The Philosophy of Gandhi

A Study of his Basic Ideas

Glyn Richards

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• eBook ISBN: 9781135799342
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This book seeks to give a coherent account of Gandhi's basic ideas, demonstrating the importance of Hindu thought and the centrality of his concept of Truth.

CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH

The concept of Truth (Satya) is fundamental to the thought of Gandhi. It is not without significance that the sub-title of his autobiography is ‘The Story of my experiments with Truth’, and his whole life might well be interpreted as an attempt to live in accordance with or an existential quest for Truth. Followers of Gandhi explicitly maintain that he was essentially a practical man with no concern for metaphysics or philosophical speculation, yet it is clear that whenever he attempted to explain what he meant by Truth he was involved in metaphysical speculation whether he or his followers realized it or not. My contention is that the unity of Gandhi’s thought and the interrelatedness of the various aspects of his teaching spring from firmly-held metaphysical beliefs and that the nature of these beliefs become very much apparent when he expounds what he means by Truth. I am not suggesting that he arrives at the meaning of Truth as the result of philosophical or metaphysical speculation in a vacuum. He is not a neutral observer who first learns to define Truth and then applies it to different aspects of life. Rather he is a participant in a form of life and the meaning of Truth for him is made apparent from the way in which it is used in that form of life.

Gandhi is faithful to the traditions of Hinduism when he affirms the isomorphism of Truth (Satya) and Reality (Sat). He refers to reality as Truth and by the use of the term he preserves the metaphysical and ethical connotation of such traditional Hindu terms as dharma, universal law or duty, and ta, the cosmic moral law. For him nothing is, or nothing exists, except Truth,¹ and where Truth is there also is true knowledge, (cit), and where true knowledge is, there also is bliss, (ānanda). Truth then is Saccidānanda, being, consciousness, bliss. This may be one of the reasons why Gandhi has no difficulty in describing himself as an Advaitin or non-Dualist,² though to what extent it is accurate to regard Gandhi as an Advaitin is another matter. It is evident that he has no difficulty either in describing himself as a Dvaitin or Dualist, or as a follower of Viśiādvita or qualified non-Dualism, namely, non-Dualism with distinctions. But his claim to be able to represent the three major philosophical schools of the Vedānta does not prevent him from regarding Truth (Satya) as the most correct and most fully significant term that could be used for God. On the face of it the statement ‘God is Truth’ seems to imply that Truth is an attribute or description of God, and in the first instance Gandhi was content to allow the phrase to be used in this way although it did not accurately reflect his position. Later, however, he came to realize that it was more accurate for him to say Truth is God than it was to say God is Truth. That is, he considered the term God to be an appellation for Truth rather than the term Truth to be a description or attribute of God. The statement Truth is God’, which Gandhi instinctively felt to be a more accurate expression of his basic position, is not inconsistent with his description of Truth as Being itself, as eternal, or with his reference to Truth as that which alone is, all else being momentary. While in his view Truth need not assume shape or form at any time, yet when it is made to do so in order to meet specific human needs it is called Īśvara or God and assumes a personal connotation.³

