Genocidal Crimes

Alex Alvarez

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781134035809
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Jura
• Subtopic: Völkerrecht

Genocide has emerged as one of the leading problems of the twentieth century. No corner of the world seems immune from this form of collective violence. While many individuals are familiar with the term, few people have a clear understanding of what genocide is and how it is carried out. This book clearly discusses the concept of genocide and dispels the widely held misconceptions about how these crimes occur and the mechanisms necessary for its perpetration.

Genocidal Crimes differs from much of the writing on the subject in that it explicitly relies upon the criminological literature to explain the nature and functioning of genocide. Criminology, with its focus on various types of criminality and violence, has much to offer in terms of explaining the origins, dynamics, and facilitators of this particular form of collective violence. Through application of a number of criminological theories to various elements of genocide Alex Alvarez presents a comprehensive analysis of this particular crime. These criminological perspectives are underpinned by a variety of psychological, sociological, and political science based insights in order to present a more complete discussion of the nature and functioning of genocide.

1
DEFINING A CRIME

From its inception, then, genocide has been an empirical, moral, legal, and political concept. To one person, “genocide” means evil and demands preventive or punitive action by a government; to another, “genocide” carries a circumscribed juridical meaning, while to still others it designates a specific type of mass violence.

Scott Straus¹

Genocide is the supreme crime!

Kenneth J. Campbell²

Genocide. Few words seem to be able to evoke such an immediate and emotional response as this simple word. Yet, for all of its power and ability to elicit outrage and condemnation, it is a term that is much misunderstood and often misapplied. Defined as a crime under international law since 1948, it has only gained wide currency in recent years and come into fairly common usage. But what exactly is it? Given its ubiquity, defining genocide is surprisingly difficult. We shouldn’t be surprised at this, however, since describing any phenomenon as complex, as varied, and as changeable as genocide is ultimately very problematic. Think of it this wa. A definition is supposed to describe something in order to provide a clear picture of the object being studied. In many ways it provides a snapshot of a phenomenon that tells people what the thing “looks like.” A good definition should clearly illustrate what fits and, importantly, what does not fit. Yet social phenomena are rarely if ever so clear-cut and easily captured by a few brief sentences. Genocide is no exception to this rule. Thee are a number of specific reasons why genocide is a difficult concept to define.

DEFINITIONAL DIFFICULTIES

First, genocide is not a unitary phenomenon. Instead, we need to recognize that it encompasses a great many different kinds of behaviors done for various motivations. When most people envision genocide, they tend to think of the gas chambers of the Holocaust or perhaps the mass shootings that preceded them. This is a natural eaction since the Holocaust remains the most well-known example of genocide. But this is an incomplete picture since genocide can also include many other forms of both direct and indirect violence. Genocide has been perpetrated not only with gas, guns, machetes, clubs, and similar kinds of weapons, but also through less direct methods that include disease, malnutrition and starvation, forced sterilization, dislocation and displacement, and rape.³ As the political scientist Martin Shaw points out, “Genocide involves mass killing but it is much more than mass killing.”⁴ Similarly, when we examine the motives for genocide we also see a tremendous amount of diversity. Helen Fein, for example, a sociologist and a leading genocide scholar suggests four primary types of motivation.⁵ The first is deelopmental genocide in which a state intends to remove a population that is seen as being in the way of the colonization and/or economic exploitation of a region. Despotic genocide, on the other hand, refers to situations in which a government relies on genocide in order to remove rivals for political power. Ideological genocide concerns those genocides perpetrated because of a belief system. The last type, etributive genocides are ones committed during one group’s struggle for political and/ or social power against another group. This ariety of both motivation and method of destruction is one reason why it is difficult to capture the meaning of genocide within any single definition.

