Irish Political Studies Reader

Key Contributions

Conor McGrath, Eoin O'Malley

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• Print ISBN: 9780415446471
• eBook ISBN: 9781134064366
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This is an introduction to the best available scholarship within Irish politics, featuring the most influential and significant articles which have been published on Irish politics during the past twenty years.

Each article is accompanied by a new commentary by another leading scholar which addresses the impact and contribution of the article and discusses how its themes remain crucial today. The book covers all the most important topics within Irish politics including political culture and traditions, political institutions and parties and the peace process.

The combination of the best original scholarship and contemporary commentaries on the core political issues makes Irish Political Studies Reader an invaluable resource for all students and scholars of Irish politics.

1 Introduction

Politics in Ireland, 1982—2007

Eoin O’Malley and Conor McGrath

Twenty-five years ago, when the Political Studies Association of Ireland (PSAI) was established, a book was published which sought to reflect the changes Ireland had undergone in the previous 25 years. Despite having just suffered a depression, the (very) late 1950s had been a time of hope in the Republic of Ireland — not least because of the Whitaker Report which promised to open up Ireland to external economic forces. However by 1982 the introduction of that book, intriguingly titled Unequal Achievement, painted a bleak picture:

The Irish economy is in recession. Unemployment is rising and the social problems which follow from economic stagnation are growing. Despondency seems to be on the increase, as though the intractability of our problems had at last sapped our will to solve them.

(Litton, 1982, p. ix)

As well as the stagnation of the Republic’s economy, the other great intractable problem on the island — the inter-communal dispute in Northern Ireland — was going through one of its severest tests. It had just witnessed the hunger strikes and the upsurge in violence and social unrest associated with them. A solution to the Northern Ireland problem seemed further away than ever; indeed it was common to cite Richard Rose’s (1976, p. 139) devastating conclusion that, ‘The problem is that there is no solution’. In the last 25 years, since 1982, hopelessness, depression, stagnation and violence have largely given way to self-confidence, economic boom, vibrancy and political progress. In 2007 the island of Ireland is a different place — one worthy of Hartley’s phrase ‘the past is another country, they do things differently there’. In some respects the Ireland of 2007 is infinitely better than the Ireland of 1982, in others perhaps worse; it is, however, unarguably different.

Economy

By the end of the twentieth century the Republic of Ireland had transformed itself from the ‘poor man of Europe’ to one of its leading lights. The extent to which this wealth is real or illusory is debatable — much of the growth is based on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from multinational companies and an unsustainable property and construction boom — but that Ireland has been transformed following years of economic growth is clear. Ireland’s unemployment rate hovered at about four per cent for much of the 2000s (down from 18 per cent in 1987), a position of effective full employment. Ireland’s per capita Gross Domestic Product was among the highest in the European Union (EU).

How this happened is the subject of debate but a number of contributing factors can be identified. Ireland opened itself up to foreign investment, offering low corporation tax rates and comparatively liberal labour markets. This relieved it of its dependence on trade with Britain and on agricultural produce. Ireland ‘bet’ on developing a specialisation in information technology, which happened to be the major growth industry in the 1990s. It can be argued that demographic and social factors helped. Ireland had a much younger population than many places in Western Europe and because of a series of decisions in the 1960s to invest in education, these people were now reasonably well educated for the labour market. That these people were English-speaking and culturally close to the U.S. — the major source of FDI — may have helped. Ireland also benefited from pump-priming from the EU which invested heavily in Ireland’s infrastructure. Ireland’s system of ‘social partnership’ may also have given stability to previously fractious industrial relations, enabling further investment. A series of public expenditure cuts from the late 1980s designed to get the public finances under control probably gave more confidence to business to invest, as did a series of measures which both liberalised the economy and offered stability to investors (for instance, membership of the European Monetary Union). Another factor which is difficult to measure but clear anecdotally is the development of an entrepreneurial culture to an extent not previously seen in Ireland. None of these factors alone could account for the unprecedented economic growth. For instance, Ireland’s demographic make-up could have led to greater emigration as it had in the past. But what is certain is that Ireland’s depressions and boom were related to public policy and ultimately political choices (see Garvin, 2004; and Girvin in this volume). Less certain is whether the Republic of Ireland will be able to hold on to these gains over the next 25 years in the face of rising house prices and wages, competition from developing economies in Asia and Eastern Europe, a continued reluctance by the state to divest itself of direct ownership in a host of industries, and an infrastructure system which is clearly much improved but still with substantial room for further development. Explaining these developments adequately will thus be an important research question for social scientists.

