Strategic Partnerships in Asia

Balancing without alliances

Vidya Nadkarni

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN: 9780415777742
• eBook ISBN: 9781135265243
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the nature and implications of the increasing interaction among three secondary powers in the world: China, Russia and India. It provides an in-depth analysis of the complex and often contradictory goals underlying their emerging strategic partnerships along with an assessment of the role these partnerships play in the larger regional and global contexts. In particular, it focuses on the important region of Asia/Eurasia, where these countries seek to increase their influence and compete against the prominence of the United States.

Breaking new ground in looking at the ways in which the triad of bilateral strategic partnerships affect the countries' individual aspirations for power, status and wealth, this book argues that their attempt to develop codified, formal bilateral partnerships and trilateral ties that seek to neither antagonise nor fully embrace each other is both a challenge to peace and security and an opportunity for cooperation. It concludes by suggesting scenarios under which competitive or cooperative economic and security orders may emerge.

Clearly written and thoroughly accessible, this book will be an informative text for courses on international relations, international security, foreign policy and Asian and Russian politics.

1
Unipolarity and its implications for Asian/Eurasian security

The role of China looms large in academic and public debates over the feared waning of Pax Americana (Shaplen and Laney 2007; Cha 2007). Barring cataclysmic domestic political upheavals in that country, were its current economic growth rates averaging 10 percent annually to continue together with its ambitious military modernization programs, China would be poised to become a formidable power by the middle of the twenty-first century. If the European theater represented the central battleground of ideologies and armies during the Cold War, the vast Asian continent will be the scene of an intense struggle for influence over its future as the twenty-first century unfolds.

Asia’s other giant, India, will most certainly join this struggle. Trailing China’s program of economic liberalization by over a decade, India’s economic profile improved noticeably by the end of the twentieth century. In his analysis of India’s reforms, James Manor cites a Goldman Sachs projection that India, by mid-century, will not only be a major contender in world affairs but will also be the world’s third largest economy, behind the United States and China (2005: 97). Since joining the ranks of nuclear weapons states in 1998, India has doggedly pursued an overall enhancement of its military might and has emerged as the principal regional power in South Asia. The course of the relationship between India and China will have significant implications for the nature of the evolving security order(s) in Asia.

With a large footprint in Central Asia and a geographic presence in the northeast of that continent, Russia, by virtue of its size, resources, and considerable military power, cannot be overlooked as an important player in that part of the world. Since 1993, Russia has invested heavily in simultaneously engaging India and China and in promoting a stronger tripartite relationship among them. Moreover, Russia’s interest in reprising its influence in Eurasia extends the unsettled security frontiers of Asia into the eastern fringes of Europe. Flush with revenues from the sale of oil and gas and a devaluation of the ruble following the financial collapse of 1998, Russia’s economic prospects have improved and the country is once more asserting its power as a major claimant for influence in Eurasia and Asia (Perkovic 2006).

The march of developments in Asia and Eurasia is of immediate, even urgent, relevance to the United States, which as the reigning global power is the only extra-regional state with the reach and the capabilities for influencing the direction of outcomes in both the Asian and Eurasian theaters. But unipolarity notwithstanding, American preferences alone will under-determine regional outcomes. The roles played by secondary powers like China, India, and Russia will also be consequential for the nature of emerging security orders in Asia and Eurasia.

This chapter addresses four questions: (1) In a unipolar world, how can the nature of US power and influence in Asia and Eurasia best be characterized? (2) What insights may we draw from major international relations theories on the durability and impact of America’s preeminent power? (3) How can we isolate the impact of systemic imperatives from regional and domestic variables in explaining regional security dynamics? (4) Why is a focus on China, India, and Russia warranted in a study of Asian and Eurasian security futures?

The argument proceeds as follows: China, India, and Russia are large nuclear weapons states, which are seeking to actualize explicitly stated aspirations for great power status under the long shadow of US preeminence. All three countries lie outside US-sponsored security systems: China and India are not part of the US network of bilateral security alliances in Asia; and Russia is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the preeminent global power, the US quest for continued influence in Asia and Eurasia collides with mutually competing Chinese, Indian, and Russian ambitions for status and influence, vastly complicating the security landscapes in these regions. The theories of realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, drawing on divergent notions of “order,” if deployed only at the global level, offer partial insights into this unfolding security dynamic. A more complete explanation requires the inclusion of domestic and regional variables.

Unipolarity, hegemony, and imperialism

Polarity is a structural concept representing concentration(s) of power or pole(s) in the international system. Scholars who characterize the post-Cold War world as unipolar draw upon evidence of the overwhelming preponderance of American material capabilities. Polarity represents an important explanatory variable for structural realists, who argue that systemic anarchy, which is a constant feature of international politics, elevates the significance of changing power distributions among states in explaining international outcomes, such as the likelihood of wars and patterns of alliance formation.¹ The translation of capabilities into influence, however, is contingent upon the will of the powerful state(s) to join resources to the goal of power projection. The resulting unequal relationships between a major power and subordinate states are either hegemonic or imperialistic.

