Multilateral Counter-Terrorism

The global politics of cooperation and contestation

Peter Romaniuk

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN:
  9780415776486
  9780415776479
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135156985
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Diplomatie et traités

Contemporary terrorism is a global phenomenon requiring a globalized response. In this book Peter Romaniuk aims to assess to what extent states seek multilateral responses to the threats they face from terrorists. Providing a concise history and a clear discussion of current patterns of counter-terrorist co-operation, this book:

• analyses a wide spectrum of institutions from the United Nations and its various bodies to military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies
• explains the full range of cooperative counter-terrorist activities and the patterns across them, from the use of intelligence and military force to criminal law measures, financial controls and diplomacy
• examines under what conditions states cooperate to suppress terrorism
• evaluates how existing international institutions been affected by the US-led "global war on terror," launched after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The book contests that the whilst there are several notable examples of successful counterterrorism cooperation, past and present, this work suggests that the broader trend can only be understood if we accept that across the domains of counter-terrorism policy, cooperation often resembles a competition for influence over outcomes.

Multilateral Counter-terrorism is an essential resource for all students and scholars of international politics, criminology and terrorism studies.

1
Historical precedents for multilateral counter-terrorism

Anti-anarchist cooperation and the League of Nations

The origins of multilateral counter-terrorism lie in efforts to suppress anarchist violence in the late nineteenth century. These measures comprised diplomatic initiatives, as well as cooperation among police services. Although such efforts were discussed as early as the 1870s, those initial attempts were not successful and yielded only the unilateral deployment of certain national police services abroad (an approach pursued by Britain, Italy and Russia).¹ It took a period of sustained anarchist violence in the 1890s to induce states to consider cooperation more seriously. In this chapter, I trace the emergence of multilateral counter-terrorism through three key developments in the pre-World War II period. The first of these, the 1898 International Anti-Anarchist Conference in Rome, represents the first attempt by states to coordinate law and policy to combat political violence. Despite this, anarchist activity continued and the effort was renewed through the 1904 St. Petersburg Anti-Anarchist Protocol, signed in secret by more than 10 states. The protocol set an ambitious program for cooperation, including the establishment of anti-anarchist bureaus in participating states, rules for expelling anarchists, and norms for communication and information exchange regarding anarchist activity. A reduction in anarchist crimes in the early twentieth century, and the intervention of other pressing events, saw the issue decline in importance on the international agenda. But it re-emerged after 1934 in response to the double assassination of Yugoslavia’s King Alexander and French foreign minister Barthou by a Croatian nationalist in Marseilles. Coordinated efforts this time occurred through the League of Nations and, after a period of negotiation, the members concluded the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937. The convention is novel in that it provides a definition of “terrorism,” a feat not achieved in any subsequent international treaty or resolution. While the convention attracted 24 signatories, only one member (India) ratified it, meaning that it never entered into force and has the status of a “dead letter.”²

Why do these historical precedents matter for our understanding of multilateral counter-terrorism today? In concluding the chapter, I contend that there are several lessons from history here, not least because the pre-World War II record of multilateral counter-terrorism provides early evidence of what we can now recognize as broad trends that pertain over time. Specifically, history shows that: states are constrained by competing political agendas and are, therefore, unable to achieve broad-based consensus on counter-terrorism cooperation; where cooperation does succeed, it is generally pursued at an operational level, thereby minimizing political sensitivities; where it occurs, multilateral counter-terrorism builds on, and subsequently shapes, cooperative endeavors in related domains; the need to define terrorism has a politicizing effect on cooperation, yielding unworkable definitions or, later, stalemate; attempts to advance multilateral counter-terrorism are often direct responses to attacks, but the issue inevitably recedes from importance as cooperation stumbles and other priorities emerge. In sum, history matters in that the contemporary record of multilateral counter-terrorism sometimes resembles patterns of cooperation that first emerged more than 100 years ago.

Cooperation against anarchism

By the 1880s, anarchist ideas had gained wide circulation in Europe, the Americas and beyond. In particular, the anarchist attempt to legitimate the use of violence as a tool of social change—“propaganda by the deed”—attracted many adherents and served to inspire acts of violence by individuals and groups, inducing a previously unseen degree of hysteria in many countries.³ As Richard Bach Jensen points out, this sense of hysteria was out of proportion to the number of fatalities actually claimed by anarchists. He estimates that, for the period 1880–1914, and not counting Russia, anarchists killed only about 160 people, while injuring another 500.⁴ Rather, the fear they stirred reflects that anarchist tactics were unique (often involving bombing and the use of dynamite), their violence was random and caused mass disruption, and the media served to publicize their acts. They targeted the symbols of religious and bourgeois life, and claimed more heads of state (seven in Russia, Europe and the United States between 1894 and 1912) than any comparable practitioners of political violence.⁵ Still, despite perceptions at the time, it cannot be said that anarchists ever formed a unified political movement as such, and Rick Coolsaet observes that, “The [so-called] Black International only ever existed in the minds of police officers and the press.”⁶ This leads many contemporary observers to compare the anarchists to today’s “al Qaeda movement,” a position I argue against, below.