Second, genocide is often evolutionary. That is, genocides can and often do change as the policies of destruction progress. Genocide is not static; rather, it is a process and, like all processes, it can and does change to fit evolving circumstances. If we examine the Holocaust, for example, we see that it first involved mass shootings with Special Action Groups or Einsatzgruppen following along behind the German army as it advanced eastward through the Soviet Union. These units would ound up and then shoot any Jews and Soviet officials they were able to capture.⁶ This method, however, was soon deemed too inefficient and slow, as well as causing too much psychological distress to the perpetrators, so the Nazis moved to the more impersonal and more effective use of gas chambers, which were used to such lethal effect in places such as Auschwitz, Sobibor, and Treblinka.⁷ In fact, all of the Nazi policies toward the Jews from the 1930s onward exhibited a similar process of change as experience and situational dynamics dictated. Similarly, both the Armenian and the Cambodian genocides evolved over time as needs, experiences, and perceptions changed. Sometimes these developments might be drastic and involve a decisive change in methodology and strategy while other times they simply reflect a change of emphasis. Over time, for example, as the Khmer Rouge government sought to eliminate enemies, the focus increasingly turned from external to internal foes. Whereas the first targets came from various minority groups and those perceived to be tainted by the previous government and western ideas, towards the end many of the victims were themselves Khmer Rouge soldiers and administrators.⁸ The old adage that eery revolution eats its young certainly applied in this case. Not all genocides, however, exhibit this same level of progression. The Rwandan genocide, for example, follwed pretty much the same tactics throughout its short 90-day span. But the Rwandan genocide was remarkably brief and most genocides tend to last a good deal longer and are therefore more likely to evolve. Even with the case of Rwanda, however, the genocide was not perpetrated uniformly. Scott Straus’s analysis reveals that at the local level there were important differences in the implementation, speed, and lethality of the violence.⁹ In short, then, the evolutionary and contingent nature of genocide helps make defining this crime difficult.

The thid issue that makes defining genocide problematic is that there is a tremendous conceptual and behavioral overlap between the legal definitions of genocide, war crimes, and human rights violations. War crimes, for example, involve violations of the laws and customs of war and govern things such as the treatment of prisoners and civilians, tactics and weapons, medical experimentation, torture, random destruction, murder, and rape.¹⁰ The poblem is that genocide typically occurs in the context of a war and is often composed of specific acts that can also be qualified as war crimes. The illegal targeting of civilians, for example, is a clearly recognized category of war crimes and is also one of the defining characteristics of genocide. So which is it? Thee are technical legal considerations that help scholars and attorneys determine which is which, but these distinctions are usually not clear to non-experts. Similarly, rape and torture are considered crimes against humanity but are also prohibited as war crimes and genocide.¹¹ Determining under which category or categories a specific act might fall is no easy task and serves to compound the difficulty in defining genocide.

Fourth and last, genocide is a much used and misused term. University cutbacks, African American incarceration rates, the election of George W. Bush, highway deaths, abortion, AIDS, animal cruelty, nuclear war, slavery and the slave trade, have all at one time or another been labeled as genocide and this list is by no means complete.¹² The incease in popular awareness about genocide has meant that the term is often applied to any topic or issue that somebody wants to call attention to, or condemn, or in order to mobilize popular opposition or support. Genocide is a powerful word that has a tremendous ability to elicit a strong and visceral reaction and is therefore an attractive term to use when confronted with a subject that you wish to revile. While understandable, this misuse of the word makes the issue more confusing. Not every outrage or atrocity constitutes genocide, and to suggest otherwise simply muddies the waters.

For all of the reasons listed above, defining genocide remains somewhat difficult. Yet, for all their problems, definitions are important. Definitions provide the conceptual foundations upon which we build our mental picture of the phenomenon being studied. They help us make sense of things and give shape and form to the events under examination. Importantly, they also provide the basis upon which cases are included or excluded for study, which in turn influences the inferences, explanations, comparisons, and insights that are generated. Definitions are also important because they provide the legal basis for identification and prosecution. Criminologically speaking, definitions provide the basis for legal codes and procedures. Definitions, in short, are important tools for helping us better understand the nature and dynamics of genocide, and the logical starting point is the definition formulated by the United Nations.

UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION DEFINITION

After a contentious year of debates, compromises, and arguments, on December 9, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously voted to make genocide a crime under international law and to commit themselves to its prevention and intervention. Meeting in Paris, this third session of the General Assembly also passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948,¹³ which makes this particular session one of the most momentous in history for the protection of human rights for both individuals and groups. For genocide this vote signaled a new legal recognition of the criminal nature of this phenomenon. Genocide, in other words, for the first time in its long history, became a crime. Historically, many, if not most genocides, were perpetrated within the boundaries of sovereign states and were therefore usually perceived as being purely internal affairs, outside of the control of the international community. In the same way that domestic violence which occurred in the home was widely perceived to be a private issue and not the concern of the community, so too was genocide perceived as existing beyond the scope of interest for the world at large. The Genocide Convention, however, helped change this perception and served to foster the notion that genocide is best understood as a type of international crime. The impetus for this legal ecognition stemmed in large part from the Nazi-perpetrated Holocaust and the advocacy of one man; Raphael Lemkin.

Lemkin was a Polish-born lawyer who fled his country in the wake of the Nazi invasion in September of 1939.¹⁴ Ending up in the United States and desperately concerned about his family and friends, Lemkin became a passionate advocate and lobbyist calling attention to the crimes of the Nazis in occupied Europe. He quickly realized, however, that what was going on ...