The Northern Ireland economy, once one of the most vibrant industrial centres in the world, suffered from stagnant unionist rule, its being tied to the relatively declining British economy and then the violence of the Troubles, which meant that little inward investment could take place. The economy became, and remains, dependent on transfers from Britain, which account for 20 per cent of economic product, and the public sector as a whole accounts for about 60 per cent of activity in the Northern Irish economy, much higher than either Britain or the Republic. Still there has been a ‘peace dividend’ and a dividend from its proximity to the Republic. By 2007 Northern Ireland’s growth rates were higher than Britain’s or the Republic’s, and house prices there were rising faster than in most of the United Kingdom, leading many to hope that it could eventually emulate its southern neighbour.

As a result of these developments the physical differences between north and south narrowed significantly. In the 1980s the Republic of Ireland’s roads were the subject of ridicule. A cartoon by Martyn Turner in the Irish Times contrasted ‘Dear, old Ireland’ with ‘Cheap, new Northern Ireland’. The physical difference on crossing the then heavily fortified border was marked. Northern Ireland had a well-built road network and well maintained public spaces. The Republic’s road network has improved since then and the physical changes in the countryside reflect the country’s economic growth if not taste. However, the countryside in the Republic is blighted by ribbon development along the roads of Ireland with incongruous mansions in many places. The cities have seen poorly built apartment blocks already in decay and at risk of becoming ghettoes of the poor. Out-of-town shopping centres, already common in Northern Ireland, have thrived at a cost to city centres which have been neglected up until recently. These decisions resulted in increasing traffic problems and are not helped by poor public transport networks. Many of the planning decisions which allowed this type of development we now know (thanks to the work of various tribunals of inquiry set up to investigate certain payments to politicians and planning decisions) to have been taken as a result of political corruption. Again we see the primacy of politics.

Political or 'peace' process

At the time the Political Studies Association of Ireland was being formed in 1982, the Troubles were (with the benefit of hindsight) just about at their mid-point. It is difficult to exaggerate the toll they exerted — in lives taken and lives ruined, in economic terms, in inter-group relations. One account provides a reckoning of the murder rate as around one in every 400 people in Northern Ireland, and conflates this as being equivalent to 150,000 and 600,000 killings in Britain and the United States respectively, while further noting that by comparison 52,000 U.S. soldiers died in Vietnam and total US military casualties in World War II were 274,000 (Smith, 2002, p. 21; also see the remarkable book by McKittrick et al, 2004). On whatever measurement and by any standard, the violence in Northern Ireland was enormously destructive.

The course of the violence and of the rather intermittent and sporadic efforts at political progress have been well charted by now (Bell, 1993; Bew and Gillespie, 1999; Bloomfield, 1998; Cunningham, 2001; Elliott and Flackes, 1999; Prior, 1986; Rees, 1985; Taylor, 1997, 1999 and 2001; Thatcher, 1993). So too has the more substantial political momentum which has been achieved in the second half of the Troubles and since, much of the material coming from the first-hand perspective of insiders (Adams, 2003; Cox et al, 2000; de Bréadún, 2001; Finlay, 1998; Godson, 2004; Major, 1999; Mallie and McKittrick, 2001; Mitchell, 1999; Mowlam, 2002; Needham, 1999; Rafter, 2002; Tonge, 2005; Wilford, 2001).

