shot, diameter and weights. Anderson’s further experiments led to his To Hit a Mark as Well upon Ascents and Descents, as Upon the Plain of the Horizon (1690), in which he communicated his work on the path of projectiles. In 1696, Anderson followed up with his The Making of Rockets in which he devoted much space to the strength of gun metal. Experimentation was a key element of the process of deciding how best to acquire comparative advantage, and as a major aspect both of advances in mathematics and of the Scientific Revolution. For example, Nicolas-François Blondel’s book on the firing of mortars drew on work presented at the Académie Royale des Sciences in 1673, although the publication was postponed until 1683 as Louis XIV was concerned that it would help other powers.

During the War of American Independence (1775–83), the British sought to evaluate the respective advantage of smoothbore muskets and the grooved-barrel rifles that American snipers used with considerable effectiveness, notably in helping defeat a British army at Saratoga in 1777. Rifles were slower to fire than muskets, but had a greater accurate range. In 1779, General Thomas Desaguliers, chief fire-master at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich, carried out comparative tests of the accuracy of a smoothbore musket, an American rifle and a carbine. Different variables were then tested: weight of shot, amount of powder used, greasing and coating of the barrel and shot, distance to target and the material from which the targets were constructed. The tests demonstrated the rifle’s accuracy.

TASKS FOR ASSESSMENT

Within the Western world, technology was important but so also were other factors. With the exception of Russia, which was on a unique geographical range, the force–space ratio of all European states existed within a very different context from the great extent of the series of empires from Ottoman Turkey to Manchu China. As a result, there were fewer ‘internal frontiers’ in European states, and their military tasking and force-profile could be very different to those of these empires, which devoted much attention to suppressing revolts. Tasking was a key element, one that drew together policy, strategy, force structure, doctrine, training and equipment.

In the West, alongside expansion at the expense of non-Westerners, the struggle between Britain and France (and Spain) dominates attention. In particular, fighting from North America to West Africa, the West Indies to the Philippines and Europe to India, made the Seven Years’ War (1756–63; to Americans, the French and Indian War of 1754–63) into what is often termed the first global war. However, the relevance of such a description for a conflict that excluded East Asia, an area that is of much greater significance if the world is remapped in terms of population, is unclear. Within India, moreover, the key issue from the 1750s was Afghan expansion, and neither conflict between Britain and France nor British expansion in Bengal. The largest battle in India was the Third Battle of Panipat between the Afghans and Marathas in 1761, and not any battle involving the British or French, such as the British success at Wandewash.

Focusing on Britain and France indeed means emphasising the maritime dimension of the Western account, notably the British perspective, and under-playing the landward dimension of Asian warfare. The same was true of conflict within Europe. Nevertheless, although internal waterways (where the Chinese had considerable naval strength) have consistently received insufficient attention from historians, naval mastery, and the uses to which it was put, do indeed deserve the attention they receive. They created significant potential and brought very important changes at the global level.

These changes, however, are underrated if there is a focus on conflict within Europe. This focus reflects the scale of the battles there, the prominent role of German scholars and those working on the Prussian army in military history, and the scholars’ commitment to the idea of a key army acting as a model to other militaries, notably Prussia under Frederick II, the Great (r. 1740–86), which, in practice, did not lead to highly significant changes at the global level. Instead, if attention should be devoted to conflict within Europe, it is the growing ability of Russia to dominate Eastern Europe that is most notable and, as a secondary theme, the failure of France to do the same in Western Europe. In 1716, 1735 and 1748, Russian troops moved into what is now Germany, and in 1760 they briefly occupied Berlin.

NAVAL POWER

Significant naval forces with a range greater than war canoes were deployed by only a handful of non-Western powers, principally the Ottoman (Turkish) empire, the Barbary states of North Africa (Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli and Tunis) and the Arabs of Oman. The ships of these powers approximated to Western warships, but lacked the destructive power of the latter: the Barbary and Omani ships were commerce raiders that emphasised speed and manoeuvra...