European Union: The Basics

Alex Warleigh-Lack

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• eBook ISBN: 9781134121274
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Fully updated to include the new Treaty of Lisbon, this is the best short and accessible introduction to the politics of the European Union, written by one of the world's most well-known authorities in the area. Ideal starting reading for students and the general reader, it explains in clear jargon-free language:

• the EU's development to date
• how the EU works, and why it works this way
• the EU's major policies
• the EU's biggest problems and controversies
• the EU's likely evolution in the coming years.

The new edition builds on the strengths of the previous edition and now includes extra material on:

• the Treaty of Lisbon
• the EU's development since 2003, including its enlargements in 2004 and 2007
• recent EU policies and rule changes
• the EU's role in the world.

Key features to help learning and understanding are:

• boxed descriptions of key issues and events
• a guide to further reading at the end of each chapter
• a glossary of key terms, concepts and people
• helpful appendices about the EU's member states and good internet sources.

1
INTRODUCTION

WHY ‘EUROPE’ MATTERS: THE RISE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A PROBLEM-SOLVING DEVICE

After more than fifty years, the politics of European integration still has the power to engross. The unique mixture of international organisation and transnational polity that is the European Union of today (EU, the Union) does not lend itself to easy classification in traditional academic categories. Moreover, the last two decades have seen an amazing rate of change in the structures, processes and competences of the EU. Indeed, since the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed at Maastricht in 1992 in the heady days of ‘euro-phoria’, four new Treaties on the workings of the Union have been agreed. One of them (the Constitutional Treaty) was rejected after negative referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, and, as this book is being written, the final Treaty in this flotilla, the Treaty of Lisbon, is going through the process of ratification in order to fill most of the gaps that were left by its stillborn predecessor.

What the EU does, and who it does this for, has also changed enormously in recent years. The Union has acquired its own currency (the euro), which as of January 2008 is in use in fifteen of the twenty-seven member states, and the beginnings of real cooperation in foreign and even defence policy. This adds an impressive range of new tasks to the Union’s pre-existing competences in matters such as constructing and facilitating the single European market and agriculture. Since 1995, the Union has also welcomed, in three rounds of ‘enlargement’, new member states from Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean—with several countries still in the queue, for example, Croatia and Turkey. ‘Europe’, as many people continue rather vaguely to call the EU, has an impact on many issues of import across and beyond its member states. These issues range from the very technical, with a primary impact on a fairly narrow range of people (e.g. trading standards in particular goods), to vital issues of macroeconomics (the single currency) or environmental protection. European Union law gives member state nationals rights which they can invoke in their national courts, and is even, albeit on a basis that is subject to frequent contestation, supreme over any national law of the member states with which it conflicts.

For some observers, ‘Europe’ has become an interfering monster, a set of institutions bent on enhancing their own power by becoming involved in ever greater numbers of issues which would be better dealt with at national, regional or local level, or even left to the market to regulate. For others, the EU is too weak, a set of institutions which is obliged to find ways to reinforce itself where it can, rather than a ‘proper state’ with clear powers, its own resources, and a monopoly on legitimate power—at least in certain policy areas. As ever, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. The Union now has at least some role to play in the making of policy across a whole range of issues, but there are also clear limits to its powers. Moreover, this state of affairs has arisen rather more as a result of deliberate choices made by member state governments than as a consequence of power-grabbing by rapacious ‘Brussels’. As is made clear in Chapter 3, despite the fact that actors from EU institutions other than the Council (which represents the member states), and even from outside the EU bodies entirely, can have a significant influence over the content of policy made by the Union, ultimately the national governments of the member states remain in charge. When it comes to designing the rules of the system, and deciding in what ways and in what areas the EU shall have competence, it is the member states which decide.¹ On matters of day-to-day legislation, member states share legislative power with the European Parliament in certain areas, but keep other policy areas almost completely to themselves. In other words, if the EU matters more in the lives of every citizen of its member states than in the past and is more powerful than any other international organisation, that is because the member states have chosen to allow this to happen.

Why have they done so? A detailed explanation of this issue is given in Chapter 2, but in order to help explain the approach taken in this book it makes sense to discuss the key parts of an answer to this query here. In essence, the EU’s member states have used it as a means by which they can solve policy problems which would otherwise remain intractable, or which would at least not be addressed so effectively by individual member states on their own. These issues range from matters of post-Second World War economic recovery and guarantee of the food supply to matters of market regulation (the rather drier and more technical issues of supporting a suitable framework for economic growth, represented most clearly by the ‘single European market’ project) and even development policy (the provision of at least some co-ordination of member states’ efforts to alleviate poverty in the so-called ‘Third World’).

The use of the EU as a tool in solving policy problems obviously demands a degree of mutual understanding, or at least a readiness to compromise, on the part of the member states. For some observers, this extends little further than mutual back-scratching: one member state may agree to let the EU act in one policy area, if another member state agrees to allow the Union to be active in another. For other observers, this represents the germ of a new way of ‘doing politics’ – it represents a kind of reflex of co-operation which makes collaboration with other member states a routine method for resolving policy problems. To some degree, this is a case of the old metaphor in which the glass can be seen as either half-full or half-empty. What is clear, however, is that over time the member states have used the EU more and more often as a means of solving policy problems. Thus, each member state has become ‘Europeanised’ (see Chapter 2) – that is, they have become part of a transnational system in which, within a limited if extensive number of policy areas, co-operation with other member states is necessary in order to produce public policy. Over the fifty or so years of European integration thus far, the EU has not replaced the member states. Instead, it has become ‘fused’ with them (Wessels 1997); via their membership of the EU, member states have developed new institutionalised links both with the Union and, via the institutions of the EU, with each other.

Just as clearly, however, the ways in which the member states seek to use the system of co-operation which they have created have changed over time. Initially, the aim was to give virtually all power to the Union in certain key areas of policy: this process was supposed eventually to lead to the birth of a new federal state, because one area of European cooperation would require support from another in order to work effectively—the idea of ‘spillover’. For example, once coal and steel production became subject to joint control, the defence industries to which they made such key contributions would also be harmonised, leading to the need for common foreign and defence policies and thus a common European government. This was the so-called ‘Monnet Method’ of integration, named after Jean Monnet, one of the pioneers of European integration.

Over time, however, the Union has evolved into a very different kind of organisation. The spillover idea did not reach its full potential—certain member governments, most notably France, made it clear very early in the process of integration that they would not agree to an automatic transfer of power to the EU in policy areas they considered to be vital for their own national interest. Thus, for example, the proposed European Defence Community that would have followed hotfoot on the Economic and Steel Community failed to come into existence. As a result, the evolution of the EU has been much more complex, characterised by rather elliptical trajectories and tussles over the balance between national and European-level power; it has produced a situation in which the Union has far more power in certain areas of policy, especially trade and agriculture, than in others, e.g. tax.

Moreover, since the 1980s the neoliberal idea that the state (or international organisation/system) should do as little as possible, and leave the maximum possible room for manoeuvre to the market, has held sway in the EU almost as clearly as it has in many of the individual member states. Thus, when the Union acquires new competences now, it usually does so as a forum in which guidelines can be set, standards can be benchmarked, and good practice can be exchanged by means of the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC). Such measures are, for example, the way in which the EU takes action against unemployment. In other words, the EU now acts more frequently as a co-ordination device which allows member states to develop their own respective approaches to common problems within an agreed framework than as a provider of detailed legislation which member states must then implement according to a preordained scheme.

GROWING PAINS: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S QUESTIONS SURPLUS

The undoubted expansion of EU competence has not, to put it mildly, made the Union any less controversial. Despite the fact that it now does more for its citizens than ever before,² and also the fact that it has a very ‘light touch’ when compared with the federalist approaches of its founders (see Chapter 2), the Union’s perceived legitimacy is actually brought into question more regularly now than in the past. Its member states often differ bitterly about they think the EU should do, and how much power they are ultimately ready to cede to, or, in more EU-friendly language, ‘pool in’, the Union. Moreover, EU citizens frequently appear to find the notion of deepening integration at least as problematic now as in the past.

Thus, there is a paradox at the heart of European integration: the EU is now vastly more important to the lives of all who live in its member states than at its creation, and yet this growth in importance has not necessarily increased the Union’s popularity. Nor has the EU become part of the conscious ‘lived experience’ of most of its citizens, who continue to be, on the whole, unaware of both the EU’s powers and its limits. This is particularly obvious in states such as the UK, where Euro-myths about straight bananas and the like tend to be all that most citizens hear about on the subject of the EU, whose single market legislation in fact helps make their daily lives more varied (you would not find houmous in Sainsbury’s in the 1950s), and whose freedom of personal movement rights make it easy for rain-lashed Brits (and Dutch, and Germans…) to buy up vast stretches of sunnier member states or just take holidays there. However, it is also true of member states whose citizens tend to be less sceptical about the Union—such as in Spain.

A further complication makes the issues facing the EU become even more daunting. The recent enlargement of the EU to many countries of the former Soviet bloc and the micro-states of Malta and Cyprus has made the Union a truly continental system. Indeed it has made the Union the world’s biggest market by quite some way. It has also made the EU far more diverse, in terms of the relative wealth and political culture of its member states, and the policy preferences of national elites. Thus, the Union will have to make good on its long-held ambition to achieve ‘unity in diversity’. It will also have to reinvent itself, moving away from its period as a club of fairly homogeneous West European states towards a future as a structure which is capable of providing (or at least co-ordinating) much of the public policy making of most of the continent. Such a process requires mutual adaptation between states from the East and West, as well as the North and South, of the continent, and has so far sometimes proved problematic. Western European states—notably France—have often been rather de haut en bas with their Eastern European partners; in return, the latter have often seen the EU as too politically progressive by half, particularly regarding secularism and the treatment of ethnic minorities/lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender issues. An example is Poland.

The idea that the EU, or its predecessors the European Economic Community and the European Community, is at a vital crossroads where crucial decisions about its future impose themselves is not new. Indeed, it has long been something of a cliché, and many observers of the Union have regularly wondered how it continues to function in its rather idiosyncratic manner. If it is ratified, the Treaty of Lisbon may provide some answers, but even this document will not on its own make the EU even more capable of powerful action on key policy challenges such as climate change. This is because such issues are really only partly about institutions and decision-making rules, i.e. the kind of thing to be found in the EU’s treaties. Instead, they are also about the ideas, values and interests which shape national governments’ decisions about the changes to the EU system and range of EU policies that they are willing to accept.

The EU continues to face many challenges, some internal, some external (as discussed in Chapter 6). The ability to provide, or at least help provide, environmental and energy security is an obvious example, as is the ability to address international migration. After the collapse of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the EU may now be emerging from a period of introspection; this certainly appears to be the wish of most national governments, who hope the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified and endure for some time, meaning issues of institutional reform will fall right to the bottom of the EU agenda. However, at the time of writing, this cannot be taken for granted, and consequently the Union may only have postponed the need to ask and answer some very pointed questions about its future. Should, or can, the EU become a federal state, a continental power capable of rivalling the USA and provide an alternative patron in the global political economy to weaker third countries? Can the process of European integration be deepened without going down the road to federalism? Has European integration already gone too far—and if so, can, or should, it be ‘rolled back’ so that its member states can once again be more truly autonomous? How should the EU relate to other organisations with a role in European governance, such as NATO, or the Council of Europe? Should it aim to replace, or co-operate with, them? And how should the EU relate to, and perhaps work with, those states which are either unwilling to join, or incapable of joining, the Union? Perhaps most importantly of all, what can the EU do if its member states—and their peoples—take different views about all these issues? Currently, then, the EU suffers from a surplus of questions about its own role and future, and a deficit of answers.

HOW TO USE THIS BOOK

Aids to understanding

This book thus seeks to help the reader find his or her own ways to reduce the EU’s question surplus. It is aimed at either the ‘intelligent layperson’, who requires a solid introduction to the EU for professional or general informational purposes, or the non-specialist/ beginner student who needs a good introduction to the key issues on the EU agenda, grounded in an understanding of how and why the EU has developed to its current condition. The book is thus, I hope, written in accessible language. However, the book also retains academic conventions and style so that those who so choose can use it as a platform to further study of the EU.

The book has several features which are designed to aid comprehension and facilitate further learning. Each chapter after this Introduction includes key learning points, which help the reader focus on the most salient of the issues addressed. Each chapter also contains think points which, while not necessarily designed as essay questions, certainly help the reader both focus on key issues and reflect on them. The chapter on the EU’s history begins with a timeline of the most important events in the EU’s development to date. I also include in each chapter a brief guide to further reading—up to six particularly useful texts which allow the interested reader to explore the academic literature on the pertinent issues in more depth. At the end of the book is a glossary of key terms used, including theoretical concepts and acronyms. The book also has two appendices. The first consists of a list of websites which can provide further information about, or analysis of, the politics of European integration. The second is a list of member states as of January 2008.

Themes and objectives

The book has two key themes. First, I argue that the current politics of European integration cannot be understood without reference to the following factors:

• historical trends, i.e. the concept of ‘path dependence’. This is the idea that events/decisions which were made previously have an important impact on decisions made in the present day, either by restricting the range of possible options or by shaping perceptions held by key people of what should be done about a given problem.
• pressures from global, or at least international, systems and processes. Without the decision of the USA to support and fund (West) European integration after the Second World War, for example, there is every reason to doubt that the EU would exist in its present form.
• pressures from domestic politics. Which problems either cannot be solved by a member state of the EU acting independently, or might be solved more effectively through partnership with other member states? How far, and why, are citizens and governments in the member states willing to support the European integration process?
• the role of ideas and beliefs, as well as national (and EU institutions’ own) interests, in shaping what actors involved with the integration process want to achieve. In other words, we cannot understand the outcomes of the European integration process merely by looking at what we, as observers, think has been the ‘national interest’ set out by a given member state government. Instead, we need to understand how beliefs and values—about the integration process itself, the kind of policies it should encompass and the actual content of those policies—shape what the EU is able to do. For example, it is perfectly possible that member states should agree that the EU should help ensure each member state has low inflation. Indeed, this is the key role of the European Central Bank (see Chapter 2). However, some member states consider that this objective can best be achieved by membership of the single currency, the euro; others prefer to remain outside the euro, and pursue the goal of low inflation by means they choose themselves. At the time of writing, Slovenia falls into the first category, but the United Kingdom falls into the second.

As a second theme, I argue that the European integration process has produced not a federal state but rather an idiosyncratic, if often extremely tightly-bound, political system. I argue that this system was established when the original six member states began to co-operate over the production of coal and steel, which were then key sectors of the economy. It has since been shaped into a novel kind of compromise between those whose ambition was to create a ‘United States of Europe’, and those who wished to use European integration more instrumentally, that is, as a tool to adopt in order to meet a specific objective, without creating an entity capable of replacing its member states.

In order to explore these arguments, I set out four key objectives.

• First, to explain both how the EU works—how it produces public policy and legislation—a...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Preface to the Second Edition
• List of boxes (key learning points)
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The evolution of European integration
• 3 Institutions and decision-making in the European Union
• 4 Key policies of the European Union
• 5 The European Union in the world
• 6 Controversies in today’s European Union
• 7 Where now for the European Union?
• Appendix 1 Internet sources of information on the European Union
• Appendix 2 Member States of the European Union, as on 1 January 2008
• Glossary
• Notes
• References