However organized, anarchist violence increased in the 1890s, prompting two kinds of responses from states.⁷ First, at the national level, many states sought new legislation to enable them to suppress anarchism. Such laws criminalized the use of explosives and also attempted to suppress anarchist propaganda. Second, states sought stronger bilateral ties among police services. There was some precedent for this, as Britain, Italy and Russia had already stationed officers abroad. The Russians (faced with threats from nihilists and revolutionary socialists) had sought broader cooperation in the 1870s and 1880s, but had not been able to advance the idea. For their part, the British (threatened by Irish nationalist Fenians) and the Italians (whose diaspora was notoriously radical) each had their own reasons to develop international policing networks. Still, there remained a sense that these responses were inadequate given the apparent scope of the anarchist threat. But what to do? Here, there was no consensus. Rather, some states, especially Britain and Switzerland, invoked the ire of others for their relatively liberal policies regarding sanctuary for political refugees and asylum. Similarly, extradition and expulsion policies were a source of contention, as states sought to utilize these sovereign prerogatives to their own advantage.

These pressures were brought to a head when Empress Elizabeth of Austria was stabbed in the heart by an Italian anarchist as she boarded a ferry on Lake Geneva on 10 September 1898. Rome was soon under pressure to act and did so promptly, issuing invitations for a European conference to counter anarchism. These invitations were quickly accepted by the European powers, although Britain considered declining. British hesitation reflects that anarchism was considered to be more of a problem for the continent. However, concern about the presence of émigrés gave London a stake in the debate about expulsion and extradition, commending attendance.⁸ Importantly, the invitations from Rome requested that delegations comprise not only diplomats, but police officers, and technical and administrative staff,suchasofficials from justice and interior ministries. Indeed, attendees included the national police heads of Russia, France and Belgium, in addition to the municipal chiefs of police forces from cities such as Berlin, Vienna and Stockholm.⁹

The conference commenced on 24 November 1898, with 54 delegates from 21 countries. It lasted a month and concluded on 21 December. The conference addressed three main tasks: the definition of “anarchism,” the development of an international agreement on the treatment of anarchists and the elaboration of technical arrangements to coordinate anti-anarchist activities among states.¹⁰ The first of these tasks yielded a broad definition of “anarchist acts” as those “having as [their] aim the destruction through violent means of all social organization.” Anarchists were those that committed such acts. Some delegations, especially the Germans and Russians, who tended to take on leadership roles over the conference, would have preferred a more precise definition.¹¹ Others, especially the Swiss and British, expressed reservations that a broad definition would limit states’ discretion and impinge upon individual rights to freedom of expression. At issue here was whether or not anarchist crimes would be defined as “political” crimes, and therefore be non-extraditable. The broad definition of “anarchist acts” (with its reference to “social organization”) reflects the irony that influential delegations went out of their way to treat anarchism (with its obviously political motivations) as being non-political, to facilitate extradition.¹²

With the task of defining “anarchism” accomplished, albeit in a satisficing way, the conference divided into committees on legislation and administrative matters, respectively, with a subcommittee of the latter dealing with questions of extradition and expulsion. The agenda in the legislative committee was set by the representative of Monaco, who was acting on behalf of France, which hoped to avert any confrontation on these matters with its ally, Russia. A series of proposals was eventually adopted by delegates, including prohibitions and punishments attached to: the use of explosives for illegitimate purposes, membership in anarchist associations, provocation or support for anarchist acts, spreading anarchist propaganda, publicizing anarchist trials and assisting anarchists. There were also proposals concerning conditions for the incarceration of anarchists and a measure to adopt the death penalty for anarchist crimes, although the latter was approved with several delegations abstaining.¹³

Several states indicated that they would introduce new legislation to implement this program. But what was the impact of this agreement in practice? An initial point to note here is that these provisions were adopted as recommendations only—a trade-off made necessary by dissonant views about the definition of anarchism. But even with this in mind, the results were very modest. Jensen notes the irony that Great Britain—which did not sign the protocol that emerged from Rome— was the only European power to draft legislation to implement it, and even that initiative never made it into law.¹⁴

If the work of the legislative committee did not translate in substantive changes, the committee on administrative matters was rather more successful. Participants there agreed on a set of operational proposals, including that states should monitor anarchist activity, establish central agencies to oversee this task and, subsequently, exchange information among national agencies. Regarding the latter, a secretive group of police chiefs and others met over the course of the conference, agreeing to exchange lists of expellees on a monthly basis. Moreover, it was out of this group that the conference agreed that the portrait parlé system for identifying criminals should be adopted as standard practice by states. This system utilized a numeric code to record anthropometric measurements, thereby enabling identification information to be transmitted by telephone or telegraph. This scheme was eventually superseded by the move to fingerprinting in the early 1900s.¹⁵

On the question of extradition, delegates eventually agreed that crimes related to anarchism should be treated as non-political crimes and, therefore, that they be subject to extradition agreements. But again, this consensus did not translate into significant change at the operational level. More important in this regard was the specific agreement among delegates that attempts against the lives of heads of state should be extraditable. This measure—the so-called “Belgian” or attentat clause—had gained currency in 1856 after a failed attempt to blow up a train carrying Napoleon III. It would later become standard practice. A further effect of Rome was the facilitation of contacts among police services, enabling relationships to develop and providing a basis for future cooperation.¹⁶

In sum, the outcomes from Rome were underwhelming, although there were some tangible results in terms of operational cooperation (especially regarding portrait parlé and the attentat clause) and the promise of more in the future. Indeed, it soon emerged that further action would be required to quell anarchist activity, which persisted into the new century. Most glaringly, in July 1900, King Umberto of Italy was assassinated by anarchists. This was followed by the assassination of President McKinley of the USA in September 1901. These shocking events triggered a range of responses, including prompt action by states to reform policing practices (especially regarding the protection of heads of state), as well as the expansion of existing bilateral arrangements, such as officer exchanges, among police services. The McKinley assassination brought the United States into debates about international cooperation to suppress anarchism. Previously, the United States had largely avoided anarchist attacks, giving the impression that— despite the presence of native and foreign anarchists—anarchist violence was someone else’s problem. By contrast, the attack by US-born anarchist Leon Czolgosz, led the new president, Theodore Roosevelt, to declare: “Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race; and mankind should band together against the anarchist. His crime should be made an offense against the law of nations … It should also be so declared by treaties among civilized powers. Such treaties would give to the Federal Government the power of dealing with crime.”¹⁷

The renewed attention to anarchism was viewed as an opportunity by Russia and Germany, who were seeking to press the case for more meaningful anti-anarchist cooperation in the wake of Rome. In late 1901, the Russians and Germans addressed a memorandum on the topic to European states, which was also shared with the United States. The memorandum sought action on many of the unimplemented elements of the Rome agreement, especially the creation of central anti-anarchist bureaus by states, information exchange, international regulations for the expulsion of anarchists, and measures to strengthen criminal laws.¹⁸ Within the United States, Roosevelt’s rhetoric was not enough to convince Congress to pass broad anti-anarchist legislation. Rather, familiar concerns for states’ rights and the centralization of power in the federal government limited legislative action to measures to bar the entry of anarchists from abroad. Believing that such a response was unsatisfactory, the Russian and German ambassadors presented a more detailed proposal to Washington, emphasizing administrative measures for expulsions and, again, the creation of central bureaus. However, as Jensen argues, the United States did not possess a national police force, and federal law enforcement agencies did not emerge until the twentieth century. Therefore, even if the United States was inclined to revisit its tradition of isolationism, and to overcome its wariness of the European powers, it could not credibly undertake to implement the Russian/German proposal.¹⁹ In later chapters, I illustrate the extent to which this situation was reversed in the twentieth century, as the USA transformed its role from skeptical follower to assertive leader.

Despite US reticence, the Russian/German proposal won adherents within Europe, at least in the East. On 14 March 1904, 10 states (Russia, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Denmark and Sweden-Norway) signed the secret St. Petersburg Anti-Anarchist Protocol. The protocol set out procedures for expelling anarchists, as well as calling for the creation of central anti-anarchist offices in each country and regular communication on anarchist activity on a police-to-police basis.²⁰ In addition to the United States, several other states elected not to sign. For example, the Italians were concerned that the expulsion clause would mean that Italian anarchists abroad would be forced to return to Italy—a prospect Rome wished to avoid.²¹ The British response was inte...

Table of contents

• Routledge Global Institutions
• Contents
• Tables
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations and acronyms
• Introduction
• 1 Historical precedents for multilateral counter-terrorism
• 2 Multilateral counter-terrorism and the United Nations, 1945–2001
• 3 Multilateral counter-terrorism and the United Nations after 9/11
• 4 Multilateral counter-terrorism beyond the UN
• 5 Multilateral counter-terrorism
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• Appendix C
• Appendix D
• Notes
• Select bibliography
• Index