Chapter 1
Media rituals
The short and the long route
⊠the familiar is not necessarily the known âŠ
(Lefebvre 1991a: 15)
There is something strange, even disorienting, about the mediaâs impact on social life. We can recognise the reaction of Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald to Britainâs âinventorâ of television, John Logie Baird. Macdonald thanked him for the television, this âwonderful miracleâ that had âput something in his room which would never let him forget how strange the world was â and how unknownâ. But now we can only understand that early reaction against the grain of the enormous familiarity of television, and the familiarity of the worlds that television presents to us. The strangeness lies elsewhere, in our difficulty in grasping what difference it makes to the social world that the media is there. Understanding media means remembering that the familiar is not necessarily the known, and must therefore first be made strange.
This book uses theory â not abstract theory, but theory informed by empirical research â to understand the dimension of media we find most difficult to understand: the dimension left unexplained even when we have analysed all media texts and their source in the media industries. For we would still have to explain the mediaâs role in ordering our lives, and organising social space. We would still have to explain those times when our attention to media seems more than casual, even necessary, and when the media appears to stand in for something essential about our lives together as social beings. To do so, we must look with a wider-angled lens than usual at how the social world is âmediatedâ through a media system that has very particular power-effects, and how the actions and beliefs of all of us are caught up in this process. I am introducing the term âmedia ritualsâ to capture an aspect of this terrain.
By âmediaâ here, I will mean not any media, or process of mediation, but particularly those central media (primarily television, radio and the press, but sometimes film and music, and increasingly also computer-mediated communication via the Internet) through which we imagine ourselves to be connected to the social world. There is, as Todd Gitlin (2001: 10) recently argued, a dimension of our experience of media that differentiated studies of this or that medium miss: this is our sense of âbeing with mediaâ in their totality. This is the common sense notion of âthe mediaâ, although in the age of media digitalisation its precise reference point is beginning to change. It is the media (in this sense) that underlies what I will call âthe myth of the mediated centreâ: the belief, or assumption, that there is a centre to the social world, and that, in some sense, the media speaks âforâ that centre. This myth underlies our orientation to television, radio and the press (and increasingly the Internet) as a social centre, and our acceptance of that centreâs position in our lives as legitimate. If symbolic power is the socially sanctioned âpower of constructing realityâ (Bourdieu 1991: 166), then the myth I am attacking can be expressed another way: as the belief that the concentration of symbolic power in media institutions is legitimate. My claim will be that media rituals are the key mechanism through which that assumed legitimacy is reproduced.
âMedia ritualâ is a term of art. There is a short and a long route to explaining it. The long route will be developed theoretically in Chapters 2 and 3 and then explored from various specific angles in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. The need for a long route derives from the fact that, as the bookâs subtitle, âA critical approachâ, indicates, I will work both with and against our instinctive sense of what this term means. I want to rethink common sense notions of âritualâ in order to address the complexity of contemporary mediaâs impact on social space. Understanding âmedia ritualsâ is not simply a matter of isolating particular performances (rituals) and interpreting them; it is a matter of grasping the whole social space within which anything like âritualâ in relation to media becomes possible. I call this wider space âthe ritual space of the mediaâ (more on which later in the chapter).
Put more directly, âmedia ritualsâ are any actions organised around key mediarelated categories and boundaries, whose performance reinforces, indeed helps legitimate, the underlying âvalueâ expressed in the idea that the media is our access point to our social centre. Through media rituals, we act out, indeed naturalise, the myth of the mediaâs social centrality. The term âmedia ritualsâ encompasses a vast number of things: from certain âritualisedâ forms of television viewing, to peopleâs talk about appearing in the media, to our âautomaticâ heightened attention if told that a media celebrity has just entered the room. Even this shorter route to understanding the term requires some background.
THE SHORT ROUTE TO UNDERSTANDING âMEDIA RITUALSâ
There are three broad approaches to the term âritualâ in anthropology. These have understood âritualâ respectively as:
1 habitual action (any habit or repeated pattern, whether or not it has a particular meaning);
2 formalised action (for example, the regular and meaningful pattern by which a table is laid for food in a particular culture);
3 action involving transcendent values (such as the Holy Communion, which in Christian contexts is understood as embodying a sense of direct contact with the ultimate value, God).
The first approach is uninteresting; sometimes in everyday language, I might talk about my âritualâ of always having a drink and a snack when I get home after work, but in this case the word âritualâ adds nothing to the idea of regular action or habit. The second and third approaches are more interesting and may overlap. Formalised action is much more than habit, since it implies that âritualâ involves a recognisable pattern, form or shape which gives meaning to that action. To see âritualâ from the third perspective â as action involving or embodying broad, even transcendent, values â is compatible with the second approach (indeed, ritualâs formality is what enables it to be associated with something transcendent), but shifts the emphasis away from questions of pure form and towards the particular values that ritual action embodies.
Why should the term âritualâ in these second and third senses (or a combination of them) help us understand contemporary media? Doesnât this fly in the face of many claims that we live in an age of âde-traditionalisationâ (Heelas et al. 1994)? Doesnât it ignore the progressive multiplication and diversification of media outputs and media technologies? Isnât it blind, finally, to the fact that in the âinformation societyâ there is no possibility of anything as stable as ritual centres, only temporary regularities in a global âspace of flowsâ (Castells 1996; Lash 2002)?
To answer these questions fully is a task for the whole book, but there is a short answer for now. Just as ritualised action turns our attention to âsomething elseâ, a wider, transcendent pattern âover and aboveâ the details of actions, thereby raising questions of form, so too it is the mediaâs influence on the forms of contemporary social life â the wider transcendent patterns within which the details of social life make sense â that I intend to capture by the term âmedia ritualsâ. It is not enough to make finer descriptions of media practice using our existing conceptual tools; only through a new concept, or so I will argue, can we cut beneath the apparently chaotic surface of everyday media practice. Once we do so, we will find more order than we expect and in the process add something to media and social theory, and also, I hope, to anthropological theory, where not only ritual but now mediation too are central concerns.
The term âmedia ritualsâ refers to the whole range of situations where media themselves âstand inâ, or appear to âstand inâ, for something wider, something linked to the fundamental organisational level on which we are, or imagine ourselves to be, connected as members of a society. I will explore the usefulness of this term in a number of specific examples: from media events (Chapter 4) to pilgrimages to media sites (Chapter 5) to the mediaâs claims to represent reality (Chapter 6) to media sites for public self-disclosure (Chapter 7). What I do not want to do, however, by introducing the term âmedia ritualsâ is to mystify what the media is, and its implications for questions of power. In speaking of âmedia ritualsâ, therefore, I intend to detach the term from its usual moorings.
âRitualâ has often been associated with claims that it produces, or maintains, social integration. This is a reading associated particularly with the tradition of social thought derived from the great French sociologist, Emile Durkheim. Durkheim was the leading French sociologist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and contributed more than anyone else to our understanding of how modern, complex societies hold together, if they do. He explored these questions in two contrasting books: the early The Division of Labour in Society (1984) and the late The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1995). One reading of the latter has emphasised the supposed unbreakable connection in Durkheimâs thought between ritual and social integration. I will offer a different reading of why Durkheim matters. I will follow anthropological theorists such as Maurice Bloch and Pierre Bourdieu who have connected ritual not with the affirmation of what we share, but with the management of conflict and the masking of social inequality. Unfortunately, in media analysis, whenever âritualâ has been introduced, it has been in the context of a rather traditional idea (derived from a particular reading of Durkheimâs sociology of religion) that rituals âfunctionâ to confirm an established social order that is somehow ânaturalâ and beyond question.
Instead we need to rethink âritualâ, including âmedia ritualâ, and Durkheimâs model of the social significance of ritual, to make room for new connections: between the power of contemporary media institutions and modern forms of government (Giddens 1985), between an understanding of ritual and the disciplinary practices of surveillance, between, that is, Durkheim and Foucault. For too long, media theorists have analysed the most dramatic examples of media power (the great media events of televised coronations and state funerals) in isolation from questions of government. As Armand Mattelart (1994) argues, the result is an impoverished account of the mediaâs role in modernity. By contrast, a purely Foucauldian discourse analysis with its emphasis on flow, dispersal and discontinuity might well underestimate the real and consistent pressures towards order in contemporary mediated societies. (We can only guess, since Foucault did not, any more than Durkheim and with less excuse, analyse modern media!) That is why the theoretical framework of this book will draw on both Durkheim and Foucault, and many points in between, to grasp how media are entangled in the rhetoric of the contemporary âsocial orderâ. It is worth saying something now about that difficult term, social order.
UNDERSTANDING THE âORDERâ OF MEDIATED SOCIETIES
We cannot analyse the social impacts of contemporary media without taking a position on broader social theory. The underlying question, after all, is how are media involved in contemporary societiesâ holding together, if in fact they do. The approach I take to this question will be post-Durkheimian and anti-functionalist.
What do I mean by this? First, to be âpost-Durkheimianâ is not to abandon Durkheimâs social theory as a reference point, but to rethink our relation to Durkheim in a radical fashion; and, second, to be âanti-functionalistâ means opposing any form of essentialist thinking about society, not only functionalist accounts of societyâs workings (and mediaâs role in them) but equally the idea that society is essentially disordered and chaotic. The two points are linked, since it is too weak a notion of social order that prevents some social theorists from seeing how much an anti-functionalist reading of Durkheim still has to offer in explaining contemporary media rhetorics. These points need some explanation.
Starting out from Durkheim
There are other roots than Durkheim for the study of âritualâ, of course, but it is Durkheimâs sociology of religion (especially in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life) which is the unavoidable reference point for any account of ritual that is interested in wider questions of social order. It was Durkheim who insisted on the need to grasp the dimension of social life that transcends the everyday. He called this âthe serious lifeâ, la vie sĂ©rieuse (cf. Rothenbuhler 1998: 12â13, 25), and saw religion as its main, although not its only, manifestation. Durkheim, however, understood the term âreligionâ in a rather special sense. For him religion:
is first and foremost a system of ideas by means of which individuals imagine the society of which they are members and the obscure yet intimate relations they have with it.
(Durkheim 1995: 227)
Religion, then, for Durkheim is not (whatever the claims it makes for itself) about cosmic order, but about the way social beings imagine the social bond that they share as members of a group. Instead of analysing contemporary religion, Durkheim offered a speculative account of the âoriginsâ of religious practice in aboriginal societies in perhaps the most brilliant product of âarmchair anthropologyâ (Pickering 1984: 348). Durkheim argued that our experiences of being connected as members of a social world are at the root of our most important categorisations of that world (such as, but not limited to, the sacred/profane distinction, which Durkheim argues underlies all religion in the usual sense of the term).
This argument can be broken down into three stages:
1 At certain key times, we experience ourselves explicitly as social beings, as members of a shared social whole.
2 What we do in those moments, at least in Durkheimâs imagined aboriginal case, is focused upon certain shared objects of attention, such as totems, and certain rituals which confirm the meaning of these âsacredâ objects or protect them from all other objects (the âprofaneâ).
3 The distinctions around which those moments of shared experience are organised â above all, the distinction between âsacredâ and âprofaneâ â generate the most important categorisations through which social life is organised. This, in Durkheimâs view, explains the social origin of religion and religious behaviour, and the centrality of the sacred/profane distinction in social life.
Durkheimâs contemporary relevance
Why should Durkheimâs account be of any interest to us today, either generally, or in a book on contemporary media? Surely Durkheimâs method for developing his insights (if that is what they were) was neither plausible anthropology nor (even on its own terms) an analysis of modern religion. So why have Durkheimâs ideas fascinated a whole range of social analysts interested in contemporary forms of social order? The answer, paradoxically, is that Durkheimâs insight, althou...