Militant Islam

A sociology of characteristics, causes and consequences

Stephen Vertigans

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• Print ISBN: 9780415412469
• eBook ISBN: 9781134126385
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Local & Regional Planning Public Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Militant Islam provides a sociological framework for understanding the rise and character of recent Islamic militancy. It takes a systematic approach to the phenomenon and includes analysis of cases from around the world, comparisons with militancy in other religions, and their causes and consequences.

The sociological concepts and theories examined in the book include those associated with social closure, social movements, nationalism, risk, fear and 'de-civilising'. These are applied within three main themes; characteristics of militant Islam, multi-layered causes and the consequences of militancy, in particular Western reactions within the 'war on terror'. Interrelationships between religious and secular behaviour, 'terrorism' and 'counter-terrorism', popular support and opposition are explored. Through the examination of examples from across Muslim societies and communities, the analysis challenges the popular tendency to concentrate upon 'al-Qa'ida' and the Middle East.

This book will be of interest to students of Sociology, Political Science and International Relations, in particular those taking courses on Islam, religion, terrorism, political violence and related regional studies.

1 The al-Qa’ida phenomenon and beyond

Myths and realities

Introduction

In this chapter, the nature of the phenomena under investigation is established. Important characteristics associated with militancy are identified and distinctions are drawn between Muslim interpretations to help clarify precisely what is being discussed. The significance of historical events and shifts in consciousness are outlined and the roots of contemporary theological influences uncovered. The chapter concludes with an examination of popular explanations for the causes behind the resurgence of militant Islam today. In so doing, it is intended to enhance levels of understanding about the complexities behind militancy and to provide the historical and discursive framework that subsequent chapters will seek to augment.

Establishing militancy

Because of the tendencies to categorize militant Islam under the all-encompassing al-Qa’ida umbrella and to concentrate upon events in the Middle East, the extensive range of groups, activities and ideological influences could be considered surprising. Halliday (2000) points out that there is no essential Islam and this point can be extended to militancy.

Militant groups like Hizb ul-Mujahidin in Kashmir, the Filipino Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Lashkar Jihad in Indonesia, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Arakan Rohingya Nationalist Organisation in Myanmar and Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah claim to draw their guidelines for life from Islamic scriptures that are viewed as disappearing, or have disappeared, from governance. This elimination is associated with concomitant oppression, corruption, immorality, pernicious and pervasive Western discourse and the loss of territories. Religious guidelines are considered to provide the basis for conduct and judgement, for ideas and practice, understanding life and the universe and the rectification of contemporary problems facing Muslims.¹ In so doing, contemporary problems would be eradicated. Islamic concepts should therefore embrace ‘all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgement, the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam, and all the other domains of life’ (Hamas 1988). How Islam as a way of life is to be implemented is a source of considerable debate that is outlined in Chapter 4. For example, even the rules and regulations for participating in the lesser jihad, associated with Holy War in the West, differ across and within the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence.² The lesser jihad is widely associated with ‘self-defence’ of the individual and religion but what this constitutes is the source of debate that draws upon a multitude of hadiths. Marranci (2006) points out that these sources are much more open to interpretation and modification compared with the Qu’ran. And like the Bible, Torah and Hindu Vedas, within surahs (verses) in the Qu’ran, there are numerous examples of a merciful and merciless, diplomatic and warlike God. Such exegesis inconsistencies require explanations that locate the surahs within contexts and a compatible theological framework. Khosrokhavar (2005) notes when confronting apparent incompatibilities it is necessary to provide a hierarchy with some surahs acquiring priority in certain conditions. Establishing this ranking and appropriate contextualization creates additional layers of interpretation and adds to further diversity. These vicissitudes allow Muslims to draw upon different surahs in support of their positions and, in the case of militants, to justify their violent actions according to selected religious sentiments.