For Gandhi, however, the primary connotation of the term ‘God’ is not personal. He describes God as a force, as the essence of life, as pure, undefiled consciousness, as truth, goodness, light and love, and as the atheism of the atheist since the latter also seeks truth. He rejects the suggestion that Buddhism can be considered atheistic on the grounds that God is really the dharma or teaching of the Buddhists.⁴ He sees God as the unseen power pervading all things, the sum-total of life, the indefinable, the formless, the nameless. What these descriptions present us with is the concept of an impersonal Absolute or Ultimate and this is exactly what Gandhi wishes to convey for he has no hesitation in expressing a preference for the idea of God as formless Truth.⁵ Yet his expressed preference for the worship of the formless does not prevent him from recognizing that God is personal to those who need to feel his presence and embodied to those who desire to experience his touch.⁶ In his view it makes no difference whether the devotee conceives of God in personal or in impersonal terms since the one class of devotee is not inferior to the other. His readiness to acknowledge that God is all things to all men enables him to support the Dvaitin or Dualist, and Viśiādvaitin or qualified non-Dualist positions as well as maintaining his own preference for Advaita or non-Dualism. His acceptance of what he calls ‘the doctrine of the manyness of reality’,⁷ by which he probably means that reality can be conceived of in many different ways, makes it for him to approve of the non-creative aspect of God as propounded by the Jains, and the creative aspect of God as propounded by Rāmānuja the foremost exponent of the Viśiādvaita position. That this tolerant attitude should have resulted in his being called an Anekāntavādin, or a believer in many doctriness, is not surprising, but it did not disturb him in the least.⁸ His position is such, however, that it does produce the paradox that God is described in the same context as an impersonal force and the essence of life, and also as omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent.⁹ Gandhi moves from impersonal to personal descriptions of God without difficulty and while he expresses preference for an impersonal God he is not averse to describing God in personal terms. This might be interpreted as an indication that it is not his purpose or intention to present a systematic, coherent and consistent Advaitin account of the concept of Truth or God after the fashion of Śankara, the principal exponent of non-dualism, and that what could be said concerning the metaphysical basis of his thought is that although it purports to be Advaitin it does not preclude the possibility of Dvaita, or Dualist, and Viśiādvaita, or qualified non-Dualist interpretations of the nature of reality. On the other hand, it might be argued that when he moves from the concept of impersonal truth to the concept of a personal God, he is distinguishing, in traditional Advaitin fashion, between higher and lower levels of truth or reality. But acceptance of this argument involves acceptance of the superiority of the higher, impersonal level of truth over the lower personal level of truth and the acknowledgment of two levels of knowledge. Gandhi, as we have seen, sees no superiority in conceiving of God in impersonal rather than personal terms so it is difficult to see how the traditional distinction between higher and lower levels of truth can be applied to him. The fact that he uses both personal and impersonal descriptions of God supports this point. If the question is asked whether Gandhi is not aware of the dangers of contradiction in his use of personal and impersonal terms to describe God, the answer might be that it would depend whether the personal use of the term God refers to an entity, or being, in the form of an extra-mundane person, whether or not a contradiction is involved. Gandhi, however, does not conceive of God in this way even when he uses the term in a personal sense. He insists that ‘you labour under a limitation when you think of a being or entity who is beyond the power of a man to grasp’,¹⁰ so it can be maintained that he is aware of the problems involved in his personal-impersonal uses of the term God. It might also be maintained that the elasticity of the concept of Satya in Indian philosophical thought may well account for these apparent contradictions.

The foregoing argument may be supported by what Gandhi says about the names and forms of God. He is able to refer to God by such names as Rāma and Ka, which are specifically Hindu names, and as Ahuramazda, which is the Zoroastrian name for the God of light. These names have a personal connotation and, according to Gandhi, are simply man’s attempt to define the mysterious, invincible force that pervades all things. In his youth he was taught, in accordance with Hindu custom, to repeat the thousand names of God, but he realized that the thousand names of God were not exhaustive and that while God has many names and many forms he is also nameless and formless.¹¹ In fact the power that is called God is beyond definition; it is, as is stated of Brahman, ‘neti, neti,—not this, not this’, and in our attempts to define it we are seeking to describe the indescribable. According to Gandhi, if it is at all possible for man to describe this power then it ought to be called Truth (Satya), which is a derivative of Sat, which literally means that which is or exists. All the names and forms attributed to this indefinable power are, in Gandhi’s view, symbols, and attempts to personalize God. Some clearly feel the need for the Ultimate to be expressed in symbolic, personalized form, and image worship can be regarded as part of the desire of human nature for symbols.¹² Personifications of the Ultimate in such forms as Rāma and Kra have to be regarded as symbols which manifest man’s craving for the Unseen for what suits one man does not necessarily meet the needs of another.

‘I have accepted all the names and forms attributed to God, as symbols connoting one formless omnipresent Rāma. To me, therefore, Rāma…is the all-powerful essence whose name, inscribed in the heart, removes all suffering, mental, moral and physical.’¹³ When it was suggested to Gandhi on one occasion by a Roman Catholic priest that if Hinduism became monotheistic Christianity and Hinduism could serve India in co-operation, Gandhi’s reply was that Hindus were not polytheistic. While it is undoubtedly true that Hindus say there are many gods they also declare that there is but one God, Īśwara, Devādhideva, who is God of gods. Gandhi himself professed to be a thorough Hindu yet not a believer in many gods.¹⁴

If it is insisted that image worship is nothing but a form of idol worship, Gandhi’s response to this accusation is that image worship is simply indicative of man’s need for symbols. Hindus do not worship their images of stone or metal. They worship rather God as symbolized or personified in those forms, If a worshipper were to make a fetish of his stone or metal image, however, then that might correctly be construed as idolatry, but such an attitude has to be distinguished from the element of sacredness that worshippers often attribute to temples, churches and mosques or to books such as the Bible, the Koran or the Gītā. Gandhi illustrates his rejection of the charge of idolatry by stating: ‘Every Hindu child knows that the stone in the famous temple in Banaras is not Kashi Vishwanath. But he believes that the Lord of the Universe does reside specially in that stone.’¹⁵

The stone referred to here is clearly a symbol of God rather than an embodiment of God, but at the same time it has an element of sacredness, which is what Gandhi may be implying when he maintains that God resides in the stone in a special way. Or to put it in another way, for Gandhi the stone partakes of the nature of that which it represents.

