Whose Black Politics?

Cases in Post-Racial Black Leadership

Andra Gillespie, Andra Gillespie

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781135851071
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politik

The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a new vanguard in African American political leaders. They came of age after Jim Crow segregation and the Civil Rights Movement, they were raised in integrated neighborhoods and educated in majority white institutions, and they are more likely to embrace deracialized campaign and governance strategies. Members of this new cohort, such as Cory Booker, Artur Davis, and Barack Obama, have often publicly clashed with their elders, either in campaigns or over points of policy. And because this generation did not experience codified racism, critics question whether these leaders will even serve the interests of African Americans once in office.

With these pressing concerns in mind, this volume uses multiple case studies to probe the implications of the emergence of these new leaders for the future of African American politics. Editor Andra Gillespie establishes a new theoretical framework based on the interaction of three factors: black leaders' crossover appeal, their political ambition, and connections to the black establishment. She sheds new light on the changing dynamics not only of Black politics but of the current American political scene.

1
Meet the New Class

Theorizing Young Black Leadership in a “Postracial” Era¹

Andra Gillespie

Introduction

By all accounts, Americans are being introduced to a third generation of Black elected leadership. Ironically, this new phase, like the phases that preceded it, is called “new Black politics.” What distinguishes this new batch of leaders from their predecessors is their generation (i.e., they were born or came of age after the Civil Rights Movement), their education (they were educated in Ivy League and other White institutions), and their potential (they have realistic chances of holding higher executive and legislative positions more frequently than any other generation of Black leaders) (Reed and Alleyne 2002).

This latest wave of Black politicians is not immune from criticism. Not least among critics’ concerns is whether these new Black politicians will advance the substantive and strategic policy goals of the African-American community. Yes, some of these women and men can realistically become senators and president, as Barack Obama has so aptly demonstrated, but at what price? Will they have to sell out Black interests to gain the electoral advantage needed to attain high office (Martin 2003)?

Implicit in this discussion of new Black politicians is their relative chance for success and the means by which they emerge onto the political spectrum. Is the emergence of this cohort of leadership an organic development emanating from Black communities, or are these politicians overly ambitious instrumentalists who are exploiting their racial background for political traction? What is more, does this cohort of elected leadership have a chance at developing a loyal base of Black voters, or are they being propped up by White elites seeking to divide and conquer Black communities?

The answers to these questions are important because the stakes are so high. The new cohort of Black elected officials receive such notoriety because their probability of attaining high office is greater than it has been for any generation of Blacks in the United States. If this cohort of elected leadership meets expectations, and continues to ascend in critical numbers to governors’ mansions, the U.S. Senate, and the White House, what are the implications for Black communities? Clearly, these leaders will be in an unprecedented position to shape public policy. Thus, it seems that the big question is not just what pundits think about new Black politicians, but what constituents think about these candidates and whether the material conditions of African Americans will improve under their direction.

In the pages that follow, I trace the emergence of this new cohort of Black leadership. I draw on the Black leadership literature to see how scholars in the past defined and assessed would-be Black leaders. Indeed, they created multiple, yet similar typologies to evaluate leadership. I then use the basic demographic record of the current crop of young Black elected officials to introduce a new model of Black officials, which I in turn apply in describing the post-Civil Rights cohort.

New Black Politics Throughout History

So far, there have been three iterations of new Black politics in the post-Civil Rights era: the widespread election of the first Black elected officials in the 1970s; the successes of Black candidates in major elections in large, majority White jurisdictions in the 1980s; finally, the current rise of young, Black moderates, many of whom challenge members of the earlier wave of Black elected officials in majority Black cities and Congressional districts. Each wave of Black politicians is significant for the barriers that the politicians traversed. They are also important to study because the rise of each class of Black elected officials is concurrent with innovations in campaign strategy. However, despite the campaign innovations, scholars studying these waves of elected officials have been careful to question whether the programmatic agenda of these Black elected officials aligns with the interests of Black constituents.

New Black Politics: Phase I

Charles Hamilton notes that after the passage of Voting Rights Act, the focus of Black politics, in a literal and academic sense, shifted from the judicial to the legislative/electoral arena. Now that Blacks largely had the franchise, the goal shifted to channel that electoral power into legislative policies that would benefit Blacks (Hamilton, 1982). Putting Black officials in office was a key first step in achieving that agenda. Indeed, from 1965 to 1988, there was a more than thirteen-fold increase in the number of Black elected officials (Tate 1994, 1; see also Williams 1987, 112).

The elected officials of the first wave of new Black politics faced tremendous obstacles. As trailblazers coming on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement, they had to run in still racially tense environments. Furthermore, they had to reconcile with the White portions of their constituency that may have been skeptical of them as leaders (Smith 1990).

Moreover, these new Black elected officials had difficulty implementing their agenda. As Linda Williams notes, “urban Blacks today have reached city hall precisely at the moment when the real power to deliver jobs, money, education and basic services is migrating to higher levels of government and the private sector” (Williams 1987, 129). She observes that first wave Black politicians came to power during a period of national economic decline and decreased federal aid to cities. As a result, first wave Black mayors were hampered in their efforts to provide redistributive relief to their constituents. What little aid they were able to provide tended to focus on ameliorative policies such as affirmative action and set-asides, which disproportionately benefited middle class Black residents. What is more, Blacks ascended to the mayoralty in cities which severely proscribed their power, limiting some from having control over important functions such as taxation (Williams 1987, 128–29).

William Nelson further notes that the notion of new Black politics being the collective agent for improvement of the whole Black community is easier said than done. Using Cleveland as an example, he notes that uniting Blacks around a permanent agenda is difficult. Carl Stokes was able to unite Blacks under one political banner. However, that union dissolved when Stokes stepped down as leader of Cleveland’s Black political organization. Diversity of opinion and ambition, then, undermined some attempts for political unity (Nelson 1982). Moreover, Robert Smith observes that the legislative record of these officials, with respect to their progressive, Black politics agenda, has been limited. They were only able to develop downtown space, implement municipal affirmative action, and respond to police brutality (Smith 1990).

New Black Politics: Phase II

One of the distinguishing features of each wave of new Black politics has been the new Black candidates’ campaign style. While candidates in each wave of new Black politics have had some measure of crossover appeal, observers have attributed more crossover appeal to each subsequent generation of new Black political candidates. For example, Ardrey and Nelson (1990) note that Black elected officials elected in new Black politics’ first wave, who were largely civil rights leaders, transferred the confrontational style from the movement to the electoral and legislative arena.

Many scholars viewed 1989 as a watershed year for Black politics. In November 1989, Blacks ascended to the mayoralty for the first time in Seattle (Norm Rice), New Haven (John Daniels), Durham (Chester Jenkins), and New York City (David Dinkins). Most notably, Douglas Wilder was elected Governor of Virginia, making him the country’s first Black governor since Reconstruction. This cluster of elections is particularly important given that these men were elected in majority White jurisdictions with at least 40 percent of the White vote (McCormick and Jones 1993, 66, 68).

With their elections, Wilder and his peers ushered in the second wave of new Black politics. The second wave is characterized by the prevalent use of a deracialized campaign strategy. McCormick and Jones define a deracialized campaign as one being “…in a stylistic fashion that diffuses the polarizing effects of race by avoiding explicit reference to race-specific issues, while at the same time emphasizing those issues that are perceived as racially transcendent, thus mobilizing a broad segment of the electorate” (McCormick and Jones 1993, 76). McCormick and Jones (1993) go further to articulate this strategy by noting that candidates employing such a strategy convey “a nonthreatening image” (76, original emphasis), “avoid employing direct racial appeals in organizing the Black community” (76), and “should avoid emphasis of a racially specific issue agenda” (77, original emphasis).

Douglas Wilder clearly exemplifies the deracialized strategy. Strickland and Whicker note that Wilder, “adopted mainstream and even fiscally conservative positions. He was also able to avoid discussing overtly racial issues” (Strickland and Whicker 1992, 210). For example, Wilder’s campaign theme was “the ‘New Virginia Mainstream,’” and he made law and order, drug enforcement, and his support for the death penalty a key part of his platform (Jones and Clemons 1993, 140).

While this strategy may be electorally effective, some find it normatively troubling and wonder what the implications are for the pursuit of a pro-Black political agenda. Earl Sheridan (1996), in his article, “The New Accommodationists,” implicitly likens such a strategy to Booker T. Washington’s infamous Atlanta Compromise speech when he writes that instead of lauding Black elected officials who deemphasize race to get elected, “America needs Black leaders who will continue the legacy of the 1960’s, not the 1890’s—men and women who will call for meaningful change in our society” (Sheridan 1996, 169). He fears that in an attempt to gain office by any means necessary, these officials would abandon the issues of concern to the Black community to get votes and would shortchange Black interests to stay in power (Sheridan 1996, 165, 166).

McCormick and Jones are a little less fearful of the implications of using a deracialized electoral strategy, but they, too, brace for less progressive politics as a result of the strategy. They write that “In the absence of such demands from a politically organized African American community, there is little reason to expect African American elected officials who capture office in predominantly White political jurisdictions to be in the vanguard of articulating racially-specific policy issues” (McCormick and Jones 1993, 78). That being said, they proffer that even these politicians will occasionally have to make some explicitly racial overtures to their Black constituents, lest these officials lose an important base of support in their communities (McCormick and Jones 1993, 78).

However, much of the hand wringing over the implications of deracialization as a strategy of second-wave Black politicians was short-lived. Second wave politicians experienced a number of setbacks which prevented that cohort from making a long-term impact on the communities they represented. Some setbacks were structural. Doug Wilder, for instance, was constitutionally barred from seeking a second consecutive term as Governor of Virginia. Others, such as David Dinkins, had very short tenures in office due to poor public perceptions (see Kim 2000 for an example of Dinkins’ alienation of Black constituents). However, a number of politicians in the second wave suffered electoral defeats that marked the end of their electoral pursuits. For instance, Harvey Gantt twice lost his bid to represent North Carolina in the U.S. Senate to Jesse Helms in what were racially vitriolic campaigns. Andrew Young² lost a bid to be Georgia’s Governor by wasting time campaigning for White votes in southern Georgia at the expense of campaigning in his base in and around Atlanta. Thus, according to the various authors studying the rise of second wave politicians in the late 1980s and early 1990s, deracialized candidates overestimated racial goodwill outside of the Black community and paid a high electoral price for ignoring Black voters (Z. Wilson 1993; Davis and Willingham 1993; Pierannunzi and Hutcheson 1996).

Moreover, from an academic perspective, many authors challenged the notion that pure deracialization was even going on in the first place. Mary Summers and Phillip Klinkner, for instance, argue that John Daniels did not run a deracialized campaign in his successful bid to become New Haven’s first Black mayor. They point to his progressive campaign platform, his integral role in introducing community policing to New Haven and his creation of a needle exchange program, in addition to his willingness to discuss his race...