Animals in Greek and Roman Thought

A Sourcebook

Stephen T. Newmyer

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN: 9780415773355
• eBook ISBN: 9781136882630
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Ancient History
• Index: History

Although reasoned discourse on human-animal relations is often considered a late twentieth-century phenomenon, ethical debate over animals and how humans should treat them can be traced back to the philosophers and literati of the classical world. From Stoic assertions that humans owe nothing to animals that are intellectually foreign to them, to Plutarch's impassioned arguments for animals as sentient and rational beings, it is clear that modern debate owes much to Greco-Roman thought.

Animals in Greek and Roman Thought brings together new translations of classical passages which contributed to ancient debate on the nature of animals and their relationship to human beings. The selections chosen come primarily from philosophical and natural historical works, as well as religious, poetic and biographical works. The questions discussed include: Do animals differ from humans intellectually? Were animals created for the use of humankind? Should animals be used for food, sport, or sacrifice? Can animals be our friends?

The selections are arranged thematically and, within themes, chronologically. A commentary precedes each excerpt, transliterations of Greek and Latin technical terms are provided, and each entry includes bibliographic suggestions for further reading.

Part I
ANIMALS AS BEINGS

1
THE INTELLECT OF ANIMALS: RATIONAL OR IRRATIONAL?

1. Alcmaeon of Croton

Alcmaeon of Croton in southern Italy (c.5th century BCE), famous for his researches on the human sense organs, especially the eye, is widely held to be the earliest Greek thinker who drew a sharp distinction between the intellectual capacities of human and non-human animals, and in so doing, he inaugurated the belief that man alone of animals is rational, a notion that became a fundamental assumption in much of subsequent classical speculation on animals. Likewise his distinction between understanding (xunesis) and perception (aisth

sis) would enjoy a long life in Greco-Roman thought. The natural consequence of an absence of rational capacity in non-human animals is, in Alcmaeon’s view, a lack of language and an inability to advance culturally. It is reasonable to assume that Alcmaeon’s researches on the human sense organs influenced his conclusions on animal mentality. The following statement on his views is derived from the treatise On the Senses by Theophrastus.

Animals Have No “Understanding”

For [Alcmaeon] says that man differs from the other creatures in that he alone has understanding (xuni

si), while the other creatures have perception (aisthanetai), but do not have understanding.

(“Alcmaeon,” DK 1a)

2. Chrysippus

Chrysippus (c.280–207BCE), head of the Stoic school of philosophy after Cleanthes, seems to have taken a particular interest in the intellectual capacities of animals, and he may have contributed substantially to the school’s denial of reason to non-human species that would form the cornerstone of the school’s position on animals. The h

gemonikon, or “governing principle,” to which he alludes in this statement was held by the Stoics to be one of eight constituent parts of the soul in human and non-human animals, the other seven being the senses, the capacity for utterance and the capacity for reproduction. While this “governing principle” went on in human beings to attain to rationality, it remained forever irrational in non-humans, denying them the capacity for reason. Consequently, the actions of animals are, according to Stoic teaching, motivated merely by “impulse” (horm

), such as the tendency of an animal to move toward a food source and away from a source of danger or harm, neither action requiring the operation of reason. This intellectual disparity between humans and other species had wide-reaching consequences for the Stoics, the most fundamental of which was the elimination of any responsibility on the part of humans to consider the interests of animals in undertaking any action.

The H

gemonikon, or “Governing Principle” in the Animal Soul Is Devoid of Reason

Every soul possesses a kind of “governing principle” (h

gemonikon), but [in animals] it is their life and sensation (aisth

sis) and impulse (horm

).

(SVF 2. 821)

3. Plato

The dialogues of Plato (c.429–347 BCE) reveal a broad familiarity with many species of animals, although Plato’s interest in animals is more that of a metaphysician than of a biologist. Animals figure in his works rather frequently as metaphors and as images, and animality is quite often contrasted with humanity in Plato, to the disadvantage of animalkind: humans who do not live up to their potential as rational beings are likened to beasts that wallow in their lowliness, while those who remain uneducated are said to resemble the wildest of beasts (Laws 766a). Similarly, democratic government is said by Plato to be like a pack of animals that are impossible to control (Republic 563c). In common with a number of other ancient writers, he considered some kinds of animals, including bees and ants, to be positive models for human conduct, while others, such as wolves and lions, were emblematic of savagery and not to be emulated in human behavior.

