Virtue as Social Intelligence

An Empirically Grounded Theory

Nancy E. Snow

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN: 9780415999090
• eBook ISBN: 9781135838614
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory takes on the claims of philosophical situationism, the ethical theory that is skeptical about the possibility of human virtue. Influenced by social psychological studies, philosophical situationists argue that human personality is too fluid and fragmented to support a stable set of virtues. They claim that virtue cannot be grounded in empirical psychology. This book argues otherwise.

Drawing on the work of psychologists Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, Nancy E. Snow argues that the social psychological experiments that philosophical situationists rely on look at the wrong kinds of situations to test for behavioral consistency. Rather than looking at situations that are objectively similar, researchers need to compare situations that have similar meanings for the subject. When this is done, subjects exhibit behavioral consistencies that warrant the attribution of enduring traits, and virtues are a subset of these traits. Virtue can therefore be empirically grounded and virtue ethics has nothing to fear from philosophical situationism.

1 IN SEARCH OF GLOBAL TRAITS

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to advance an empirically supported conception of traits that can help to give virtue, as traditionally conceived, a firm grounding in empirical psychology. The kinds of traits of interest to virtue ethicists should have some of the properties traditionally attributed to virtues. Three of the properties traditionally ascribed to virtues are globality, stability, and reference to the agent’s perceptions and other features of her mental states. The traits described here display two of these characteristics —stability and reference to the agent’s perspective and mental state—and have the potential for the third—globality. Empirical evidence for these traits has been provided by the work of social-cognitivist psychologists Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda.

Mischel and Shoda advance a conception of traits that takes into account the meanings that objective situations have for people. They have found evidence that cross-situational behavioral consistency sufficient to justify trait attributions can be found by considering these meanings as parts of the descriptions of situations. Traits are keyed to the meanings of situations as interpreted by subjects, such as, for example, whether a person finds a situation threatening or irritating, and not solely to the objective features of situations, such as finding a dime in a phone booth, or finding lost change on a table. For Mischel and Shoda, then, situations are identified by the psychological meanings they have for people, as well as by their objective features. Thus, their conception of situations as well as of cross-situational consistency differs from that of situationist psychologists and philosophers.

As I noted in the introduction to this volume, situationists define situations solely in terms of their objective features. By objective features of situations, they mean the physical or environmental characteristics of situations that are accessible to observers and that can be characterized independently of the meanings those features might have for subjects (see Doris 2002, 76). In situationist social psychological studies, experimenters define the kinds of objective situations in which trait-related behavior should be displayed as well as the behavior that counts as manifestations of traits. The perspective of the subject, whose behavior is studied, is not taken into account. Mischel and Shoda thought that studying behavior in situations defined solely in objective terms was the wrong place to look for behavioral consistency. When they redefined situations in terms of the meanings situations have for subjects, they found evidence of behavioral regularities that crossed objectively different situation-types.

In this chapter, I challenge the relevance to virtue ethics of the situationist conception of consistency as regularity in behavior across situations defined solely in objective terms. This is not the kind of behavioral consistency in which virtue ethicists should be interested. Situations have meanings for people, and these meanings are important in assessing whether or not their behavior expresses traits, including traits that can be considered virtues. This important point about traits has been overlooked or minimized by situationist psychologists and philosophers, but not by social-cognitivist psychologists.¹

In section 2, I explain Mischel and Shoda’s social-cognitivist approach and theory of personality. Empirical evidence supporting Mischel and Shoda’s conception of traits is discussed in section 3. In section 4, I respond to objections, mainly from Doris (2002, 76–85), to the notion that Mischel-Shoda-type traits have relevance for characterological moral psychology. In section 5, I sketch how these traits, though they might initially be local, can be generalizable across objectively different situation-types, provided that those situation-types have the same or similar meanings for the trait-bearer. Such generalizable traits, I contend, have the potential to be global, at least in some personalities. The sketch of section 5 is also a preliminary exploration of the implications of trait generalizability for virtue development and vice control. I continue this story in section 6 by bringing work in the psychology of prejudice to bear on our understanding of virtue development and vice inhibition. By the end of the chapter, I hope to have presented an empirically adequate conception of traits. Virtues are likely to be a subset of these traits. Descriptions of such traits figure in an empirically plausible sketch of virtue cultivation and vice inhibition. This account of traits is amenable to use in virtue ethical theories that assume that virtues are, or have the potential to be, global.

2. A VIEW FROM SOCIAL-COGNITIVISM

The methodological approach taken by situationist social psychologists has been questioned by social-cognitivist psychologists (see Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994; see also Sreenivasan 2002, 58; Kamtekar 2004, 470–473). Social-cognitivists conceptualize personality functioning in terms of the interactions of multiple cognitive and affective processes. These processes, they believe, develop in social and cultural contexts and are activated in social settings (Cervone and Shoda 1999, 4). Social cognitivists argue that failing to consider the meanings that situations and behavior have for subjects has caused situationist psychologists to overlook trait-relevant behavior (see, for example, Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 674–675; Mischel 1999, 43–44). For example, subjects and researchers might disagree about what counts as trait-relevant behavior in a given set of circumstances. Behavior that is regarded by researchers as inconsistent across types of situations might not be so regarded by subjects (see also Sreenivasan 2002, 58).

Mischel’s (1968) critique of trait and state theories, described in the introduction to this book, presaged more recent social-cognitivist work in which he reconceives and unifies trait and state approaches (see Mischel 1973; Shoda and Mischel 1993; Mischel and Shoda 1995; Shoda and Mischel 1996; Shoda and Mischel 1998; Mischel and Shoda 1999; Mischel 1999, Mischel 2007). Mischel and his collaborator Shoda conceptualize personality as a cognitive-affective processing system (CAPS). The variables of this system, social-cognitive units, consist of beliefs, desires, feelings, goals, expectations, values, and self-regulatory plans, which can be activated either in response to external situational features, or to stimuli internal to the agent, such as her imaginings or practical reasoning. The repeated activation of sets of such variables over time can build relatively stable personality traits.

Mischel and Shoda maintain that people interpret the stimuli they respond to; that is, situations have meanings for people. They believe that how people think and feel about features of situations depends to a certain extent on pre-existing personality variables, such as temperament, as well as on an individual’s social learning history. If I am temperamentally disposed to be irritable or fearful, these aspects of my personality influence how I interpret and respond to situations and events.² My interpretation of situations and events using categories such as irritating or threatening influences my reactions and reinforces my dispositions. Thus, the traits that I have are shaped both by innate factors as well as by my experiences as a social learner. If this general picture of how personality affects our construals and responses is true, then, to some extent, we influence the quality of the world we inhabit.

Another feature of CAPS traits helps to explain the dynamics of interpretation and response. Mischel and Shoda (1999, 46–53) distinguish between trait structure and the dynamics of trait activation. As I understand their view, the trait is a structure or set of variables that have been frequently activated in response to stimuli. These variables are interconnected in the sense that the activation of one variable can set off or activate others. My belief that another is in need, for example, might activate my desire to offer assistance. Thus, Mischel and Shoda contend that the activation of some variables guides the activation of others. They also hold that the activation of some variables inhibits or constrains the activation of others. For example, my belief that I should help might activate the belief that the other’s pride would be wounded by my offer. Other things being equal, this latter belief would typically activate my desire not to cause offense and inhibit or constrain the formulation of plans to help.

Trait structure, then, can be conceptualized as a network of interrelated variables. Different variables can be activated on different occasions. In other words, the dynamics of trait activation vary with variations in activating stimuli. Yet, it makes sense to think that each kind of trait has a distinctive and relatively stable core structure of characteristic variables. What makes compassion distinctive, for example, is being moved to sadness or sorrow by the misfortune of another, believing that one can or should help, and desiring to help. The linkage of these relatively stable variables makes the trait of compassion what it is. The activation of these linked variables produces a compassionate response. This is true even when that response is mitigated by the activation of other variables. That is, a compassionate response remains compassionate even when it has been truncated or constrained, for example, by the belief that the other’s pride would be wounded by assistance and the desire not to cause offense.

One final point about the CAPS theory is worth noting. If, for example, Jill consistently reacts fearfully to teasing from playmates whom she perceives as threatening, and Jack consistently reacts aggressively to teasing from playmates whom he perceives as threatening, Mischel and Shoda contend that these facts about their personalities can be described in terms of “if … then” personality profiles or “behavioral signatures” (Mischel 1999, 53; Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 674; Mischel and Shoda 1999, 207–209). The profiles relate a person’s behavior to her construals of situations as they occur over time (Shoda and Mischel 1996, 421–422). The “ifs” are not simply physical stimuli from the external environment, but reflect also the meanings that stimuli have for people. Given sufficient evidence of consistent behavioral reactions under certain psychological conditions, we can typically predict behavior and attribute traits. Given enough evidence, we can say, other things being equal, that “if Jill perceives she is being threatened, she will typically be timid,” and “if Jack perceives he is being threatened, he will typically be aggressive,” thereby attributing appropriately circumscribed traits of timidity and aggressiveness to each party. Whether Jill reacts timidly and Jack, aggressively, depends on the psychological terms in which each perceives or construes situations, namely, as threatening, and not solely on the situations’ objective features.

3. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR CAPS TRAITS

Mischel and his collaborators hypothesize that cross-situational behavioral consistency can be found by examining how people act in situations they perceive as having similar meanings (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 674; Mischel 1999, 43). Evidence of this kind of consistency would support the ascription of traits that are generalizable across objectively different types of situations. Mischel and his colleagues have conducted a series of experiments providing evidence in support of various aspects of their hypothesis (see Wright and Mischel 1987; Wright and Mischel 1988; Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1989; Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1993; and Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994).³ Among them were studies done at a children’s summer camp in New Hampshire (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994). In this research program, eighty-four children were observed during a six week summer session (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 77). Researchers distinguished between objective situations that occurred at camp, such as woodworking sessions and cabin meetings, and five different interpersonal situations—(1) positive contact between peers; (2) teasing, provocation, or threatening between peers; (3) praising by adults; (4) warning by adults; and (5) punishing by adults—that occurred in each objective setting. The situations that were the units of psychological study were the interpersonal situations. The interpersonal situations had been selected for study on the basis of previous interviews with the children that enabled researchers to identify the psychological situations that were important for the children at camp (see the description of Mischel and Shoda’s work in Mendoza-Denton, Park, and O’Connor 2007, 15). Each of the interpersonal situations incorporated a different combination of two psychologically salient features: whether the interpersonal interaction was initiated by a peer of the subject child or by an adult counselor, and whether the interaction was valenced positive or negative (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 676–677). Table 1.1 provides examples (excerpted from Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, Table 1, 676).

Table 1.1

Subjects encountered each of the five interpersonal situations at least six times (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 677).⁴ Within each hour of camp activity throughout the six week session, observers recorded the frequency of five types of behavior displayed by subjects in each of the five interpersonal situations. The types of behavior were: (1) verbal aggression (teased, provoked, or threatened); (2) physical aggression (hit, pushed, physically harmed); (3) whined or displayed babyish behavior; (4) complied or gave in; and (5) talked prosocially (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 677).

Using this experimental framework, the researchers tested two separate hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that subjects would exhibit stable situation-behavior profiles, expressible as “if … then” statements, that are unique to each individual and provide genuine insight into his or her personality (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 677–678). For example, if child A is punished by an adult, she may consistently react with verbal aggression, no matter what the objective setting in which punishment occurs; whereas if child B is punished by an adult, she may typically react with compliance, again across a variety of different types of objective setting. Their behavior is elicited by what the experimenters term the “psychologically salient ingredient” of the interpersonal situation, namely, being punished by an adult. If child A is teased, provoked, or threatened by a peer, she may consistently respond with physical aggression across objective situation-types; whereas if child B is teased, provoked, or threatened by a peer, she may consistently react by whining, again across a variety of objective settings. Again, the behavior, according to the researchers, is elicited by the psychologically salient feature of the interpersonal situation—being teased, provoked, or threatened by a peer. The researchers hypothesized that consistent reactions to different interpersonal situations give insight into an individual’s personality. We may infer from child A’s consistent reactions that she is verbally and physically more aggressive than child B, who is more inclined to compliance and whining.

The experimenters’ second hypothesis is that cross-situational behavioral consistency is a function of the similarity in meanings that different objective situations have for individuals (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 681). That is, if child A consistently reacts with verbal aggression to punishment by an adult, no matter what objective setting she is in, her behavioral consistency across the different objective situations is a function of the psychological meaning that the interpersonal experience of being punished has for her. Being punished by an adult is the salient feature of the situation that activates trait-related behavior. Similarly, if child B reacts with compliance to punishment by an adult across different objective situations, that too, is a function of the meaning that punishment by an adult has for him. Consequently, whether people behave consistently across different objective situations depends on the meanings those situations have for them. The researchers tested this hypothesis by compiling comparisons of individuals’ consistency in behavior within the same interpersonal situation as it occurred in different objective settings as well as across different interpersonal situations.

Mischel and his colleagues found evidence to support both hypotheses. In support of the first, that stable situation-behavior profiles provide genuine insight into personality, the researchers offered sample situation-behavior profiles of four subjects (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 678). Records of verbally aggressive behavior occurring across all five interpersonal situations were presented for four children. Each child had a distinctive profile. For example, child #17’s profile was the most stable of the four reported by Shoda, Mischel, and Wright, showing evidence of consistently aggressive behavior across different types of interpersonal situations. He or she exhibited low verbal aggression when teased by a peer, higher verbal aggression when warned by an adult, and very high verbal aggression when punished by an adult. Other children whose data were reported exhibited less stable, yet distinctive profiles.

The experimenters go on to argue that the stable profiles reflect nonrandom aspects of personality and not mere error variance. Shoda, Mischel, and Wright (1994, 680) calculated stability coefficients for the profiles, concluding that for a significant proportion of the children in the sample, the situation-behavior profiles “… tended to constitute a predictable, nonrandom facet of individual differences.” That is, the profiles reflect predictable variability in the children’s behavior in response to interpersonal situations, and are not measurement errors to be aggregated away (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 682). According to the researchers, the stability of these behavioral tendencies over numerous occasions is evidence of the uniqueness of the children’s personalities.

Table 1.2

In support of the second hypothesis, that cross-situational behavioral consistency is keyed to the meanings interpersonal situations have for people, the researchers compared behavioral consistency within interpersonal situations occurring in different objective settings to behavioral consistency across interpersonal situations. Shoda, Mischel, and Wright (1994, 682) report correlation coefficients for all five behavior types as they occurred across different objective situations for all five types of interpersonal situations. The correlation coefficients for verbal aggression are lited in Table 1.2 (excerpted from Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, Table 3, 682).

The first entry in the column on the left indicates that the mean correlation of verbally aggressive behavior in response to being teased or provoked by a peer within the same type of interpersonal situation as it occurred in different objective situations was .40 with an estimated error of .16. The first entry in the column at the right indicates that the mean correlation of verbally aggressive behavior in response to being teased or provoked by a peer in each of the four other interpersonal situations (being warned by an adult, being punished by an adult, being praised by an adult, or having positive peer contact) was .17 with an estimated error of .13.

As the correlation coefficients indicate, for all of the interpersonal situations except the “adult praised” condition, the likelihood of verbally aggressive behavior occurring in response to the same type of interpersonal situation across different types of objective situations was higher than the likelihood of its occurrence across different types of interpersonal situations. This is evidence that behavioral consistency is a function of the perceived meanings of situations. Further support for this claim is provided by the researchers’ finding that as the number of shared psychological features of interpersonal situations decreased, the consistency of individual differences in behavior also decreased (Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, 681–682). As the researchers report, within interpersonal situations that shared at least two common features (e.g., when warned by an adult and when punished by an adult), the mean consistency in individual differences in verbal aggression was .28. Between two different situations that shared only two features, the mean consistency in individual differences in verbal aggression was .25. When two psychological situations shared only one common feature, the mean consistency was .15. When the situations shared no common features, the mean consistency was .06.

These findings are of philosophical interest. Consistent behavioral reactions in response to similarly perceived interpersonal situations that occur across different objective settings ground attributions...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: In Search of Global Traits
• Chapter 2: Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity
• Chapter 3: Social Intelligence and Why it Matters
• Chapter 4: Virtue as Social Intelligence
• Chapter 5: Philosophical Situationism Revisited
• Conclusion
• Notes
• References