In the vocabulary of international relations, the exercise of hegemony and imperialism are seen to require the application of hard power by preponderant states to influence the conduct of subordinate states. Imperialism, in addition, almost always includes the facet of coercion; but as John Agnew has pointed out, even imperialist orders are not sustainable in the long term unless there is at least a minimal element of acquiescence from subject peoples (2003: 876). A hegemonic order, on the other hand, relies more on co-optation through the provision of material and security benefits; but it can also entail the use of force.

In developing a typology of relationships between a preponderant state and subordinate states, Hedley Bull offers three alternatives: dominance, hegemony, or primacy (1977: 207–12). A dominant relationship involves tight and pervasive control over subordinate states, with no respect for international norms or international law. In a hegemonic order, the preponderant state exercises looser control and generally abides by most norms of international law but does not completely abandon the resort to armed coercion to keep the internal and external orientations of the subordinate states in line with its preferences. In a relationship of primacy, the preponderant power eschews the threat or use of force in its relationships with the subordinate states and uses traditional diplomatic methods for exercising influence.²

Mark Kramer uses Bull’s typology to examine the ties between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the Cold War and argues that this relationship evolved from one of dominance under Stalin to one of hegemony after Stalin’s death, but did not make a successful transition to primacy, which might have made Soviet influence more durable (1996). Defining a sphere of influence as a “region of the world in which a preponderant external actor (state A) is able to compel the local states to conform with state A’s own preferences,” Kramer argues that only a dominant or a hegemonic order may be “truly regarded as descriptive of a ‘sphere of influence’” (1996: 99). In general, then, hegemony implies a concerted, and sometimes coercive, effort by a predominant state to impose its preferences upon subordinate states and maintain a security order by dint of its capabilities and the reach of its influence. Based on the criteria specified by Bull for dominance, hegemony, and primacy, one may posit the US relationship with Western Europe during the Cold War as one of primacy, while characterizing its relationship with Central and Latin American countries as one of hegemony.

According to John Ikenberry, hegemonic orders may run the gamut from coercive (approximating Bull’s characterization of dominance) to those based on some congruence of interests (roughly equivalent to Bull’s concept of hegemony), to those that are institutionalized (Bull’s notion of primacy comes close to this form, although Bull does not incorporate the notion of an institutionalized order within his definition) (Ikenberry 2002b: 9–10).³ Thus, liberals like Ikenberry can tellingly contrast coercive Soviet hegemony with an institutionalized, benign, and liberal American hegemony during the Cold War. Further, Ikenberry states that since imperialist orders almost always imply some degree of coercion, a coercive hegemony is in effect an “informal imperial order” (2002b: 9–10). Since dominant states tend to infuse hegemonic projects with their values, priorities, and purposes, Ikenberry argues that the characteristics of American hegemony in Europe (Bull, as noted earlier, would characterize this situation as one of primacy) emerged through an interactive process involving the push and pull of various interests and compromises reached on differing policy positions adopted by decision makers on both sides of the Atlantic.

Ikenberry notes that for the states in Western Europe during the Cold War, the enduring value of American “hegemony” rested as much in its insurance against the Soviet threat as in its liberal underpinnings. America’s post-World War II European project represented not only an “empire by invitation” (Lundestad 1986) but an “imperium,” the characteristics of which were influenced and, to a large extent, shaped by the target countries. US disengagement from Western Europe immediately after the end of the Second World War had to be reversed in the face of twin concerns: first, of a predatory Soviet Union; and second, of an economically devastated European landscape and a war-ravaged population susceptible to the promises of economic deliverance that were at the core of the party platforms of the socialists and communists—a circumstance that the Soviet Union might well have been able to exploit to its advantage.

These concerns allowed France, Germany, and Britain, in particular, to influence the nature of America’s European involvement after the end of the Second World War. In Ikenberry’s view, not only did the initial US-supported project of fostering a postwar multilateral economic order anchored in principles calling for a liberalizing of trade and financial relations have to be abandoned in the face of political and economic realities in Europe; but US designs for creating a European “Third Force” to provide an independent base of power also had to be modified to allow instead for a direct American security presence. Economically, the United States, in response to European pressure, had to settle for a program favoring welfare goals and a strong role for the state, substituting “embedded liberalism” in place of liberal multilateralism (2005). Thus, the nature of America’s role in Europe during the Cold War was not a function merely of US preferences but was largely shaped by the desires of its European allies.

While the Cold War American project in Europe ultimately bequeathed an enduring and institutionalized security order in the shape of the transatlantic pluralistic security community, the same was not true in Asia, where important bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan underpinned the US-sponsored security order. Following the failure to create multilateral security arrangements in Asia as it had in Europe, the United States in the post-Cold War period has been generally unsupportive of multilateral initiatives in Asia floated by states in the region. For instance, Washington “resisted” a Japanese proposal to alleviate the economic difficulties of its Asian economic partners by routing expanded financial help through the Asian Development Bank (Ikenberry 2003a: 10–11).

