Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities

Chinese Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States

Amy L. Freedman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• eBook ISBN: 9781135960551
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

From New York City's Chinatown to urban Indonesia, there are fifty-five million ethnic Chinese living outside of China. Their strong sense of community, along with their considerable economic clout, makes them a compelling group with which to study immigrant political participation. Amy Freedman's empirical study examines the hows and whys of Chinese overseas political activity in three diverse countries. When, and under what conditions, do immigrants become active in the political process? Does political influence stem from group mobilization? What role do communal organizations and their leaders play in determining participation? In answering these questions, Freedman assesses the goals and objectives of ethnic communities entering the political fray.

1
Introduction

I am standing under a harsh fluorescent light as a man, approaching, unsheathes a meat cleaver. Around me gathers a gang of people, all holding thick wooden sticks, steel pipes or spears. In the street beyond, more armed silhouettes near. Some are boys as young as 10, learning early how to play vigilante. Around us, stores in the Chinese-dominated downtown remain shuttered, the windows above blank and empty behind bars of iron. A block away, police speed by on screaming motorcycles, the sound echoing down the dirty, deserted alleys. Their passage is a reminder that elsewhere in this city, homes and cars are burning, families fleeing.

—Jose Manuel Tesoro, “How and Why Indonesia’s Third-largest City
Descended into Chaos,” Asiaweek, May 22, 1998

The quote above reflects the recent experience of Chinese in Indonesia, but it could just as easily be an account of another minority community (Chinese or otherwise) facing persecution from a more numerically powerful indigenous group venting their anger on a community clearly marked as outsiders. This work aims to do two things. On a general level it is about ethnic politics: How do immigrant communities become incorporated into the larger polity? More specifically, this work is about one group of immigrants: the Chinese. In this regard the study looks cross-nationally at how and why Chinese communities have accessed the political arena of their adopted countries. The Chinese diaspora is an interesting group to focus on for several reasons. Chinese communities can be found in places as diverse as Paris and Mauritius. Approximately 19.5 million ethnic Chinese live outside China, mostly in Southeast Asia and North America.¹ Throughout the world they have organized a system of guilds, benevolent societies, tongs (secret societies), and name and place associations which facilitate the group ties that characterize the community and which have given rise to the phenomena of “network capitalism”² which once fueled economic growth throughout Asia Pacific. Chinese immigration to a wide variety of nations, the size of some of the communities and strength of Chinese community associations and ties, along with a perception that they have significant economic clout in their adopted countries, make them a compelling group with which to study the issue of immigrant politicization.

There are two assumptions in popular opinion and in much of the scholarly literature about politics and the Chinese diaspora: that the Chinese are political pawns of either Beijing or Taipei; or that they are politically passive and more interested in prospering economically than they are in wielding influence or power politically within their countries of residence. Even in initial research it became clear that the extent and nature of Chinese overseas political activity has changed over time and in response to events and developments both within their communities and from outside political institutions.

Events in the United States and Indonesia over the last two years³ might lead one to believe that Chinese political participation consists of wealthy businessmen forging connections to prominent political leaders. This is not the sum of Chinese political activity and it is part of more complex relations between the Chinese community, economic and political elites, and the mechanisms of government. While there is no one set of strategies or goals that can perfectly capture the activity of the Chinese in all four cases, there are some generalizable trends that can be identified at the outset. Chinese in Indonesia, on peninsular Malaysia, and in the United States, certainly want to be free from persecution and want to ensure the protection of their businesses and property. Chinese overseas consistently seek access to education for their children; some of them also want the ability to maintain their cultural identity, and they would like political rights similar to the rest of society. There is great diversity among and within the communities as well as in the tactics used to reach or ensure these objectives. Both this chapter and the case studies will detail how and why Chinese communities endeavor to become equal players in the political process.

THE PUZZLE

This work begins with the observation that for Chinese overseas, levels of political participation do not seem to be correlated with socioeconomic variables like income or education. This poses an interesting question for the literature on political participation, which finds participation closely connected to levels of education and income. In order to understand this gap between the current scholarship and what seems to be the reality for Chinese communities overseas, this study examines the processes and mechanisms through which these groups are incorporated into the political arenas of their chosen homelands. A second concern addressed here is whether community political participation impacts the level of influence that a group has on policy issues that concern them.

In places where the Chinese have achieved economic success, like Indonesia and Malaysia, rates of political participation are still low. Material from the case studies shows that despite middle- and upper-class status in Indonesia, Chinese have been somewhat removed from most avenues of political power. From the middle of the 1960s until 1998 Sino- Indonesians were prohibited from participating fully in political, civic, and military affairs. Although Indonesia’s political system was largely closed to any sort of open contestation, Indonesian Chinese, specifically, were prevented from accessing other avenues of participation. Nonetheless, individual Chinese had considerable personal influence in Indonesia under Suharto. In contrast, Chinese participation in Malaysia is institutionalized; however, the degree to which they are politically active or influential is circumscribed. In the United States, where political contestation is fairly open, Chinese groups remain poorly represented in both local and national politics, and wield only modest influence in policies that impact their community.

In order to unravel this puzzle, the following questions are asked: When or under what conditions do Chinese become active in the political process of their adopted countries? Does political influence stem from group participation? And a subquestion that stems from the first two: What role do communal organizations and their leaders play in determining the nature and scope of participation? In answering these questions this work discusses various possible elements that might impact the degree to which Chinese overseas are political actors: socioeconomic status, culture, and institutional or opportunity structures are examined. Ultimately, this work assesses both the goals and objectives of the Chinese community in entering the political fray, as well as looking at the strategies and tactics used in accessing the political arena.

TERMINOLOGY

CHINESE OVERSEAS

With whom is this study concerned? It is always problematic to define one’s subject of study. The term “Chinese overseas” is used to refer to all ethnic Chinese living outside Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the People’s Republic of China (the term “greater China” is often used to describe this region collectively). This broad description could be taken to include nationals of Taiwan or China living abroad. Many of these migrants may harbor a desire to become more permanent settlers; however, until they choose to adopt citizenship of a country outside greater China, this study is not primarily about them. Because the focus of this work is on political participation through (mostly) legal channels, noncitizens are marginalized in this book. Predominately, this study is concerned with ethnic Chinese who have become citizens of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States. As Lynn Pan states in the beginning of The Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas, “Examples of these are the so-called ‘hyphenated’ Chinese: Sino-Thais, Chinese Americans and so on; people who are Chinese by descent but whose non-Chinese citizenship and political allegiance collapse ancestral loyalties” (Pan 1999:15).

Others with Chinese heritage may have, through intermarriage or assimilation, ceased to call themselves Chinese. This work is less concerned with this group of people and, with the exception of Indonesia, there is little discussion about this segment of the “Chinese” diaspora. For this research, identity is self-ascribed and, because the level of analysis is the community rather than the individual, a certain degree of community identification is also necessary.

NOTIONS OF COMMUNITY

Since this work is concerned with community activism as a whole, and with the ability of individual leaders or activists to mobilize the community, it is less concerned with the actions of individual community members themselves. Much of the recent ethnic studies literature focuses on problems inherent in defining a “community.” Ong (1996) describes two distinct groups of overseas Chinese in the United States: one affluent and tied to the global economy, whom she calls “transnational publics,” the other, poor and often illegal, still settles in urban Chinatowns.

These two types of migratory Chinese communities, so dramatically contrasted in terms of class, points of origin, strategies, and power, are shaped by and in many ways the products of flexible regimes of labor capitalism that cast emigrant elites and labor towards metropolitan centers of capital and prestige. (Ong 1996:2)

Although she distinguishes between the two groups of Chinese, she finds that they are influenced by similar economic processes, and thus both groups can be linked to a larger “imagined community” (Anderson 1991). The “community” is thus held together by transnational practices of travel and economy, and also by ideologically charged themes which shape the diaspora. Conversely, in her study of Philippine women migrants, Christina Szanton Blanc (1996) argues for viewing the immigrants as part of several communities, across multiple diasporas. This author does not take issue with these diverse notions about what constitutes a “community.” However, for this study a community is an identifiable, self-ascribed, set of people who share certain common characteristics; these might include, but are not limited to, language, religion, nationality, proximity, and cultural⁴ attributes. Not all Chinese in the places chosen for this study want to be identified as part of a “Chinese community.” For example, some ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia have converted to Islam, changed their names, and perhaps married non- Chinese. Such individuals may no longer share common interests with co-ethnics. In such an instance, it is difficult to see how a study of Chinese overseas politicization and influence applies to them. However, if the dominant society persists in viewing them as outsiders, and if particular state institutions or policies target or affect them regardless of how they self-identify, in other words if they are treated differently than the majority population, then they, like other Chinese, must be concerned with the allocation of resources and values that impact their status in relation to the dominant group.

A slightly different approach is taken by Wang Gungwu (1993) in his work on “greater China” and the Chinese overseas. He argues that there is no single Chinese community abroad, and he suggests dividing the Chinese into three groups according to their political activities. Group A consists of the small number of Chinese who maintain links with the politics of mainland China or Taiwan⁵ and who identify with the destiny of these two entities. He finds that this group is more numerous in the United States than in Southeast Asia because interest in the home country is closely correlated with recent migration. Group B has a realistic focus on occupational status and on maintaining an ethnic Chinese identity. Interest in the politics of the host country is limited. Instead there is a focus on economic issues and on professional and communal associations. He finds that most Chinese in the United States and in Southeast Asia fall into this category. The last group, Group C, is committed to its adopted country and to the politics of that nation.⁶ A potential Group D would be those Chinese who have become fully assimilated with the larger society. While Wang rightly points out the wide variation among Chinese communities and within them, he does not go beyond analyzing the length of time since migrating in accounting for the differences. This cannot, then, explain why some Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia who have been there for two hundred years might still be categorized as Group B. Even within a Chinese “community,” as he defines it, there is no doubt going to be a variety of levels of political interest and incorporation. This study is more concerned with the collective effort and impact of the group on politics than in classifying individuals.

There is much work still to be done in the area of acculturation of immigrant groups into their new societies.⁷ Compelling studies have yet to be done on rates of intermarriage and assimilation across countries or across immigrant groups. While there certainly may be differences in political activity among different generations of immigrants, this study is based on the assumption that community membership is self-ascribed and that activity on behalf of the group is the relevant criterion for inclusion in the analysis. For example, if a third-generation Chinese lives outside Chinatown and chooses to play an active role within the Chinese community, either through activism, employment, or through professional organizations, then the study is concerned with his or her role in mobilizing his or her constituents for political activity. Likewise, since the study is concerned with political activity such as voting and personal networking, it is less focused on the role of the most recent immigrants, although they too are members of “the community.” This is not to say that newer immigrants do not participate in some types of political behavior, because clearly they do; however, this work is most concerned with the collective action of those who have become eligible and have made the decision to take on more permanent status within a country.

Of the four cases examined here, Indonesia poses the most problems to the treatment of the Chinese as a single community within the larger context. As will be discussed later, there are enormous differences among Sino-Indonesians in wealth, time in country, language use, and religious affiliation. While these differences are also apparent within the United States and Malaysia, because Chinese in these two countries are allowed to (and often encouraged to) identify themselves as Chinese, that is, to celebrate their culture and heritage, the differences are often under the surface of a broader “Chinese” identification. Nonetheless, since both the Indonesian government and the majority of indigenous Indonesians perceive the Chinese to be outsiders, regardless of whether they have changed their name, intermarried, or converted to Islam; and since middle-class shop-owners are sometimes assumed to share something in common with the wealthy tycoons linked to Suharto, then it seems reasonable to try and understand the political strategies and goals of the Chinese as a group in Indonesia. In the case of Indonesia this study will certainly make distinctions among socioeconomic classes within the group.

Anderson (1991) writes of imagined communities, which can link the person and collective identities. The process of within-group identity formation overemphasizes what it is that group members actually share. It gives greater emotional weight to the common elements, reinforcing them with an ideology of linked fate. (Ross 1997:48)

This work perhaps shares the same pitfall, overemphasizing the “common elements” and downplaying the divisions. This is a possible failing of a project that chooses as its subject the whole rather than the individual. The author’s compensation for this is to attempt to try to define and clarify who in each case study is being referred to when “the community” is discussed.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In the most basic sense, political participation is action designed to influence government decision-making. As Huntington and Nelson (1976:3) wrote, “participation may be individual or collective, organized or spontaneous, sustained or sporadic, peaceful or violent, legal or illegal, effective or ineffective.” In parts of this study, and in the most conventional sense, participation is equated with electoral action. Obviously this is not the only type of political behavior that may influence political decision-making. As the quote from Huntington and Nelson illustrates, political activity can vary across a wide spectrum. In this book the following types of political behaviors will be discussed: voting, interest-group activity, community advocacy and political education, and individual networking.

Voting seems like a self-evident term. When elections are held for political office, eligible individuals go to designated places and cast a ballot for the candidates of their choice. However, voting and elections may have different purposes and implications in various settings. For example, in the United States voting may be done under conditions of anonymity and there may be more than one party contesting a position. In other countries, like Indonesia under President Suharto, elections may have been held for purposes of bolstering the ruling party’s power.

Interest-group activity is political organization by those with common interests. The motivating issue could be centered on a narrow business or economic interest, or more broadly on a religious group’s beliefs. Interest groups attempt to influence policy-makers on behalf of their members. This can be done through requests and education, through supporting a candidate seeking office, or through lobbying efforts. Community advocacy is not dissimilar from interest-group activity. The main difference is that the organizing principle for communal activism is to meet the needs of the community rather than some specific political interest. Political education is when a group seeks to educate its own members on a particular issue, or when they seek to educate lawmakers on an issue of interest to the community. Individual networking is when elites work with political officials for personal gain rather than for more defuse benefits.

Political participation is fundamentally rooted in collective organization or action. Most participation requires some form of collaborative activity and the rewards go to some type of collectivity. While many of these actions require individuals to choose to participate, this study is largely concerned with group behavior as a whole. Examples of groups around which political participation is constructed include: class, communal groups (based on race, religion, language, or ethnicity), neighborhoods, party (those that identify with the same group trying to win or maintain power).⁸

One of the challenges facing leaders in the Chinese community is how to mobilize this sort of collective action. Some argue that it is difficult to view and to organize the Chinese as a single community because there are divisions within the community based on class, language, country or place of origin, and time within their adopted countries.

OVER...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, AND MAPS
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• 1. INTRODUCTION
• 2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE
• 3. MALAYSIA: INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTICIPATION
• 4. SUHARTO’S INDONESIA: OUTSIDERS TIED TO THE PALACE
• 5. CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES
• 6. SUBURBANIZATION: CHINESE IN MONTEREY PARK, CALIFORNIA
• 7. NEW YORK: THE CITY OF ETHNIC POLITICS
• 8. CONCLUSION
• NOTES
• BIBLIOGRAPHY