By the use of the last phrase I have indicated a comparison that may possibly be drawn between Gandhi and Paul Tillich. Gandhi’s teaching concerning the symbolic nature of personifications of Truth in a variety of different forms seems on the face of it to correspond to what Tillich has to say about the symbolic nature of Christian terminology. Both maintain that there are symbolic representations of the Ultimate whether the Ultimate be depicted as Truth or as the Holy. For Gandhi, symbols manifest man’s craving for the unseen and intangible; for Tillich they are necessary because the Ultimate or Holy could not maintain its unconditional character without them. The difference between the practical approach of Gandhi and the more systematic, theological approach of Tillich is evident from these descriptions. Tillich holds that symbols in themselves cannot be equated with the Ultimate nor can they be regarded as fully expressing the Ultimate. He refers to symbols as pointing beyond themselves to the Ultimate while at the same time partaking of the nature of that to which they point. By this he means that they possess a certain sacred connotation or depth dimension. They open up levels of reality not easily accessible to the more literal approach and relate to elements within the depth of man’s soul. Symbols, for Tillich, do not wholly contain the Ultimate and, in his view, there can be no finite particularization of the Ultimate or Holy. To maintain that the Ultimate can be fully expressed in finite particulars can only result in what Tillich calls the demonization of the Holy. Symbols, according to Gandhi, are a necessity for the religious life of some people but he insists that there is nothing inferior in conceiving of God in personalized terms. Furthermore, different religions may need different symbols, and it is only when they are treated as fetishes, or when they become the means whereby one religion claims superiority over another, that they cease to be of value and are fit only to be discarded. In other words, while Tillich maintains that when finite particulars are given the status of ultimacy it is detrimental to true religion and a form of demonization, Gandhi insists that symbols which become fetishes are idolatrous and fit only to be discarded. Presumably what he means is that at that point they will have lost their representative character and become embodiments of the divine. Tillich would call this practice demonization, or the elevation of a finite particular to the status of ultimacy. Gandhi would regard it as a failure to preserve or maintain the function of symbols and a degeneration of their purpose. Tillich’s tendency to hypostasize the Ultimate in the concept of Ground of Being does not appear to be shared by Gandhi. True he expresses a preference for the impersonal concept of Truth (Satya), which etymologically is a derivative of Being (Sat), in contemplating the Ultimate, but this does not preclude other more personal concepts of God. The reason he gives for adopting this standpoint is that reality can be conceived of in many different ways all of which are equally valid. It follows that Gandhi’s view of symbols differs somewhat from that of Tillich in the sense that they do not point to a hypostasized Ultimate. For the latter, the term God is the main religious symbol for the Ground of Being while, for the former, God is the name we give to the mysterious power that pervades the universe and not a symbol in the Tillichian sense. The manifestation of God in the Indian tradition would take such forms as Brahma, Viu and Ŝiva, the trimūrti of the Hindu way of life, and innumerable other gods and goddesses, the veneration of which, in Gandi’s view, is sometimes inaccurately and insensitively described as idol worship. According to Tillich, the way in which God is filled out with concrete symbols in the Christian tradition is by the use of certain aspects of man’s finite experience. For example, he is referred to as Father, as Person, as One who acts and who shows love, power and justice. The essence of idolatry for Tillich is when these concrete, finite symbols are accorded the status of the Holy or Ultimate Concern; this is the demonization of religion. According to Gandhi, it i...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• PREFACE
• CHAPTER I: THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH
• CHAPTER II: TRUTH AND RELIGION
• CHAPTER III: TRUTH AND AHIMSĀ
• CHAPTER IV: SATYĀGRAHA
• CHAPTER V: SARVODAYA
• CHAPTER VI: TRUTH AND SOCIETY: UNTOUCHABILITY AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN
• CHAPTER VII: TRUTH AND SOCIETY: EDUCATION
• CHAPTER VIII: TRUTH AND ECONOMICS
• CHAPTER IX: TRUTH AND POLITICS
• CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION
• GLOSSARY
• BIBLIOGRAPHY