A violent form of jihad can be considered to be justified as a form of reactive self-defence when the nation-state or Muslim country has been invaded. But for others it may involve the threat of attack, the suppression of Muslims or denial of the shari’ah in areas where there are large numbers of Muslims or in territories that are considered to belong to Muslims, usually stemming from historical control.³ Inspirational figures like Qutb have adapted the concept, integrating political, social and individual religious aspirations, namely that social and political struggle towards an Islamic state must be an inherent feature of individual struggle towards virtue. Such interpretations can lead, as de Waal (2004: 8) suggests, to the application of transcendental logic where ‘absolute jihad obliterates the division between the right to wage war and rights within war’. Despite the long history of Muslim humanity in warfare, this form of jihad does not place emphasis upon respect for the laws of war or restraint of actions upon victims. Yet, contrary to popular perceptions, this does not mean that such militant groups are undisciplined. De Waal (ibid.) notes that if jihadis are to survive and prosper they must be able to at least match adversaries, attract support, inspire loyalty and devise and implement strategies which requires discipline. The groups under investigation in this book are engaged in what they consider to be military actions and associated attempts at proselytism that involve individuals, institutions and the media. This definition does not include groups that are considered to be radical or fundamentalist like the Tabligh movement that was formed in India in 1926 and has become prominent in diverse places like Western Europe, Algeria, Mauritania, Somalia and Southeast Asia. For the Tabligh, da’wa activities are central to achieving change through a ‘bottom up’ approach that revolves around preaching and conversion. By ‘calling’ people to the correct path and a righteous life, it is intended both to increase membership and levels of religiosity through peaceful non-political processes. In this, connection is made to Muhammed’s instruction that Muslims should learn from birth to the grave. Educationalists and the use of da’wa are central within this legacy. For such groups, processes of social change begin with individuals who spread their beliefs and practices beyond mosques into schools, factories, sport clubs and broader communities. Ultimately this approach is designed to result in the rejuvenation of the population’s morals into a pious community and ultimately the implementation of an Islamic state. This is not to argue that violent militants are opposed to da’wa. In Milestones, Qutb (1991) outlines a preference for achieving popular support for the shari’ah through proselytism. Violence was, however, to be utilized when barriers and tyranny prevented people freely embracing (his interpretations of) Islam.

Another tradition associated with fundamentalism, the salafiyya and the Saudi conservative Wahhabi, is critical of political activism tending to focus upon individual behaviour and morality. The movement has gained popularity across the Middle East into North Africa, France, Sahelian and sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Across the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood is more engaged with political activism while remaining largely peaceful and heavily involved in da’wa-related activities. There are also numerous political parties⁴ promoting Islamic discourse within democratic arrangements and attracting mass support which are often classified⁵ with more militant groups. These Muslims aim to implement change within societies through existing mainstream political processes and are derided by violent militants. For example, Gerges (2005) details how jihadis are vehemently opposed to the influential Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood is considered to have made irreligious concessions in the pursuit of political power. Yet they share some common goals and could have been allies. Indeed governments and academics often classify the two distinct factions within one category. However, for militants like al-Zawahiri, participating within the existing order is considered to be prolonging the state of kufr which is discussed in Chapter 4. In turn, non-violent Islamists have been extremely critical of the use of violence by groups associated with al-Qa’ida. For example, leaders like Mohammed Derbala and Nageh Ibrahim, of the formerly violent Egyptian group al-Jama’a al-Islamiya, have denounced the attacks on America in 2001. Zayyat (2004) has described the acts as a ‘folly’ lacking strategic clarity and foresight and which have had a detrimental impact on Islamist movements worldwide. He argues that the consequences of the attacks include the loss of many lives, networks and opportunities for political asylum in the West. In addition, the fractures within Islamism have deepened and governments have been able to repress legitimate opposition under the cover of the ‘war on terror’. Religious texts have been used to counteract attempts to theologically legitimize the actions while highlighting examples of American support for Muslim nation-states and communities that contradict bin Laden’s claim for a ‘clash of civilizations’. The indiscriminate killing of civilians including women and children and sectarian violence have caused considerable consternation amongst groups like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Tanzim al-Jihad that have split with al-Zawahiri (Gerges 2005). Mainstream Muslims, including the ulema, denounce the killing of civilians as haram, forbidden by Islam (al-Zayyat 2004). Derbala accuses the al-Qa’ida ‘hardcore’ of misusing and over-concentrating upon the ‘lesser jihad.’⁶ The result is an imbalanced approach that results in un-Islamic behaviour with a detrimental impact on the umma. Finally, Ibrahim argues, the overwhelming tendency to hold the West accountable for the multitude of problems fails to acknowledge that Muslims are also responsible. By concentrating upon the West, he argues that the militants are hindering the abilities of Muslims to readdress the problems within.⁷ But whilst these groups and parties have not been explicitly involved in the onset of violence, it will be argued in subsequent chapters that they are contributing to processes that are displacing ethnic loyalties and localized interpretations, especially Sufi traditions, which are being replaced by more radical practices and beliefs.