The economies of both Northern Ireland and the Republic have both benefited from the stable peace achieved in Northern Ireland. Ireland no longer instinctively evokes images of car bombs. In the 1980s a solution to the conflict seemed a long way off; the hunger strikes had radicalised a new group of nationalists, and unionists balked at the possibility of interference from Dublin through institutions set up by the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The ongoing process towards a normalised political framework for the rule of Northern Ireland started in the late 1980s with secret meetings between the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin leaders, John Hume and Gerry Adams. It was helped by the increased contact and subsequently improved relations between the two governments. By the early 1990s the Provisional movement — both the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin — made conciliatory gestures in the form of ceasefires and the British and Irish governments engaged fully and, more importantly, publicly with Sinn Féin. The major Agreement signed in Belfast in 1998 between the then largest unionist party, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and the two nationalist parties as well as a host of smaller parties took the form of a sectarian Executive and Assembly which would through a series of mechanisms govern many aspects of Northern Ireland. It included other institutions such as the North–South Ministerial Conference which would attempt to make policy in a small number of areas on an all-island basis, a British–Irish Inter-governmental Conference and a British–Irish Council. By 2007 the Executive and Assembly had been in suspension rather than operation for most of the period, and while functioning had exhibited little success in governing. However, the two most (British and Irish) nationalist parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin, also became the largest parties and their electoral success made each secure enough to make significant concessions. The IRA decommissioned its weapons and Sinn Féin agreed to support the police force, while the DUP — once opposed to the Agreement — signalled its willingness to go into government with Sinn Féin.

While progress has been and is being made, it remains to be seen whether Northern Irish politics can be fundamentally transformed. The two moderate partners at the centre of the Good Friday Agreement — the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP — have both lost ground since the Agreement was signed. Even they were unable to work entirely harmoniously together while in office. How the DUP and Sinn Féin will meet this challenge is as yet unknown, but it is undoubtedly a problematic relationship. While power-sharing has long been regarded, for understandable historical reasons, as a ‘good thing’, it may be difficult for politics in Northern Ireland to make the transition from a sectarian, constitutional, focus to a discourse and electoral competition based primarily on socio-economic or ideological priorities until such time as the system — and the people — can come to terms with a more traditional form of government. The existence of a single-party government, or of a multi-party voluntary coalition, exercising power through collective responsibility, with a clearly-defined and significant grouping of opposition parties offering both legislative oversight and electoral choices, are all still some way off for Northern Ireland. It is, though, clear in 2007 that while the process to a long-term political settlement is ongoing, the comparative peace and stability being experienced in Northern Ireland makes it a radically different place.

Attitudes in the Republic apparently also changed. Many in the Republic had been actively hostile to Britain, and it could be plausibly argued that opinions on the approach towards Britain and the ‘Northern Problem’ formed the basis of the major political division in the Republic. The importance of nationalism is still evident but survey evidence shows that by 2003 young people in the Republic felt much closer to people in Britain than to those in Northern Ireland (British Council Ireland, 2003). This, coupled with Northern Ireland’s addiction to London’s tax revenue, perhaps makes the likelihood of a united Ireland much less. Indeed, it is at least arguable that the population of the Republic of Ireland would never have voted in favour of a united Ireland had that been a realistic possibility over the last 30 years, given the common ignorance and fear which many felt towards Northern Ireland then, and moreover that they would not now be prepared to vote for unification on the basis that its economic costs could imperil the Republic’s relative prosperity. There is a real sense in which the Troubles were fuelled by a feeling on all sides of being unwanted — unionists often perceiving the United Kingdom as being only too willing to be rid of Northern Ireland if it could, and nationalists/republicans perceiving that the Republic was willing to abandon them if support came with a tangible price-tag.

Social and demographic changes

In 1982 Ireland was a country of emigration. Later, the continuing high emigration throughout the 1980s was excused by one minister, Brian Lenihan, who exclaimed in a U.S. magazine that ‘after all we can’t all live on a small island’ (Newsweek, 19 October 1987). By 2007 ten per cent of the Irish population was foreign born, up from negligible levels in the 1980s. Immigration rates are among the highest in Europe. This has led to a physical change in Irish society. Most towns and villages have significant non-Irish populations, and most school children are in schools with children of many other nationalities. These changes will undoubtedly have an impact on social attitudes in the coming decades — and indeed signs of a degree of racism are becoming evident for the first time in Ireland, both north and south. Predic...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction Politics in Ireland, 1982—2007
• Part One Political culture and traditions
• Part Two Electoral politics and political institutions
• Index