Michael Mastanduno has aptly characterized American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific as an “incomplete hegemony,” because while the United States “has played a key role in managing and defusing regional crises” and “promoting economic liberalization in the region,” it has “proved unable to foster any fundamental resolution of those crises or to address their underlying causes”. Mastanduno sees the primary American challenge in Asia as resting in its inability thus far to induct China and India into the US-centered order, as it has Japan (2002: 183). One may also add that the inability to integrate Russia in a Eurasian security order represents an equally weighty challenge for the United States and Europe. In the Asian/Eurasian regions, the reach of American power is long and its presence is vital, but its hold is not entirely secure.

For the purposes of this study, we will draw on elements of the concept of hegemony as used by Bull and on attributes of Ikenberry’s second hegemonic order. This will not only allow us to understand the nature of the relationship in Asia/Eurasia between the United States and secondary powers in a unipolar world, but also to examine the role of regional dynamics in shaping regional outcomes, since the United States is unable to control fully the flow of regional developments and the actions of major regional powers. American hegemony in the Asian/Eurasian regions is neither purely coercive nor deeply institutionalized, but presupposes the existence of some congruence of interests between the preponderant power on the one hand and secondary and subordinate states on the other. This approach relies to a considerable degree on co-optation of states in the region through the provision of economic and security benefits, rather than simply on coercion; on a general regard for international law and international norms; on specified conditions for resort to violence; and on the exercise of diplomacy in bilateral and multilateral contexts to further American interests and American preferences.

Thus far, the primary goals of the United States in Asia/Eurasia have been and continue to be to stymie the rise of any regional hegemonic power capable of supplanting American influence, and to ensure the continued indispensability of American presence in the region. From the perspective of the United States, the ideal post-Cold War American project in Asia would be to transform its hegemony into a self-perpetuating institutionalized security order, but there are significant obstacles to the realization of such an outcome. American hegemony is neither unquestioned over the vast Asian/Eurasian expanse by China, Russia, and India, nor is it confronted frontally by these countries. The choice of a “middle course” may be explained by two factors: first, because the highly asymmetrical power imbalances between the preponderant state and the secondary powers render the success of direct challenges improbable; and second, because secondary powers have to factor the views of other Asian/Eurasian states into their calculus, especially when such states have welcomed American involvement on the continent for economic and security reasons. On the latter point, as Ikenberry and Inoguchi have pointed out, the Asian hegemonic order established by the United States is attractive to many states because it has played a stabilizing role in the region, managed relations among allies, and promoted an open regional and global economy (Ikenberry 2007: 8–9).

The glaring asymmetries in major dimensions of military and economic power between the United States and its nearest potential challengers in Europe and Asia have been well documented by recent scholarship and have been noted alike by journalists and policy makers. Zbigniew Brzezinski has called the United States “the first and only truly global power” (1997: 10). Joseph Nye has declared that “[n]ot since Rome has one nation loomed so large above all the others” (2002: 1). Former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine referred to the United States as a “hyperpower” (Boniface 2002: 108). Wu Xinbo somewhat hyperbolically observed that “[a]s we move into the twenty-first century, the magic of globalization and the information age has rendered US influence omnipresent on the earth” (2002: 3). The editors of the Economist likened the United States to a colossus bestriding the globe (Economist 1999: 15). William Wohlforth has convincingly demonstrated that American power is unprecedented and American unipolarity unlikely soon to be overturned (1999). Scholarly debates over the future contours of the interstate system have thus centered on the meaning, durability, and implications of American global preeminence.

Each of these debates has produced a rich tapestry of interwoven questions. Does global preponderance confer upon the United States an unbounded capability to reshape the world in accordance with American priorities? Since the preferences of secondary powers are likely to collide with those of the United States at least some of the time, what if any are the limits to American power and influence? Is US preeminence likely to wax or wane depending upon American strategies? In other words, is the durability of American power capability-dependent, strategy-driven, or does it rest on a shifting combination of capability and strategy? What strategies are secondary powers likely to employ either in deference to or in an attempt to undermine American power? Will American preeminence set the stage for the creation of regional orders in which the logic of cooperation trumps the logic of conflict and violence, or are conflict-ridden revisionist attempts more likely to occur as American power wanes? What role will regional dynamics play in the shaping of regional outcomes? If regional dynamics are an important variable, how will the United States, through the strategic or tactical manipulation of its resources and allies, be able to affect the play of regional forces?

Far from being self-evident, the answers to these questions yield multiple scenarios when refracted through the prisms of realist, liberal, and construc...

Table of contents

• Contents
• Tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Unipolarity and its implications for Asian/Eurasian security
• 2 Strategic partnerships in Asia and Eurasia
• 3 The Sino-Russian partnership
• 4 The Indo-Russian partnership
• 5 The Sino-Indian partnership
• 6 Geopolitics and geoeconomics
• 7 Prospects for multilateralism in Asia/Eurasia
• 8 What does the future hold?
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index