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PART 1
The Domestic Context:
Changing Dimensions of Political and Social Structures
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1
The Difficult Development of Parliamentary Politics in the Gulf
Parliaments and the Process of Managed Reform in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman
Greg Power
This chapter looks at the dynamics of political liberalisation in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman in recent decades, focusing specifically on the evolution of their parliaments1 as the most prominent institutions of representative democracy. Although the countries have similarities by dint of their geographical proximity, religion, economic reliance on oil and monarchical structure, the recent history of their parliaments emphasise their distinctiveness and the differential impact of social, economic and political factors on the process of gradual liberalisation in each.
At one end, Kuwaitâs parliament is the loudest and liveliest in the region, having sat since 1963 (albeit with unconstitutional dissolutions in 1976 and 1986) and which in recent years has increasingly challenged the Emir and the government. In Bahrain, a short-lived parliament existed for around two years in the mid-1970s and was resuscitated by the new King in 2002, partly as a means to ease sectarian tension. However, the fact that the new parliament turned out to be a pale imitation of its predecessor has been a source of continuing grievance around which much subsequent political turmoil has revolved. By contrast, the evolution of Omanâs parliament has been slow, even by the standards of the Gulf. The country, which was the last in the GCC to adopt a constitution in 1996, held its first popular elections in 2003, but to a body which lacked legislative power and whose influence was confined almost entirely to economic development.
Three themes underpin the chapterâs analysis of each countryâs political trajectory and dynamics of change. First, the process should not be understood as one of democratisation so much as one of gradual political liberalisation, whose pace and content is determined by the ruling autocracy. It is an exercise in top-down, managed reform characterised by âguided pluralism, controlled elections and selective repressionâ (Brumberg 2002: 56). Liberalising autocracies are thus
liberal in the sense that their leaders not only tolerate but promote a measure of political openness . . . but they are autocratic in that their rulers always retain the upper hand . . . with their ultimate reliance on the supreme authority of the monarch or president, liberalised autocracies provide a kind of virtual democracy.
(Brumberg 2003: 3)
Political participation is thus only possible within distinct limits set by the regime. However, there are numerous pitfalls in this form of controlled liberalisation. The âKingâs Dilemmaâ, as originally set out by Huntington in 1963, is that reforms from the top often increase demands for more radical change from the bottom. The monarchical elites in the Gulf are thus walking a tightrope, for while
they are uniformly seeking to maintain their position of power for the long-term, the dilemma they are grappling with is how to balance undertaking reform to increase their own legitimacy against allowing the pendulum of power to swing . . . which could ultimately see a tangible challenge to their position.
(Ehteshami and Wright 2007: 916)
The second theme is that political liberalisation in the Gulf is fundamentally shaped by the fact that they are rentier states. The quadrupling of oil prices during the 1970s changed the dynamic in these countries, bringing huge wealth but meaning that the economy is ultimately dependent on the expenditure of the state as the principal recipient of oil rents. This has several implications for politics. In the first place, it weakens demands for political representation â where the state does not need to rely on the income of citizens or the private sector for its tax revenues, it will feel less of an obligation to give them influence over policy or spending decisions. In short, âno taxation, no representationâ. In addition, the middle classes, who would be expected to articulate these demands most forcefully, were effectively bought off in most of the Gulf countries. The merchant classes traded political power for economic wealth, or as John Waterbury puts it
the tacit understanding has been that the bourgeoisie would renounce any overt political role and that it would follow the broad economic directives of the state, in exchange for which it would be allowed to make significant profits. The state would keep labour docile through a combination of welfare benefits and political repression.
(Waterbury 1994: 27)
The state continues to provide the financial support to almost all of its citizens, either through direct employment in a hugely bloated public sector or by other benefits and disbursements. The political system, and the parliament within it, will therefore reflect those dynamics. Ultimately, as Larry Diamond suggests, âoil distorts the state, the market, the class structure and the entire incentive structureâ (Diamond, 2010: 98).