Contrary to popular perceptions, Islamic reformism also possesses a prominent recent history. Central reformist figures of the nineteenth century like Namik Kemal (1840–88), Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–98), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837–97) and Mohammed Abduh (1849–1905) sought to bring about change within individuals and societies that would enable Western power to be challenged. Through modernist reconstruction of Islamic civilization, it was intended to reform Muslim societies and to eradicate the cultural, intellectual and spiritual decadence that was perceived to exist within communities. Islam was to be accommodated to the requirements of modernity, which enabled the reformers to utilize Islamic concepts to justify theologically the adoption of European institutions and practices. Similar reformist tendencies could be noted in other religions at this time. For example, van der Veer (1994) discusses reformist Hindu and Sikh movements that emerged in the nineteenth centuries, aiming both to defend society against ‘foreign’ influences, principally linked with British colonialism, and to address ‘internal’ weaknesses that had resulted in a decline from a preceding ‘Golden Age’. For example, the most significant reformist nineteenth-century movement associated with Hinduism was the Arya Samaj. Its leader Swami Dayananda Saraswati wanted to return to the religion of the scriptures and to eradicate image worship, caste divisions and to change rites of passage. The Sikh reformist Singh Sabha also sought to ‘purify’ the religion and eradicate ‘Hindu’ practices. Indeed van der Veer (1994) details that their main slogan was that Sikhs were not Hindus. Clear demarcations were established between interpretations of Sikhism and Hindus and Muslims. Religious groups that followed Sikh teachings but did not accept the brotherhood were not accepted as Sikhs. At the extreme of reformism were to be the Bhindranwale group⁸ of nationalists who demanded the formation of Khalistan as a separate nation-state.

Reformers remain within Islamic debates, including most notably the former Shi’ite Iranian president (1997–2005) Mohammed Khatami and a range of ideological thinkers like Abdallah al-Hamid, Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim, Muhammed Arkoun, Hasan Hanafi, Muhammad Shahrur, Abdul Karim Soroush and Abu Zayd who personalize religion alongside popular political participation, seeking to integrate the central tenets of the religion with compatible components of modernity. Overall though there has been a shift from the modernist reformism, that became noticeable under Abduh’s successor Rashid Rida (1865–1935) who placed greater emphasis upon resistance and anti-Westernism and brought the movement closer to developments within Wahhabism in the newly formed Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Similar transmutations towards enhanced militant fervour can be noticed, to differing degrees, across Muslim societies and communities.

Discursive and historical influences within militancy

The immediate roots of transnational violent militancy can be traced back to the declaration issued by bin Laden in 1996. In the ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places’, growing doubts about the potential of local jihads were expressed and Muslims were informed that they should kill Americans, including civilians, anywhere in the world. From this point, a broader strategy became conspicuous. The declaration outlines the expanding focus upon the main enemy and in particular the requirement to expel the Americans from Saudi Arabia. ‘People of Islam should join forces and support each other to get rid of the main kufr who is controlling the countries of the Islamic world’ (bin Laden 1996). Bin Laden cites Ibn Taymiyya in support of the approach being taken, that ‘to fight in defence of religion and Belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after Belief than fighting the enemy who is corrupting the life and the religion’ (ibid.). At this stage though, the emphasis is still upon jihad as a defensive mechanism.

In 1998, the fatwa by the World Islamic Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders changed this and jihad became globally aggressive, taking the fight to the ‘far enemy’. Burke (2006) suggests that bin Laden acknowledged that attempts during the 1990s to rouse support for militancy on a nation-by-nation basis had failed. By transferring attention to a common enemy, it was hoped that allegiances could be established to overcome the parochialism that was apparent within militancy. It was at this stage in al-Qa’ida’s development that the instruction was formulated ‘to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it’ (bin Laden 1998a). By declaring the fatwa, the militants sought to mobilize and unite opposition around militancy and against the West. In this and subsequent announcements, bin Laden incorporated historical and contemporary events and images. In a manner recognizable in Huntington’s (1998) thesis, a ‘clash of civilizations’ is portrayed of two religions in long-standing conflict. The West is considered to have caused death and misery in places like Palestine, Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir. Global jihad had been declared the individual obligation of all true Muslims and was to become increasingly noticeable from this point. Shortly afterwards, on the eighth anniversary of King Fahd’s invitation to American troops to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraq, US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were destroyed and, in 2000, the USS Cole was attacked at Aden. In September 2001, the global jihad was taken into America.