Despite his fondness for metaphorical constructions of animality, it would be erroneous to claim that Plato had no scientific interest in animals. Although the criteria by which he distinguishes them are at times fanciful and unilluminating, he seems to have been interested in establishing a system of classification of animal species. He distinguishes animals at times according to their manner of breeding or feeding, but he never attains to any consistent position on division between species. Indeed, biologists tend to feel that Plato’s playful and imaginative treatment of animals had in the final analysis a rather baneful influence on the progress of science, and he is not often accorded a place of honor in the ranks of Greek biologists.

One of the more intriguing appearances of animals in the Platonic corpus is found in the philosopher’s doctrine of metempsychosis, usually understood to mean the transmigration of souls, a belief often associated with the pre-Socratic philosopher Pythagoras (6th century BCE). The doctrine of transmigration of souls is discussed in the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Phaedo, and the Timaeus, although these discussions do not agree in all details. In the Phaedo, Plato maintains (81e–82b) that humans may assume the form of other animal species through metempsychosis, depending upon their former manner of life: those who were gluttons and drunkards may become asses, while those who were unjust and tyrannical may pass into wolves or hawks. In contrast, those who displayed what he terms practical political virtues such as temperance and justice pass into gentle, “political” species such as ants or bees. In the Republic, however, a greater range of possibilities is explored (620d): some humans are said to choose a reincarnation that resembles their former mode of life, as Orpheus elected to be reborn as a swan and Aias as a lion. In this dialogue, animals are also envisioned as being capable of choosing to be reborn as human beings, as is said to be the case with swans. Similarly, he argues in the Timaeus that those individuals who did not allow their spiritual element to predominate entirely in their lifetimes will return as animals, and that the more irrationally an individual behaved in one life, the lowlier the animal species into which he will pass in his next incarnation (42c). The apparent lack of agreement in Plato’s accounts has proved troubling to scholars since antiquity, and he allows Socrates to state (Phaedo 114d) that no reasonable person can take what he has described as incontrovertible fact, but it is remarkable how frequently the topic of transmigration of souls is encountered in the Platonic corpus. It also remains unclear what Plato believed happens to human reason when a person passes into an animal and, conversely, when an animal passes into a human. In the Phaedrus (249b), he sidesteps this problem altogether by declaring that only what had previously been a human soul can pass back into a human. In both the Phaedrus and the Republic, Plato discusses the punishments that some souls may expect in the afterlife, but this possibility is not broached in either the Phaedo or the Timaeus. The Phaedo also does not mention the possibility of animals passing into humans in their incarnations.

It is likewise difficult to assess Plato’s position on the question of rationality in animals since he seems to waver in his views. While he frequently laments the fact that humans do not always make the effort to live completely rational lives and thereby to reach their potential, he generally considers animals to have intellectual powers far inferior to those of human beings. In the passages translated below, he seems to deny rationality to animals, but in the Laws (961d) he is willing to allow them a portion of intellect (nous).

The Animal Soul Is Irrational

[Socrates]: “All of this [Diotima] taught me when she would speak on the topic of love, and she asked, ‘What, Socrates, do you suppose to be the cause of this love and desire? Do you not notice how powerfully all animals are acted upon when they are eager to reproduce, both land-dwelling and flying creatures, all of them lovesick and beset with desire, first to mate with one another and then to rear their offspring, and do you not notice that the weakest are willing to fight to the death against the strongest on behalf of their offspring and to die for them and be tortured with hunger in order to be able to feed their young, and to do anything else necessary? In the case of human beings,’ she said, ‘one might suppose they do all this from reason (logismou). But what is the cause of this erotic possession in the case of animals?’”

(Symposium 207a–c)

“But did you notice this?”

“What is that?”

“That what we just now thought about the spirited part (thumoeidous) of the soul is the opposite of what we now think? For then we supposed it was part of the appetitive (epithum

tikon) soul, but now, far from it, we say that, in the factions of the soul, it takes up arms on the side of the rational (logistikon).”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Well, is it then different from that also, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but rather two forms of the soul, the rational and the appetitive? Or is it as in a city, that there are three...

Table of contents

• Routledge Sourcebooks for the Ancient World
• CONTENTS
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• PRELIMINARY BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE
• Part I ANIMALS AS BEINGS
• Part II HUMAN–ANIMAL RELATIONS
• TEXTS CONSULTED
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• PASSAGES DISCUSSED