However, the third theme is that the legitimacy of the Gulf rulers, which has predominantly relied on oil rent, is looking increasingly shaky. The rulers themselves recognise that the rentier model is not a viable long-term strategy. As oil production declines, income falls and weakens the capacity of the state to provide for its citizens. This in turn threatens to undermine the social compact on which the current political settlement between the state, the private sector and its citizens is built.
The decline of natural resources is exacerbated by the Gulf âs rapid population growth, meaning that the burden on the state to provide education, welfare and employment is steadily expanding. The UNDPâs Arab Human Development Report in 2009 suggested that the Arab region as a whole needed to create around 50 million new jobs by 2020 to absorb their young population into the workforce. As a result all the Gulf states, to one extent or another, are seeking to diversify their economies and liberalise their markets. As Jill Crystal has pointed out: âEconomic liberalisation has been driven largely by the governmentsâ fear that growing youth unemployment will metastasise into political dissent if jobs are not found, and by the hope that the private sector can postpone that dayâ (Crystal 2009: 43).
This is more pressing in some countries such as Oman and Bahrain which have far fewer resources, but even in Kuwait the government is initiating attempts to reform its economy. Often these demands are reinforced by voices in civil society (Ottoway and Hamzawy, 2009: 105â7) creating popular demands for greater transparency, accountability and representation â trends fed by globalisation and communication technologies which provide citizens with unprecedented access to information and political opinion (Teitelbaum 2009: 15â7). Such changes though go to the heart of a political legitimacy based on state provision. The original introduction of parliaments in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman was in part to enhance the legitimacy of those regimes. Their evolution since, and the prospects for further development in the face of these emergent trends, illustrate the challenges of political liberalisation and the difficulties that need to be addressed.
Kuwait
Kuwait has the longest experience of participatory politics in the Gulf. Following independence in 1961, a constituent assembly was elected to develop the countryâs constitution which was enacted in 1962. The document falls some way short of creating a constitutional democracy, but by the standards of the Gulf it is an exceptional document, placing distinct limits on the power of the Emir and, significantly, stating that sovereignty resides in the Kuwaiti people â rather than the ruler - who elect their representatives to the National Assembly in regular and free elections.
The parliamentâs powers reflect this constitutional desire for checks and balances. In the first place, although 50 representatives are directly elected, the Emir can appoint up to 15 additional members who sit in parliament as ministers, giving the government an immediate 15-person advantage. Parliament has significant powers, but they are essentially negative ones: it has the power to block but little power to create. For example, the Emir nominates ministers to Cabinet, but parliament has the power to remove ministers (including the prime minister) and delay government legislation. It cannot appoint ministers or initiate laws. If parliament wins a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, the Emir then either has to appoint an alternative whom parliament can work with or dissolve parliament and hold fresh elections. The distribution of power between the Emir and the parliament in the constitution effectively means that each side can cancel the other out, and the system has frequently been characterised as stalemate and gridlock.
It is in this context that the ruling Al-Sabah familyâs style of âmanaged reformâ needs to be understood. Since 1963 the political system has been characterised by exactly these sorts of tussles, with the advantage see-sawing between the two, as parliament and the ruling family have sought to establish the boundaries of the other sideâs power. On two occasions, in 1976 and 1986, these tensions reached the point where the ruling Al-Sabah family suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament. Both times it was claimed that parliament was delaying legislation and hindering the proper functioning of government. On the first occasion the dissolution lasted until 1981, the second until 1992. However, the evolution of the parliament since 1992, and especially 2006, has presented fundamental challenges to the Al-Sabahsâ control of Kuwaiti politics.
Managed Reform as âDivide and Ruleâ
The Al-Sabah family has run Kuwaiti politics since the eighteenth century, principally because it was at the head of an alliance with the trading merchants who dominated the economy before the discovery of oil. The shift to the rentier state also restructured political life. During the 1950s and 1960s the merchant families effectively gave up their right to influence policy in return for substantial government disbursements and a tacit promise that the Sabahs would not interfere in business (Crystal 1989: 431). This then left the ruling family to adopt a strategy of divide and rule for the second half of the twentieth century. At various points, in order to dilute what they regarded as potential opposition in parliament, the Al-Sabahs quietly encouraged other groups, including Sunni Islamists, Bedouin and Shia groups to organise and become politically active. In addition, the family sought to buy the support of certain politicians, generally known as âservice deputiesâ whose support for government policy is given in return for the state funding for their constituencies. And, when that was not enough, the electorate was expanded to include new groups of voters, such as newly urbanised Bedouin (Brown, 2007).
This fracturing of the political system is reinforced by the absence of political parties. In common with other Gulf states, political parties are banned by law and thus candidates cannot campaign as a party slate during elections. This does not stop blocs of like-minded candidates cooperating, and they have done so since the 1960s. But once elected, parliamentary groups form around fairly obvious political divisions, forming de facto political parties, which since 1992 have broadly formed into four groups â a Sunni Islamist bloc, a Shia Islamist bloc, secular liberals and âindependentsâ who generally support the government. However, the ban on parties means that voters elect individuals, giving an impetus to independent, local and tribal candidates, and these blocs tend to lack the level of party discipline and cohesion that characterises parties in longerstanding political systems.
While the Al-Sabahsâ style of âmanaged reformâ succeeded in fragmenting the opposition for long periods, it also increased the number of opposition groups represented in parliament and could not prevent the growth in their support. Significantly the Islamist groups gained representation for the first time in 1992 and have featured prominently ever since. Overall, opposition groups polled strongly in elections in 1992 and 1996, and formed the majority of MPs in the parliaments elected in 1999 and 2003. Yet their effectiveness as an opposition to government has been sporadic. They have tested government ministers and blocked its measures, but the level of fragmentation within the parliament means that they have rarely worked in a concerted fashion. Opposition seems to rely on guerrilla raids on government measures rather than presenting a coherent alternative to government policy.
Post-2006: Kuwaiti Politics in Crisis?
However, 2006 appeared to mark a distinct shift in the relationship between parliament and government and prompted a new period of political instability. First, in January of that year, the long-reigning Emir Jaber died, prompting a crisis of succession as the designated heir to the throne, Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah, was incapacitated by illness and dementia. This raised concerns both within sections of the ruling family and parliament, heightened by the fact that the constitution states a ruling Emir can only be deposed with parliamentary approval. As parliament was in the process of removing Emir Saad, the ruling family had little option but to submit a letter of abdication and install Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed.
The acceptance of parliamentâs role in the succession issue dealt a significant blow to Al-Sabah prestige (Herb 2009b: 143) but it also appeared to galvanise the opposition political blocs, who then inflicted a significant defeat over the governmentâs electoral law. The blocs used government plans for minor redistricting to amend the law and overhaul the electoral system. The opposition sought to reduce the number of constituencies from 25 to five, so that rather than each constituency electing two representatives, they would instead elect ten. The disparate opposition groups coalesced around the argument that the governmentâs proposals effectively gerrymandered the vote in the governmentâs favour and bred vote-buying. The additional attempt to question the Prime Minister for the first time, in the form of a parliamentary interpellation, saw the Emir respond by dissolving the parliament and calling new elections for June 2006. At the resulting vote, the opposition won convincingly, taking more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, around half of them Islamists.
The immediate effect was the governmentâs acceptance of the new electoral law, but it marked the start of three years of political instability in Kuwait. In the spring of 2007 two members of the ruling family resigned following parliamentary interpellations, and in 2008 the differences between government and opposition became insurmountable as the parliament attempted to implement pay rises for state employees. The Emir again dissolved parliament and elections were held in May 2008, where the opposition groups increased their representation to 36 seats in the 50 -member Assembly. Tensions rose again at the end of 2008 when the parliament again attempted to interpellate the Prime Minister, continuing until March 2009 when the Cabinet resigned and the Emir again dissolved parliament.
The subsequent elections in May 2009 were notable for three things: the relatively low turnout at 55 per cent, the election of four women MPs for the first time and a significant increase in government-supporting MPs, mainly at the expense of the Sunni Islamists. However, the political stalemate seemed set to contin...