Clearly events since the 1998 declaration have been fundamentally significant. But concentrating on related groups’ activities will not enable the appeal or timeliness of militancy to be understood or fully explained. To help achieve this, a broader account is required that illuminates sources of inspiration, legitimacy and justification. These are rooted in a range of discursive sources and historical events, and, as the following chapters explore in greater detail, the actions of national governments and the failures of localized militant groups. Contemporary ideological influences are drawn historically from the ‘Golden Age’ of the four caliphs, Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and more recently across Muslim societies. This is clearly noticeable within Qutbian discourse that emanated from the Egyptian militant Sayyid Qutb (1906–66). Qutb had been influenced by earlier figures like the Madhi of Sudan, Umar al-Mukhtar and Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis and Abul Al-Mawdudi (1903–79) from the Indian subcontinent. All have become embedded to varying degrees in the synthesis within militancy. Groups draw upon the origins of Islam stemming from the revelations to Prophet Muhammed (670–732 AD) and the successful expansion of the religion from a small region, in what is now in Saudi Arabia, to cover large parts of Asia, Africa and Europe. Images of the global umma united in piety and devotion, governed by righteous leaders who implemented the shari’ah, originate from this period. Zayyat (2004: xiii) reflects popular sentiments within militancy when arguing that leadership during this period was ‘guided by a prophetic understanding of divine justice, which enabled the wealth and greatness of the Islamic empire to emerge … in the time of jahiliyya (… ignorance). … Political rule by Islamic shari’a’ is the only guarantor of prosperity and harmony on earth, and paradise after death.’ The extent that this period of uniformity and purity actually existed amongst diverse religious and political practices and institutions across Muslim societies is a source of theological and historical debate.⁹ From the militants’ perspective, the emergence, implementation and success of Islam were factual and are the basis for the demand that the shari’ah should be reintroduced as a ‘Golden Age’ for the contemporary era. How, where and what exactly this will entail is a source of considerable debate within and between groups and is influenced by earlier responses to challenges facing Muslims. For example, inspiration is found within Ibn Taymiyya’s reactions to ‘impure’ Muslim Mongol rulers. Ibn Taymiyya declared that rulers’ refusal to implement the shari’ah meant that they were apostates and as such were legitimate targets to be eradicated in a top-down approach. By comparison, other influential figures like Muhammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703/4–92) focussed on the purification of Muslims’ behaviour who he felt had internalized heretical practices associated with Sufism which needed to be removed, if necessary, through violence. Reactions against foreign rulers can be noticed in Hasan al-Banna’s (1906–49) campaign in Egypt against the British occupiers while Qutb initiated the two pronged approach against local rulers and the international ‘Jewish Crusaders’. These influences share a belief that the individual is subordinated to the collective identity associated with their religious interpretations. Other discourses have also been incorporated to differing degrees within conceptual and strategic development. Burke (2006) details some of the similarities between militant Islam and conversely both Marxism and fascism from the first half of the twentieth century. Qutb adapted the anarchists’ role of the vanguard which has been further developed by groups associated with al-Qa’ida, alongside the classical anarchist tactic of propaganda by deed. The dialectical perceptions of history and the role of immutable texts have been instrumental within bin Laden’s and Marxist rhetoric. With fascism, the militant Muslims have shared strong leadership, anti-Semitism, traditions of martyrdom and emphasis on morality and a purified, mythical past. As the following chapter explores, militant Islamic groups lack the complete originality with which they are attributed by Western commentators and governments.

In addition to ideological legacies, Abu-Rabi’ (2004) points out that there have been distinct types of militancy associated with pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. Therefore, militancy is not new and preceding phases of mili...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The al-Qa’ida phenomenon and beyond: myths and realities
• 2 Militant Islam in local, national and transnational networks
• 3 Reinterpreting the umma: Islamic nationalism and transnationalism
• 4 Social closure and takfir: the interrelationship between secular and militant ‘switchmen’
• 5 Challenging the risk society: contextualizing the impact of ‘Islamic’ terrorism
• 6 Reacting to the militant risk: decivilizing in the name of civilization?
• 7 Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography