The Western European Union At The Crossroads

Between Trans-atlantic Solidarity And European Integration

G. Wyn Rees, G Wyn Rees

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781000612547
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book investigates the institutional and operational development of the Western European Union (WEU) and its proposed enlargement. It assesses the motivations of its leading members and the progress made toward enhancing the WEU's role in the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference.

1
The History of the WEU

Introduction

It can sometimes be tempting to look back on the security arrangements that were constructed in western Europe during the Cold War and imagine that they were pre-determined. Because the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation came to dominate security politics and proved to be such a durable structure, one can be forgiven for assuming that this was somehow written in stone. It may be all too easy to forget the complexity of the post-war period, the intensity of the fears for the security of the continent and the search to find frameworks that could guarantee stability.

How security was to be achieved was far from clear to decision-makers at the time. Two fundamental sets of choices were apparent. The first was the balance that was to be struck between the Europeans providing for their own defence as compared to reliance upon the United States. Although it was not clear what role the US would seek to play in the security of the continent, the Europeans had to decide how closely to align with their North American ally. The WEU came to represent an expression of a European identity in defence and whilst cooperation with the US offered to fulfil vital objectives, it was recognised that European interests could be at risk of being submerged in a trans-Atlantic structure

The other major choice in defence was over the extent of the integration that would be undertaken by the European states. Defence integration offered a means of binding the states together in the face of a common adversary. It also offered a way of overcoming the fear of nationalistic rivalries and conflicts between the leading European countries. Yet integration was a major step to take so soon after the end of World War Two and it impacted on the core issue of national sovereignty; the ability of a country to defend itself. The question of how far to pursue integration was to prove a consistent thread running through the debate on a European defence identity.

Concerting Defence Arrangements in Europe

The need to concert defensive arrangements in Europe was increasingly apparent as the 1940s progressed. There was a growing sense of threat from the Soviet Union which, although western intelligence estimates were hazy, had not demobilised the greater part of its armed forces after World War Two and there were residual fears of Germany. However, attempting to orchestrate a defence framework for the continent was beset by manifold difficulties. Firstly, the major countries were struggling under enormous economic pressures which made it imperative to minimise the weight of defence spending. Secondly, there was suspicion of the influence of communist movements in many of the countries in western Europe and particularly in France, which rendered them unpredictable partners in the eyes of their neighbours.¹ Lastly, there was uncertainty about the role that the United States wished to play in Europe and its reliability as a guarantor of security.²

The first step in establishing a defence framework was the signing of the Dunkirk Treaty, between Britain and France, in March 1947.³ The Treaty was focused primarily on Germany and was designed to prevent its re-emergence as a military power. This was largely a symbolic gesture, as noted by Greenwood, because Germany was too weak to have presented an immediate danger, but could have had long term significance.⁴ Nevertheless it enabled the British government to reassure its ally about its commitment to the long term security of France from a remilitarised Germany. This was recognised to be an essential prerequisite before any progress could be made on securing a broader defence arrangement for Europe.

With the Dunkirk Treaty in place, it became possible to consider the inclusion of other west European countries into a security framework. The extent to which a European security effort would have been viable has remained a contested point between historians but there was no doubting the benefits that could have been derived from greater unity. Not only was closer cooperation a way for European states to demonstrate that they could help themselves, it also increased the likelihood that the Americans would maintain and expand their contribution. The Truman Administration was more likely to be able to sell the idea of a continued American military presence in Europe to a sceptical Congress if there was evidence that the Europeans were serious about addressing their security deficiencies. The United States did not want to be the power that guaranteed security whilst its allies made no efforts of their own.⁵

Whether at this time Britain and France envisaged the creation of a European 'Third Force', sitting independently as a power base between the two superpowers, has remained open to interpretation. There would certainly appear to be corroborating evidence that British Foreign Secretary Bevin thought in terms of a strong European bloc that could talk on equal terms with the two superpowers. This would be made possible by drawing upon the strength of the overseas empires of the UK and France.⁶ Leaders, such as Bidault of France and Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium, foresaw the danger that a weak Europe could come to be dominated by the United States. Hence they wanted to see the strength of the Europeans built up before entering into some sort of defensive pact with the US in case such an opportunity was foreclosed once a compact was made.⁷

Yet it did not follow that an ambitious European framework was necessarily incompatible with a major American role. Kent and Young both point out that Bevin may have seen the ultimate objective as building up a power base for Britain that could return it to the highest levels of world diplomacy.⁸ Baylis also endorses this view, that US military support was perceived to be a precondition for European stability as well as for a greater British role.⁹ The US was seen as a vital counter-balance to the Soviet Union and its strategic nuclear forces were the underpinning of the west's security. Furthermore, the US was needed to assist in the economic recovery of Europe, particularly through the granting of financial aid.¹⁰ In turn, the US was supportive of plans for closer European economic and defence integration, believing that an economically strong Europe would be capable of resisting further encroachment from the Soviet bloc.

The 'Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence', signed in March 1948, provided a way for the European powers to build on the foundations of the earlier Dunkirk agreement. It created a regional defence organisation known as Western Union, whose membership comprised of five states; France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In a strongly worded Treaty, the states committed themselves to assist each other with all possible means in the event of one becoming the victim of aggression (Article V). The highest authority within the Brussels Treaty became the Consultative Council which consisted of Foreign Ministers and met in the capitals in rotation. When this was not in session, authority was exercised by a Permanent Commission which met weekly in London and was supported by a small secretariat.

As the name implies, there was a broader motivation behind the Treaty than just a defensive pact. Cooperation in economic and cultural matters was seen as creating a web of relationships that would strengthen the security of Europe. Economic integration had been discussed throughout the 1940s and French Prime Minister Bidault made a speech in July 1948 which called for a customs and economic union and a European Assembly to be established between the European powers.¹¹ Britain was ambivalent towards these ideas, welcoming the cohesion that they might add to relations between states but wary of being drawn into European supranationalism. The sections of the Treaty that dealt with economic integration left the British feeling distinctly uncomfortable, as they had no desire to be drawn so closely into continental affairs.¹² To Britain's satisfaction, the economic dimensions of the Treaty were gradually filtered off into more specialised institutions and the cultural responsibilities were handed over to the Council of Europe.¹³

In the month after the signing of the Brussels Treaty, a Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) was created to enact the defence provisions. It was based upon a permanent military committee in London, a joint headquarters at Fontainebleu and three subordinate commands for land, sea and naval forces. A Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee was formed and Field Marshal Montgomery was appointed to act as its first Chairman.¹⁴ The Brussels Treaty also provided a framework for the standardisation of weaponry amongst the member states — a feature that was to characterise the organisation in the years ahead. Its aim was to create a common system for developing and manufacturing weapons so that they would be shared by all the states. Countries might choose to specialise in certain types of equipment and then produce them on behalf of their allies.

The military weakness of the west Europeans was appreciated by all the countries involved. A common strategic concept was agreed which planned to defend the line of the Ijssel river in the Netherlands, down the length of the Rhine to the French Alps. Despite its questionable efficacy, it still presupposed the sacrifice of significant amounts of western territory in a conflict. In 1949 it was estimated that 34 divisions would be required within three days of hostilities commencing and then a further 22 divisions would be required within 30 days.¹⁵ Yet by the end of the 1940s there was still only a maximum of 12 European divisions capable of being mobilised to fight in the theatre. There was a gulf between what was needed and what could actually be provided. Ranged against the west was estimated to be a massive military force. It was thought that about 40 enemy divisions might be employed in a surprise attack, increasing to around 100 divisions within the space of a month.¹⁶

However, there were important differences of opinion amongst the Brussels Treaty members about the most appropriate way of responding to the threat. Holland, for example, argued for emphasis on short-term planning because they feared that the danger of war breaking out was high. In contrast, Britain argued for long-term preparations that placed a premium upon the economic stability and viability of the west. They did not see that war was likely in the near term due to the US atomic monopoly and they were sceptical about the ability of the Europeans to generate a realistic defence capability.¹⁷ In addition, Britain had wider commitments to its overseas territories that it could not ignore. To have concentrated its energies on the European theatre to the detriment of its empire was an unacceptable option. The French were known to be concerned at British unwillingness to state what level of forces they would commit to Europe in wartime and Britain did not decide to reinforce its army on the continent until March 1950.

Hence, securing an American military commitment to continental defence grew increasingly important for European states. Even after the WUDO had been established, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) were of the opinion that the US would remain the lynchpin of the defence of Europe and recommended that an American Supreme Commander be appointed for wartime, with a British Deputy.¹⁸ The problem in seeking an American commitment was that it was unclear what sort of military guarantees the US would be willing to undertake. In addition, there was a more covert debate about the long term reliability of the US: unease remained that a future Administration might slip back into the isolationist policies that had characterised America's post-World War One stance.

By 1949 there was growing evidence that a US-European defence pact could be secured. The Vandenberg Resolution of the previous year had prepared the way in the US Congress and events in Europe, such as the Berlin blockade, convinced the Administration that an Atlantic defence organisation was required. The result, in April 1949, was the signing of the Washington Treaty and the creation of NATO.¹⁹ It has been argued that the securing of American assistance m...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The History of the WEU
• 2 Revitalisation in the 1980s
• 3 Post Cold War to Maastricht
• 4 Relations Between the WEU and the European Union
• 5 Relations Between the WEU and NATO
• 6 The Enlargement of the WEU
• 7 The Inter-governmental Conference and the WEU
• 8 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index